the contribution of paṇḍitarāja jagannātha to sanskrit poetics

Vol. I

Dr. P. Sri Ramachandrudu

THE CONTRIBUTION OF PAṆḌITARĀJA JAGANNĀTHA TO SANSKRIT POETICS

DR. P. SRI RAMACHANDRUDU
Head of the Department of Sanskrit and
Director of Sanskrit Academy,
Osmania University, Hyderabad

Foreword by :

Prof. K. KRISHNAMOORTHY
Deptt. of Sanskrit
Karnatak University
DHARWAR

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TO

MY PARENTS

श्रीमत्सत्यवतीसत्यनारायणबुधाख्ययोः ।
पित्रोः सन्तुष्टये भूयात् तयोराशीःफलं कृतिः ।।

श्रीरामनवमी

21.4.1983

पुल्लेल श्रीरामचन्द्रः

FOREWORD

"जगति विविधविद्यासिन्धुमुष्टिन्धयानां
परभणितिपरीक्षा युज्यते सज्जनानाम् ॥"

—*Mallinātha*

It is in this spirit that my learned friend, Dr. P. Sri Ramachandrudu has asked me to introduce his study in English of the admittedly most difficult and most scholarly and authoritative text-book on Sanskrit poetics by Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha, viz., the *Rasagaṅgādhara*.

While it has been the happy hunting ground of the traditional Sanskrit Pandit, it has also been the despair of many a modern student of Sanskrit trained on Western lines. Jagannātha was not only a great poet but also a stalwart dialectician who started fresh controversies while attempting to silence earlier ones. His versatile genius exceeded the bounds of traditional conformity, and he was a thinker who added new dimensions to precise thought on poetics by introducing for the first time the use of new tools of precision perfected by Neo-logic and Mīmāṁsā maxims. His rapier-sharp thrusts cut across orthodox views and contemporary expositions alike. He is proud of his abilities not only to shatter the structures studiously built by earlier thinkers but also to rebuild a mansion of his own on the ruins of the old. His technical jargon is a manacing deterrent to modern students; while his unorthodox thrusts at old and new masters alike is a challenge thrown to pandits to vindicate the validity of earlier views.

Thus a vast literature has grown in Sanskrit on this brilliant text of which University students are almost unaware. Only a person combining in himself the depth of up-to-date *Śāstric* erudition in Tarka, Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṁsā etc., the width of modern historico-critical research in the field in modern languages, European as well as Indian, along with a keen literary sensibility stemming from a familiarity with modern literary theories in the West and also a capacity to present the intricate thought-patterns of Sanskrit in readable English today can attempt such a study as the one undertaken by my friend.

Such a combination of varied talents is indeed as difficult of attainment as it is desirable. Hence, none of the works on Jagannātha so far by modern writers—S.K. De, P.V. Kane, V. Raghavan, V.A. Ramaswami Sastri not excluded—have been able to highlight point-wise all the singular contributions of Jagannātha in the field. And translations in various languages have proved mechanical exercises in futility, leaving the reader none the wiser.

As a humble student in this field for well over three decades, I am really charmed by the measure of success achieved by Sri Ramachandrudu in a task where even masters have miserably failed. I have just had a pre-view hurriedly of the first five chapters; but even this has convinced me that the author has thrown his net wide enough to cover everything relevant on the questions discussed from the traditional as well as modern perspectives. He has not blindly echoed the judgements of other writers—old or new. He has been objective and critical and does not even spare Jagannātha himself at times. It is a very difficult task and even the little break-through achieved by Sri Ramachandrudu deserves unstinted admiration. If I were to write such a book, perhaps I would have used Sanskrit less and given more space to exposition

of telling instances in English with a clear bearing on the subject. But even as it is, it would serve as the best introduction to the study of Jagannātha's *Rasagaṅgādhara* available to any University student so far. I look forward to his completing chapters on Alaṅkāra at early date but without any misprints as in this.

Not that I find myself in agreement with all the conclusions of Sri Ramachandrudu. I have my own opinions on several issues. For example, I do not believe that any logician can ever give a perfect definition of poetry whose magic is impervious to be fitted into the strait-jacket of any definition. Jagannātha's insistence on 'language expressive of beautiful thought' might include a gamut of *Rasādi* and possibly, by staining the point somewhat, may include also *artha-guṇas* and *artha-alaṅkāras*. But it would undoubtedly exclude *śabdaguṇas* and *śabdālaṅkāras* of which the former at least are essential ingredients of any poetic style and the latter too are important components, to judge from Jagannātha's own examples of poetry. This difficulty does not arise in Ānandavardhana's definition "Yatrārthaḥ śabdo vā..." because *Śabda with its beauty of Guṇas* and *alaṅkāra* can suggest *rasādi* even without the assistance of *artha*. Similarly, whether a poet can be ever made by training or divine grace to achieve the same genius as born poet, I am not sure. I cannot understand the sentence :—"The mental condition named *sthāyin* is produced by the *vibhāvas* and the *anubhāvas* of the *bhāvas* (i.e., Ālambana-vibhāvas)..." (p. 83) in expounding Lollaṭa's explanation of *rasa*. I am not clear whether the Vedāntic view of "*raso vai saḥ*" can ever agree on all fours with the Ālaṅkārika's claim of kinship, because poetic *rasa* can never be anything other than a *māyā* within a *māyā*. Yet the Navya view, that imagination (bhāvanā) is a blemish of the mind, hardly does justice to the aesthetic process of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*, a much misunderstood

concept in Sanskrit poetics. Nor can the reader's *akhaṇḍa-rasa* logically admit of *guṇībhāva* or division; *śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani* involving intellectual effort cannot be much different from figures like *śleṣa* which involve suggestion. I would not differentiate between Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana (p.191). The logical lucubrations on *śakti* and *lakṣaṇā* appear to me but tangents of the circle of poetry and not its centre. Whether there are any tirades of poetry at all—three or four as the case may be—in the felt experience of connoisseurs is an open question to me. I need not multiply such instances here.

Notwithstanding such differences of opinion, I have no hesitation in recommending wholeheartedly a study of this book to scholars as an indispensable key to open the locked doors of Jagannātha's intricate theorisings on Sanskrit poetics and as a first successful attempt to view it in proper perspective. It will certainly contribute to a little more clarity and a little less confusion of the book, even if it may not solve every issue beyond doubt, because everyone knows how the *Rasagaṅgā-dhara* is a hard nut to crack !

Dept. of Sanskrit K. KRISHNAMOORTHY
Karnatak University
DHARWAD.
March 30, 1981.

PREFACE

This work, *The Contribution of Paṇḍitarāja to Sanskrit Poetics*, is based on my thesis of the same title, written under the able guidance of Dr. Aryendra Sharma, formerly Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Osmania University, for which I was awarded the degree of Ph. D. by the same University. In order to reduce the bulk of the work, a large number of passages quoted in the thesis from various works, were dropped and I had to remain content by merely giving references, though I had a strong feeling, inspite of what the Pandits of resea h-methodology say, that every passage referred in a work of literature or a Śāstra should be quoted completely for the convenience of the reader who is not expected to read out books sitting in the reference-section of library. Had our great writers like Śaṅkarācārya and the famous commentators like Mallinātha given only references like 'Bṛhadāraṇyaka U. 4.3.5.', 'Pāṇini 6.3.9.' and 'Amara 2.3.12.' etc., our familiarity with the passages in the texts referred to would have been almost nil to our greatest disadvantage. But the fear of improbability of publishing a book of this nature and of about 900 pages forced me to adopt the "methodological" method.

When some of my friends and scholars insisted that this work should somehow be published, I ventured to give it for printing in 1978 and with great difficulty, 276 pages, covering five chapters, could be printed in two years. When I found that the printer here was in a helpless position at the hand of

workers, I withdrew the work from him and decided to issue the printed portion as the first volume, leaving the remaining portion to its fate. It was at this time that Messrs Nīrājanā Publishers stepped in and agreed to undertake the publication of this work. In view of the difference in the printing work that was done at Hyderabad and at Delhi, they have decided to publish the work in two volumes. Thus the work which was written in 1966 is now able to see the light, in 1983.

I have deliberately used many Sanskrit words and phrases in this work in order to avoid cumbersome round-about expressions in English. But I am sure, the readers of the works like the present one, as they must be familiar with the Sanskrit phraseology, will not find it difficult to follow the arguments. However, a glossary of Sanskrit words, though it cannot be claimed to be exhaustive, is given at the end. I will feel happy if this work can get the appreciation of at least a few of my colleagues in the field of Sanskrit studies.

I am very much grateful to Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy, Professor and Head of the department of Sanskrit, Karnataka University, Dharwad, an authority on Indian aesthetics, for the valuable Foreword which he was kind enough to write at my request when I was planning to issue only the first volume. It gives me immense satisfaction that my work could get the commendation of four literary stalwarts, Dr. V. Raghavan, Dr. C.S. Venkatesvaran and Dr. Aryendra Sharma as examiners and Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy through this foreword.

I thank the authorities of the Osmania University for having permitted me to publish this thesis and for the financial assistance of Rs. 3000/- which had emboldened me to think of publishing this work. I am extremely thankful to my good friend Dr. M. D. Balasubrahmanyam, Principal, Kendriya

Sanskrit Vidyapitha, Tirupati, for having introduced me to Messrs Nīrājanā Publishers, when I virtually abandoned my plan to publish the second part out of sheer disgust. I am very much thankful to Dr. Mithilesh Chaturvedi who had undertaken the onerous task of correcting not only the printed proofs of the second volume but also the typed original manuscript with the marginal writings and the jig-jag lines indicating the omissions and "misplacement" etc. My special thanks are due to Mr. Pravesh Chaturvedi, the proprietor of the Nīrājanā publishers, who is entirely different from most of the other people of his trade, in having genuine desire to serve the cause of Sanskrit and Indian culture and in not exploiting the authors and the scholars.

Śrīrāmanavamī

21.4.1983 **P. Sri Ramachandrudu**

ABBREVIATIONS

AD.	Appayya Dīkṣita
AK.	Alaṅkārakaustubha
AR.	Alaṅkāraratnākara
AS.	Alaṅkārasarvasva
CM.	Citramīmāṁsā
DA.	Dhvanyāloka
GMP.	Gurumarmaprakāśa
HAB.	Hindi Abhinavabhāratī
HRG.	Hindi Rasagaṅgādhara
HSP.	History of Sanskrit Poetics by P.V. Kane
JP.	Jagannātha Paṇḍita
KA.	Kāvyālaṅkāra
KASS.	Kāvyālaṅkārasārasaṅgraha
KAS.	Kāvyālaṅkārasūtrāṇi
KP.	Kāvyaprakāśa
KPK.	Kāvyaprakāśakhaṇḍana
NS.	Nyāyaśūtra
PR.	Paṇḍitarāja
PRKS.	Paṇḍitarāja Kāvyasaṅgraha
RV.	Raghuvaṁśa
SP.	(History of) Sanskrit Poetics by S.K. De

CONTENTS

VOL. ONE

श्री:

यस्याः परिणतेर्भेदो
जगदेतच्चराचरम् ।
मानसे सन्निधत्तां नः
परा वाक् सानपायिनी ॥

स्मृतापि कवितामदं प्रसभमाक्षिपन्ती नृणां
विमर्शनिकषोपले विदधती बुधान्निष्प्रभान् ।
सदास्य प्रतिभाद्वयी विजयतेतमां साऽद्वयी
मनोज्ञकवितेशितुर्जगति पण्डिताधीशितुः ॥

INTRODUCTION

SANSKRIT POETICS.

THE history of poetics, rather of its contents is as old as that of the language itself. Language being the vehicle for conveying the ideas of one man to another, it is but natural that man should be constantly trying to make it, as perfect as possible for achieving this end by way of inventing such devices like similes and metaphors, though not being conscious of their technicalities. For example when he happens to see a bull or a buffalo of extroardinary size and wants to inform his friend of its gigantic stature he would naturally try to bring in a slmilar object and explain that the animal is as big as a hillock or an elephant and thereby both the informer and the informed can have the satisfaction of being precise, in expression and clear in understanding respectively. Likewise, when he wants to tell his friend how he was attacked by a furious tiger, he would say "The tiger began to wave its long tail, opened its claws and pounced upon me with terrible roaring", and this is a fine expression of Bhāva or Rasa or Rasābhāsa, as we may take it depending on its development etc. Such descriptions and fine expressions would find place in poetry in abundance, which mainly consists of beautiful expression and this is the reason why the roots of Indian Poetics are generally traced to the Vedas, the oldest and the finest literary compositions of India, nay, of the world. But this does not mean to say that the Vedas contain any systematic discussion of poetical theories or their scientific classification. What all meant is that certain things, such as Alaṅkāras, which form some of the important contents of poetics can be found in Rgveda and other Vedas; and the continued employment of such things in later literature led to an enquiry of their nature, origin and importance, which ultimately resulted in the development of an important branch of learning, i. e. Poetics, Alaṅkāraśāstra.

In this connection the views of J. Gonda, (Remarks on similes in Sanskrit literature) are worth mentioning, according to whom, not only the literary language but also such things like the similes have got their roots in the earliest languages. "We should realise that the language in which it is written too, however "artificial", however "special", however "technical" it may often be, in its last resort has its roots in every days colloquial language, spoken by the general public, that atleast it cannot be considered as possible without this background". (P.9) "Naive and "primitive" men who are scarcely able to abstract are inclined to name new things after the familiar and to compare things unknown to the well-known. By means of simile they bring the unknown within the sphere of the known". (P.11) 'Primitive men and the common people think concretely and entirely on the analogical lines". (P. 12)

As is the case with all the Lakṣaṇaśāstras, the first Alaṅkāra-grantha must have been the result of the efforts of the first critic, to analyse and evaluate the literary works available at his time and thus the first Sanskrit Ālaṅkārika must have engaged himself in finding out in the earliest literary works i e. the Vedas, the peculiarity of expressions that would move him and the reason for such effect. Again tne views of the later critics would be mainly based on later literary developments thogh they are inevitably influenced by the theories of earlier critics. In course of time, the critic who finds his ground only on the literary works, himself begins to dictate terms to them so effectively that even the greatest literary men hesitate to go against his judgement. And after some time rebel poets force their way into literary field and some rebel theories, naturally, find place in the Lakṣaṇaśāstra also. Thus this is a perpetual circle of Lakṣyas and Lakṣaṇas, in not only poetics, but in any branch of learning like Vyākaraṇa also.

Some scholars, like S. K. De. are not inclined to attach much importance to the use of poetic figures etc., found in the Vedad and other ancient works and they opine that such

things or of little value in finding out the origin of poetics (H P. P. 3) But, as was snown above, the Lakṣaṇa-śāstra always walks in the foot-steps of Lakṣyas and so P. V. Kane rightly contends that the use of figures of speech etc., in ancient literature, has got its own value in tracing the course of development of Sanskrit Poetics (H S P. P: 327), for, in the words of Abercrombie, "as soon as a man becomes aware that it would suit his purpose to say a thing this way rather than that, criticism begins: which is as much as to say that criticism begins where literature begins" (Principles of literary criticism, P. 11)

As is proved by P. V. Kane and other scholars, Indian poetics has had a very long history of uninterrupted development which witnessed various changes in contents and outlook. The importance of certain topics was stressed upon by certain writers which resulted in the formation of different schools. Thus we come across five such schools originated or propagated by different authors :-

I The Rasa-school of Bharata,

II The Alaṅkāra-school of Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa

III The Rīti-school of Vāmana,

IV The Dhvani school of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, with which our anthor Paṇḍita-rāja is associated ; and

V The Vakrokti-school of Kuntaka :

On the above lines some are inclined to accept a 6th school i. e. the Aucitya- school of Kṣemendra. But we do not find even a single writer in Alaṅkāraśāstra, who does not recognise the importance of Aucitya and so being a quality acceptable to all, it need not be given a seperatistic name of 'school' (Sampradāya).

THE LIFE AND WORKS OF PANDITARAJA

It is the unique privilege of a few people to be the rare meeting-place of the two phases of the Goddess Sarasvatī, the

critical insight and the creative genius, and it is this happy combination of these two great faculties that has given Paṇḍitarāja (P R) a covetable high place among the poets as well as the literary critics of the17th century.This literary prodigy, Jagannātha 'Paṇḍitarāja'was born in the "Veginādu" sect (śākhā) of Trilinga (Telugu) Brahmins of "Koṇasīmā", in the East Godāvarī District of the present Andhra Pradesh. "Upadraṣṭā" (Supervisor of the sacrificial rites) is the honorific surname (Upanāma) of his family. He was the son of Perubhaṭṭa and Lakṣmī. According to J. B. Chaudhuty, a manuscript of Prāṇābharaṇaṃ, in the Tanjore Library, gives the name of Jagannātha's father as Raghunāthabhaṭṭa. ('Mulim Patronage to Sanskrit'. P. 67.)

According to the information given by P R., Perubhaṭṭa was a great scholar proficient in all branches of learning, He (Perubhaṭṭa) studied "Vedānta" under Jñanendrabhikṣu. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems of logic under Mahendra, Mīmāṃsā under one Deva who is, according to Nāgeśa no other than Khandadevamiśra and Vyākaraṇa under Śeṣavīreśvara the son of Śeṣaśrīkrisṇa and the classmate of Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita.[1] Excepting Vyākaraṇa, which he studied under Seṣavīreśvara himself, [2] P R. studied all the other śāstras under his own fathner

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1. "श्रीमद्ज्ञानेन्द्रभिक्षोरधिगतसकलब्रह्मविद्याप्रपञ्चः
काणादीराक्षपादीरपि गहनगिरो यो महेन्द्रादवेदीत् ।
देवादेवाध्यगीष्ट स्मरहरनगरे शासनं जैमिनीयं
शेषाङ्कप्राप्तशेषामलभणितिरभूत्सर्वविद्याधरो यः ॥"

R G. P. 2.

2. "लक्ष्मीकान्त पदाम्भोजमानम्य श्रेयसां पदम् ।
पण्डितेन्द्रो जगन्नाथः स्यति गर्वं गुरुद्रुहाम् ॥"
"......अस्मद्गुरुपण्डितवीरेश्वराणां तनयैः दूषितापि
स्वमतिपरीक्षार्थं पुनरस्माभिः निरीक्ष्यते ॥"

Manoramākucamardanam P. 1.

whom he rightly calls Mahāguru, because he was both his father and teacher.[1]

While many of the scholars understand the verce "Śrīmadjñānendra" etc., as giving the names of Perubhaṭṭa's teachers there are some like Aufrucht and Paranjape who think that these are the names of P R.'s own teachers, because when he wants to establish his competence to write such a standard work as Rasagaṅgādhara, he would naturally give the names of his own teachers but not of his father. "Besides, Khaṇḍeva who died in 1665 and Vīreśvaraśeṣa who was also the teacher of Jagannātha (vide Durgaprasad's introduction to Rasagaṅgādhara) cannot likely be the teachers of Peramabhaṭṭa, the father of Jagannātha, who must have ceased to be a student long before 1620 A. D., according to Mr. Vaidya's calculations". (Quoted in "Panditarāya Jīvītamu" P. 10.) M. Krishnamachari also seems to have understood this Śloka on similar lines. (History of Classical Sanskrit Literature P. 353.)

As even a cursory reading would indicate, the construction in the Śloka does not allow such interpretation. Evidently P R. wants to describe the great scholarship of his father and thereby to suggest his own. This is not a method adopted bv P R. alone. For example, Kumārasvāmin in the beginning of his commentary, Ratnāpaṇa, on Pratāparudrīya, refers to the great erudition of his father Mallinātha in his own words, without any special mention about himself axcepting that he was the student of his own eldest brother. In reply to the second objection, some are inclined to think that Deva may be some other Deva different from Khaṇḍadeva and Śeṣāṅka may be Seṣaśrīkṛiṣṇa himself who was the father of Seṣavīreśvara. (Paṇḍita rāja

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1. R. G. P. 2. Nāgeśa justifies this saying "सर्वविद्यानामेकस्मादेव लाभात् महागुरुत्वम् ।"
but "Mahāguru" appears to have been used to mean father irrespective of his being teacher also and it is used in the same sense by PR. in "Mahāgurukalindamahīdharodara" etc.,

R. G; Vol. II. P. 667.

jīvitamu P. 1.) But Nāgeśa who is seperated from PR. only by two generations (60 years) understands them as Khandadeva and Śeṣavīresvara respectively (GMP. P. 2) and his views, who belonged to the same Vidyāvaṁśa (in Vyākaraṇa) cannot be [1]gnored.

Perubhaṭṭa might have been a lifelong student in the correct cense of the word and he might oave studied different Śāstras as and when he could find a suitable teacher whether younger or older to him. He might have studied Vyākaraṇa under Śeṣavīreśvara along with his own son (as his Sahādhyāyin) in his oldage and perhaps it was the reason why P.R. montioned his father's study of Vyākaraṇa at the end (of the Śloka). Even in recent times we hear about people, devoted to learning who never hesitate to study under teachers younger to them by scores of years.

While P R. gives only one name of his father as Perubhṭṭa on many places, his own great grand son Mahādevakavi who wrote a commentary on Bhāminīvilāsa, gives "Jogeṣvara" as the other name of Perubhaṭṭa (at the end of śāntivilāsa).[1]

Though P. R. is believed to have belonged to the Triliṅgadeśa, there is divergence of opinion regarding his correct place of birth. It is traditionally believed that he belongs to the Munikhandāgrahāra now known as Muṅgaṇḍa in Amalāpuram Taluk, East Godāvarī District, in the Andhra Pradesh. This view finds the support of L. R. Vaidya.[2]

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1. "इतिश्री मदखिवलान्ध्रवेगिनाड्य कुलावतंस जोगेश्वर सूरिपुत्रेण पण्डितराजाख्य सूरिणा विरचिते भामिनीविलासे चतुर्थे शान्ताख्ये विलासे तत्पौत्र माधवदीक्षित सूरिसूनुना महादेव सूरिदीक्षित पण्डितराजेन विरचिते ...."

Quoted in Paṇḍitarāya Jīvitamu P. 3.

D. Padhye, in his Marathi introduction to Gaṅgālahari (P. 31) states, on the authority of Prof. S. M. Paranjape, that Mahādevadīkṣita was the grand son of P R.

2. Quoted in "Paṇḍitaraya Jīvitamu" (P. 6) as from the ntroduction of Bhāminīvilāsa.

There is another tradition believing that P R. was born near a village Dāvulūru of Tenali Taluk, Guntūr District. It is told that Ramachandrabhaṭṭu, the younger brother of P R, received the Village Dāvulūru as a gift in the year 1660, from Ajahassen Kutub Shah of Golkonda, who ruled from 1658 to 1687. (Paṇḍitarāyajīvitamu. P. 7). It seems there are many people of Upadraṣṭa family, residing near Davulūru and they claim that those in the Godavary District migrated to that place from this village only. But excepting such traditional accounts which are mainly based on regional preferences, there is nothing to prove the exact place of birth of P. R. in the Andhra Deśa, and it is also not improper to doubt, in the absence of authentic information, if P R. ever lived in his native country at all, for, his father or grandfather himself might have migrated to and settled down at Banaras where he might have been born.

The higher a person rises in greatness, the more he becomes the centre of interest and is surrounded by some kind of mystery which results in the fabrication of many stories. When this is the case even in our own times, there is no wonder if many mysterious stories shroud the life of PR. who, being such a great scholar, had occupied a covetable place in the court of a great monarch.

PR. had many disciples. One of them, Srīkulapatimiśra of the Mathura-Caturvedi family of Agra, was a great poet in Vrajabhāṣā and flourished in the court of Srīrāmasimhajī of Jayapuūr. In one of his works, Saṅgrāmasāra, he mentions his teacher's (Jagannātha's) name with great respect.[1] His words

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1. "शब्द जोग में शेष न्याय गौतम कणाद मुनि ।
सांख्य कपिल अरु व्यास ब्रह्मपथ कर्मनु जैमिनि ।।
वेद अंगजुत पढ़ैं, शील तप ऋषि वसिष्ठसम ।
अलंकार रसरूप अष्टभाषा कविता क्षम ।।
तैलंग वेलनाटीय द्विज जगन्नाथ तिरशूलधर ।
शाहजहां दिल्लीश किय पंडितराज प्रसिद्ध धर ।।

throw light, among many other things, on two important points.

P R. is mentioned as Triśūsladhara which is perhaps a synonim to Triśūli and Tailiṅga and so the view held by some scholars that TriŚūli Jagannātha is different from PR. is proved wrong. Secondly, while P.R. is believed to have belonged to the Veginādu Śākhā, it mentions him as belonging to Velanāḍu Śākhā which perhaps has resulted from the confusion caused by an intersect marriage, because there are some scholars who believe that PR. married a girl by name Kāmeśvarī from one of the families who, along with Vallabhāchārya of Velanāḍu Śākhā migrated to North India.

Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa was another student of P.R. and he belongs to his own sect. Narayanabhaṭṭa's nephew Hariharabhṭṭa writes in his Kulaprabandha, that he (Nārāyanabhaṭṭa) was the student of P.R. Thus PR. was not only a great scholar by himself but also an honoured teacher of students of recongined merit.

In one of his famous verses, PR. says that he spent his youth in the court of the Mughal Emperor. This Delhi Emperor is usually identified with Shah Jahan who according to historians, ruled from 1628 to 1666 A.D. On the strength of another vesre ('Śyāmaṃ yajñopavītam' etc. RGP 704) which describes Jahangir, some scholars thinks that PR. entered the Mughal court during the reign of Jahangīr himself, through the good offices of Asafkhan, the brother-in-law of the Emperor.

Paṅḍitarāya Jīvitamu, a Telugu treatise, takes 1600 A.D. as the approximate date of PR's birth and narrates the following interesting story, regarding his admission into the Mughal Court. PR., after finishing hiś education by 1625, left his place, seeking the patronage of kings. At last he reached Delhi by 1627, when Jahangir was on the throne. But at the end of 1627, Jahangir

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उनके पग को ध्यान धरि इष्टदेव सम जानि ॥
उक्ति जुक्ति बहुभेद भरि ग्रंथहि कहौं बरवानि ।"

Saṅgramasāra 14-5

left for Kashmir on health grounds while the prince Shahjahan was away in Deccan. in the absence of the emperor and the prince the throne became the centre of intrigue between the supporters of Shahjahan and Nurjahan. At this chaotic state of affairs PR. thought it better to seek the patronage of Jagatsimha, the son of Rāṇākarṇa (of Udiapur), who came to power in the beginning of 1628. The verse and the colophon at the end of Jagādābharaṇa, a eulogy on Jagatsimha, clearly prove that Jagannātha visited the court of Jagatsimha.

"त्रैलिङ्गान्वयमङ्गलालयमहालक्ष्मीदयालालितः
श्रीमत्पेरमभट्टसूनुरनिशं विद्वल्ललाटंतपः ।
श्रीराणाकविकर्णनन्दनजगत्सिंहप्रभोर्वर्णनं
श्रीमत्पण्डितराजसत्कविजगन्नाथो व्यतानीदिदम् ।"

"इति श्रीमहामहोपाध्यायपदवाक्यप्रमाणपारीणत्रैलिङ्गकुलावतंसश्रीमत्पेरम भट्टसूरेस्तनयेन विनिर्मितं
जगदाभरणाख्यं जगत्सिंहयशोवर्णनम् ।" 1

But the above passage gives rise to one difficulty. In the colophon of the Āsafavilāsa PR. says that the title "Paṇḍitarāja" was conferred on him by Shah Jahan.[2] The above verse from Jagadābharaṇa which must have been composed before the poet received the patronage of Shah Jahan, refers to the title "Paṇḍitarāja". This can be explained away thus. Shah Jahan, when he was in Deccan, heard the news of his father's death, and on his way back to Delhi visited his close friend Jagatsing of Mewar, to assure himself of the Rana's help in the ensuing

1. PRKS. P. 120.
Though the name of this poem and the passage quoted above clearly indicate that this is a eulogy on Jagatsimha, some scholars think that this is a eulogy on Dara Shikoh. Might be, PR. used it as a eulogy of Dara also, just as he did in the case of Prāṇanārāyaṇa. But it is not correct to think that it is not at all connected with Jagatsimha. So the foot note in JP. (P. 14) by AS. Ramasvami Sastry is against this fact.

2. श्रीसार्वभौमसाहिजहानप्रसादाधिगतपण्डितरायपदवीविराजितेन ।"
PRKS. P. 85.

struggle for the throne. In order to prove his fidelity, Jagatsing coronated Sha Jahan in Mewar itself, for the Delhi Empire, according to Tod.[1] As it was the usual practice with the kings on such occassions, Shah Jahan might have conferred the title "Paṇḍitarāja" on Jagannātha (who was already there in Jagatsing's Court) and made him his court-poet. Even if the title was not conferred on PR. on the same occassion once we are convinced that Jagatsinha and Shah Jahan were close friends, it is probable that PR. was maintaining his contact with Jagatsimha by way of paying periodical visits, even after his admission into the Mughal Court and that he composed Jagadābharaṇa on one such occassion. In the light of this story the word "Jagadīśvara" in PR.'s famous verse :

> "दिल्लीश्वरो वा जगदीश्वरो वा मनोरथान् पूरयितुं समर्थः ।
> अन्यैः नृपालैः परिदीयमानं शाकाय वास्याल्लवणाय वा स्यात् ॥"

should be understood as refering to Jagatsimha; because "अन्यैः नृपालैः परिदीयमानं" etc. indicates that the "Dillīśvara" and "Jagadīśvara" belong to the same category of Nṛpālas.

According to "Paṇḍitarāyajīvitamu" (P. 25), PR. composed Prāṇābharaṇa before Jagadābharaṇa as a eulogy on Prāṇanārā-

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1. "He (Rama Kurun) was succeeded by his son Juggutsing "the lion of the World" in S. 1684 (A.D. 1628). The Emperor Jehangir died shortly after his accession and while Khoorum was in exile. This event which gave the throne to the friend of his house, was announced to him by the Rana, who sent his brother and a band of Rajpoots to Surat, to form the Courtege of the Emperor, who repaired directly to Woodipur; and it was in the Badal Mahal (the cloudsaloon) of his palace that he was first saluted by the title of "Shah Jehan" by the Satraps and tributary princes of the Empire. On taking leave, the new Monarch restored five alienated districts, and presented the Rana with a Ruby of inestimable value, giving him also permission to reconstruct the fortifications of Cheetore."
"Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan" by James Tod.
(Calcutta edition of 1894 P. 348.)

yaṇa of Assam, whose Court he visited before coming to Mewar. But many scholars are of the opinion that PR. left Delhi after the imprisonment of Shah Jahan by his son Aurangazeb and was patronised by Prāṇanārayaṇa of Assam "whose reign between 1633 and 1666 is said to be the golden age in the Annals of Koch Behar"(JP: P. 26)

In the Mughal Court PR. enjoyed the favour of Dārashukoh,[1] the eldest son of Shah Jahan, and Asaf Khan, who "was the brother of Nurjahan and father-in-law of Shah Jahan and held a high position in the councils of the Empire during the reigns of Jahangir and Shah Jahan," and "was a man of letters and lover of beautiful". (JP. P. 16). According to some scholars, PR. might have been admitted into the Mughal Court in the last days of Jahangīr's reign, through the influence of Āsaf Khan and that is why he seems to have much respect for him. He composed a small poem "Āsafavilāsa" as a panegyric to his chief patron. PR. was very much aggrieved by the death of Asaf Khan in 1641 and he recorded his death in most pathetic terms (R G. P. 615). PR. might have lived in the Mughal Court, even after Asaf Khan's death, till about 1658, and he composed almost all his works including RG. during his stay in Delhi. According to P.V. Kane, (HSP. P. 324) "a ms. of Chitramīmāṁsākhaṇḍana is dated Somvat 1709 (i.e. 1652-53 A.D.). Therefore both the RG. and Chitramīmāṁsākhaṇḍana were composed before 1650 and after 1641 A.D. and they are surely the products of a mature mind. Therefore the literary activity of PR. lies between 1620 and 1665 A.D.",

It is generally believed that PR. had some personal animocity against Appayadīkṣita (AD.) which reflects in his criticism of the latter. But taking 1520-1593 A.D. as the more authentic date of AD. (than the date 1553-1626), V.A. Ramasvami Sastry,

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1. According to Bikramjit Hasrat, Dara Shukoh, was once very much pleased with the Sanskrit poetry of PR. and promised to give him any thing he wanted.
"Darashukoh: Life and Works" P. 212.

believes that PR. and AD. did never meet (JP. P. 21). But judged by his scathing criticism of AD., PR. seemes to have some personal grounds for this bitter, animosity and, as maintained by Puruṣottamaśarma Caturvedi, in the introduction of his Hindi RG., AD. and Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita might have been the older contemporaries of PR.

There are three verses quoted in the introduction of Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha published from Kumbhakonam. The first Śloka says:- "In an open meeting, Bhaṭṭoji, who was ungrateful to his own Guru, being instigated by the proud Drāviḍa (A D.) called him (PR.) 'Mleccha"; and that bold man (PR.) proved it true because he pressed the Kucas of his (Bhaṭṭoji's) Manoramā even while all the people like AD. were looking on. [1] "

The second verse is quoted from the "Śabdakaustubhaśāṇottejana" ascribed to PR. and this also runs on similar lines [2] .

"अप्पय्यदुर्ग्रहविचेतितचेतनाना

मार्यद्रुहामयमहं शमयेऽवलेपान् ॥"

The third verse is ascribed to Bālakavi who, on the authority of Nīlakaṇṭhadīkṣita, is believed to be the contemporary of AD. [3]

The verse quoted above indicates that AD., Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita, and PR. were living in the same period and that the two Dīkṣitas must have lived at least till PR. enjoyed the patronage of the Mughal Emperor. The only thing that stands in our way in

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1. "दृप्यद्द्राविडदुर्ग्रहग्रहवशान्म्लिष्टं गुरुद्रोहिणा
यन्म्लेच्छेति वचोऽविचिन्त्य सदसि प्रौढेऽपि भट्टोजिना ।
तत्सत्यापितमेव धैर्यनिधिना यत्स व्यमृन्दन्नात्कुचं
निर्बध्याऽस्य मनोरमामवशयन्नप्यप्पयाद्यान् स्थितान् ॥"
Hindi RG. - Introduction न–प

2. Ibid Page प.

3. यष्टुं विश्वजिता यता परिधरं सर्वे बुधा निर्जिता
भट्टोजिप्रमुखाः स पण्डितजगन्नाथोपि निस्तारितः ।
पूर्वेऽर्धे, चरमे द्विसप्ततितमस्याब्दस्य सद्विश्वजि
द्याजी यश्च चिदम्बरे स्वमभजज्ज्योतिः सतां पश्यताम् ॥
Ibid. P. प

coming to a conclusion that PR. was the younger contemporary of AD. is this. Nīlakaṇṭhadīkṣita, (ND.) the grand son of AD.'s younger brother says that he has written Nīlakaṇṭha-vijayacampū in the 4738th year of Kaliyuga (1639 A D.).

'अष्टात्रिंशदुपस्कृतसप्तशताधिकचतुस्सहस्रेषु ।
कलिवर्षेषु गतेषु ग्रथितः किल नीलकण्ठविजयोऽयम् ।।''[1]

This verse clearly shows that ND. but not AD., was the contemporary of PR. There is also a tradition saying that ND. wrote Nīlakaṇṭhavijaya in his 30th year and that he was blessed by AD. in his 12th year when the latter was 70 years old. According to this tradition AD. lived from 1550 to 1622, before Shaha Jahan's accession to the throne But this tradition need not be given implicit credit for in his Tyāgarājastava, ND. writes about AD.

''योऽस्तनोदनुजसूनुमनुग्रहेणात्मतुल्यमहिमानम् ।''[2]

If this Anugraha is not understood as āśīrvāda only, it can be believed that ND studied under AD. Again in his Nīlakaṇṭhavijaya, ND., while speaking of AD. uses the present tense which indicates that AD was alive when ND. was 30 years old.[3] Therefore AD. and Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita can be the contemporaries of PR., though older in age. Being noted scholars of the day, they must have had a better say on the social problems therefore they might have naturally been responsible for excommunicating PR. for his stay in the Mughal Court and for his alleged liaison with a Muslim girl, which enraged him to attack them bitterly in the literary field.

Many of the scholars are of the opinion that the story of PR.'s liaison with a Muslim girl Lavaṅgī is a mere fabrication of the Jealous minds of the orthodox Paṇḍits. But it is to be considered that when many other scholars who enjoyed the patronage of Muslim Rulers were not subjected to such scandals,

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1. HRG. Introduction P, "Ba".
2. ibid. P.
3. ''श्रीमानप्पयदीक्षितः स जयति श्रीकण्ठविद्यागुरुः ।'' Ibid. P. ब

why should P.R. alone be chosen for it? One may try to explain that his sharp tongue and high prosperity combined with great erudition had roused the anger and helpless envy of orthodox Pandits which resulted in the fabrication of such stories. But it is only the justification of an imaginary theory. There is nothing wrong in believing that there must be some truth in this story, when considering the atmosphere in which PR. was living. Acyutarāya, the commentator on Bhāminīvilāsa (19th century) refers to this Lavaṅgī episode and goes to the extent of remarking that PR. never had any legally married wife. (Bhāminivilāsa; P. 63). His view appears to be on the other extreme and it will be examined presently.

The typical style of such famous verses like:-

"यवनी नवनीतकोमलाङ्गी शयनीये यदि नीयते मया ।
अवनीतलमेव साधु मन्ये न वनी माघवनी विनोदहेतुः ।"

leads one to an irresistible conclusion that they can never be from the pen of any poet other than PR. That these verses were nowhere recorded by him is not a sound argument to dissociate them with PR. because, as he himself says in a different context,[1] no one, however arrogant, dares display the follies of his weaker moments. Some incidents which happerned in the lives of some of the contemporaries of PR. make one believe that the lavaṅgī episode might be true.[2]

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1. "नो चेद्दुष्कृतमात्मना कृतमिव स्वान्ताद्बहिर्मा कृथाः ।"

R.G; P. 79.

2. Siddhicandragaṇi was a contemporary of PR. and he also enjoyed the patronage of Mugal Kings, Akbar, Jahangir, and Shah Jahan. He had undertaken life-long celibacy. Once he incurred the displeasure of the King Jahangir, by not following his advice. It is said once, the king tried to dissuade him from his vow of life-long celibacy, arguing that it is quite unfit to such a young man of great beauty and good physique. His queen Nnrjahan also said that it was impracticable.

"तदा विश्वम्भराभर्तुः साब्रवीत् प्राणवल्लभा ।
तारुण्येक्व मनःस्थैर्यमसम्भाव्यमिदं वचः ।।"

Another important aspect of PR's greatness which is almost forgotten by all scholars has been brought to light by this Paṇḍitarājajīvitamu. It is said that PR. was not only a great poet-critic, well-versed in all branches of learning, but also a musician of good reputation. Śaurindramohan Tagore writes in his "Universal history of music":- "During Shah Jahan's reign (1528–58) the following musicians lived; Jagannātha, (who received from Shah Jahan the title of Kabiraj) Dairingakhan and Lalkhan..........Lalkhan was the sun-in-law of Bailas, son of Tansen. Jagannātha and Dairingakhan were weighed in silver and received each rupees 4500. Aurangazeb who ascended the throne of Delhi abolished Court singers and musicians". (Universal History of Music, P. 58)

The following extract from the ":Short Historical Sorvey of the Music of Upper India" proves that this Jagannātha is no other than our PR. "The principal musicians at the couri of Shah Jahan according to Aini Akberi, were Jagannātha who received from the Emperor the title of "Paṇḍitarāja", Dairingkhan and Lalkhan.........We are told Jagannātha and Dairingkhan were both weighed in silver and received 4500, each" etc., (Paṇḍitarājajivitamu. P. 28)

In a small article entitled "Jagannāthakavirāya" by M. R. Sastry, it is stated that Jagannātha's name was referred to in Padusha Nāmā as "Kalāvant;" and that on the 22nd Rabi-us Sani (A.H. 1044) he presented to the Nabab 12 musical pieces composed in the name of Shah Jehan. when he was weighed

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(Bhānucandragaṇicarita by the same author. verse 269).

But the strong willed celebate put forth his own st rong arguments and roused the wrath of the king who banished him and his likes to live only in jungles "a fit place for them". Of course he again becomes the favourite of the king, This episode, as narrated by the auothr himself, throws much light on the general attitude of the Mugal kings (KPK. PP. 17-18). The writes of

against silver, presented with rupees 4500 and honoured with a title "Mahākavirāya". According to this article, Dr. Quanungo indentifies this Jagannātha with the author of Rasagaṅgādhara (Journal of The Andhra Historical Research Society Vol. XXVII P. 172)

Regardlng the title "Paḍṇitarāja" it is said that it is not mere title but the name of a high office in the court of the Mughal Emperor. The following extract from "The History of Mahārāstras" by Justice Ranade proves that the head of the ecclesiastical department was called, in the court of Shivājī. as "Paṇḍitarāja"; and the same might have been the practice in the Mughal Court also.[1] Our Jagannātha must have held such office in the court of the Mughal Emperor.

In this connection it is to be noted that in the colophon of Āsafavilāsa, Jagannātha says:-[2]

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the introduction correctly remarks; "This incident may be compared with the Yavani affair in Jagannātha's life". Again he says in the foot note "Some scholars do not regard this affair (yavani affair) as historical. In the light of this incident in S's life, however, the whole question requires to be examined properly" (KPK P. 18).

Thus Siddhacandra and P.R. were contempararies and they must be knowiug each other very closely, as they were under the portonage of the same Kings. But it can not be knowu clearly, if one is iufluenced by other's work. But "from the frequent references to Navīnas in both the works, it seems that a new school of poetic criticism had come to be recognised as in Nyāya; and so both S. and J, must have drawn upon the common ideas of Navīnas" (KPK. P. 20).

1. "Next came Paṇḍitarao the Head of the ecclesiastical department and below him sat the Chief Justice". Quoted in Paṇḍitarāyajīvitamu P. 52. 2. PRKS. P. 86.

which can be taken as a clear indication that it was the name of an Office.

Perhaps PR. left the Mughal Court in the year 1658, when Shah Jahan was imprisoned and his eldest son Dara was murdered by Aurangazeb. From Delhi he went to the Court of Prāṇanārāyaṇa the King of Assam and lived there for a short period as Prāṇanārāyaṇa himself had to flee to Bhūtān in 1659 AD. Coming as he was with a disturbed mind from a place of troubles and turmoil, he might not have found time for composing a new panegyric and so he introduced some slight changes here and there in Jagadābharaṇa to suit his new patron and named it 'Prāṇābharaṇa''. From Assam he went to Vārāṇasī to spend a retired life of quietitude and happiness on the banks of his favourate holy river Gaṅgā but not to Mathura.

'सम्प्रत्यन्धकशासनस्य नगरे तत्त्वं परं चिन्त्यते ।' (PRKS. P, X)

THE PERSONALITY AND NATURE OF PANDITARAJA.

There is no reliable account, handed down to us, regarding the authentic personal history and nature of PR. but much can be gathered about his nature, from his writings. That P.R. is not a strict adherent to the Orthodox rules is quite evident from the famous Lavangi episode. On the strength of this traditional episode, and of a verse:-

'शीतार्ता इव सङ्कुचन्ति दिवसा नैवाम्बरं शर्वरी
शीघ्रं मुञ्चति किञ्च सोपि हुतभुक्कोणं गतो भास्करः ।
त्वञ्चानङ्गहुताशभाजि हृदयें सीमन्तिनीनां गतो
नास्माकं वसनं न वा युंवतयः कुत्र व्रजामो वयम् ॥'

believed to have been addressed to the King of Delhi. by PR;

Acyutarāya, a commentator on Bhāminīvilāsa believes that PR. had no wife (Dharmapatnī) at alll. (Acyutarāya's comm. on Bhāminīvilāsa P. 68.) But it is not correct to draw such conclusions on the strength of a stray verse of a doughtful origin, because his verse is included in one of the old anthologies.

On the other hand many verses of the Karuṇavilāsa which contains more personal element in it, clearly show that PR. had a Hindu wife married according to Hindu custom. The fifth verse in Karuṇavilāsa refers to the "Saptapadī" observed in the Hindu marriage.

'धृत्वा पदस्खलनभीतिवशात् करं मे
यास्ऽरूढवत्यसि शिलाशकलं विवाहे ।
सा मां विहाय कथमद्य विलासिनि द्या-
मारोहसीति हृदयं शतधा प्रयाति ॥' (PRKS. P. 69)

Probably her name was Kāmeśvarī, a name which is more common in Telugu families. as can be seen from the following verse:-

'मन्दस्मितेन सुधया परिषिच्य या मां
नेत्रोत्पलैर्विकसितैरनिशं समीजे ।
सा नित्यमङ्गलमयी गृहदेवता मे
कामेश्वरी हृदयतो दयिता न याति ।' (PRKS. P. 70)

And Mahādevasuri, himself claiming to be the grand son of PR, while commenting on the line 'याते च सम्प्रति दिवं प्रति बन्धुरत्ने' of the first verse of "Karuṇavilasa", writes 'गृहिण्यां दिवं प्रतियाते, मृतायां सत्याम् ।' Again he gives the meaning of 'नित्यमङ्गलमयी गृहदेवता मे' (of 12th verse) as 'नित्यमङ्गलः..पुत्रपौत्राद्युत्सवः, तत्प्रचुरा नित्यमङ्गलमयी गृहदेवता कामेश्वरी etc. (Paṇḍitarayajivitam P. 42). All these go to prove beyond doubt that PR. had a wife married according to Dharmaśāstra.

PR. is a man of wide learning with great scholastic ability for argument and is a great poet of self confidence. The first two qualities are self evident in his work RG. When a point of difference arises he does not spare even such writers like Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, whose views he generally values. His confidence in his poetical skill is clearly expressed by him on many occassions. In one of his famous poems, he challenges all his contemporary poets.

'आमूलाद्रत्नसानोर्मलयपरिगतादाचकूलात्पयोधेः
यावन्तः सन्ति काव्यप्रणयनचतुरा निर्विशङ्कं वदन्तु ।
मृद्वीकामध्यनिर्यन्मसृणरसझरीमाधुरीभाग्यभाजां
वाचामाचार्यतायाः पदमनुभवितुं कस्ति धन्यो मदन्यः ।'

(PRKS. P. 7)

At another instance, when a poet comes to him to show his poem he cautions him, at the beginning itself, saying that he should recite his poem before him only if he is confident that it contains the requisite qualities of a good poem. Otherwise, he is advised, to conceal his art in his own heart like a sinful action committed in secret.

'निर्माणे यदि मार्मिकोसि नितरामत्यन्तपाकद्रव
न्मृद्वीकामधुमाधुरीमदपरीवाहोद्धुराणां गिराम् ।
काव्यं तर्हि सखे सुखेन कथय त्वं सम्मुखे मादृशां
नो चेद्दुष्कृतमात्मना कृतमिव स्वान्ताद्बहिर्मा कृथाः ॥'

(PRKS. P. 78)

While talking about Prasādaguṇa he declares with great confidence that almost all his compositions can be taken as example for Prasādaguṇa. (RG. P. 82). This confidence of PR. in his poetical talent, is not altogether unjustified, especially during his times. A staunch believer in Śāṅkarādvaitavāda, PR. shows equal devotion to both Śiva and Viṣṇu but with a slight inclination towards the latter. His devotion to the holy rivers Gaṅgā and Yamunā also is well-known and this, incidentally, may be taken as a proof that PR. spent whole of his life near these two rivers but not near Godāvarī or Kṛṣṇā, for otherwise his partiaility to these two rivers would have asserted itself, one way or other.

PR. is a keen observer of men and manners around him. The sportive movements of beautiful damsels, intent upon drawing the attention of their lovers, which is perhaps a common sight in the capital of the Mughal Empire, devoted to sensual pleasures, does not miss his keen observation and one of such incidents is given a beautiful expression in his following verse:-

'भवनं करुणावती विशन्ती गमनाज्ञालवलाभलालसेषु ।
तरुणेषु विलोचनाब्जमालामथ बाला पथि पातयाम्बभूव ।' (RG. P. 121)

The context as explained by the poet himself is:- When a lady of exquisite beauty was on her way back home, she was followed by a band of young men (Road-side Romeos) attracted by her charm. When she reached home and was about to enter in, they were waiting in the street to take leave of her which she was pleased to grant by way of throwing her side-long looks on all of them. Thus the poet brings home the atmosphere of the Mughal-rule in this small verse.

To rear the pairs of pegions was considered to be the mark of civilization and fine taste in those days, which is devoutly practised even to-day by some people. This finds a fine expression in the following verse of P.R. :-

'निरुद्ध्य यान्तीं तरसा कपोतीं
कूजत्कपोतस्य पुरो दधाने ।
मयि स्मितार्द्रं वदनारविन्दं
सामन्दमन्दं नमयाम्बभूव ॥' (RG. P. 98)

Again while talking how, at times, the Alaṅkāra-Camatkāra engulfs the Dhvani-Camatkāra, he brings in a beautiful analogy of a rustic damsel who conceals her natural beauty by applying too much of toilet powder etc.. on the body. This indicates his keen observation of the fashions of his day. (RG. P . 23)

we can find his sense of sincere repentance for his sinful actions. if any, expressed through this following verse which is highly powerful and moving.

'बधान द्रागेव द्रढिमरमणीयं परिकरं
किरीटे बालेन्दु नियमय पुनः पन्नगगणैः ।
न कुर्यास्त्वं हेलामितरजनसाधारणधिया
जगन्नाथस्यायं सुरधुनि ! समुद्धारसमयः ।' (RG. P. 176)

Thus the very mention of the name "Paṇḍitarāja" makes us see with our mental eye a man of beautiful personality, devoted alike to the earthly pleasures and heavenly pursuits, with great erudition and undaunted spirit,

Following is the brief account of the works [1] of Paṇḍitaraja :-

1, Gaṅgālaharī :- Otherwise known as Pīyūṣalaharī :- This is a very popular poem of 53 verses, composed in praise of Gaṅgā. pp· 3-9.

2. Amṛtalaharī :- This is a short poem of 11 verses composed in praise of Yamunā (pp. 13 & 14).

3. Karuṇalaharī :- This is a poem of 65 verses in praise of God Viṣṇu (pp. 17–20). It contains 60 verses according to the introduction of Bhāminivilāsa (P. IX) of Poona edition.

4. Lakṣmīlaharī :- This is poem of 41 verses composed in praise of Lakṣmī (pp 23-27).

5. Sudhālaharī :- This is a poem of 30 verses in praise of the God Sun (pp. 31-34).

6, Yamunāvarṇanam:- This is a prose work or a Campū Kāvya in praise of Yamunā, yet to be traced. Only two quotations, each of two lines, from this work are given in Rasagaṅgādhara. (RG. P. 22 and pp. 160–61).

7. Āsafavilāsa :- This is a panegyric on Āsafkhān, the brother of Nūrjahan and the father-in-law of Shah Jahan who wielded great influence in the administration of the Empire. This was written at the instance of

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1. Regarding the details like the number of verses etc., of the minor works, help has been taken from the "Paṇḍitarāja Kāvya Saṅgraha" published by the Sanskirt Academy, Osmania University.

one Rāyamukuṭa of Mathurā. It is an Ākhyāyikā of about 75 lines. It begins with a small peiece of prose passage, followed by four verses and ends with a long prose passage of about one and half pages (pp. 83-84).

8. Jagadābharaṇa :)(These two poems are almost identical,
9. Prāṇābharaṇa :–)(with the difference in the names of the Nāyakas and slight changes in the epithets, introduced to suit the particular king described. For example the fourth Pāda of the second verse of Jagadābharaṇa 'जागर्तु क्षितिमण्डलोपरि जगत्सिहो धराधीश्वरः ।' is changed in the Prāṇābharaṇa as 'जागर्तुक्षितिमण्डले चिरमिह श्री कामरूपेश्वरः ।' Such changes are to be found only in eight places of this poem of 53 verses, commented upon by the poet himself,

As the names themselves indicate, these two poems are eulogies to two princes. As seen above, the Jagadābharaṇa was possibly written in praise of the king Jagtsimha, the son of Karṇa of Udayapur, about 1628. When he was forced to leave the Mughal Court in its noncongenial atmosphere, PR. sought the patronage of Prāṇanārāyaṇa of Assām. Probably he could not find sufficient time or proper mood to compose a panegyric on Prāṇānārāyaṇa and so he changed Jagadābharana itself into Prāṇābharaṇa by giving some touches here and there.

The contention of some scholars that Jagadābharaṇa was a panegyric on Dara Shikoh, is proved incorrect by the very title of the poem and such epithets as "Srīkarṇajanmārṇavah". Haradattaśarma in his introduction to Bhāminīvllāsa (Poona ed. P. X) quotes similiar views of Paranjape and himself shares the same

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1. Regarding the shortness of this vilāsa J. B. Chaudhury says "it is surprising that the ms. having the colophon alright should have such an abrupt conclusion. Evidently some portion is missing here".
"Muslim patronage to Sanskrit learning" P. 115 (Foot Note).

but as pointed out by Paranjape (quoted by Haradatta Śarma) the fourt line of the fifth verse as found in Rasagaṅgādhara (P. 669) reads, instead of 'श्री प्राणनारायण:' or 'श्री कर्णजन्मार्णव:' as दिल्लीधरावल्लभ: and there are three more verses where the readings in Rasagaṅgādhara are different from those found in Jagadābharaṇa or Prāṇābharaṇa. The fouth line of the 15th verse according to Prāṇābharaṇa is:– 'जानीमो भवता न हन्त विदित: श्रीकामरूपेश्वर:, This is changed in RG. (P. 541) as विदितोदिल्लीधरा वल्लभ:' The fourth line of 23rd verse in Jagadābhraṇa is 'नुतो निखिलभूसुरैर्विजयते जगत्केसरी' in Prāṇābharaṇa 'जयति कामरूपेश्वर:' and R. G. 'जयति कोपि भूमिपति: ।' (R. G. P. 383).

The fourth l!ne of the 26th verse in Prāṇbābarana runs as :— 'सा भाति क्षोणिशोभाकरण तव दृशो: सङ्गरे शोणिमश्री:' and it is changed in Rasagaṅgādhara as 'क्षोणीन्दो सङ्गरे ते लसति नयनयोरुद्भटा शोणिम श्री: ।' as can be seen by the differences in the readings (especially, of the first two verses) Jagannātha probably used the same Jagadābharaṇa; after introducing some changes, as a panegyric on Dara Shikoh also without changing even the title of the poem; decause it can be intrepreted as an epithet to the prince (ornament of the world). Lack of time or lack of material can be given as an explanation for the use of the same poem as a eulegy of two or three ptinces. Durgāprasād. in his introduction to RG [1] clearly states that he has seen a manuscript of Jagadābharaṇa where the name of Dara Shaikoh has been substituted to that of Prāṇanārāyaṇa. Thus PR. bags three birds (not two) at one attempt !

10. Bhāminīvilāsa :- This is a collection of stray verses (Muktakas) in four vilāsas, i.e. I Prāstāvika vilāsa, II Śṛṅgāravilāsa, III Karuṇavilāsa, and IV Śāntavilāsa. In the 33rd verse of the Śāntavilāsa the poet says that he has made this casket (Bhāminīvilāsa) for the jewels of his verses lest the bastard poetasters should misappropriate them. (PKS. P. 78) This work has been

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1. 'अस्यैकं पुस्तकं कोटानगरनरेन्द्रश्रितकैलासवासिगङ्गावल्लभपण्डितसमीपे दृष्टमासीत् ।'

published from many places over many times and the number and order of the verses of each publication differ widely. This work, as included in the PRKS. contains a total number of 365 verses- Prāstāvikavilāsa 122 verses, Śṛṅgāravilāsa 180, Karuṇavilāsa 19, and Śāntavilāsa 44.

Though this work is named "Bhāminīvilāsa", all the four vilāsas, into which it is divided, do not seem to have connection with Bhāminī; only the Śṛṅgāra-vilāsa which depicts all phases of love and the Karnṇavilāsa have connection with Bhāminī, the second one only indirectly. So it may be conjectured that the poet planned originally to write only Sṛṅgāra-vilāsa and Karuṇa-vilāsa under the title of Bhaminīvilāsa and ultimately thought it better to add two more vilāsas Prāstāvikavilāsn and śāntavilāsa at the two ends of the poem, originally planned.

11. Citramīmāṁsākhāṇḍana :- This is a work written to criticise citramīmāṁsā of AD. a treatise dealing with Arthālaṅkāras. CMK. ends with Apahnutiprakaraṇa whereas citramīmāṁsā includes two more Alankaras Utprekṣā and part of Atiśayokti. The reason is inte evident. No views of AD. on Utprekṣā and Atiśayokti are criticised in Rasagaṅgādhara which is the source of this treatise, At the beginning of this work the author says that his views against citrmīmāṁsā as expressed in Rasagaṅgādhara, are being presented here in abridged form, for the convinience of scholars. (P.123). This clearly indicates that this treatise was written after Rasagaṅgādhara.

12. Manoramākucamardana :- This is a treatise of 26 pages criticising the Prauḍhamanoramā of Bhaṭṭoji-Dīkṣita. It runs up to the end of Svādisandhi. It is printed as an appendix to the Prauḍhamanoramā, Chaukhamba edition of 1934.

Besides the above works PR. refers to an Ākhyāyikā of his own from which he quotes a line descrtbing a damsel, in Kaṇva's hermitage, in RG.- P. 58. It is not known whether it is the same

work where Yamunāvarṇana etc., occur or a different one. There are many more works of little authenticity which are ascribed to Paṇḍitarāja.

RASAGANGĀDHARA

PR.'s most important work, on which rests his fame as a great scholar and critic, is RASAGANGADHARA which "stands next only to Dhvanyāloka and the Kāvyaprakāśa in the field of poetics".[1] "It is the master-piece of Jagannātha in which he shows his mastery of logic, subtle thinking, perspicuity of style, wonderful grasp and insight in the Alaṅkāraśāstra. It is a pity that the author left it incomplete, otherwise it would have entirely eclipsed even Mammaṭa's Kāvyaprakāśa".[2]

PR. is the last of the greatest exponants of Dhvani theory. His greatness lies more in putting rhe old theories in clear perspective with the help of precise and inambiguous definitions, than in inventing any new system. PR himself says that he is mainly concerned in defining things in a way which has not been adopted by others. (RG. P. 5 'Pariṣkurvantu' etc.) But is does not mean that he does not have to give us any thing of his own. He tries to give new interpretations and develop his own theories on many occassions, fully justifying his stand with the support of subtle logic and his inherent capacity for literary appreciation, combined with common sense. In the words of Dr. P.C. Lahiri, "it is true that he has generally been an adherent to the main teachings of the Dhvani theorists, but inspite of that a careful observer would not fail to see that he displays a spirit of sturdy independence through out his work. Thus some of the well-established views of eminent theorists of the Dhvani school he dismisses uncere-moniously as incapable of standing criticism, and even those that he accepts had to pass through the crucible of his strong scrutiny. He has a peculiar way of reproducing things in force-ful language on account of which even long accepted views

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1. HSP. P. 821.
2. Haraduttasharma. Intro to B. Vilāsa P. XI

appear to be newly set forth by him". ("Concept of Riti and Guna" P. 260.)

The whole scholastic atmosphere, in and around the age of PR. was surcharged with the Navyanyāya and no Śāstra was considered worth the name, unless it is presented in this garb of Navyanyāya. PR's main aim appears to be to give this honoured garb to the Sāhityaśāstra, lest it should be looked down by other Śāstras, and in this attempt he has been quite successful. He also wants to make it a perfect system independent of, and on a par with, other Śāstras.

"न च वैयाकरणमतविरोधो दूषणमिति वाच्यम् ।
स्वतन्त्रत्वेनाऽऽलङ्कारिकतन्त्रस्य तद्विरोधस्याऽदूषणत्वात् ॥' (RG. P. 396)

In order to prove that he is fully qualified to undertake this task, he indicates, in the beginning of this work his attainments, in all the branches of learning popular in his days. PR. is justified in expressing a proud satisfaction, for having incorporated, in his work, his own verses as examples, under different topics:–

'निर्माय नूतनमुदाहरणानुरूपं काव्यं मयात्र निहितं न परस्य किञ्चित् ।
किं सेव्यते सुमनसां मनसापि गन्धः कस्तूरिकाजननशक्तिभृता मृगेण ॥ (RG. P. 3)

Evedently there is, in this verse, an implied sarcastic reference to the statment of AD. who says[1] that he selected verses of old authors and used them as examples in his Citramīmāṁsā.

1. 'चिन्त्येऽत्र चित्रवर्गे प्रदर्श्यर्योर्लक्ष्यलक्षणयोः ।
प्राचीनानामेव श्लोकाः प्रायेण लिख्यन्ते ॥' Citramīmāṁsā P. 5.

The word kāvya in the verse "Nirmāya Nūtanam" etc., is interpreted by Nāgeśa as meaning Bhāminīvilāsakāvya which according to him, was composed to supply illustrations for Rasagaṅgādhara (Marmaprakāśa P. 3). But what was meant by Jagannātha, by "Kāvya" is only a Ramaṇīyārthapratipādakaśloka"' because there are hundreds of verses in Rasagaṅgādhara which are not to be found in Bhāminīvilāsa and some of which are found in his other minor works. In some other place also, "Kāvya" is used by

It is to be noted that PR. used his great poetical talent, while writing RG. to his fullest advantage. Even Mammaṭa had to remain content by simply laying down rules for Madhuraracanā. He was not able to cite proper examples. But PR. who lays down more stringent rules for the sweet composition of a poem is able to give his own verses by way of illustration.

It may be said against this method that though PR. like some of his predecessors gives his own examples, and thereby spares himself of the great trouble of searching through the vast literature to seleet suitable ones, he has certainly reversed the proper order; for, a Lakṣaṇaśāstra should follow the existing Lakṣyas rather than make the Lakṣya follow its dictates. There is, of course. some truth in this observation, but the rules of composing poetry have become so well-established by the time of PR. and even before, that it is no more considered to be the duty of Lakṣaṇa śāstra to follow the Lakṣyas. It has already occupied the place of a dictator; and this prompted PR. like some old writers, to compose verses, according to the rules laid beforehand. A fine example of tail wagging the dog !

PR. has given two names to his work on Alaṅkāraśāstra—one a general name and the other a special one. The general name is "Kāvyamīmāṁsā" and the special name is "Rasagaṅgādhara". As regards to the first name, it does not present us any difficulty in understanding the meaning. We are familiar with such names as "Śārīrākamīmāṁsā" and, in this Alaṅkāraśāstra itself, Rājaśekhara names his treatise "Kāvyamīmāṁsā". It can be usderstood as 'काव्यस्य मीमांसा–काव्यसम्बन्धी पूजनीयो विचारः।' The second name is peculiar. It is peculiar in the sense, we are not familiar with similar names given to any old work on Alaṅkāraśāstra. We are familiar only with such names like 'Kāvyālaṅkāra' 'Kāvyādarśa'

Jagannātha to mean only a Muktakaśloka. While writing about Varṇavinyāsa, he says : कथं तर्हि–'भुजगाहितप्रकृतयो गारुडमन्त्रा इवाव नीरमण। तारा इव तुरगा इव सुखलीना मन्त्रिणो भवतः।' इति भवदीयं काव्यं इति चेत्' etc. (RG. P. 85)

'Alaṅkāraratnākara" "Rasamañjarī" "Sāhityadarpaṇa" and 'Rasataraṅgiṇī' but not with such metaphorical names as the present one.

Excepting a few like 'Laghuśabdenduśekhara", "Paribhāṣenduśekhara", (Which are perhaps suggested by this name itself!) of Nāgeśa such names are not to be commonly found in other śāstras also. When the writers give such names to their works, they evidently intend to suggest the name of a particular god by the Rūpakālaṅkāra, expressed or implied. That is why Nāgeśa clearly says that his work Laghuśbdenduśekhara is having Umā of Prauḍhamanoramā as the other half. PR. is generally inclined to take the metaphorical sense even in the works of other writers whether or not the same was intended by them. We are not sure if Bhaṭṭojidikṣita intended any metaphorical sense while he named his work "Prauḍhamanoramā." But PR. understands it in such sense to suit his own purpose, and names his work, intended to criticise Manoramā, as "Mnoramākucamardana". When it is his attitude even towards the works of other writers, it is natural that he should intend the mataphorical sense in his title, "Rasagaṅgādhara" and pressing it (metaphor) further, he names the chapters as "Ānanas".

But the title presents some difficulty in understanding the meaning of the samāsa in strict grammatical method; because this word should mean both the work and the god Goṅgādhara. It may be understood like this : 'रसः गङ्गा इव, तस्याः धरः रसगङ्गाधरः।' a work having Gaṅgā-like rasa as its subject. In this way it can mean only the work but not the god Gaṅgādhara. When it is understood as रस एव गङ्गा तस्याः धरः रसगङ्गाधरः"—it may be indicative of the lord śiva, though indirectly, (because Gaṅgā is given importance); but it cannot be properly applied to the work. Therfore both the Vigrahas are to be accepted by Tantranyāya and the first "Rasagaṅgādhara", the work, should be identified with the second "Rasagaṅgādhara", the god; "Śivatva" being ascribed to the work on the ground of having the common attribute "Rasagaṅgādharatva".

Similiar explanation of words like "Laghuśabdenduśekhara" and "Paribhāṣenduṣekhara" is given in the commentaries of the works with the above names.[1] But peculiarly enough the commentary "Bhūti"[2] does not try to explain the word Paribhāṣenduśekhara, to make it applicable to god Śiva also; though its very name 'Bhuti' (Aiśvarya or Bhasma) indicates that it is alive to the metaphorical sense of the word. Perhaps the commentary feels that the second meaning is indicated through Vyñjanā only. In such case the word Rasagaṅgādhara also can be understood as conveying "Śiva" by Vyāñjanā.

It may be more appropriately understood, in Śivapakṣa, as is done in the commentary Gūḍhārthadīpikā[3] on "Paribhāṣenduśekhara", as:- रस इव गङ्गा रसगङ्गा । तस्याः धरः रसगङ्गाधरः etc. But the above commentary which takes 'परिभाषा इव इन्दुः' does not explain how Upamāna can have pūrvanipāta. Therefore, better to take it as Madhyamapadalopisamāsa रस सदृशी

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1. लघुशब्देन्दुशेखरमितिः- शब्द इव इन्दुः शब्देन्दुः । लघुश्चासौ शन्देब्दुश्च लघुशब्देन्दुः, कलात्मकश्चन्द्रः । स शेखरे यस्य । यद्वा लघवः शब्दाः ग्रस्मिन् सः लघुशब्दः; स इन्दुशेखर इवेत्यर्थः । शब्दो व्याकरणाभि व्यङ्गयः स इन्दुरिव शब्देन्दुः । तस्मिन्निन्दुतादात्म्यं अर्थप्रकाशकत्वेन दोषरहितत्वेन वा विवक्षितम् । स एव शेखरः शिरोभूषणं यस्येति वा ।'
Chandrakalā of Bhairava—P. 2

'परिभाषा एव इन्दुः अर्थप्रकाशकत्वात् सा शेखरे यस्येति ग्रन्थ पक्षे; यद्वा शेखरशब्दस्य भूषणवाचकस्य परिभाषेन्दुशब्देन परिभाषेन्दुरेव शेखरो यस्येति बहुव्रीहिः । शिवपक्षे तु परिभाषैवेन्दुः शेखरे यस्येत्यर्थः ।' Bhairva's Commentary—P. 2

2. परिभाषा इन्दुरिव प्रकाशकत्वेन शेखरे यस्य तं ग्रन्थं; परिभाषार्थस्य मुख्यप्रतिपाद्यत्वेन मस्तकधृतत्वारोपः ।'
'Bhiūti' on Paribhāṣenduśekhara—P. 3

3. Gūḍhārthadīpikā P. 4-5. 'तत्र ग्रन्थपक्षे परिभाषा एवेन्दुरिति मयूरव्यंसकादित्वात् समासः.........शिवपक्षे तु परिभाषा इवेन्दुः, स शेखरः यस्येति विग्रहः' etc.

गङ्गा–रसगङ्गा etc. as is explained by Vāmana in the case of "Bimbādhara" etc. (Kāvyālaṅkāra sūtra V-14) Any way, it is quite evident that this word is used by PR. in metaphorical sense and accordingly he names the chapters "Ānanas".

It looks strange, at the first instance, that a work, three fourths of which deal with subjects other than Rasa, should be named after "Rasa" as "Rasagaṅgādhara". But while selecting this title, the author seems giving importance to a particular definition of Rasa brought into light by him for the first time. And though recognising the importance of Rasa in a Kāvya, PR. thinks that even without Rasa a Kāvya can be called as such and so he criticises the definition of Sāhityadarpaṇa, which declares Rasa as the soul of poetry. And again when almost all the others deal with the Rasa only in the later chapters, PR. deals with it, in the first chapter itself and gives to it the place of a crest-jewel like that of Gaṅgā on the head of Śiva. Hence the name 'Rasagaṅgādhara'.

It is also possible that PR. had the following idea in his mind while selecting the name RG. "Rasagaṅgādhara" can be understood as :–'रस एव गङ्गाधरः or रसाभिन्नः गङ्गाधरः रसगङ्गाधरः ।' according to Śruti quoted by him ('रसो वै सः ।') Then by adding the 'अच्' according to 'अर्श आदिभ्योऽच्' (Pāṇini V. 2-127) the word can mean the Grantha having the Rasagaṅgādhara as its subject (प्रतिपाद्य विषय) (रसगङ्गाधरः अत्र अस्तीति रसगङ्गाधरः ।).

As was seen above PR. divides his work according to its metaphorical title into "Ānanas" (faces). This led many scholars to think that he completed this work in five Ānanas in keeping with the number of the faces of Śiva and that the last three Ānanas with some portion of the second Ānana, are now lost to us. Some are of the opinion that having planned to complete his work in five Ānanas PR. left it unfinished, perhaps on account of some adverse circumstances. Before embarking upon such conclusions, it should be considered what could have been the subject matter of those lost or unwritten chapters. As the author himself says,

his main intention in writing this work is to give a clear definition and concrete shape to the subjects already discussed in Alaṅkāra-śāstra. Therefore the author need not be presumed to have attempted to write on subjects which have already been defined by previous writers and about which he does not have any difference of opinion. For example, he never tries to established the theory of Dhvani and is content by simply mentioning some of its main varieties. Viewed in this light, there appear only a few topics left over by our author undiscussed, such as Doṣas of Śabda and Artha (Rasadoṣas he dealt with) and Śabdālaṅkāras etc. to which he might not have had much to add. We need not think that PR. might have devoted one chapter for dramaturgy, for in this section he can find little scope for the use of his original talent. It is quite alien to the nature of our author to simply repeat, like Viśvanātha and others, the tedious definitions and examples of Daśārūpka or any other old work. Famous writers like Mammaṭa also, whome our author finds as worthy models, are silent on this section of poetics. Thus we can scarcely find any important topic left over by PR. in these two chapters. It is true some portions of the second Ānana are lost as is evident from some references in the available portions but the lost portion need not necessarily be so big as to require three Ānanas. Therefore it is possible to come to a conclusion that PR. according to the conception of "Ardhanārīśvara", divided his work into two Ānanas, the first Ānana, on Rasa standing for the part of Gaṅgādhara (A real Rasagaṅgādhara) and the other for that of Aṁbikā.

It is to be noted in this connection, that the colophon of the socalled first Ānana, refers to it as 'पूर्वं आननम्' but not as प्रथमं आननम् (RG; P. 134) (R.G. Kasi edition of 1903 P. 170.) though "Pūrvam Ānanam" is conviniently taken as "Prathamam-Ānanam" by the editors whose minds are guided by their predilections for the five Ānana theory. Of course this can be taken to mean as "facing east"; but PR. would have given the name 'Sadyojātam' also. Therefore one need not feel sorry that many important chapters of Rasagaṅgādhara have been lost.

FIRST CHAPTER

THE DEFINITION OF "KĀVYA"

PR. takes up the definition of "Kāvya" as the first topic of his work. "What is Kāvya" is a puzzling question which has been engaging the attention of all the scholars since the beginning of the regular stndy of Alaṅkāraśāstra. Writers on Alannkāraśāstra, introduced a peculiar metaphor ascribing all the features of man to the Kāvya. This trend was first found in Bhāmaha and with many additions, made in course of time, it reached a complete form, in the hands of Vidyānātha.

Bhāmaha simply talks of the Śarīra of a Kāvya saying "षष्टया शरीरं निर्णीतं शतषष्टया त्वलङ्कृतिः ।" (Kāvyalankāra. VI-65) By Śarīra he means only the Śabda or both the Śabda and Artha. Taking this as a clue all the later writers began to talk about some kind of similarity between the Guṇas Alaṅkāras and etc., of the Kāvya on the one hand and those of the man on the other. Ultimately, Vidyānātha completes the metaphor in all its aspects. Thus according to him Vyaṅgya, Alaṅkāras, Guṇas, Rītis, Vṛttis, Śayyā, and Pākas, correspond to the life, Alaṅkāras, Guṇas, Svabhāvas, Vṛttis, and Śayyā as associated with a man. (Pratāparudriyam. II-2-5.)

Almost all the Ālaṅkārikas talk, directly or indirectly about the Kāvyaśarīra, and their definition of Kāvya differs according to their conception of the important element in the same. S. K. De thinks (S. P. Vol. II-36) that all the Ālaṅkārikas from Bhāmaha to PR. are unanimous in thinking that both the Śabda and Artha constitute the body of Kāvya. Thus we can group the definitions of Kāvya into two catagories as those giving more prominence to the element of Śabda as the body of the Kāvya and those giving equal prominence to both the Śabda and Artha. These two kinds of definitions are coming down to us almost since the commencement of the systemtie study of poetics.

We may broadly divide the older definitions into two catagories:–(1,). Pre Dhvani-theory definitions and (2) the definitions of Post-Dhvani-theory period. The definitions of all the rhetoricians from Bhāmaha to Ānandavardhana come under the first catagory while the definitions of the writers from Ānandavardhana to PR. fall under the second one. There is vast divergence of opinion, between these two groups of authors, regarding the essence or the important element in the poetry and therefore, their defiinitions of Kāvya show the distinct influence of their conception of Kāvyātman. Almost all the rhetoricians, prior to Dhvanikāra, accepting the importance of Alaṅkāra as they are, hover round the word and its meaning, which are the places of two kinds of Alaṅkāras-Arthālaṅkāras and Śabdālaṅkāras. This trend has been completely changed by the emergence of the powerful Dhvani-theory of Ānandavardhana, the influence of which can be found on all the later rhetoricians. This change in outlook naturally finds expression in the definitions of Kāvya also.

Bhāmaha, the first known rhetorician of great repute defines Kāvya as:– शब्दार्थौ सहितौ काव्यम्' (Kāvyālankāra I–16) Taken as it is, this cannot technically be called as Lakṣaṇa at all, for, we hardly come across a literary work where Śabda and Artha are not united. Realising the inadequacy of this Lakṣaṇa, later rhetoricians who followed the footsteps of Bhāmaha, try to explain this Sāhitya of Śabda and Artha in so many ways. But the real explanation of this Lakṣṇa can be found in the words of Bhāmaha himself. To find out the implication in Bhamaha's definition we must first examine the context in which it is found. Earlier, Bhāmaha discusses the views of old rhetoricians-of those who give importance only to the Śabdalaṅkāras and of those who give importance only to the Arthālaṅkāras :–(Kāvyalaṅkāra I-13-15)

At the end he gives his own opinion :–(K. A. I. 15) that both the Śabdālaṅkāras and Arthālaṅkāras are acceptable to him. The Lakṣaṇa of the Kāvya, 'अलङ्कारसहितौ शब्दार्थौ काव्यम्' Closely

follows the above lines and therefore the word "Sahitau" in the socalled definition should be taken to mean 'शब्दालङ्कारार्थालङ्कार सहितौ ।' Thus the Lakṣaṇa will be 'अलङ्कारसहितौ शब्दार्थौ काव्यम्' this definition of a Kāvya would appear to be quite appropriate from the pen of an author who gives much importance to Alaṅkāras. An indirect hint at the definition of Kāvya acceptable to Bhāmaha, may be found in a subsequent line 'अलङ्कारवदग्राम्यमर्थ्यं न्याय्य मनाकुलम् ।' (KA. I-35) Therefore 'शब्दार्थौ सहितौ काव्यम्' may be accepted as Bhāmaha's general definition of Kāvya, and in this regard we have the support of many of the later writers. The same line with the amplification as explained above, or "Alaṅkāravadagrāmyam" etc., may be taken as the complete definition acceptable to him, because it fits in well in his system.

As can be seen from his definition, Bhāmaha is the first rhetoricin who gives equal importance both to the Śabda and Artha as the body (Śarīra) of a Kāvya and this view has been accepted by many eminent writers of even post-Dhavani-period (like Mammaṭa Kuntaka etc.,) As opposed to this view we come across writers like Daṇḍin who accept Śabda alone as the Śarīra, rather the prominant element of Śarīra, of poetry and define the Kāvya accordingly. Daṇḍin defines Kāvya thus :- 'शरीरं तावदिष्टार्थव्यवच्छिन्ना पदावली" (the arrangement of words expressive of desired sense, is the body of Kāvya).[1] Strictly speaking, it cannot be said that Daṇḍin intends 'इष्टार्थव्यवच्छिन्ना पदावली' to be the definition of a Kāvya, for, he himself says that this is the Śarīra of a Kāvya, and so it cannot be called as the Lakṣaṇa of Kāvya itself. For example Vidyānātha in his Pratāparudrīya (II-1) talks of the body of Kāvya only after giving the definition.

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1. Kāvyalakṣaṇaratnaśrī interprets the phrase "Iṣṭārthavyavacchinnā" in a defferent way. 'कविना वक्तु मिष्टेऽभिप्रेते अर्थे कस्मिश्चिद्रघुवंशादौ व्यवच्छिन्ना गमकत्वेन स्वीकृता विशेषे (ण)··· (शरी) रं विज्ञेयम् ।" (Kāvyalaksaṇaratnaśrī P. S.)

But we do not find a seperate definition of Kāvya by Daṇḍin excepting an indirect indication.[1]

The intended Lakṣaṇa can be found out if we read this line along with the previous lines iu the same context. Daṇḍin writes:-

"इदमन्धं तमः कृत्स्नं जायेत भुवनत्रयम्
यदि शब्दाह्वयं ज्योतिरासंसारान्न दीप्यते ॥" (Kāvāyadarśa I-5)

"अतः प्रजानां व्युत्पत्तिमभिसन्धाय सूरयः
वाचां विचित्रमार्गाणां निबबन्धुः क्रियाविधिम् ॥"
तैः शरीरञ्चकाव्यानामलङ्काराश्च दर्शिताः ।
शरीरं तावदिष्टार्थव्यवच्छिन्ना पदावली ।" (Kāvyādarśa I-IX &X)

Here Daṇḍin talks of three things connected with Kāvya. They are the Vicitramārgas, Kāvyaśarīra and the Alaṅkāras. Thus all these three things combined together constitute a Kāvya and the Lakṣaṇa as intended by Daṇḍin may be phrased as like this.[2] "सालङ्कारा, इष्टार्थव्यवच्छिन्ना विचित्रमार्गा पदावलिः काव्यम् ।"

Both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin give much importance to the Alaṅkāras in a Kāvya and they take them, though not explicitly, as the soul of poetry. They differ only about the Śarīra of Kāvya.

1. Some scholars think that this line itself is intended by Daṇḍin as Kāvyalakṣna because it comes after his declaration 'यथासामर्थ्यमस्माभिः क्रियते काव्यलक्षणम्' But here 'Kāvyalakṣaṇa' means the whole work itself the same being a second name of Kāvyādarśa. The author Kāvyalakṣaṇaratnaśri, an old comentary on Kāvyādarśa takes this word only in this sense. Moreover it cannot be taken as perfect Lakṣaṇa at all because any thing conveying Iṣṭārtha will have to be taken as Kāvya.
2. It should be noted, in this connection, that the Agnipurāṇa which borrows the phrase Iṣṭārtha etc., from Daṇḍin is not content with this alone as the Lakṣaṇa of Kāvya and proceeds to add Alaṅkāras etc., in the Lakṣaṅa. (Agnipurāna I 6-7).

While Bhāmaha accepts both Śabda and Artha as the body of the poetry, Daṇḍin is inclined to take Śabda alone as the body but he does not give any reason in support of his view. But the commentary, Kāvyalakṣaṇaratnaśri, remarks that just like the body of a man decorated with ornaments, the body of Kāvya also i. e. Śabda, is to be decorated with the Alaṅkāras (perhaps the Arthālaṅkāras), (Kāvyālakṣṇa-ratnaśri. P-6). Thus the Ādhārādheyabhāva of the Alaṅkārya and Alaṅkāra is justified as regards the Śabda and Arthālaṅkāras.

One thing may be understood from this. All the earlier rhetoricians like Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and others accept the Alaṅkāras as the most important content of a Kāvya. On the strength of the name Alaṅkāra, given to the literary embellishments they feel that there should be a Śarīra which is the Alaṅkārya of the Alaṅkāras. While Bhāmaha and his followers are prone to accept both the Śabda and Artha as Alaṅkārya, and thus Śarira, Daṇḍin thinks that the Śābda should be taken as the Alaṅkārya i e. Śarīra. Here Daṇḍin's view appears to be more logical. The analogy between the ordinary ornament and the body of a person on one hand and the Alaṅkāra and Kāvya on the other, may appear as a sound one but a close examination shows that there is a fundamental difference between these two cases. The ornament put on the body can be seperately shown as a different object having a seperate existence from the body. This is not the case with the literary embellishments; for they (the Śabdālaṅkāras or Arthālaṅkāras) do not and cannot have a seperate existence, independent of Śabda or Artha, because the Śabdālaṅkāras and Arthālaṅkāras are no other than the peculiar arrangements of Śabdas and Arthas respectively. In such case, there is no real Alaṅkāryālaṅkārabhāva in its literal sence and the Ātmeśrāyadoṣa is quite evident. One will have to try to justify this Alaṅkāryālaṅkārabhāva by offering some farfetched explanations; but this trouble can be got over, atleast regarding the Arthālaṅkāras, if we accept the views of Daṇḍin, who postulates Śabda as the body of poetry which is to be decorated by

Alaṅkāras like Upamā, Utprekṣā and etc. This must be the idea behind the commentary cited above. Thus the controversy regarding the body of the poetry has been set rolling long ago by Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, each having his own followers till today.

Coming to Vāmana we find that he gives us some kind of definition of Kāvya, though not in the form of an actual definition. He begins with the Sūtra "काव्यं ग्राह्यमलङ्कारात्" (Kavyālankārasūtra P-1) and in the Vṛtti he says :– 'काव्यशब्दोऽयं गुणालङ्कार संस्कृतयोः शब्दार्थयोवेर्तते, भक्त्यातु शब्दार्थमात्रवचनोऽत्र गृहयते" (Kavyālankārasūtra P-1) He gives us the same definition as that of Bhāmaha with the addition of Guṇas which he considers to be the soul of poetry. "रीतिरात्मा काव्यस्य, विशिष्टपदरचना रीतिः विशेषो गुणात्मा' (Idid PP. 3–4)

Rudraṭa does not give any definition of his own because, perhaps the already existing one is acceptable to him also and so we find a passing reference bv him to the Kāvyalakṣaṇa (perhaps of Bhāmaha) "ननु शब्दार्थौ काव्यम्" (Kāvyālaṅkāra P–8). Thereby he indicaies that he is in favour of accepting both the Śabda and Artha as constituting a Kāvya. This point is clearly explained by his commentator Namisādhu who writes :– "कवेः काव्योपयोगिनोः शब्दार्थयोः अन्योन्याव्यभिचारात् एकतरोपादानेनैन द्वितीये लब्धे द्वितीयोपादानं काव्ये द्वयस्यापि प्राधान्यख्यापनार्थम् । ... ... द्वयमेतत् समुदितमेव काव्यं भवतीति तात्पर्यम् ।' (Kāvyālaṅkāra P. 8)

As can be seen from the above account, no writer in the pre-dhvani-period attempted to give a complete systematic definition of Kāvya. One has to arrive at conclusions as to what is meant by 'Kāvya' by putting together the various statements of these authors, scattered here and there. A systematic treatment of Kāvyalakṣana begins only in the post-dhvani-period and reaches its perfection in the definition given by PR.

With the establishment of the Dhvani-theory by Ānandavardhana and the subsequent importance that is given to Rasa the concept of poetry has been completely changed and the

significance and bearing of Alaṅkāras and Guṇas etc., have undergone a thorough revision. From this period onwards the rhetoricians, including those who are opposed to the Dhvani–theory, stopped hovering round the Śabda, Artha, Alaṅkāras and Guṇas etc., and began to probe into the depths of poetry. This significant change in the outlook can be seen in the definitions of Kāvya of the post dhvani period. Strangely enough, we do not find either Ānandavardhana or Abhinavagupta attempting at a clear definition of Kāvya excepting one or two passing general remarks "शब्दार्थशरीरं तावत् काव्यम्" (Dhvanyāloka P. 16) and "काव्यविशेषो हि विशिष्टार्थप्रतिपत्तिहेतुः शब्दसन्दर्भविशेषः" (Dhvanyāloka P. 300) etc., which can be cited by the followers of Bhāmaha as well as Daṇḍin as an authority for their views.

The first systematic treatment of the definition of Kāvya-systematic, because it is given with the intention of giving a definition, we come across in the Vakroktijīvita of Kuntaka. According to him Śabda and Artha united and embodied in the composition giving pleasure to the people of literary taste and resulting from the well–conceived effort of a poet constitute the Kāvya :–

"शब्दार्थौ सहितौ वक्रकविव्यापारशालिनि ।
बन्धे व्यवस्थितौ काव्यं तद्विदाह्लादकारिणि ।' (Vakroktijīvita I–7)

He further clarifies that what is meant by Sāhitya is the association of Śabda and Artha with beautifully arranged Guṇas and Alaṅkāras etc , which result in mutual adornment of Śabda and Artha themselves (Vakroktijīvitam P. 10). This Kāvya-lakṣana of Kuntaka is only a logical elaboration of what was said by Bhāmaha while defining Kāvya broadly, (Kavyalankara I–16), just as his very system of Vakrokti is an indirect revival of Alaṅkāraschool of which Bhāmaha and others are the exponents. (See SP. Vol II P. 188). While Ānandavarthana and others are more interested in explaining what is expressed by the peot and how it is enjoyed by Sahṛdaya, Kuntaka is mainly concerned with how something is expressed. That is why kuntaka 'devotes nearly

the whole of his work, with the exception of the introductory portion of the first chapter, to the definition classification and illustration of these varieties of Kavivyāpāra-Vakratā, which thus form the different catagories into which poetic speech may be analysed. (SP. Vol. II. P. 187). Viewed in this light, kuntakas, definition cannot be called complete because it does not take us beyond the sphere of Śabda and Artha.

Bhoja in Sarsvatīkanṭhābharaṇa (P.2) indicates what is perhaps acceptable to him as the definition of Kāvya "निर्दोषं गुणवत्काव्थं अलङ्कारैरलङ्कृतम् । रसान्वितं कविः कुर्वन् कीर्ति प्रीतिञ्च विन्दति ।' In this indireetly given definition, while including all those that are associated with Kāvya, Bhoja appears to have been stressing on the Rasānvitatva, (having Rasa) if we understand the adjective 'Rasānvitam' as the Vidheyaviśeṣaṇa, on the strength of the importance he gives to Rasa in his work. Here we do not find any indication as to whether he means both śabda and Artha together as Kāvya or śabda alone. But it is evident from what he writes about the meaning of the word Sāhitya in Śṛṅgāraprakāśa (7th chapter), that his conception of Sāhitya is enterely different from that of many other rhetoricians and so he need not be construed as giving equal importance both to the Śabda and Artha as the body of a Kāvya. Bhoja' s definition is, though in the form of a casual statement, more definite, as a comprehensive enumeration of all the important ingredients of a Kāvya and has been adopted even by Mammaṭa with slight modifications.

Agnipurāṇa which mainly depends upon Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa (Ref. SP. Vol. II. P. 201), gives a definition where the definitions of Dandin and Bhoja are combined together and so need not engage our special attention.("इष्टार्थव्यवच्छिन्ना पदावली काव्यं स्फुरदलङ्कारं गुणवद्दोषवर्जितम्" (Agnipurāṇa I–6–7).

According to Mammaṭa Kāvya consists of Śabda and Artha containing literary qualities (Guṇas) and devoid of blemishes (Doṣas) and at times even without the Alaṅkāras (being prominent) (KP. P. 9)

Mammaṭa presents us with a definition which is acceptable even to the rhetoricians not belonging to the Dhvanischool, because he avoids any special reference to Dhvani, Rasa or any thing related to the Dhvani. Infact, it is more suited to the non-Rasavādins because only according to their opinion some of the adjectives like 'Saguṇau' and 'Adoṣau' etc., are directly applicable to the Śabdārthau, without understanding them as Aupacārikaprayogas as was to be explained by Mammaṭa's commentators, (Pradīpa (KP.) P. 9-10) Mammaṭa's stand regarding the nature of Guṇas etc. Naturally it receives wider acceptance from rhetoricians with a few exceptions here and there.

One wonders, why Mammaṭa, being a great exponnent of Dhvanitheory, does not choose to make even remote reference to Dhavani or Rasa in his definition of Kāvya, and finds it fit to use the words 'Saguṇau' and 'Adoṣau' as the adjectives of Śabdārthau'. This may be explained away like this. Mammata, after giving a general definition of Kāvya clasifies it into three groups, 'Uttama', 'Madhyama' and 'Adhama'. He includes such Kāvyas which do not have even the remotest touch of Dhvani in the third catagory, Adhama. But he has to see that the Kāvalakṣaṇa is applicable to such Kāvyas also. That is why he gives such a general definition without committing himself to the Dhvani or Rasa.

Mammaṭa's definition has been followed by many later rhetoricians, verbatim by some, and with slight changes by others. Thus the definitions given by Hemacandra, Vidyānātha and Vāgbhaṭa are as follows:-

"अदोषौ सगुणौ सालङ्कारौ च शब्दार्थौ काव्यम्

(Hemachandra's Kāvyānnśāna P. 19)

"गुणालङ्कारसहितौ शब्दार्थौ दोषवर्जितौ,

गद्यपद्योभयमत्रं काव्यं काव्यविदो विदुः।' Pratāparudrīya II-1.

"शब्दार्थौ निर्दोषौ सगुणौ प्रायः सालङ्करौ काव्यम्।"

Kāvyanuśāsanaṁ. P. 14.

But Jayadeva, the author of Candrāloka resents the secondary position that is given to Alaṅkāras by Mammaṭa and Vāgbhaṭa. According to him to talk of a Kāvya without Alaṅkāras is to think of fire without heat (candrāloka. I. 8). Thus trying to raise the Alaṅkaras to their former glory, he gives his own definition which is rather a more comprehensive list of things connected with a Kāvya than its concise definition:-

"निर्दोषा लक्षणवती सरीतिर्गुणभूषणा ।
सालङ्काररसानेकवृत्तिर्वाक्काव्यनामभाक् ।" (Candrāloka I.7)

Here by saying 'Lakṣanavatī; Jayadeva appears to have been trying to revive the almost forgotten Lakṣaṇas, first enumerated by Bharata as associated with drama, some of which, in the hands of the later rhetoricians, turned into Alaṅkāras. (Ref. Some Concepts of Alaṅkāra Śāstra P. 43).

While Ānandavardhana is content with giving equal importance to the three kinds of Dhvani, i.e. Rasadhvani, Alaṅkāradhvani and Vastudhvani, (Dhvanyāloka P. 84) Abhinavagupta tries to explain that Rasadhvani alone is the most important and that the remaining two are subordinate to it. (Locana PP. 52, 84, 85). Taking this clue from him, come forward some rhetoricians, defining Kāvya in terms of its possessing Rasa.

Thus Śauddhodani, the author of Alaṅkāra Vidyāsūtra defines Kāvya as:- "काव्यं रसादिमद् वाकयं श्रुतं सुखविशेषकृत् ।" (Alaiṅkāraśekhara. P. 2). Evidently he wants to give importance to Rasa, though not completely avoiding Alaṅkāras. Keśavamiśra, while commenting on this writes:-

"आदिपदेनालङ्कारपरिग्रहः। तथाच तदुभयान्यतरवत्त्वं लक्षणम्, सुखविशेष साधनत्वं वा लक्षणम्" etc. (Alnkara sekhara P. 2-3).

"The word आदि includes figures of speech. Thus the defintion of a Kāvya would be that it should contain any one of them, i.e. either Rasa or Alaṅkāra. Or the defintion may be that it should be the source of peculiar pleasure".

Keśava, while remarking 'Tadubhayānyataravattvam', must have been influenced by the views expressed by Govindaṭhakkura in Pradīpa. For, there, differing with Mammaṭa, he remarks that Camatkāra being the essence of poetry it should contain either Rasa or Alaṅkāra, for producing the Camatkāra. (Pradīpa (KP.) P. 10.) Again Keśava's last remark 'सुखविशेषसाधनत्वं वा लक्षणम्' is an indirect acceptance of camatkāravattva as the Lakṣaṇa. In this context Keśavamiśra quotes two more Lakṣaṇas by some old unknown authors, who appear to be in favour of accepting Śabda as the body of a poem.

'रसप्रतिपत्तिद्वारा सुखविशेषसाधनं वाक्यं काव्यम्', इत्यपरे। केचित्तु 'पदावली काव्यम्' etc. (Alaṅkāraśekhara P.3.)

Candīdāsa, a commentator on Kāvyaprakāśa and the great grandfather of Viśvanātha, prefers the definition "आस्वादजीवातुः पदसन्दर्भः काव्यम्" (HSP. P. 354) "Kāvya is the arrangement of the words the essence (life sustainer) of which is enjoyment" to the one given by Mammaṭa.

Viśvanāthakavirāja, the author of Sāhitya-Darpaṇa defines Kāvya as:- "वाक्यं रसात्मकं काव्यम् ।" (Sāhityadarpaṇa P. 5) ("Kāvyam is a sentance heving rasa as its soul"). He severely criticises, word by word, the definition given by Mammaṭa. Viśvanātha's definition was, in its turn, criticised by many later writers including PR; and P.V. Kane remarks in his History of Poetics, "some give a definition of Kāvya which is more difficult than the thing to be defined (such as that of Viśvanatha)". (HSP. P. 352). Again he writes in his notes on Sāhityadarpaṇa "Viśvanātha, on the other hand, after a good deal of hair splitting, offers us a definition which does not leave us any the wiser after reading it". (Sahityadarpaa P. 16).

As can be seen from the above account, some definitions are mere enumeration of the contents of Kāvya with little sense of technicality of a Lakṣaṇa, and while some give equal importance both to Śabda and Artha, some give importance to Śabda alone.

PR. has all these and similar definitions before him and he tries to incorporate what is the best, in or underlying all these definitions, at the same time maintains accuracy in his Lakṣaṇa, in its strict technical sense. As can be presently seen. the definition given by PR. is very simple, precise and all comprehensive—all comprehensive in the sense, it is applicable to all the Kāvyas, including modern ones, and according to the test of the rhetoricians of any school. In the words of P.V. Kane "on the whole Ja gannātha's definition is preferable, as it avoids all reference to debatable points." (HSP. P. 353).

At the first instance PR. defines Kāvya as "रमणीयार्थप्रतिपादक: शब्दः (काव्यम्)" (RG. P. 4). (Poetry is the word which conveys a beautiful idea). Then he explains what is meant by 'Ramaṇīya' and gives two more definitions which are only the amplifications (Pariṣkṛtarūpa)[1] of the first one.

This definition itself may appear, at the first instance, to be an amplification of Dandin's definition 'इष्टार्थव्यवच्छिन्ना पदावलिः' (Kāvyādarśa I. 10) as was thought by some scholars. (Jagannatha Pandite P. 80). But as was explained above Dandin's Lakṣaṇa is not a full Lakṣaṇa but only a part of it and the complete Lakṣaṇa can be inferred only on combining what was said by him in different places where as PR's Lakṣaṇa is self-sufficient and complete and quite modern in its outlook.

As was promised by him at the beginning (RG. P. 4) PR. wants to give a Lakṣaṇa of Kāvya in its technical sense, carefully avoiding the three common defects of Lakṣaṇa. If the meaning of the word Ramaṇīya in the 'Ramaṇīyārthapratipādakah' is to be understood in the general way, the defect, Ativyāpti arises, for, statements like 'You are blessed with a son'

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1. This is the general practice adopted by PR. through out this work to give a general definition, and to come to a definite conclusion after examining the pros and cons of the subject and then to examine the views of other rhetoricians.

and 'A big fortune is awaiting you' etc., are sources of pleasure, yet they connot come under the purview of a Kāvya. To avoid this he explains the 'Ramaniyatā' as synonymous with 'लोकोत्त-राह्लादजनकज्ञानगोचरता'. The pleasure that is derived from the above statements is only Laukika, in as much as it is directly caused by a particular man's worldly prosperity and so it is quite personal. Again he makes the 'Lokottarattva' a synonym to 'Camatkāratva,' and accepts it to be a Jātiviśeṣa to avoid the lack of Anugama (comprehension). This Camatkāratva should be realised only through one's experience and cannot be described in words (R G. P. 5). This kind of Lokottarāhlāda is the result of Bhāvanā which is no other than the constant contemplation, (over the Kāvyārtha), (R G. P. 5). Here by substituting the word Bhāvanā for Jñāna, P R. slightly modifies his previous statement "रमणीयता च लोकोत्तराह्लादजनकज्ञान-गोचरता," as "रमणीयता च लोकोत्तराह्लादजनकभावनागोचरता" and this has been necessitated by the following reason. There may be some 'Samūhālambanajñāna' (cognitive jumble) comprising of two co ordinate thoughts of which one may be of Ramaniyārtha (a pleasing idea) and the other of Aramaṇiyārtha. (non pleasing idea). This kind of Samūhālambanajñāna also will have to be taken as Camatkārajanakajñāna. Such cases are excluded by replacing 'Jñāna' by 'Bhāvanā'. Bhāvanā being a chain of cognitions, it can be connected only with Ramaniyārthas, under special circumstances. In other words, one may be thinking of a particular object again and again for a long time only if it is beautiful and so only beautiful objects can be the Viṣaya of Bhāvanā. Thus by substituting the word 'Jñāna' by 'Bhāvanā' the author arrives at the follewing definition:-

"चमत्कारजनकभावनाविषयार्थप्रतिपादकशब्दत्वम्" (RG. P. 5).

"Kāvya is that śabda which conveys a sense which is the object of pleasant constant thinking"

PR. gives two more amplified forms of the definition. The

first one is:- "यत्प्रतिपादितार्थविषयकभावनात्वं चमत्कारजनकतावच्छेदकं तत्त्वम्" (R G. P. 5).

This modification is introduced to avoid Ativyāpti in Dhārāvāhikavākyārthajñāna. 'Bhāvanā' is only another name for Dhārāvāhikajñāna. When a succession of cognitions, (Dhārāvāhikajñāna) is produced by a Vākya, the Vākyā also, along with the Vākyārtha, will continue to be the object of cognition (Jñānaviṣaya). Such subsequent Vākyas also would come under the purview of Kāvya because "चमत्कारजनकभावनाविषयार्थप्रतिपादकत्व" can be applied to them also. Such Vākyas are excluded by this modified form of definition.

A Śabda or sentence expresses a meaning in a particular order and then arises the Bhāvanā taking that Vākyārtha as its Viṣaya (object). This Bhāvanā prodnces Camatkāra. Thus the Bhavanā being the Camatkārajanaka, Bhāvanātva becomes Camatkārajanakatāvacchedaka. And such sentence in that particular order should be taken as Kāvya. Thus the meaning of this Lakṣaṇa is 'the Śabda (sentence) of particular order, the meaning of which is the object of Bhāvanā is Kāvya, when such Bhāvanā is Camatkārajanaka (causing pleasure) and thereby the Bhāvanātva being the Camatkārajanakatāvacchedaka'. Now the group of sentences reflecting in the Dhārāvāhikajñāna cannot be said to have had that particular order producing Camatkāra and so the Ativyāpti is avoided (because only the sentence first heard in a particular order, produces Camatkāra bnt not all the sentences reflecting in the Dhārāvāhikajñāna).1

Not content with this, PR. gives another amplification in Anugama style. He feels that the second one is much cumber-

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V.A. Ramasvamisastri explains the purpose of this amplification also as similar to that of the first amplification. Perhaps he feels that there may be Samūhālambanabhāvanā also like Sāmuhalambanajñāna according to some Tārkikas (JP. PP. 81-22)

some because it contains Yacchabda and Tacchabda, which being the words of uncertain meanings, hinder the Aungama. Therefore he gives a third modified Lakṣaṇa which is comparatively simple according to the tradition of Tārkikas as there will be no need of bringing many things into Śābdabodha as in the case of the second form of Lakṣaṇa. This final Lakṣaṇa is:- "स्वविशिष्टजनकतावच्छेदकार्थप्रतिपादकतासंसर्गेण चमत्कारत्ववत्त्वं काव्यत्वम्" (RG. P. 5)

In this Lakṣaṇa, the Saṁsarga 'स्वविशिष्टजनकतावच्छेदकार्थप्रतिपादकता' may be long one but, it need not be brought into Śābdabodha. And by this Kāvyatva is simply defined as 'Camatkāratvavattva' and thus the Lakṣyatāvacchedaka is very much simplified. Here 'Sva' stands for Camatkāratva. Svaviśiṣṭa is Camatkāra because Camatkāra is associated with Camatkāratva by Samavāya-Saṁbandha. Bhāvanā being the cause of Camatkāra, Svaviśiṣṭajanskatā rests with Bhāvanā. This Janakatā of Bhāvanā is qualified (Avacchinna) by the Artha because Artha is Avacchedaka of Janakatā by Viṣayatā saṁbandha (by virtue of its being the object of Bhāvanā) Such Artha is conveyed by Śabda and so it is Pratipādaka. Thus the relation between Śabda and Camatkāra is "स्वविशिष्टजनकतावच्छेदकार्थप्रतिपादकता।" Therefore the Śabda which is associated with Camatkāra by the above relation is Kāvya.

As is seen above, PR. is inclined to give prominance to Śabda as the body of Kāvya, and therefore he naturally finds fault with those rhetoricians like Mammaṭa who give equal importance both to the Śabda and Artha. And as a supporter of Navyanyāya-system he feels that a Lakṣaṇa cannot be perfect unless it is free from the three defects of Ativyāpti, Avyāpti and Asaṁbhava. He criticises the Lakṣaṇas given by the old writers even on this ground. First he takes up the Lakṣaṇa given by Mammaṭa by 'Pradhāna malla nibarhaṇa nyāya' (Knocking the chief wrestler to the ground by which others would automatically be declared defeated):

Mammaṭa defines Kāvya as "तददोषौ शब्दार्थौ सगुणावनलङ्कृती पुनः क्वापि" (KP. P. I.4)

"Śabda and Artha which are devoid of blemishes, and are associated with Guṇas—Literary merits. Constitue a Kāvva, even if they do not have Alaṅkāras in some places"

This definition has been criticised by Viśvanātha word by word. While agreeing with Viśvanātha on many points, PR. directs his main attack on Śabda and Artha being Kāvya (Śabdārthau Kāvyam). He says that Kāvyatva cannot be associated with Śabda and Artha equally because it rests only with Śabda. In support of his argument, he cites the general usage 'Kāvya is being recited loudly' and 'Kāvya was heard but meaning was not understood' etc. In view of this general usage and in the absence of any Pramāṇa in support of the other view, Śabda alone should be meant, PR. declares, by the word 'Kāvya., Incidentally he refutes the views of some supporters of Mammaṭa, who think that the requisite quality of Kāvya is only to produce aesthetic pleasure, and that both Śabda and Artha are equally responsible for the same. If this is to be accepted, PR. says, even music can be called 'Kāvya', because it also produces aesthetic pleasure according to all rhetoricians. The same argument holds good to meet the view that 'Kāvya is one which rouses emotion'.

If Kāvya is accepted, PR. argues further, as constituting both Śabda and Artha, it is to be answered whether Kāvyatva rests with Śabda and Artha together (Vyāsakta) or seperately (Pratyeka Paryāpta). Either of the alternatives is untenable- because in the former case such expressions like 'the sentence of the verse is not a Kāvya' (Ślokavākyaṁ na Kāvyaṁ) would have come into vogue, on the basis of the general rule that 'one is not two' (Eko na dvau), and in the later case two Kāvyas will have to be accepted in one verse. Thereforc, he concludes, the Lakṣaṇa of a Kāvya should

be associated with Śabda alone as in the case of the Lakṣaṇas of Veda and Purāṇa [1] etc.

After dealing with the Viśeṣyadala (Śabdārthau) PR. takes up the Viśeṣaṇadalas 'Saguṇau', 'Sālaṅkārau' and 'Adoṣau' for examination. There are certain beautiful expressions like 'the disk of the Moon has appeared' (उदितं मण्डलं विधोः) and 'the Sun has set down' (गतोऽस्तमर्कः) which are devoid of any Guṇas or Alaṅkāras, but are suggestive of fine ideas, and hence falling under the purview of Kāvya. To avoid Avyāpti in such cases, the phrases 'Saguṇau' and 'Sālaṅkārau' should be dropped. Moreover, Guṇatva and Alaṅkāratva being non-comprehensive (Ananugata) (because so many Guṇas and Alaṅkāras may be emerging and disappearing from time to time, or interchanging their positions according to the divergent views of rhetoricians) they cannot be included in a Lakṣaṇa the very purpose of which is Anugama. Again, as Mammaṭa himself is going to explain, the Guṇas are considered as the qualities of Ātman (Rasa) and Alaṅkāras as its embelishments (Upaskāraka). How can, then, these things be associated with the body, that is, Śabda and Artha? According to the Adjective 'Adoṣau' a poem containing any defect, cannot be callee Kāvya at all. In such case, how can we justify the popular expression 'Duṣṭaṁ Kāvyaṁ' (this is a Kāvya having blemishes)? There is no scope for considering it as a Lākṣaṇikaprayoga, for, we cannot find any strong objection making the expression beyond justification. There may be certain things like 'Khaga-saṁyoga'

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1. Piculiarly enough, PR. says first, "एषैव च वेदपुराणलक्षणेत्वपि गतिः, अन्यथा तत्रापीय दुरवस्था स्यात्" that the Lakṣaṇas of Veda and Puraṇa etc., should be on the models of the Kāvyalakṣaṇa. But while concluding he cites the Lakṣaṇas of Veda and Purāṇa by way of analogy. "तस्मात् वेदशास्त्रपुराणलक्षणस्येव काव्यलक्षण स्यापि शब्दनिष्ठतैवोचिता ।" R.G., P. 7.

(contact with the bird) which are Avyāpyavṛttis,[1] on account of the difference of parts, but the same cannot be said in the case of Doṣābhāva. For, there can be such expressions like 'the tree is in contact with the bird on its trunk but not on the branch', but we do not come across such expressions like 'this verse is Kāvya in its first half (where there is no Doṣa) but *not in the second half* (because there is Doṣa in it).

After criticising Mammaṭa's definition, PR. examines the definition of Viśvanātha. Viśvanātha defines Kāvya as 'वाक्यं रसात्मकं काव्यम्' and this is nearer to the one given by PR. in that, this gives prominence to Śabda over Artha. But the only objection that is raised against this by PR. is that it is subject to the defect, Avyāpti, because this cannot include, among Kāvyas, such works which do not give predominance to Rasa. He says that such works should not be ignored as not being Kāvya because many of the Kāvyas of even great poets will have to be discarded as not being Kāvyas, against the established convention, for, there are many beautiful descriptions of things like the flowing water and the actions of children and apes etc. If in order to bring them under the scope of this Lakṣaṇa, one tries to establish some remote indirect connection with Rasa he will have to face the defect Ativyāpti, because such remote connection with Rasa can be traced in the case of even such wooden phrases like 'the cow moves about' and 'the deer runs', which should not come under the purview of the Lakṣaṇa. Thus PR. concludes the section dealing with the definition of Kāvya by refuting the Lakṣanas of his predecessors, which were holding ground during his time.

The definition of Kāvya as given by PR. has not been received unchallenged. PR. establishes that Śabda alone should be taken as the body of Kāvya, on the strength of the Lokavya-

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1. Avyāptavṛtti is a thing which co-exists with its own absence on the same ādhāra. "अव्याप्यवृत्तित्वञ्च स्वसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभाव प्रतियोगित्वम् ।" Tarkasaṅgrahasarvasva P. 13.

vahāra like 'poem was heard but the meaning was not understood' etc. But Nāgeśa and some of his followers, put forth some arguments to establish that both Śabda and Artha constitute Kāvya. Nāgeśa, in the guise of supplementing the views of PR. criticises him, in his own characteristic way. He cites another general usage 'Kāvyam buddham' (Kāvyam is understood) which proves that 'Kāvya' stands for its Artha also. He also says that the Bhāṣya on "तदधीते तद्वेद" (Panini Sutra IV – 2 – 59) presupposes that 'Veda' consists of both Śabda and Artha. In reply to the objections raised by PR. (whether Kāvyatva rests with Śabda and Artha together or seperately etc.), he says that the word Kāvya though it should mean both Śabda and Artha may be used to mean either of them by Laksaṇā. (G.M. P., P. 7) While advancin gsimiliar arguments Gaṅgādharśāstri (R.G. Kasi ed. P. 10) says that 'Saguṇau' and 'Adoṣau' need not be taken as the Uddeśyatāvacchedaka (i.e. they need not be taken as part of lakṣaṇa) in the Lakṣaṇa of a Kāvya, but both Śabda and Artha should be taken as Uddeśyatāvacchedaka, because the efforts of the poets are directed towards perfecting both these things with equal impartance. He argues, if Śabda alone is considered to be constituting Kāvya, why should one talk about things which are connected with Artha? Because, Śabda alone being the Kāvya, one should talk about only such things like Doṣaṣ, Alaṅkāras and etc., pertaining only to Śabda. Thus there are many scholars who try to vindicate the views of Mammaṭa and his followers.

Inspite of what has been said by all these critics, after all PR. appears to be quite justified in thinking that Śabda alone is generally meant by 'Kāvya' ann 'Veda' etc. There may be a few phrases like 'Kāvyam Buddham' etc., as cited by Nāgeśa. But they are not as common as such phrases like "काव्यं श्रुतम्, काव्यं उच्चैः पठितम्, अर्थो न ज्ञातः" etc.

From one's own personal experience, it can be seen that every one understands the words like 'Kāvya' and 'Veda' as meaning Śabda alone, till one comes across such definitions like

'शब्दार्थौ काव्यम्'. There is vast difference in the way in which we understand the phrases like 'काव्यं श्रुतं' 'काव्यं पठितम्' on one hand and काव्यं बुद्धम् on the other. The phrase 'Kāvyam Śrutam' simply means to us 'Kāvay was heard' (काव्यं श्रवणविषयीकृतम्) with no necessity of understanding 'the word of Kāvya was heard' but the phrase 'Kāvya Buddham' mean to us 'the meaning of the Kāvya was understood' (काव्यस्य अर्थ:ज्ञात:) and the very presence of ṣaṣṭhī Vibhakti indicates that the Kāvya and Artha are quite seperate things related with cach other as the container and the contained. Such usages, therefore, can be taken as Lākṣaṇika-prayogas.

Even in the passage of Mahābhāṣya cited by Nāgeśa, there is no strong evidence, that Patanjali takes the word 'Veda' to mean both Śabda and Artha. What all Patañjali states here is:-
किमर्थमिमावुभौ? न योऽधीते वेत्त्यप्यसौ । यस्तु वेत्ति अधीतेप्यसौ । नैतयोरावश्यकः समावेशः । भवति कश्चित् संपाठं पठति, न च वेत्ति; कश्चित्वेत्ति न च संपाठं पठति" । (Mahābhaṣya P-190).

As the well-known saying 'सिद्धानुगमसात्रंहि कर्तुं युक्तिपरीक्षकैः, न सर्वलोकसिद्धस्य लक्षणेन निवर्तनम्'. goes to explain even the definition of some-thing should be, as far es possible, in conformity with the general usage and PR's definition satifies this test also.

The writers on all the Śāstras with a few exceptions accet Śabda as one of the four Pamānas. (Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna and Śabda) and Veda is considered by all the Āstikas as the first and foremost Śabda-Pramāṇa. It is true that the Viyākaraṇas do not talk about these Pramāṇas. But they, at least Pāṇinīyas, do not challenge the authority of Vedas, of which Vyakarana is one of the Aṅgas. They did not either give a new name such as 'Śabdārtha-Pramāṇa' to the 'Śabda Pramāṇa', accepted by Naiyāyikas aad others. In such case it can be presumed that the name 'Śabda-Pramāṇa' must have been acceptable to 'Pāṇinīyas' also including Patañjali (according to

the famous principle अनुक्तमन्यतो ग्राह्यम्) and Veda as Śabda-Pramāna'. Ths names 'Vāṅmaya' Sārasvata' and etc., also support the view that Śābda alone is meant by 'Kāvya' and 'Veda' etc.

The well-known definition of Veda
"प्रत्यक्षेणानुमित्या वा यस्तूपायो न विद्यते ।
एनं विदन्ति वेदेन तस्माद् वेदस्य वेदता ।"
(Aitareya Brāhmaṇa Bhāṣya P.1)

indicates that 'Veda' is to be understood as 'that through which some things is known' (वेद्यते अनेनेति वेदः) and this definition is more appropriate to Śabda than Artha because the Artha is Vedya through Śabda.

The definition as given in 'Artha Saṅgraha' अपौरुषेयं वाक्यं वेदः (P. 27) lays stress on the Śabda-aspect of Veda. Again the well-know verses :-

"'अनादिनिधना नित्या वागुत्सृष्टास्वयंभुवा ।
आदौ वेदमयी दिव्या यतः सर्वाः प्रवृत्तयः' ।
(Śaṅkara's Sāriraka Bhāṣyam P, 322)

'काव्यालापाश्च ये केचित् गीतिकान्यखिलानि च ।
शब्दमूर्तिधरस्यैते विष्णोरंशा महात्मनः ।।
(Quoted from Vishṇpurāṇa in Sabityadarpana P-2)

go to prove the propriety of PR's contention. Therefore PR need not be considered to have committed any serious error, in giving prominence to Śabda. The examples like 'वेदं अध्यापयद्विधिम्' (सि. कौ.) 'पठति माणवको वेदम् पाठयति माणवकं वेदम् (काशिका) etc. given under 'गतिबुद्धि' etc. पाणिनि सू. 1-4-52 where 'Veda' is given as the 'Karma' in the form of शब्द of the roots अधी and पठ् clearly indicate that 'Veda' was accepted by them as शब्दरूप

Moreover, if both Śabda and Artha are considered as constituting a Kāvya, both kinds of usages like' 'काव्यं पठितम्' and

8858

'काव्यं बुद्धम्' etc., will have to be taken as Lākṣaṇikaprayogas. According to P.R.' s view, only Prayogas like the latter one, will have to be understood as Lākṣaṇika-Prayogas and as such there is some Lāghava also in PR.'s theory.

To say that 'Adṛṣau' etc., need not be included in Uddeśyatāvacchedaka, is only an implied acceptance of PR.'s view, because, in such case, he also does not have any objection to include them merely as a statement of facts but not as a part of Lakṣaṇa; for, he himself says 'गुणालङ्कारादिभिः निरूपणीये तस्मिन् (काव्ये)' etc. (The nature of Kavya is to be explained with the explanation of the nature of guṇas and Alaṅkaras etc.)at the beginning of his Lakṣaṇa, All the other objections raised by Śāstri and others appear to have resulted from the erroneous conception that PR. has completely ignored the Artha itself; which is not the case at all. His main concern is to find out whether Śabda alone should be taken as the body of poetry orŚabda and Artha together. While accepting Śabda as Śarīta, he is, as his Lakṣaṇa itself shows, conscious of the presence of Artha as the associate (Viśeṣaṇa vidhayā). And now where is scope for the argument that he should not talk about things connected with Artha?

It has been the practice of some scholars 1 to quote 'वागर्थाविव सम्पृक्तौ वागर्थप्रतिपत्तये' etc. (R.V.I. 1) of Kālidāsa and शब्दार्थौ सत्कविरिव (Siśupālavadha II-86 of Māgha to prove that some of the great old poets also are in favour of the view 'Śabārthau Kāvyam'. But such quotations lead us no where. Because it cannot be said that PR. being a great Mīmāmsaka as well, does not understand that Śabda and Artha are inseperably united 'औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धः........' (the relation between śabda and Artha is permanent) (Jaimini Sūtra 1-1-5). why; he himself says afterwards, while talking about Pratibhā 'सा च काव्यघटनानुकूलशब्दार्थोपस्थिति :' (R.G. P. 9) (The effort-less prese-

1. 'Some problems of Sanskrit poetics'. P. 2.

nce (in the mind) of words and meanings, useful for the composition of a Kāvya is called Pratibhā). Only thing he wanted to establish is that 'Kāvya' means Śabda conveying Artha but not Śabda and Artha together. In fact, as will be explained later, PR. gives more importance to Artha in a Kāvya, than what is given by Ubhayavādins.

Now let us examine if the views express d by PR. regarding the Kāvyalakṣaṇa can find any supporters among older rhetoricians or his contemporaries. Śrīvatsalāñchana, the author of 'Kāvyaparīkṣa' (who is believed to have belonged to the period between 1323 and 1330 Kāvyaparīkṣā Intr. P. 12 & 13.) closely follows the Kāvyalakṣaṇa, said to hove been given by Candīdasa and defines Kāvya:-

'काव्यमास्वादजीवातुः पदसन्दर्भ उच्यते ।
सालङ्कारगुणादोषौ शब्दार्थाविति केचन ।।'

(Kavya Parikṣā P. 1).

"The arrangement of words, hrving enjoyment or pleasure as its life is Kāvya. Some say that Śabda and Artha which are associated with guṇas and Alaṅkaras and which are devoid of Doṣas constituted a Kāvya.'

After givīng this definition he states that according to the older people, Śabda alone is Kāvya because of the general usage : काव्यं करोति' 'काव्यं पठति' and 'काव्यं श्रृणोति' etc., This usage is (referred to by PR. also). Again he refers to some views in the followīng words :- " केचितु आस्वादव्यञ्जकत्वमेव काव्यत्वमित्याहुः " and "एकस्मिन्नेव पद्ये यदंशे दोषाभाव तदंशे काव्यत्वम् । यदंशे दोषः तदंशे अकाव्यत्वम् । तथा वैकमेव पद्यं काव्यमकाव्यं च" etc. (Kāvya Pariksā. P.I). which were cited and refuted by P.R. as seen above.

Prabhākarabhaṭṭa the author of Rasapradīpa (written 1582), (R.P. Introduction P.8) defines Kavya after examining Mammata's definition, in following words:- वस्तुवस्तु चमत्कार विशेष

कारित्वं सुखविशेषकारित्वं वा काव्यलक्षणम्। सुखविशेषस्तु स्वसंवेद्यो जातिरूप एवेति विपञ्चितं मयालङ्काररहस्ये" (RP. P.8).

Ofcourse this Camatkāritvam results according to him from the presence of either Rasa or Bhāva-(RP. P.8). After discussing as to which is Sukhāvacchedaka (whether it is Kāvyatva or something else), he concludes that: – एवञ्च तत्तद्विभावादिप्रतिपादकवाकय त्वमेव तत्तज्जात्यवच्छिन्नकार्यतानिरूपितकारणतावच्छेदकं: न काव्यत्वम्। विशेष-कार्यकारणभावस्यावश्यकत्वा त्तेनैव सिध्दौ काव्यत्वतत्तज्जातिपुरस्कारेण सामान्य कार्यकारणभावान्तरस्वीकारे मानाभावात्" etc. (R P. P. 11)

But contrary to his own statement, he says, at the end, that Kāvya does not consist of either Śabda alone or Artha, or both Śabda and Artha but it consists of their association, (RP. P.13) and in this statement we see the influence of Kuntaka.

According to Pradīpa kṛt, as quoted by Prabhākarabhaṭṭa (RP. P.12) (These lines could not be traced in the Kāvyapradīpa) Kāvyatva rests with Śabda alone because the Pūrvanipāta of 'Śabda' in 'Śabdārthau' according to the Vārtika "अजाद्यदन्तम्" (Aṣṭādhyāyi 2.2.33) (according to which it should have been 'Arthaśabdau'), indicates the importance of Śabda and this importance is only by being Viśeṣya (अर्थविशिष्टः शब्दः)

Another writer Siddhicandragaṇi, the author of Kāvyaprakāśakhaṇḍana, after referring to the views of Sāhityadarpaṇa about the Kāvyalakṣaṇa, refutes the Lakṣaṇa of Candīdāsa also (काव्यमास्वादजीवातुः पदसन्दर्भः) on the ground that when it is not clearly known what is Āsvādajīvātu, how can it be included in Kāvyālakṣaṇa ; and if it is known, that itself should be included in the Lakṣaṇa. Then he says on the lines followed by PR.

"नवीनास्तु 'काव्यत्वमखण्डोपाधिः। चमत्कारजनकतावच्छेदकस्य काव्यपदप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तस्य चान्यस्य वक्तु मशक्यत्वात् तदेव लक्षणमस्तु किमनेनाननुगतेन लक्षणेन' इति वदान्ति"। (KPK P.3)

He also puts forth same arguments as those advanced by PR. to establish that 'Kāvya' consists of Śabda alone but not both Śabda aud Artha. यदपि 'काव्यत्वं शब्दार्थोभयवृत्ति' तदपि न 'काव्यं करोति' 'काव्यं पठति श्रृणोति' चेति व्यवहाराच्छब्द एव काव्यत्वं कल्पनीयम्" etc.,

The foregoing account, goes to prove that there were certain ideas regarding Kāvyalakṣaṇa in the form of arguments and counter-arguments, even before PR. and during his time, and it was given to him, to give a definite turn to those arguments and arrive at the definition of Kāvya in a Nyāya-style with much precision and modernity of out look. And PR. is able to give wider scope to the Lakṣaṇa by introducing the word 'Camatkāra' "a general and all comprehensive name for literary relish". (Some concepts of Alaṅkāraśāstra' P. 269.). In the words of Dr. Raghavan "It is again on the basis of this Camatkāra, that Jagannātha gives his most comprehensive definition of poetry in his Rasagaṅgādhara. Camatkāra, he says, is the supermundane, artistic delight brought about by the contemplation of beauty and poetry is such verbal expression as is the embodiment of an idea conveying such beauty". (Ibid. P. 271)

KĀVYA-HETU

The Source of Poetry or The Poet's Equipment.

After defining Kāvya, PR. discusses about the Kāvyahetu. The Kāvyahetu has been the subject of discussion for almost all the rhetoricians Bhāmaha downwards. It is generally believed that the main concern of the Indian critic is with the offect that has to be produced by a poetical work on the mind of the reader or the audience with little intrest in the poetic intuition or the working of the poet's mind. ('Some problems of Sanskrit poetics' pp. 32-33.) Bnt, as can be judged from the discussion on Kāvyahetu, to which some space has invariably been devoted by every rnetorician, and which mainly concerns itself with the genius and equipment of the poet, though not with his individual personality (which is, of course, very difficult to deal with completly) one has to admit that

our rhetoricians also are well–aware of this aspect of literary criticism.

All the rhetoricians are unanimous in recognising the importance of the three qualities i. e. Pratibhā, (Intuition), Vyutpatti (learning) and Abhyāsa, (Practice) in produciug a poetical work. The difference lies only in accepting the relative superiority of Pratibhā over the other two, or in ascribing equal importance to all the three qualities or in accepting the last two qualities as auxiliaries to the former. Thus we can divide the rhetoricians into three gorups:-

1. Those who give equal importance to all the three, each one being the cause of poetry seperately,
2. Those accepting superiority of Pratibhā over others which are helpful to it, and
3. Those who accept that Pratibhā, Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa, all these three things put together, are the source of poetry.

Before deciding the relative importance or otherwise of Pratibhā, Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa let us examine their nature,

As is described in Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad "कामः सङ्कल्पो विचिकित्सा श्रद्धाऽश्रद्धा धृतिरधृतिर्ह्रीर्धीर्भीरित्येतत्सर्वं मन एव ।" Br. U. 1–5–3, the Manas has got different aspects, having different functions and Pratibhā is one of such mental powers. The different aspects of Manas are given different names by the rhetoricians also and the following Kārikas give us a definite idea about them :-

"स्मृतिर्व्यतीतविषया मतिरागामिगोचरा ।
बुद्धिस्तात्कालिकी ज्ञेया प्रज्ञा त्रैकालिकी मता ।
प्रज्ञां नवनवोन्मेषशालिनीं प्रतिभां विदुः ।
द्वे वर्त्मनी गिरां देव्याः शास्त्रञ्च कविकर्म च ।
प्रज्ञोपज्ञं तयोराद्यं प्रतिभोद्भवमन्तिमम् ।।"

(Sampradāya Prakasini (K.P.) P. 8)

Thus 'Smṛti' is connected with past things, 'Mati' with future things, 'Buddhi' with the present while 'Prajñā' is connected with

the things of all times, and Pratibhā is the neme of the Prajñā, ever unfolding itself into newer regions. This Pratibhā, otherwise known as 'Śakti', has been axplained by all the rhetoricians, in similar terms :-

Bhaṭṭatauta :— "प्रज्ञा नवनवोन्मेषशालिनी प्रतिभा मता ।
तदनुप्राणनाजीववर्णनानिपुणः कविः ।।[1]
तस्य कर्म स्मृतं काव्यम् ।"

Abhinavagupta :— "प्रतिभा अपूर्ववस्तुनिर्माणक्षमा प्रज्ञा । तस्या विशेषो रसावेशवैशद्यसौन्दर्यकाव्यनिर्माणक्षमत्वम्" (Locana P.92)
and "शक्तिः
प्रतिभानं वर्णनीयवस्तुविषयनूतनोल्लेखशालित्वम्"
(Locana P. 317)

Mammaṭa :— "शत्तिः कवित्ववीजरूपः संस्कारविशेषः" । (K.P., P.8)

Vāgbhaṭa :— "प्रसन्नपदनव्यार्थयुक्त्युद्बोधविधायनी ।
स्फुरन्ती सत्कवेर्बुध्दिः प्रतिभा सर्वतोमुखी"
(Vagbhaṭalaṅkāra P. 4)

Rājaśekhara :— "या शब्दग्राममर्थसार्थमलङ्कारतन्त्रमुक्तिमार्गमन्यदपि तथाविधमधिहृदयं प्रतिभासयति सा प्रतिभा ।"
(Kāvyamimāṁsā 26-27)

Rudraṭa :— "मनसि सदा सुसमाधिनि विस्कुरणमनेकधाभिधया ।
अक्लिष्टनि च पदानि विभान्ति यस्यामसौ शक्तिः ।
प्रतिभेत्यपरैरुक्ता ।" (Kāvyālaṅkāra P. 6)

According to Bhartṛhari Pratibhā is the instinct in not only men but also in animals and birds which alone is responsible for their peculiar capacities like building of their nests etc. (Vākyapadīyam. II. 143-151)

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1. Quoted in Kṛṣnamāchārya's History of Classical Sanskrit Literature. P. 749.

Mahimabhṭṭa :- Mahimabhaṭṭa explains Pratibhā as the 'Prajñā' stirred by a momentary contact with his own self of a poet whose mind is calmly concentrated on the Śabdas and Arthas appropriate for Rasa :—

"रसानुगुणशब्दार्थचिन्तास्तिमितचेतसः ।
क्षणं स्वरूपस्पर्शोत्था प्रज्ञैव प्रतिभा कवेः"
साहि चक्षुर्भगवतः तृतीयमिति गीयते ।
येन साक्षात्करोत्येष भवांस्त्रैकाल्यवर्तिनः ।। (Vyaktiviveka P.452-53)

According to Kuntaka Pratibhā is the result of the development or fruition of Samaskāras accumalated in the present and the previous births :— "प्राक्तनाद्यतनसंस्कारप्रौढा प्रतिभा काचिदेव कवि शक्तिः" (Vakroktijivitam P. 107)

While many of the rhetoricians appear to be in favour of identifying Śakti with Pratibhā as shown above, Rājaśekhara maintains that Śakti is different from Pratibhā, the former being the root-cause of the latter. It is the root-cause of Vyutpatti also:- "विप्रसृतिश्च सा (शक्तिः)प्रतिभाव्युत्पत्तिभ्याम् । शक्तिकर्तृके हि प्रतिभा व्युत्पत्तिकर्मणी ।" (Kavyamimāmsā. P. 26)

As can be seen from the above accounts, the following is the nature and the function of Pratibhā:-

1. Pratibhā is the natural iustinct of a man, mainly inherited from his Previous births,

2. It unfolds itself in the ever-new regions of understanding and imagination,

3. It is the genius of the poet culminating into the creation of things not familiar previously,

4. It gives the poet the capacity to give a form and local habitation to the things of mental creation, and

5. It also presents the poet with words and meanings and Alaṅkāras etc:, suitable and heldful for the creation of fine poetry.

Vyutpatti:- The poet is required to acquire all the knowledge that is avilable at his time, with complete understanding of the society, he lives in or wants to depict. This has been succinctly brought out by Rudraṭa in the following verse:-

"छन्दोव्याकरणकलालोकस्थितिपदपदार्थविज्ञानात् ।
युक्तायुक्तविवेको व्युत्पत्तिरियं समासेन ।"

(Rudrata's Kāvyalaṅkāra P. 6.)

According to Abhinavagupta Vyutpatti aids Pratibhā by way of giving discriminatory power in arranging the material :-
"शक्तिः प्रतिभानम् । वर्णनीयवस्तुविषयनूतनोल्लेखशालित्वम् । व्युत्पत्तिस्तदुपयोगि समस्तवस्तुपौर्वापर्यपरामर्शकौशलम् ।" (Locana. P. 317)

Abhyāsa :— Abhyāsa is the constant practice in composing poetry which ultimately leads the poet to perfection. Vāmana lays stress on the need of Abhyāsa postulating some methods and proper times congenial for the same. (Kāvyalāṅkārasūtra. P. 10-11) Rudraṭa also attaches great importance to Abhayāsa while he writes :- "अधिगतसकलज्ञेयः सुकवेः सुजनस्य सन्निधौ नियतम् ।
नक्तन्दिवमभ्यस्येदभियुक्तः शक्तिमान् काव्यम् ।।"

(Kāvyalaṅkāra. P. 20)

Now let us examine the views of some important writers on the above subject. Bhāmaha says that a man aspiring to become poet should acquire knowledge of all branches of learing and make a constant practice under the guidance of an able teacher. (Kāvyalañkāra. I. 9. 10)

Thus he accepts the importance of Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa. But at the very first instance he stresses on the importance of Pratibhā, without which, as he would like to suggest, both the Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa would be useless. (K. A. I. 5) Coming to Dandin we find that he is in favour of giving equal importance to all of them i. e. Pratibhā Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa. (Kāvyādarśa. I. 103) As though contradicting the views of Bhāmaha who is inclined to give first place to Pratibhā, Dandin says that even a man

who is devoid of inborn Pratibhā can become a good poet, if he can acquire a high standard of Vyutpatti and does constant practice.
(kāvyādarasa I. 104)

Vāmana also recognises the importance of Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa and he deals with them rather more elaborately. But he gives prime importance only to Pratibhā in unequivocal terms (K.A.S. III. 16). Then comes Rudrata who also appears to be in favour of giving first place to Pratibhā. He talks of two kinds of Pratibhā-one, Sahajā (inborn) and the other Utpādyā. The inborn Pratibhā requires some refinement (Samskāra) by Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa and it is superior to the Utpādyā which is to be produced by them (Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa). (Kāvyalaṅkāra-I. 14-17)

Ānandavardhana does not deal with the Kāvyahetu, as a seperate subject but he clearly says that Pratibhā is the most important of all the three qualities, because the absence of Pratibhā magnifies even the slightest blemish in a Kāvya, however great may be the erudition of the poet. (D. A. P, 316) In another place he states, for a man possessing Pratibhā, there is no dearth of the material for the composition of good poetry. (D. A- P. 537).

Kuntaka also, in his Vakroktijīvita, incidentally talks of the three Kāvyahetus and even here, in his own characteristic way, he makes a psychological observation. According to him if a man is of refined nature, his Śakti or Pratibhā also will be of the same kind and he would pursue only to acquire such Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa which are in keeping with the gentleness of his nature and Śakti. Therefore, instead of being influenced by Vyutpatti or Abhyāsa, as is generally believed by other writers, Pratibhā itself determins the course of them. Then Kuntaka raises a questiou whether it is correct to say that Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa which are the later acquisitions are influenced by a man's own nature. And he answers this questions in affirmative, saying, let alone the case of a Kāvya, in every thing the Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa are guided and influenced by a man's nature. At last he accepts that the Svabhāva (here Pratibhā) Vyutpatti

and Abhyāsa help each other i. e. when Svābhāva guides the Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa, they in their turn, can influence the Svabhāva also to some extent. (Vakroktijivitam. P. 103)

In some other places while talking about other subjects, Kuntaka incidentally indicates the supremacy of Pratibhā:-

"यद्यपि द्वयोरप्येतयोः तत्प्राधान्येनैव वाक्योपनिबन्धः तथापि कविप्रतिभाप्रौढिरेव प्राधान्येनावतिष्ठते।" (V. J; P. 32)

"यत्किंचनापि वैचित्र्यं तत् सर्वं प्रतिभोद्भवम्।
सौकुमार्यपरिस्पन्दस्यन्दि यत्र विराजते" (V. J; P. 105)

"एतच्चैतस्यैव कवेः सहजसौकुमार्यमुद्रितसूक्तिपरिस्यन्दिसौकुमार्यस्य पर्यालोच्यते, न पुनरन्येषामाहार्यमात्रकाव्यकरणकौशलश्लाघिनाम्" (V.J; P. 167)

Thus Kuntaka says, in clear terms, that poetry worth its name, can be the product of only the Pratibhā but not of any thing else.

Abhinavagupta, as though intending to endorse the views of Āndndavardhana regarding the superiority of Pratibhā, pays homage to it (Her), in the following Śloka at the end of the first chapter of Locana:- "यदुन्मीलनशक्त्यैव विश्वमुन्मीलति क्षणात्।
स्वात्मायतनविश्रान्तां तां वन्दे प्रतिभां शिवाम्।"
(Locana. P. 164)

According to Trikadarśana Paramaśivatattva is the highest of all the 36 Tattvas. As soon as a desire for the creation appears in the heart of Paramaśiva, He assumes two forms, Siva and śakti. This śakti, otherwise called 'Vimarśa' or 'Pratibhā' manifests herself in creation, existence and destruction of the world. While residing in Śiva himself she bestows him with the capacity of understanding his own caitanyarūpa and Prakāśarūpa. Thus while using the word in this Philosophical sense Abhinavagupta suggests to us that Pratibhā to a poet, the creator of the poetical world, is what Pratibhā is to śiva, the creator of the world.

Mangala, who is known to us only through Rājaśekhara, appears to be in favour of giving much importance to Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa. After quoting the veiws of Syāmadeva, who holds samādhi (concentration) as the requisite equipment of a poet, Rājaśekhara tells us that Maṅgala would like to give such important place to Abhyāsa (K. M; P. 26). As regards the relative superiority of Pratibhā and Vyutpatti, Mangala holds a view, quite opposite to that of Ānandavardhana. According to him Vyutpatti can compensate the absence of Pratibhā. (K. M; P. 38). Rājaśekara, after referring to the views of Ānandavardhana and Mangala, each upholding the superiority of Pratibhā and Vyutpatti respectively, comes out with his own view and says that both Pratibhā and Vyutpatti are equally important in their mutual association. (K. M; P. 39)

This is an attempt on the part of Rājaśekhara to effect some kind of compromise between the two extreme views, and the same consideration must have weighed with Mamaṭa also. According to Rājaśkhara Pratibhā is of two kinds 'Kārayitrī' (creative) and 'Bhāvayitrī' (Appreciative). The former is again divided into three varieties (1) 'Sahajā' (in born) (2) 'Āhāryā' (acquired in this birth only) and (3) 'Aupādeśikī' (resulting from the grace of gods or guru). Thus Rājaśekhara introduces an elaborate discussion aboui Pratibhā the influence of which can be found on later writers. Mammaṭa includes Abhyāsa also and says that all tne three combined together should be taken as the root-cause of poetry. According to Vāgbhaṭa(Alankāratilaka. P.2) and KeśavaMiśra (Alankārasekhara. P. 4) Pratibhā alone is the cause of poetry while the other two are useful as its auxiliaries.

According to Hemacandra,Prathibhā alone is the root-cause of poetry, while Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa are useful only for its refinement. He says that the last two are useless without Pratibhā. Hemacandras also classified Pratibhā as Sahajā and Aupādhikī. While explaining the difference between these two kinds of Prathibhā, he gives a slight Philosophical turn. The natural bright-

ness of Ātman like that of Sun, is temporarily shrouded by things like Ajñāna as by a cloud. The appearance of this Prakāśa after the removal of the cover by the causes not known in this birth, is Sahajā Pratibhā. When the removal of this cover has been effected by causes known to us (like Mantra etc.,) the Prakāśa is called Aupādhikī-pratibhā. The purpose of the Mantras etc., is the destruction of the existing obstructions and the Suspension of the forthcoming ones. (Kāvyānuśāsanam. P. 6)

Narendra Prabhasūri, the author of Alaṅkāramahodadhi, opines that Pratibhā alone is the cause of Kāvya like a Bīja (seed) for the sprout, and Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa to Pratibhā are what the earth and water are to the seed (Sahakārikāraṇa only).

(Alankaramahodadhi. P. 7)

Many other rhetoricians also express their views about Pratibhā Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa and all their views are based on one or the other of the troeries discussed above. Now the line of thinking of P.R. can be well appreciated under this background.

At the very outset, P. R. says that only Pratibhā is the root-cause of poetry. He defines Pratibhā as the quick presence of words and meanings useful for the composition of Kāvya (R. G; P. 9) . This definition is quite in keeping with the etymology of the word 'Pratibhā' which is derived from the root 'Bhā' with 'Prati'. While defining like this, P.R. thinks that Pratibhā is one of the many aspects (functions) of the mind. Perhaps he does not think, even worth considering, the view that Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa also can be Put on par with Pratibhā regarding the creation of poetry. He proceeds stright way to state how Pratibhā can be produced. The Pratibhā is the result of either some Adṛṣṭa, an unknown cause, the grace of gods or great men(which may be of the previous birth or present one) or of peculiar Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa. Thus, though being a Pratibhāvādin, P. R. gives a relatively more important place to Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa,

because while many of his predecessors aecept that they can effect some Samskāra only, he says that they can directly produce. Pratibhā itself. This is an indirect acceptance of the importance of Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa; but P.R's approach is quite scientific, especially in view of the definition of Psatibhā that is given by him. Even if we accept the views of Trayavādins, for the sake of argument, what is the use of Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa, excepting that they cause the presence of Śabdas and Arthas, which is no other than Pratibhā? A common example can justify the stand taken by PR. When the flame of a light burns the finger, we simplv say it is burnt by the light; we do not say it is burnt by the light, the wick, and the oil, etc,, though the very existence of the light depends upon the wick and lamp etc. Similarly, what is wrong in accepting that Pratibhā alone is the cause of poetry, though at times the Pratibhā itself is the result of other things like Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa etc.? 1

Scholars like Gagnādharaśāstri (R.G. Kaśī. ed. P. 16) refuse to appreciate this stand of PR. and try to uphold the views of Mammaṭa and other Trayavādins. But it is interesting to note that even Mammaṭa, perhaps inadvertently, gives more importance to Pratibhā. While explaining what is Śakti he states that (K. P. P. 8) Śakti is the seed (Bīja) of poetry and no poetry can be produced without this, and even if it is produced it will not be worth the name. While commenting on the word 'Bīja' Nāgeśa states in the Uddyota: that just as water helps a seed to develop into a sprout the Vyutpatti, etc., also help Pratibhā as sahakārins (auxialaries) in producing a Kāvya. (K. P.; P. 7)

Thus Nāgeśa makes Vyutpatti etc., only as Sahakārikāraṇas. Viewed, in this light; PR. gives them much importance,

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(1) Bhartṛhari talks of six kinds of Pratibhā:– (1) natural (2) produced by good conduct (3) by practice, (4) by yoga (5) by an unknown cause connected with previous birth, (6) or by the blessings of greatmen.

"स्वभावाचरणाभ्यासयोगादृष्टोपपादिताम् ।
विशिष्टोपहितां चेति प्रतिभां षड्विधां विदुः ॥"

because he accepts them as the cause of Pratibhā directly. P. R shows the futility of the stand of the Kāraṇatrayavādins by citing at length the example of people like Kavikarṇapūra who, with little Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa could compose beautiful Kāvyas by the grace of Mahāpuruṣas.

P. R. does not draw any clear distinction between the two kinds of Pratibhā Sahajā and Utpādyā. But he says that Pratibhā can result from the Adṛṣṭa also. When the Adṛṣṭa is of the previous birth, we can take the Pratibhā as Sahajā, and when it is the result of the Adṛṣṭa of this birth only or of Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa it can be taken as Utpādya. Ofcourse P. R. does not trouble himself with such petty classifications.

Pratibhātva is a jāti, says P. R. If Pratibhātva cannot be accepted as a jāti, on account of any reason, it can be taken as an Akhaṇḍopādhi (like Ākāśatva etc.). Such things like Nīlaghaṭatva are considered to be Sakhaṇḍopādhis because Nailya etc, also appear in them adjectival to Ghaṭa etc, (Vaiśiṣṭyāvabhāsa). Taking the word Pratibhā as 'नवनवोन्मेषशालिनी प्रज्ञा' in the conventional way, Nāgeśa and his followers read it 'Khaṇḍopādhih' because Navanavonmeṣaśālitva also appears in Pratibhātva in adjectival way. But in view of the way in which he understands Pratibhā (काव्यघटनानुकूलशब्दार्थोपस्थितिः) P.R. appears to be correct in saying Pratibhātva as Akhaṇḍopādhi.

It is interesing to note that Siddhicandragaṇi, citing a similar example, states that Śakti alone should be taken as the cause of Kāvya because even children are seen composing poetry. (K. P.K, P.2) This and the identity of other views of these two authors indicate that P. R. is putting forward the theories that have been prevailing in his time, some of which must have been originated and propagated by himself.

CLASSIFICATION OF KĀVYAS

As the history of the development of poetics would show us, earlier writers fromBhāmaha to Ānandavardhana, were nmaily

engaged in finding out the external factors of a Kāvya like Śabda Artha and the Alaṅkāras associated with them. They were never serious about its internal qualities like Dhvani, Rasa and etc., though we find some indirect reference to them in their works also, here and there. Therfore it is but natural that their classification of Kāvya should be based on external things like Śabda, Artha and the language etc. For example Bhāmaha's classification of Kāvya is as follows :—

(a) First, Kāvya is classified, on the basis of the difference of composition, into two groups :—

(1) Gadya-Kāvya (Prose) (2) Padya-Kāvya (Poetry)

(b) into three groups on the basis of language :—

(1) Saṁskṛta (2) Prākṛa and (3) Apabhraṁśa,

(c) into four groups on the basis of the theme :—

(1) Vṛttadevādi carita śaṁsi (narrating the real story of gods and the like), (2) Utpādyavastu (narrating the story of poets own invention), (3) Kalāśraya (connected with arts), and (4) Śāstrāśraya (connected with Śāstras),

(d) into five groups on the basis of construction :—

(1) Sargabandha (Mahākāvya divided into Sargas), (2) Abhineyārtha (drama), (3) (4) Ākhyāyikā and Kathā (varieties of prose composition), and (5) Anibaddha (otherwise known Muktaka, compositions of verses, each self-contained) (Kāyālaṅkāra. I. 16-18). Similar method of classificatton has been adopted by the followers of Bhāmaha with slight variations here and there.

The attention of rhetoricians has been diverted to the internal aspect of the poetry by Ānandavardhana through his epoke-making work Dhvanyāloka. There we find the basis for a different kind of classification of poetry. Ānandavardhana does not propose any new classificatson under seperate headings, but its indications are cleary seen in his work and the same has been treated, under a seperate heading by Mammaṭa.

According to his new principle of classification, Ānandavardhana can be surmised to be intent upon grouping poetry under three headings :— (1) Uttama (2) Madhyama and (3) Adhama, which he calls 1) Dhvani 2) Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya and 3) Citra, respectively. (1) When the Śabda and Artha subordinate themselves and suggest some thing new, this is the instance of Dhvani (Kāvya) (Dhvanyāloka. P. 103). (2) Guṇībhutavyaṅgya is that Kāvya where the expressed meaning is more pleasant than the suggested one (D.A., P. 459). (3) The Kāvya where the embellishment of Śabda and Artha is given more importance is called Citra (D.A., P. 494)

The important features of all these three varities of Kāvya are explained by Ānandavardhana in the following words :—

"व्यङ्ग्यार्थस्य प्राधान्ये ध्वनिसञ्ज्ञितः काव्यप्रकारः। गुणभावे तु गुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्यम्। ततोऽन्यद्रसभावादितात्पर्यरहितव्यङ्ग्यार्थविशेषप्रकाशनशक्तिशून्यञ्च काव्यं केवलवाच्यवाचकवैचित्र्यमात्राश्रयेणोपनिबद्धमालेख्यप्रख्यं यदाभासते तच्चित्रम्। न तन्मुख्यं काव्यम्। काव्यानुकारो हि सः। तत्र किञ्चिच्छब्दचित्रं यथा दुष्करयमकादि। वाच्यचित्रं ततः शब्दचित्रादन्यत् व्यङ्ग्यार्थसंस्पर्शरहितं प्राधान्येन वाक्यार्थतया स्थितं रसादितात्पर्यरहितमुत्प्रेक्षादिकम्॥" (Dhvanyāloka. P.494)

Mammaṭa follows the classification hinted by Ānandavardhana and gives the names of 'Uttama' (K.P., P.15), 'Madhyama, (K P., P. 18), and 'Adhama' (K.P., P.19), to the 'Dhvani', 'Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya' and 'Citra', respectively. He divides Citra into two groups :— (1) Śabdacitra and (2) Arthacitra and adds that Citra contains Alaṅkāras with negligible Vyaṅgyārtha. (K.P; P. 19). This classification of Kāvya as given by Mammaṭa has been followed verbatim by almost all the later Ālaṅkārikas excepting a few like Viśvanātha and PR.

Viśvanātha is not prepared to accept every work as Kāvya unless it contains some relishable suggested sense (Āsvādayogya-Vyaṅgyārtha). Therefore there is no question of 'Citra' being a variety of Kāvya at all (S.D; P. 248). This stand of Viśvanātha is justified to some extant in view of his definition of Kāvya.

(वाक्यं रसात्मकं काव्यम्). Inspite of all that is written by him, Viśvanātha's classification does not seem to be in conformity with his definition, for, once he accepts Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya as a variety of Kāvya, which cannot be Rasapradhāna and thus 'Rasātmaka', is he not contradicting his own Lakṣaṇa ? That is why only Mammaṭa's classification, which can claim the general support of Ānandavardhana has been popular with later rhetoricians, excepting PR.

PR's discerning mind is not satisfied with the classification of Mammaṭa, which, in some points, goes against the views of Ānandavardhana He strictly adheres to his definition of Kāvya and takes camatkāra as the deciding factor, in the superiority or otherwise of the Kāvya and of the Vyaṅgya in it. As is rightly pointed out by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta such Kāvyas as having Goṇībhūtavyaṅgya with no less charm, are more in number than the Dhvani-Kāvyas. (D. A; P. 463. Locana. P. 462). While explaining that Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya also can be the source of camatkāra, PR. gives a beautiful analogy and says that though subordinate to another thing, Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya eontains some peculiar charm of its own, like a qeen striving under servitude fallen to her lot, by adversity of fate. (R. G; P. 21). This analogy may suggest that the Vyaṅgya in such particular contexts is not able to get the place which it deserves; but it does not indicate how it can be a source of Chamatkāra. The analogy, given by Ānandavardhana in similiar context provides a higher place to the camatkāra that is produced by the Guṇībhūtavyaṅgyas. He compares the Guṇībhūtavyaṅgyas where Vyaṅgya has become subordinate to some Vācyārtha etc., with a king who follows his servant at the time of his marriage. In fact, on such occasion, the dignity of the king is enhanced. This suggests how Sahṛdaya can find much Camatkāra even in Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya. (D.A;P.463). Such being the case we are not sure if Ānandavardhana would have approved it to be named Madyama kāvya while naming the Dhvani 'Uttama'. As can be seen from the general approval accorded to the GuṇībhūtaVyaṅgya, we can surmise that Ānanda-

vardhana might not have accepted so much of disparity between Vyaṅgya and Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya as to call the one 'Uttama' and the other 'Madhyama'. That is why he cleverely names them, according to their nature, 'Vyaṅgya' and 'Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya' etc., without committing himself further.

What ever might be the idea of Ānandavardhana, P. R. felt that such a popular type of Kāvya as Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya, should not be given a position lesser than that of of Uttama. But in order to maintain the conventional superiority of Dhvanikāvya he names it 'Uttamottama'. Another thing he is particular about is that all the Arthālaṅkāras including the Samāsokti and Paryāyokti etc., should not indiscriminately be grouped under Citrakāvya and called 'Adhama', regardless of the fact that they contain some charming Vyaṅgya, though Guṇībhūta. Thus he tries to correct the stand taken by Mammaṭa, at laest as explained by his commentators. (R. G; P. 20).

Thus Kāvya, according to PR. is of four varieties:–
(1) 'Uttamottama' (2) 'Uttama' (3) 'Madyama' and (4) 'Adhama'.
(1) 'Uttamottama is the Kāvya where Śabda and Artha relegate themselves to a subordinate position and suggest a charming sense' "शब्दार्थौ यत्रगुणीभावितात्मानौ कमप्यर्थमभिव्यङ्‌क्तः तदाद्यम् ।" This is almost similar to the definitions given by Ānandavardhana (D. A; P. 103) and Mammaṭa (K. P.; P. 15). But as is noted above, PR. takes Camatkāra as the deciding factor and includes the same in the Lakṣaṇa. Ofcourse the importance of Camatkāra has been recognised by Ānandavardhana himself, and so it cannot be called as a new innovation of PR; but the credit of making it as the measuring rod in clear terms should certainly go to him only. In the above Lakṣaṇa the phrase 'Kamapi' is explained as meaning 'source of Camatkāra' and this excludes the Atigūḍhavyaṅgya and Sphuṭavyaṅgya (where the suggested sense is very much concealed or clear) which are devoid of charm, from the scope of Uttamottama Kāvya. If Camatkāra alone is taken as the critarian, Vācyasiddyaṅga (where the suggested sense justifies conno-

ted sense) also will have to be included in the first catagory, in that it also contains Camatkāra. This Ativyāpati is avoided by using the phrase 'Guṇībhāvitātmānau'. All the Dhvanis of Rasa, Rasābhāsa and Bhāva etc., come under the first catagory.

'Uttama is the Kāvya where the Vyaṅgya is charming only being subordinate to Śabda or Artha or both' "यत्र व्यङ्ग्यमप्रधानमेव सत् चमत्कारकारण तद्द्वितीयम्।" There are some instances where the Vyaṅgya is superior (Pradhāna) to Vācya etc., but subordinate to another Vyaṅgya.

PR. while explaining the purpose of 'Eva' in the above Lakṣaṇa gives his decision as to the group under which such instances should falll. He says that they should come under Uttamo–ttama-Kāvya. "वाच्यापेक्षया प्रधानीभूतं, व्यङ्ग्यान्तरमादाय गणीभूतं व्यङ्ग्यमादाय अतिव्याप्तिवारणाय अवधारणम्" R.G., P. 20). After giving an example for Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya, P.R. tries to draw a line of distinction between Uttamottama and Uttama by saying that the Camatkāra, caused by the former is greater than the one caused by the latter, for, the Vyaṅgya is Pradhāna in the one and is Apradhāna in the other. Thus the Prādhānya or otherwise of the Vyaṅgya and the Ādhikya or the Alpatva of Camtkāra seem to be inter related, but ultimately Camatkāra alone has to decide the status of the Vyaṅgyārtha and Vācyārtha.

"अनयोर्भेदयोरनपह्नवनीयचमत्कारयोरपि प्राधान्याप्राधान्याभ्यामस्ति कश्चित् सहृदयवेद्यो विशेषः।" (R.G; P.21)

The phrase "प्राधान्याप्राधान्याभ्याम्" should be understood as 'चमत्कारस्य प्राधान्याप्राधान्याभ्याम्' but not 'व्यङ्ग्यस्य प्राधान्याप्राधान्याभ्याम्. Here by wrinitg "कश्चित् सहृदयवेद्यो विशेषः" PR. means that there is some peculiarity in the charm (Camatkāra) which can be experienced only by Sahṛdayas.

Badarināth Jhā (R. G. (with Candrikā) P. 72 (first Vol.)) takes this passage to mean that 'there is some kind of difference like Pradhānībhūta - vyaṅgya and Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya between the

Uttamottama and uttama and feels that PR.'s writting goes against the opinionof Ānandavardhana who wrote :–"चारुत्वो (चमत्कारो) त्कर्ष निबन्धना हि वाच्यव्यङ्ग्ययोः प्राधान्यविवक्षा।" But what all PR. wants to show here is a kind of Samavyāpti between Vyaṅgyaprādhānya-prādhānya and Camatkārapradhānyaprādhānya (where eve trhere is Camatkārapradhānya, there is Vyaṅgyapādhānya and vice versa). That he gives ultimate importanc to Camatkāra is evident from his incidental remark (while explaining the verse 'Śayitā savidhe' etc.,): चमत्कारो न स्यात् इत्यस्यैव बाधकत्वात्" (R.G; P. 11). Moreover the scope of Camatkāra is wider, because it can be associated with Vācya and Śabda etc., also and applying this only as the measuring rod, he excludes the Śabdacitra from the scope of 'Kāvya'.1

Again the commentator finds fault (R. G. (candrikā)vol. I P. 72) with PR. for not having provided place for Kāvyas of Sandigdha-Prādhānya and Tulya Prādhānya i. e. Kāvyas where the importance of Vācya and Vyaṇgya is undecided or equal. PR. did not talk of these varities, because, he might have felt that on the application of the principle of Camatkāra there can be no such instances, for, it would easily decide the Prādhānya or Aprādhānya. Or the Absence of the reference to the varieties can be explained in the following way. At the end of this topic P. R. says that such Kāvyas, where the Prādhānya of the Śabda and Artha is found to be equal, should be included among the Madyama. (R G. P. 83). If the same principle is extended with one more addition we can say in this context"सन्दिग्धतुल्यप्राधान्ये तु उत्तमतैव।"

Madhyama is the Kāvya where the expressed sense (Vācyārtha) alone is charming inspite of the presence of negligible Vyaṅgya. (R, G; P. 22). All the Kāvyas with figures of speech like Utprekṣā come under this group. In this context PR. writes that even in such Alaṅkāras there would be some Vyaṅgya, though

1. In fact the reading in Dhvnyāloka is 'Cārutvotkarṣanibandhanā' etc. but not 'Camatkārotkarṣanibandhanā' etc., as quoted by Jha. Dhavnyāloka P. 114.

negligible, and only its presence makes the Vācya charming. Thus, instead of grouping all the Arthālaṅkāras, as was done by Mammaṭa, under Adhama-class, PR. includes some of them (Samāsokti, Paryāyokti etc.,) having perceptible subordinate suggested sense, (Jagarūkaguṇībhūtavyaṅgya), among the Uttama-Kāvyas and the others (like Utprekṣā, Upamā etc.,)- having non perceptible subordinated suggested sense, among Madhyama 1 but none among Adhama. (R. G; P. 23). This is how the Alaṅkāras could get full justice in the hands of PR., which was denied to them by his predecessors like Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha.

Mammaṭa names all the Arthacitras and Śabda Citars as Adhama-Kāvya indiscriminately. PR. feels that this kind of grouping is quite improper and so defines the Adhama Kāvya as the one where the charm of words, rifined by the charm of the sense is given importance (R. G; P. 23). Such works of only Śabdacamatkāra without Arthacamatkāra do not come, according to him, under the purview of Kāvya at all, in that they do not satisfy the definition of Kāvya (R. G; P. 23-24). Thus the same PR. who has been criticised for having given importance to Śabda in Kāvya in his Kāvyalakṣaṇa (neglecting Artha), appears giving more importance to Artha in a Kāvya as campared with his predecessors.

While explaining the verse given as an example for the Uttamottama-Kāvya, PR. lays great stress on one point that a thing intended to be suggested should not be expressed either in a general way or in a particular way because in either case, the beauty of the suggested sense will be lost (R. G; P. 12-13).

We come accross another important discussion in this section. This is where PR. refutes the views of A. D. which he expressed in Citramimāmsā (P. 1) while explaining the following verse as an example of Uttama Kāvya.

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1. Inspite of the justification of this classification, PR. could have given some other name instead of 'Madhyama' which is more appropriate only when three catagories of things are mentioned, as in the classification of Mammaṭa.

"निःशेषच्युतचन्दनं स्तनतटं निर्मृष्टरागोधरो
नेत्रे दूरमनञ्जने पुलकिता तन्वी तवेयं तनुः ।
मिथ्यावादिनि दूति बान्धवजनस्याज्ञातपीडागमे
वापीं स्नातुमितो गतासि न पुनस्तस्याधमस्यान्तिकम् ।।" (C.M; P. 2)

Here A. D. explains all the phrases 'Niśśeṣacyutacandanam' etc., in such a way that they can be applied only in the context of sambhoga which is intended to be the Vyaṅgyārtha of this verse.

PR. finds fault with A, D, s explanation on two grounds:- (1) That it is against the accepted theories of old rhetoricians like Ānandavardhana and Mammaṭa and (2) It is olso beyond proper justification. (R. G; P. 15)

Mammata explains, in explicit words, (K. P; P. 237-40) that all the factors that are to be associated with the Vyaṅgyārtha need not and should not be the peculiar characteristics of the Vyaṅgyārtha alone; because in such case, it ceases to be Vyaṅgyārtha and becomes Anumeyārtha (inferred sense). A sense is suggested even by the common factors (Sādhāraṇadharmas) with the help of the peculiarity of circumstances and of the speaker etc. Thus the explanation of AD. goes against the views of old rhetoricians.

According to the explanation of A. D; the meaning of the phrases 'Niśśeṣacyutacandanam' etc., cannot be applied to Vāpīsnāna but only to the Sambhoga. Accordingly 'Snātum gatā' should be understood 'Snatum na gatā' and "तस्याधमस्यान्तिकं न गता" as "तस्याधमस्यान्तिकं गता" by Viparītalakṣaṇā and so questions PR; where is the scope for Vyañjanā? Even if Vyañjanā is accepted, it will result in Guṇībhūta Vyaṅgya because the Dūtīsambhoga which is considered to be the Vyaṅgya has to support the Vācyārtha t. e. 'Adhamatva' and 'Niśśeṣacyutacandanatva' etc.,

In an attempt to justify Appayadikshita Sri Gangadhara Shastry remarks :— "एवञ्च प्रकृते अधमपदव्यञ्जनीयसम्भोगसम्भावकता-मात्र उपयोक्ष्यमाणानां स्तनतटादिपदद्योत्यार्थानां गुणीभावेपि सम्भोगस्यावाच्यतया

लक्षणाफलत्वेनालक्षणीयतया च स्वतर्कितत्वप्रकारकबुबोधयिषालक्षणार्थप्राधान्यसद्–भावेन तत्प्रयुक्तमुत्तमत्वं को निवारयेत्।" (R.G. Kasi. ed. P. 28).

It is not clear to which argument of P.R. this is intended to be a reply; because P.R.'s argument about its becoming Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya is that the Dūtī-sambhoga (considered to be Vyaṅgyārtha), will subordinate itself to Vācyartha in that it stands as a justification of the Vācyārtha of the phrases like 'Niśśeṣacyuta-candanam' 'Adhama' etc., (R.G; P. 18). But śri Śāstri states that though the senses suggested by the 'Stanataṭa' etc., support the sense suggested by the word 'Adhama' and thus become subordinate (Guṇībhūta) the Prādhānya of the sense suggeste d by 'Adhama' is there uneffected maintaining the Uttamatva of the Kāvya. But where is the reply for the argument advanced by PR; in this statement ? Next, in reply to PR.'s objection that the establishment of Asādhāraṇatva would be suitable to and resulting in Anumeyānumāpakabhāva but not Vyaṅgyavyñjakabhāva śri Śāstri writes that one cannot be Anumākaka unless its existence is proved beyond doubt :- "यत्तु सम्भोगस्य स्तनतटाद्यवधारणव्यञ्जनीयत्वाभ्युवगमे अनुमानान्तःपातितया व्यञ्जनाव्यापारनैरर्थक्यभयेन साधारण्येन बोधविषयतो–पादानं, तत्र प्रकाशपञ्चमोल्लासशेषदर्शितदिशा अधमत्वादेरिव स्तनतटादिमात्र–चन्दनच्यवनादेः प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नताविरहेण अप्रमितस्यानुमापकतानङ्गीकारेण व्याप्तिपरामर्शज्ञाने अनपेक्ष्य प्रतिभामात्रद्योत्यतायाः अनुभवसिद्धत्वेन न किञ्चित्।" (R.G. Kasi. ed. P. 29).

The Prakāśapañcamollāsaśeṣa referred to above is perhaps the statement of Mammaṭa made while refuting the views of Anumānavādin (in 'Bhramadharmika etc.') "गोदावरीतीरे सिंहसद्–भावश्च प्रत्यक्षादनुमानाद्वा न निश्चितः। अपितु वचनात्। न च वचनस्यप्रामाण्यमस्ति। अर्थेनाप्रतिबन्धात् इत्यसिद्धश्च।" etc. (K. P; P. 239) The statement :- 'न च वचनस्य प्रामाण्यमस्ति, अर्थेनाप्रतिबन्धात्" need not be taken as a general statement holding good in all cases; because the Prāmāṇya of the Vacana depends upon the Āptatva of the speaker. That is why Nāgeśa adds "किञ्च पक्षे सिहंसद्भावः न मानान्तरेणावधारितः ; किन्तु पुंश्चली वाक्यादवधारितः। न च तद्वचनं निश्चायकम्" etc; (Pradīpa. K.P; P. 39).

The use of 'Puṁścalī' by Pradīpakāra also is signifiicant. Therefore even a thing known through Śabda can be Anumāpaka. Moreover what was remarked by PR. (R.G. P. 16), is that one need not strive so hard for Itaravyāvṛtti which is required only in Anumāna but not in Vyañjanā because Dīkṣita intends to say that "तटादिघटिताः वाक्यार्थाः स्नानव्यावृत्तिद्वारा सम्भोगाङ्गानां आश्लेषचुम्बनादीनां प्रतिपादनेन प्रधानव्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जने साहायकमाचरन्ति।" (R. G; P. 15). He no where said that Stanataṭādi can be taken Anumāpaka and as such. Therefore 'Idamatra dīkṣitākūtam' etc., is only indicative of Śrī Śāstri's great respect for AD., which no one can deny to him.

After refuting the interpretation given by A.D., P.R. intreprets the phrases 'Niśśeṭacyutacandanam' etc., in such a way suitable to the Vācyārtha of 'Vāpīm Snātumito gatāsi' implying that the sense as explained by Dikṣita can be their Vyaṅgyārtha only.

It is quite interesting to note that the meaning of this verse was explained in a similiar manner using almost identical phrases by Śrīvatsalañchana, the Author of Kāvyaparīkṣā (P. 10-11) and by Siddichandragaṇi the author of Kāvyaprakāśakhaṇḍana (P.4). The identity of views of these atuhors indicates that there were two intrepretations in vogue at the time of A.D. and P.R. and while the former had adopted the first intrepretation, the latter preferred the second one, and added some more points in its justification. That is why, PR. concludes his intrepretation with the words :— " इत्यालङ्कारिकसिद्धान्तनिष्कर्षः " (R. G; P. 19), thereby indicating that it is not his own invention.

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Second Chapter

RASA

After the definition of Kāvya and its classification PR. takes up Dhvani for discussion. First he simply enumerates the five kinds of Dhvani saying:- Dhvani is of two kinds (1) Abhidhāmūla and (2) Lakṣaṇāmūla (1) sense suggestsd by the primary meaning (2) and the sense suggested by the secondary meaning. Again the first is of three varieies:- (1) Rasa-Dhvani)2) Vastu-dhvani and (3) Alaṅkāra-dhvani. The word 'Rasa-dhvani' stands for all the Asaṁlakṣyakramadhvanis i. e. the Dhvanis the sequence in which is not perceptible, and, therefore means Rasa-dhvani, Bhāvadhvani, Rasābhāsadhvani, Bhāvābhāsadhvani, Bhāvaśānti-dhvani, Bhāvodayadhvani, Bhāvasandhidhvani and Bhāvaśab-alatādhvani. The Lakṣaṇāmūla dhvani is also af two kinds:- (1) Arthāntarasaṅkaramitavācya (The dhvani where the expressed meaning is transformed into another sense) (2) and Atyantatiras-kṛtavācya (the dhvani where the original meaning is completely concealed). After thus simply mentiouing the names of the five varieties of dhvani. PR. introduces an elaborate discussioc on Rasa which is the soul of Rasa-dhvani and is the most charming of all the dhvanis,

PR., under this topic introduces (enumerates) cleven theories of Rasa, in the order of their merit, instead of following the order of differenc stages of the historical development of Rasa theory as is the general proctice with other writers. Before entering into a detailed discussion of what is written by PR. about Rasa, let us have a general survey of the historical development of Rasa with an attempt to understand the Philosopical background, if any, of various theories.

According to Rājaśekhara, Nandikeśvara was the earliest writer on the theory of Rasa; but no work of Nandikeśvara is

available to us. Therefore for all practical purposes, we have to take only Bharata as the earliest writer on Rasa (known to us). But as the Ānuvamśyaślokas (verses handed down by tradition) quoted by Bharata indicate, we may believe that the treory of Rasa was well established by the time of Bharata himself.

Bharata's work, Nāṭyaśāstra is mainly devoted to the exposition of the art af Nāṭya, and so it is more a work on dramaturgy than on poetics. Naturally, therefore, the Rasa is one of the many subjects that are discussed in the Nāṭyaśāstra, that too as is applicable to the drama. The same Rasa has been introduced into the sphere of Śravyakāvya also by later writers on poetics.

All the Ālaṅkārikas believe Bharata to be the earliest exponent of Rasa theory and so they try to find his support for all their views on Rasa. One theory (of Rasa) as explained by a particular writter may show some improvement over an earlier one, and some more improvements may be shown by another theory introduced by a third writer. But we cannot say that all these different views get the equal support of Bharata however vehimently the writers may try to enlist his support. Therefore it may not be wrong to say that Bharata had his own views on Rasa. But every later writer explained it in his own way and as it is common with all the old commentators, every one tried to prove that his own view had the fullest support of Bharata. What must have been Bharata's theory of Rasa, in its crude form, we can find out only by examinig his simple text forgetting all the commentaries on it, for the time being.

As was seen earlier, Bharata does not claim any originality, in his theory of Rasa. He simply explains in his own words what is Rasa and quotes two Ānuvaṃśyaślokas in support of his explanation. The theory of Rasa as enunciated by Bharata appears to be quite simple, free from later elaborate explanations based on various Philosophical speculations. His theory runs as follows:—

"तत्र विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिसंयोगाद् रसनिष्पत्तिः।" को दृष्टान्तः ? अत्राह—यथाहि ननाव्यञ्जनौषधिद्रव्यसंयोगात् रसनिष्पतिः तथा नानाभावोपगमाद्रसनिष्पत्तिः

यथाहि गुडादिभिर्द्रव्यैः व्यंजनैरोषधिभिश्च षाडवादयोरसा निर्वर्त्यन्ते तथा नाना भावोपगता अपि स्थायिनो भावा रसत्वमाप्नुवन्तीति । रसःइतिकः पदार्थः ? उच्यते, आस्वाद्यत्वात्, कथमास्वाद्यते रसः ? यथाहि नानाव्यंजनसंस्कृतमन्नं भुंजाना रसानास्वादयन्ति हर्षादींश्चाधिगच्छन्तीति 'सुमनसः पुरुषा' इत्यभिव्याख्याताः । तथा नानाभावाभिनयव्यंजितान् वागङ्गसत्त्वोपेतान् स्थायिभावानास्वादयन्ति हर्षादींश्चाधिगछन्तीति प्रेक्षकाः सुमनसः इत्यभिव्याख्याताः । तस्मान्नाटयरसाः ' अत्रानुवंश्यौ श्लोकौ भवतः :— "यथा बहुद्रव्ययुतैर्व्यंञ्जनैर्बहुभिर्युतम ।

आस्वादयन्ति भुंजाना भक्तं भक्तविदो जनाः ।।

भावाभिनयसम्बद्धान् स्थायिभावांस्तथा बुधाः ।

आस्वादयन्ति मनसा तस्मात् नाटयरसाः स्मृताः ।।"

(Nāṭyaśāstra (H A B) P. 442 -501)

According to Bharata the Rasa is only a Laukikavastu. He explains it on the analogy of Pākarasa. When we mix the food made of rice and wheat etc., with some Vyañjanas (condiments of different tastes), a piculiar taste like Ṣāḍaba is produced. Similarly, the Nāṭyarasas are also produced by a piculiar admixture of Vibhāvas Anubhāvas and Vyabhicāribhāvas, with the Sthāyibhāva. And to be more precise, according to Bharata, the Sthāyibhāva is changed in to Rasa when it is associated with the Vibhāvas etc. This same Sathāyıbhāva, when tasted by the Sahṛdayas, gives them pleasure, like the Pākarasa which gives pleasure to the eater. Thus judged by the analogy of Pākarasa, Bharata appears to think that Nāṭyarasa is produced like the Pākarasa and that the pleasure (Harṣa) that is caused by the Rasa is quite different from the Rasa but not Rasa itself. While saying that the Rasa is only Sahṛdayagata, Bharata also appears to be thinking that the effect of Rasa need not certainly be pleasure alone, because he writes —

"प्रेक्षका हर्षादींश्चाधिगच्छन्ति" implying pain also by the word 'Ādi'. As can be seen from the phrases "नाट्यरसाः स्मृताः" प्रेक्षका हर्षादींश्चाधिगच्छन्ति; तस्मान्नाट्यरसा इत्यभिव्याख्याताः ।". Bharata has been concerned only with Rasa as associated with Nāṭya and drama

"तत्र रसानेव तावदादावभिव्याख्यास्यामः। नहि रसादृते कश्चिदर्थः प्रवर्तते"
Nāṭyaśāstra (H.A.B.) pp. 440-441.

The ancient waiters on poetics like Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin though they are quite familiar with the theory of Rasa as explained by Bharata, were content like Bharata, to confine it to drama and they never attempted to give it an important place, in Śravyakāvys. Being mainly Alaṅkāravādins, they did not raise the Rasa from the level of Alaṅkāra, but simply included it among Alaṅkāra., because they were perhaps thinking that there is no possibility of full development of Rasa in Śravya Kāvya as in Dṛśyakāvya.

Bhāmaha while writing about Kāvya says in inambiguous terms, that a poem should contain all the Rasas (Kāvyālaṅkara. I. 21). Perhaps he is the first man to give place to Rasa in the Śravya-Kāvya also. But he simply includes it among the Alaṅkāras and calls Rasa as the Rasavadalaṅkāra (III. 6). But what exactly was meant by 'Rasa' by Bhāmaha is not clearly known because he no where attempts to define Rasa and even the example given by him does not give any clear idea. When Bhāmaha does not give any definition of his own for Rasa, it can be assumed that he accepts the one given by Bharata and as understood by him.

Dandin's views on Rasa are almost similar to those of Bhāmaha. He also includes it in Alaṅkāras naming it Rasavadalaṅkāra. While explaining the Madhuraguṇa he defines it as containing Rasa which rests both with Śabda and Artha (Kāvyādarśa. I. 51). He explains that all Alaṅkāras aid in producing Rasa in general and the special responsibility of producing it rests with the Agrāmyatā (I. 62). Later on, he explains Rasa by defining the same as the Sthāyibhāva intensified by Vibhāva etc., but names it 'Rasavadalaṅkara'. Thus he explains all the eight Rasas, in the second chapter of Kavyadarśa in verses from 281 to 291. At the end he declars that what has been written while talking of Mādhurya is about Rasa in general, and that it is dealt with here in its particularity i.e. in its eight varities

II 292). Thus Daṇḍin deals with Rasa more elaborately than Bhāmaha which indicates the importance, Rasa is gaining gradually in the shpere of poetry (Śravyakāvya) also.

Udbhaṭa in his Kāvyālaṅkārasārasaṅgraha, follows the views of Bhāmaha and repeats the same sentence 'रसवद् दर्शितस्पष्ट शृङ्गारादिरसोदयम्" (Kāvyālainkāra Sārasaṅgraha. IV. 3). and adds his own sentence to it "स्वशब्दस्थायिसञ्चारिविभावाभिनयास्पदम्" thereby meaning that Rasodaya requires (1) The mention of Rasa with its name (Sṛṅgāra etc.,) (2) And the representation of Sthāyī, Sañcāri, Vibhāvas and Anubhāvas. One thing which is quite peculiar in Udbhaṭa, and which is not acceptable to later rhetoricians is that Rasotpatti is possible even by Svaśbdābhidhāna, mentioning it by name. This is considered to be a serious defect of Rasa, by later rhetoricians and it is named Vamana.

Vāmana does not find any thing of his own to add to what has already been said by previous writers about Rasa and its Lakṣaṇa etc. He simply includes Rasa in Guṇas like Daṇḍin without including it among the Alaṅkāras also as was done by the latter, and thereby avoids confusion. While Daṇḍin feels that Rasa belongs to Madhura Guṇa, Vāmana says that it is the property of Kānti Guṇa (K.A. Sūtra. P. 42). He concludes this topic with giving an example for the Śṛṅgārarasa.

Rudraṭa appears to be the first rhetorician to give the Rasa an independent place, independent of Alaṅkāras, Guṇas or Rītis (Kāvyālaṅkāra. P. 150). He does not give any special definition of Rasa of his own, but appears to be following the one given by Bharata becuse by writing "रसनाद्रसत्वमेषां मधुरादीनामिवोक्तमाचार्यैः" he reminds us of the similar lines of Bharata (N. Śāstra (H.A B.) P-150) Apart from the eitht Rasas accepted by Bharata, Rudraṭa includes two more Rasas namely Śānta and Preyān. It is interesting to note that Rudraṭa does not find any thing wrong in accepting Vyabhicāribhāvas like Nirveda, also as Rasas, Provided they are intensified (Paripuṣṭa) like other Sthāyibhāvas,

as is also clearly explained by Namisādhu, the commentator (Kāvyālaṅkāra. P. 150 151) He gives greater importance to Rasa in a poem and declares that without Rasa a Kāvya will be quite uninteresting. He also opines that the use of Ritis and Vṛttis should be according to the nature of Rasa present in a particnlar place. Thus by the time of Rudraṭa, Rasa could secure a place of considerable importance, in a Śravya-Kāvya also.

As can be seen from the above account no author from Bhāmaha to Rudraṭa appears to be keen in examining the theory of Rasa by introducing his own view-point or some philosophical principle. Every one seems to be content with accepting what is said by Bharata about Rasa. It falls to the lot of the commentators on Bharata to interpret tho theory of Rasa in their own way by introducing one Philosophical principle or the other into it and thus we come across such five interpretators, Lollaṭa, Śrīśaṅkuka, some Sāṅkhya, Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta. Unfortunately, our knowiedge of the theories of the first four writers is only through Abhinavagupta, the author of the commentary, Abhinavabhāratī, and through some later writers like Mammaṭa and Hemacandra etc.

According to our present knowledge, Bhaṭṭalollaṭa appears to be first writer to have attempted a psychological analysis of Rasa. As quoted by Abhinavagupta (H.A.B. PP. 442-43). he understands the Rasasūtra of Bharata like this.

Rasa is produced when Sthāyibhāva is associated with Vibhāvas Anubhāvas and Vyabhicāribhāvas. The mental condition named Sthāyin is produced by the Vibhāvas and the Anubhāvas of the Bhāvas (i. e. Alambanavibhāvas but not by the Anubhāvas of the Āśraya because, these Anubhāvas being produced by the Rasa cannot be its cause) and by the Vyabhicāribhāvas. Here arises a question. As can be inferred from the Nyāya-Sūtra and Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya there on, while proving the existence of Manas (N. S. 1.1.6), two Jñānas do not coexist at the same time. Such being the case how can the Vyabhic

āribhāvas which are no other than mental states coexist along with the Sthāyibhāva, which is also a mental state? This Bhaṭṭalollaṭa tries to answer saying that the Sthāyi which is in dormant state can exist along with the Vyabhicāribhāvas, also in dormant state.

Though saying that the Sthāyibhāva is produced by the Vibhāvas etc., in the beginning, Bhaṭṭalollaṭa contends, at the end that the dormant feeling (Sthāyibhāva) intensified by the Vibhāva etc:, turns into Rasa, and the same in its nonintensified state is called Sthāyibhāva.

Lollaṭa's views are quoted by Mammaṭa also. But there is slight difference between what is quoted by Mammaṭa and the one quoted by Abhinavagupta, Abhinavagupta clearly says that Rasa is situated both in Rāmādi and in the actor, because the latter identifies himself with the Anukārya, whereas Mammaṭa appears to be thinking that according to Lollaṭa, the Rasa is only in the Anukārya but the Naṭa only appears to be possessing it, because of his effective imitation and action. 1 Further Mammaṭa does not make it clear whether the Anubhāvas should be taken as the Kāryas of Bhāvas as specified by Abhinavagupta. He simply says:— "अनुभावैः कटाक्षभुजाक्षेपप्रभृतिभिः कार्यैः"

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1. Here evidently, Lollaṭa, takes the Vyabhicāribhāvas appearing on the Naṭādi i.e. Rasāśraya, in which case he has to explain how these Vyabhicāribhāvas, themselves produced by Rasa, can be the cause of Rasa itself, as in the case of Anubhāvas. Perhaps this also will be answered by saying that the Vyabhicāribhāvas also are caused by the Sthāyibhāva itself.

1. "विभावैर्ललनोद्यानादिभिः आलम्बनकारणैः रत्यादिको भावः जनितः अनुभावैः कटाक्षभुजाक्षेपप्रभृतिभिः कार्यैः प्रतीतियोग्यः कृतः व्यभिचारिभिर्निर्वेदादिभिः उपचितो मुख्यया वृत्या रामादावनुकार्ये तद्रूपतानुसन्धानात् नर्तकेऽपि प्रतीयमानो रसः" K. P. 91 Commenting on this part, Pradipa writes "रामादावनुकार्ये रसः नटे तु तुल्यरूपतानुसन्धानवशात् आरोप्यमाणः" etc.

It is to be noted that according to the reading 'मुख्यया वृत्या' etc., as found in Hindi Abhinavabhārati (H.A.B; P. 443) there does not appear much difference in the views of Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa because both of them accept Rāmādi only as the real Rasāśraya. But the rading 'अनुकार्ये अनुकर्तर्यपिच अनुसन्धानबलात्" is misleading. But in view of the statement in Abhinavabhārati while citing the views of Lollaṭa in the 10th Kārikā of 6th chapter "वासनावशेन रटे सम्भवात्" that Rasa and Bhāvas are possible even in Naṭa, Lollaṭa must be said to be of the opinion that Naṭa also can have Rasa, in which case Mammaṭa and Pradīpakāra appear to be holding views different from those of Abhinava. The sentence quoted above, indicates that there is possibility of Naṭa also having Rasas and Bhavas which implies the possibility of being otherwise also. But Rasa is certain to exist in the Anukārya and that is why Mammaṭa does not insist upon the existence of Rasa in Naṭa also.

While Abhinavaś exposition of Lollaṭa's theory is from the view point of Anukārya and Anukatṛ, that of Mammaṭa is from the view point of the spectator. Thus Mammaṭa tries to complete the, theory of Lollaṭa from all view points.

Lollaṭa's theory may be summarized as followes:—

The Sthāyibhāvas like Rati, are produced in the Anukārya by the two kinds of Vibhāvas, In fact, the Uddīpanavibhāvas, cannot be called as Kāraṇa because only the already existing Bhāva is being intensified (Uddīpita) by them. Therefore their Kāraṇatva is considered to be Aupacārika. Or it can be explained like this. The Sthāyibhāva is being intensified to the state of Rasa after it had its small beginning, and taking the whole flow of Rasa as one unit, the Uddīpanavibhāva may be called as the cause of Rasa. This is the explanation given by Rasa-

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1. In fact 'मुख्यया वृत्या रामादौ' also is included in brackets in the Gaekwad Edn. of Nāṭyaśāstra Part IP. 252.

Pradīpa (P. 20). It is made to be understood as existing by the Anubhāvas like Kaṭākṣas, and is fully developed by the Vyabhicāribhāvas. This Sthāyibhāva originally exists only in the Anukārya (Rāmādi) but as the actor is identified with the Anukārya (by the audience) it is thought by them to be existing in the actor himself. Only when it is conceived like this it is termed as Rasa.

Bhṭṭalollaṭa is said to have expounded his theory of Rasa on the basis of Mīmāṁsā system. According to this system Abhidhā alone (without the aid of Vyañjanā etc.,) with its very long power of action can express the Rasa etc., as the Vākyārtha. Just like the word 'Ghaṭa' which produces the sense of the pot in the mind of the hearer by its Abhidhāśakti, so also the words expressive of Vibhāvas etc., can produce the cognition of Rasa in the mind of the audience, of course by their far reaching Vyāpāra, like an arrow which pierces through the armour, skin and flesh etc., in only one attempt (H.S.P; P. 51. and S P. Vol. II. P. 125).

Sri Revaprasada Dviveddi, in his Hindi commentary on Vyaktiviveka, after discussing about the origin of the misconception of attaching this theory of Iṣuvaddīrghavyāpāra to Lollaṭa, says that Lollaṭa cannot be said as the follower of this theory, because the Iṣudṛṣṭānta is advanced by the Prābhākaras who are the Anvitābhidhānavādins, where as Lollaṭa appears to be the follower of Bhāṭṭamata i.e. Abhihitānvayavāda, as can be judged from his Rasa theory. (Vyaktiviveta. PP. 137-139).

But it is not known how Bhṭṭalollaṭa, in the absence any clear authority, can be called as the follower of Bhāṭṭamata even. In fact, the commentators on Bharata, excepting Abhinava-Gupta deal with Rasa in its relation only to the drama and the dramatic perforamance. Even Bhaṭṭanāyaka appears to have introduced the Bhāvaktva etc., just to criticise Vyañjanā-vāda and atleast Lollaṭa and Śaṅkhuka do not seem to be talking about Śabdavy-

āpāras as can be seen from their theories presented by Abhinava and Mammaṭa. Therefore, it will be putting the later theories especially connected with the functions of Śabda, in the mouths of the old writers. when they practically have very little to do with the Śabda and its functions, being mainly concerned with histrionic effects.

This theory of Lollaṭa was refuted by Sri Śaṅkuka, about whom also we know only through the quotations by later writers. These are Śrī Śaṅkuka's objections, raised against Lollaṭa's views as summarised by Abhinavagupta (H.A.B; P. 445):—

(1) Sthāyibhāva cannot be said to be Rasa because in the absence of Vibhāvas etc., which may be useful as Liṅga, Sthāyibhāva cannot be inferred.

(2) If it is accepted that even in the absence of Vibhāvas etc , Sthāyibhāva may be expressed by words, Rasa cannot become Pratyakṣa, because Śabdajñāna is only a Parokṣajñāna.

(3) If the existance of Rasa (which is no other than Sthāyibhāva) is accepted even before the presentation of Vibhavas etc., the explanation of Rasotpatti by the Rasasūtra would be meaningless.

(4) When the Ratyādi Sthāyibhāvas themselves are considered to be Rasas, we will have to accept, as in the case of the Rati etc., various degrees (as the highest state and lowest state etc.) in the Rasa also which is against the general experience.

(5) If, in order to avoid this, it is accepted that there would be no difference of degrees in the Sthāyibhāvas or that the Sthāyibhāva which has reached the highest degree is to be called Rasa, then Bharata's acceptance of six varities of

Hāsya according to the degrees of Sthāyibhāva, can not be justified.

(6) When warious degrees are to be accepted in Sthāyibhāva and thereby in the Rasa also, there will be innumerable varities in all the ten kinds of Rati.

(7) More over it is not correct to accept that the Sthāyibhāva when it is developed is Rasa, because in the case of Śoka which is severe at the begining, a general decrease is noted in course of time.

(8) Similarly, Krodha, Utsāha, and Rati also are seen to be vaning in the absence of Amarṣa, Sthairya, and Sevā respectively. Thus on the strength of these arguments Śaṅkuka tries to refute the theory of Lollaṭa.

It can be seen from the above arguments that some of them are not at all strong and convincing. There is no scope for the first, second and third arguments because Lollaṭa never said that the latent Sthāyibhāvas can be understood even in the absence of Vibhāvas etc., or that they can be expressed by words. Fourth, fifth and sixth arguments also cannot be considered to be strong, because when Bharata is prepared to accept six varieties in Hāsyarasa, there will be nothing wrong in accepting some more varieties in other Rasas also, if the difference is distinct. The intensity of Sthāyibhāva is reduced in course of time-this is not a strong argument at all, because it can be accepted as Rasa, only when the intensity is not reduced. Thus in the absence of detailed explanation, all these arguments of Śaṅkuka as quoted by Abhinavagupta, do not seem to be strong.

What ever may be the strength of Śaṅkuka's arguments, Lollaṭa's theory of Rasa is not acceptable to the later writers. The strong argument against Lollaṭa's theory is:- he does not tackle the important question 'what is the Āśrya of the Rasa' scientifically. All the theories of Rasa should try to explain how

the Rasa is enjoyed by the spectator. When the Rasa is not accepted as resting in the Sāmājika, how can he enjoy it, because a thing which is the Kāraṇa can produce the Kārya at its own place but not in a different place; and so the Rasa which is in the Anukārya (imitated) or the Anukartṛ imitator) as is accepted by Lollaṭa, cannot produce pleasure in the Sāmājika. Otherwise even the sight of the Laukika-Śṛṅgāra must be able to produce similar camatkāra in the spectator. It may be said that only a thing which is supposed to be existing, but does not exist really, can produce such effect; and so the Rasa supposed to be existing in the Naṭa by the audience gives them pleasure. This argument is not correct, because it gives superiority to Bhrāntijñāna over the Pratyakṣapramāṇa which is against the accepted rules. If the knowledge of the other man's pleasure is to give pleasure to the perceiver also, a hungry poor man would be able to derive contentment on seeing the rich eating (Kavvatattva samikṣā P. 176). Therefore the Rasasūtra is to be explained in a different way and Śaṅkuka's explanation of it is as follows.

The actor with his long training and constant practice represents the causes, the effects and the associating causes, which are technically called Vibāvas, Aṇubhāvas and Vyabhicāribhāvas respectively, so skillfully that though artificial, they are considered by the spectators as the real ones. Because of these Vibhāvas etc., the Sthāyibhāvas like Rati are inferred by the spectators as existing in the Naṭa. If fact, they are not in the Naṭa, because he is imitating the original Sthāyibhāvas of the real heroes like Rāma, and only because this is the imitation of the original Sthāyibhāvas this is given a different name 'Rasa'.

This is the process of the experience of the spectators: First they take the Naṭa as Rāma. This knowledge of 'this is Rāma' is peculiar and quite different from all the kinds of knowledge found in this world like the knowledge about the painted horse. It cannot be called Yathārthajñāna because Naṭa is different from Rāma. This cannot be said to be Bhramajñāna even, because

there is no another jñāna of negation like 'this is not Rāma'. This is neither Saṁśayajñāna because there are no two alteratives (Koṭis) in the cognition as 'is this Rama or not'. In the absence of such Jñāna as 'he is like Rāma' this nannot be called Sādṛśya jñāna even. Therefore this Jñāna about Naṭa as 'this is Rāma' is quite peculiar and different from all the other jñānas like Pramā, Bhrama, Saṃśaya, and Sādṛśya etc. This kind of Jñāna is the result of the great skill of the Naṭa in the four kinds of Abhinaya.

It may be said here that, inspite of the absence of the subsequent Bādha-Jñāna, it should be taken only as a Mithyājñāna according to the rule 'तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकानुभावोऽयथार्थः ।" (to pesceive a thing where it does not exist is Bhrama); because the Rāmatva which is not in the Naṭa is ascribed to him; and in such case how can a Bhrama produce the real effect? This question is met by Śaṅkuka by saying that even a Bharma can be productive of such effect. In this connection he quotes the Kārikas of Dharmakīrti from Prmāṇa-vārtika:—

> "मणिप्रदीपप्रभयोः मणिबुद्ध्याभिधावतोः ।
> मिथ्याज्ञानाविशेषेऽपि विशेषेऽर्थक्रियां प्रति ।।" (H.A.B., P.449.) 1

Seeing a gem and a light from a distance a man misunderstands both of them as Maṇis. Thus his Jñāna is only a Bhrama.

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1. In olden days, there used to be two holes in the doors through which it is to be locked. There are two rooms in which one gem and lamp are kept respectively, and lustre of them was seen through the holes. Two men mistake it (the luster) to be gem; whereas neither the lustre of the gem nor that of the lamp is a gem. But the man who proceeds to the first room to pick up the gem would get the real gem while the second man cannot get it from the second room. Thus the Bhrānti of the first man is called Saṁvādibhrama and that of the second man Visaṁvādibhrama. This Kārikā is found in Vedanta pañcadasi xi. 2) and is explained in similar way in Kārikās 3-6.

But when he approaches them he is able to get Mani. Therefore even a Bhrama can produce real effect. This Jñāna is further proved to be Bhrama, also because in Nāṭya only the artificial imitation of Kāraṇas, Kāryas and Sahakārins are brought into use and these given new names 'Vibhāva' 'Anubhāva' and 'Vyabhicāribhāva' etc.

Ālambanavibāva and Uddīpanavibhāvas can be presented by reciting appopriate verses (K.P;P. 93) The Anubhāvas and Vyabhichāribhāvas also can be presented by the Naṭa with the help of his training etc. But Sthāyin can never be presented by Kāvya because it cannot be expressed by merely using such words like Rati, Hāsa etc, being beyond the scope of Abhidhā. It can only be imitated and this imitation by Naṭa helps the spectators in inferring the Sthāyin in him. Only these Sthāyins like Rati, which are imitated are being called by the rhetoricians with the names like Śṛṅgāra-Rasa. In other words, Rasa is the inference of the Sthāyin like Rati. But, unlike other inferences, this Anumiti is the source of pleasure, because of the natural beauty of the things inferred, and in this respect, it is quite unique. 1 This inference being only in the spectators, Rasa is to be understood resting with them. Though the Sthāyins are not in the Naṭa, the Sāmājikas have the inference, because there is no Bādhakajñāna, i.e. the nonexistence of Sthāyin in Naṭa is not known to them. Strictly speaking, this is not the inference of Sthāyin but

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1. To prove that Anumīyamāna also can produce some effect on the spectator, Hemachandra gives a popular example:- "कषायफलचर्वणजपरपुरुषप्रभवमुखप्रसेककलनाकल्पनया" i.e. when a man looks at the face of another man with slight contortions, while eating something sour in taste (like tamerind) saliva comes into the mouth of the spectator also; similarly the spectators of a drama can enjoy the Rasa when they see the actor showing the effects of Rasa by training etc., Kāvyānuśāsanam P. 70.

only the inference of the socalled Sthāyin which is only the imitation of the original one. Therefore ultimately the imitation of the Sthāyin should be understood as the Rasa according to Śaṅkuka (H.A.B; P. 476).

Being an Anumitivādin, it goes with-out saying, Śaṅkuka is the follower of Nyāya. Which Nyāya he followes, (whether Bauddha Nyāya or Brahmanical Nyāya) does not matter much because according to any Nyāya this theory of Anumiti does not change.

Śrī Śaṅkuka's Anumitivāda or the Anukaraṇa Vāda is criticised by Bhaṭṭa Tauta, one of the teachers of Abhinavagupta. Bhaṭṭa Tauta raises four possible alternatives in claiming that the Rasa is an Anukaraṇa, and refutes all the four, one after another. He questions.- Is your claim that Rasa is only an imitation, based on the experience of the spectators are that of the actors or on the nature of the Rasa or on the statement of Bharata himself?

The first alternative is not tenable. Generally, a thing which is being actually perceived, can be said to be the imitation of something else. For example, drinking of milk which is actually seen, can be said to be imitated while drinking liquor "He is drinking. liquor like milk".

But here nothing is found in the Naṭa which may be said to be the imitation of something else. Because the spectators see on him such things like the artificial face, horripilation, faltering voice and the movement of the limbs etc., which cannot be the imitation of the Sthāyibhāva like Rati, which is no other than a particular state of mind. The Anubhāvas appearing outwardly cannot be identical with the mental state of others which is beyond the perception of another. Moreover, something may be called an imitation only when the original is known. But no body knows about the Rati of Rāma which is the original. And nobody thinks that the Naṭa is imitating Rāma. It cannot even

be said that only the mental state of the Naṭa is inferred while in fact, Rāma's Rati alone is being imitated; because this stand cannot hold ground on careful examination. Here the nature of the inference is to be explained. Is it in the form 'this is the mental state of Naṭa but resembling that of Rāma' or in the form 'this is Rāma's mental state'. Evidently there is no such sense of similarity and so it will have to be accepted that the Anubhāvas etc., which are the Kārya of Ratyādi Kāraṇa are being cognised by the spectators; and so the Anukaraṇatāvāda, the theory of imitation becomes baseless. It may be said that the Sthāyibhāvas inferred by the artificial Vibhāvas etc., should be artificail and imitative. But it should be explained whether the Vibhāvas etc., are taken by the spectators as artificial or real. In the first case, the real Rati cannot be inferred from the artificial Vibhāvas and in the second case Rati cannot be understood as an imitation. It cannot be said that though the Vibhāvas are only artificial, they are not considered to be so, and therefore it is a kind of Mithayā Jñāna, because an inference cannot be caused by such Mithyāhetu. It cannot also be justified by giving the analogy of the inference of fire from the calumn of mist mistaken to be smoke; because even there a Mithyāvahni is inferred from the Mithyādhūma, but not something else like Guñjāpuñjā (red suds of a water-weed), resembling the fire. More over, the Sāmājikas do not have feeling of Sādṛśya about the Naṭa, because in such case there would be no place for Rasa at all. It is also not correct to claim that the Jñāna 'this is Rāma' is peculiar being neither a Mithyājñāna nor Satyajñāna; becase when there is no contradicting cognition (Bādhakajñāna) it should be considered as Śatyajñāna, and otherwise (if there is contradictory congnitions), it can be decided as only a Mithyā Jñāna after examining its real nature. Thus Rasa cannot be established as the imitation of Sthāyibhāva on the strength of the feeling of the Sāmājikas. Even the second alternative can not hold ground. Naṭa never feels that he is imitating Rāma or his mental condition; because imitation involves the prior knowledge of the imitated, and in its absence, how can it be called imitation? It is

also not correct to say that this is Anukaraṇa (because it is being done afterwards) on the basis of the etymology of the word अनु पश्चात् करणम् because, in such case every thing in the world can be called Anukaraṇa. It may be said that the Naṭa does not imitate any particular individual Rāma but he imitates only the Śoka of a man of Uttama-Prakṛti. Here it should be explained how the actor is imitating the Śoka; It is not correct to say that he is imitating by Śoka, because Naṭa does not have Śoka at all. He does not imitate Śoka with tears etc , because the tears etc., are quite different from the Śoka which is a kind of mental state. It may be said that the Naṭa is imitating the Anuhbāvas of the Śoka of a man of Uttama-Prakṛti. But it will have to be explained the Anubhavas of which Uttma-Prakṛti he imitates; because it is not possible to understand the Sāmānya without reference to the Viśeṣa. If to explain the Viśeṣa, it is said that the Naṭa imitates that particular Uttama-Prakṛti who weeps like this (Naṭa) then, as Naṭa also comes into picture, where is Anukārayānukartṛ-Bhāva. Moreover the Naṭa, because of the training, by recollecting his own Vibhāvas, and on account of his Hṛdaya-Samvāda (Emotional sympathy), simply shows the Anubhāvas, and recites poem, giving it proper intonation and shows some peculiar Ceṣṭas, and this much can not produce the sense of imitation in the spectators; because, it may be possible to imitate the dress of the woman but not the Ceṣṭā.

Accepting the third view, it is also not correct to say that it is an imitation according to the real nature of the thing as explained by the Vivecakas, because a thing which is understood afterwards, cannot be called Vastu-Vṛtta (as having really happened). (H.A.B; P. 456)

Even the fourth alternative is not correct, because no where we find Bharata saying or suggesting that Rasa is the imitation of the Sthāyibhāva. Even if it is accepted that like the dress of a woman the Ceṣṭas and Sthāyibhāvas also can be imitated, where is the authority to call such imitated with the name of

Rasa, because the imitated dress etc , is not given any new name (H.A B; P. 460.)

It may be argued on behalf of Śaṅkuka, that just like the cow which is expressed by mixing different colours (in painting) the Rasa also is expressed (produced) by the Saṁyoga of Vibhāvas etc. But this argument does not hold water. Because, in the case of the picture a real cow is not expressed or made to be understood; like a cow in darkness by the light; only a peculiar thing resembling the cow is being expressed and that particular form is being understood as resembling the cow. But in the present case, the group of Vibhāvas etc., is not being understood as resembling the Rati etc. Therefore the theory of imitation as expounded by Śaṅkuka is not at all correct (H.A.B; P.460).

Śaṅkuka's theory of Rasa has been explained by Mammaṭa also. As can be seen from the foregoing account, there are two aspects in the theory of Śaṅkuka. So far as the actor is concerned the Rasa is a thing to be imitated (Anukaraṅīya); and it is to be inferred (Anumeya) from the spectators' point of View. While Abhinava Gupta lays stress on the first aspect and tries to refute the same, Mammaṭa appears to be mainly concerned with the second aspect; and its refutations.

The Anumeyatā of the Rasa is objected to, mainly on the ground, that only Pratyakṣajñāna can produce aesthetic pleasure (Camatkāra) but not Anumiti; and the pleasure derived by the spectators can not be the result of the inference. They cannot enjoy Rasa, unless they themselves happen to be the place of Rasa. Moreover, if it is accepted that their experience is only of the nature of inference, it is not possible to have the 'Carvaṇā' which is a kind of continuous flow of enjoyment, because when the Rasa is inferred only by one Anumāna, there will be no scope for the second Anumāna in the abs nce of Siṣādhayiṣā, a desire to infer. Thus both the aspects of the theory of Śrī Śaṅkuka are proved untenable.

After examining the views of Śaṅkuka, Abhinavagupta puts forth very briefly a theory, said to have been enunciated by some followers of Sāṅkhyasiddhānta.

The theory of Sāṅkhyas may be, roughly stated, as follows. All the external things like Vibhāvas etc , have the capacity of causing pleasure and misery (and also Moha), because every thing in the world consists of three Guṇas. The Rasa also consists of Sukha, Duhkha and Moha. In the Sāmagrī of Rasa, the Vibhāvas are in the place of Dal, and the Anubhāvas and the Vyabhicāribhāvas are in the place of spices. The Sathāyibhāva is produced by this Sāmagrī and it also consists of Sukha, Duhkha etc. Abhinavagupta's main objection to this theory is that it is accepting Sthāyibhāva as produced by the Sāmagrī, where as according to Bharata, it is already existing to be raised to the state of Rasa. It is also against the experience, to say that Rasa consists of Sukha, Duhkha and Moha. 1. (Here, the Hindi commentary remarks that Abhinavagupta's objection is mainly against accepting the Rasa as Mohamaya also, because he himself has accepted (Hindi A.B.P. 219.) Rasa as consisting of both Sukha and Duhkha. Hindi A.B.P. 426.).

Next, Abhinavaghpta examines the theory of Bhaṭṭanayaka. As Bhaṭṭanāyaka contends, Rasa is not perceived associated with other person (original character or the actor) because, in such case, it can not be enjoyed by the spectator, who is not at all associated with the Rasa. It can neither be perceived by the Sāmājika as being in himself. In such case, it will have to be accepted that the Rasa is produced within the Sāmājika himself, which is not possible, because the characters like Sītā can not be the Ālambana-Vibhāva for the Sāmājikas. It is also not correct to say that there will be a kind of Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa by avoiding 'Sītātva' etc., and taking only the 'Kāntātva'; because, how can such great respectable personalities of extraordinary power be brought under the effect of Sādhāranikaraṇa, when the spectator is always conscious of their greatness? Moreover, such

exraordinary exploits like crossing the Ocean etc., cannot be felt as common. The Sāmājika, as the general experience shows, is neither reminded of his beloved on seeing Sīta and the like, on the stage. It is also not correct to say that the experience of Rasa consists of the Smṛti of Rasa etc., (of having such Rati,), because in the absence of previous experience (Pūrva-Pratyakṣa), there can be no Smṛti. Rasa cannot be cognised through Śabda or Anumāna etc., because such things as cognised through Śabda etc., cannot be well enjoyed. Rasa cannot be perceived even through Pratyakṣa. When both the lovers are seen engaged in their amorous sports it will be more a sight causing such alien feelings like shame-fulness, repulsion and desire etc., rather than a pleasant experience of Rasa. Thus, it is not correct to say that Rasa can be perceived (Pratīyamāna). All these defects are applicable even when the Rasa is accepted as produced.

Bhaṭṭanāyaka also feels that the Rasa is not Vyaṅgya, because, if it is said that the Rasa which is latent is being expressed by the Vibhāva etc., it will have to be accepted that there are certain differences, in the degrees of Rasa also, according to those of Vibhāvas etc., because, the vicibility of a Ghaṭa in the darkness, differs according to the nature of the light. Such alternatives like 'Svagatatva' or 'Paragatatva' etc., can not be satisfactorily answered in this case also. Thus according to Bhaṭṭanāyaka the 'Pratīti, 'Utpatti' and Abhivyakti of Rasa can not be satisfactorily explained. After refuting the theories of Pratīti, Utpatti and Abhivyakti, Bhaṭṭanāyaka develops his own theory regarding the 'Rasaniṣpatti'. The words, employed in a Kāvya have got their own peculiarity not common to any other words. This peculiarity of the Śabda of the Śravya-Kāvya is the result of the refinement effected by avoiding Doṣas and employing Guṇas and Alaṅkāras, and in the case of Dṛśyakāvyas, it is the result of the use of the four kinds of gesticulation also. The Śabda has got three functions (Vyāpāras). The first function, Abhidhā and Lakṣaṇā (which is considered to be the tail of Abhidhā ('Abhidhā-Pucchabhūtā' and hence can be included in

its own fold, are common to the Kāvya-Śabda also with any Śabda of ordinary use. The peculiarity of the Kāvyaśabda lies in having two more special functions, Bhāvakatva or Bhāvanā and Bhojakatva, or Bhoga. The Śabdas of a Kāvya convey, the ideas like the Vibhāvas and the Anubhāvas etc., with the help of their first Vyāpāra, i. e. 'Abhidhā'. Then the Bhāvakatva comes into action and it brings about universalisation by removing the individualistic traits of the Vibhāvas etc Thus for example Sītā is cognised not as the wife of Rama, but as a beautiful maiden. Similarly all the Ālambana-Vibhāvas, Uddīpana vibhāvas, Anubhāvas, and Vyabhicāribhāvas are presented to the spectator in their generalised form. Now the third Vyāpāra, Bhojakatva or Bhoga comes into action. The Sattvaguṇa of the spectator completely suppresses the Rajoguṇa and Tamoguṇa and makes him forget his own individuality. The preponderance of Sattvaguṇa produces illumination of the mind which results in a blissful state, unalloyed with any other feeling. Thus according to Bhaṭṭanāyaka, Rasa is the Sthāyibhāva, which is universalised by the Bhāvaktvavyāpāra of the Śabda. This Bhoga is quite different from the ordinary cognition, and recollection etc. The Svarūpānanda, which is also Cidrūpa, though ever existing, does not manifest itself, being covered by the Rajas and Tamas. when they are in predominance. But the extraordinary power of the Śabda makes the Sattva predominant by suppressing Rajas and Tamas, and the natural bliss of the self comes into open like the Sun after the disappearance of the evening clouds. The Sthāyin is enjoyed by this Ānandamaya-caitanya and the same is called Rasa. The Bhoga is considered to be almost similar to Parabrahmāsvāda.

It has been generally believed that Bhaṭṭanāyaka's theory is based on the sāṅkhya system of Philosophy. ('The theory of Rasa and Dhvani' P. 103; 'Jagannthapaṇḍita' P. 103; H. S. P.; P. 224; and S.P., pp. 124-125.) But this assumption does not seem to be unquestionable. Abhinavagupta, in his Abhinavabhāratī, just before explaining the theory of Bhaṭṭanāyaka, talks

of a theory based on Sāṅkhyasiddhānta and so it can be inferred that Abhinavagupta does not feel that Bhaṭṭanāyaka's theory also is based on the same Sāṅkhya system. Dr. Narendranatha Sarma Chaudhury, rightly points out (Kāvyatattvasamikṣā P. 188) that this misconception has arisen because of the remarks in the Kāvyapradīpa which run as follows:- "सत्त्वरजस्तमसां गुणानामुद्रेकेण क्रमात् सुखदुःखमोहाः प्रकाशन्ते, उद्रेकश्च स्वेतरावभिभूय अवस्थानमिति साङ्ख्य सिद्धान्ताणुसारेण विवृणुते", (Kāvyapradīpa (K.P.) pp. 95–96.

This remark of Pradīpa, Dr. Chaudhari says, is correct only so far as the Triguṇātmakatva of the Citta is concerned but not in the Ānandāṁśa. Because, that Citta is Triguṇātmaka, is acceptable not only to the Sāṅkhyas, but also to the Vedāntins and the followers of the Pratyabhijñādarśana. Bnt according to the Sāṅkhyas, Ātman is only Śuddhacaitanyarūpa but not Ānandarūpa, whereas Bhaṭṭanāyaka appears accepting it both Citsvabhāva and Ānandasvabhāva, as is evident from the words of Abhinavagupta. "सत्त्वोद्रेकप्रकाशानन्दमयनिजसंविद्विश्रान्तिलक्षणेन पर ब्रह्मास्वादसविधेन भोगन भुज्यते" etc.

That is why Madhusūdana Sarasvati in his Bhaktirasāyana, writes how the Rasaniṣpatti can be explained according to the Sāṅkhyasiddānta also in a quite different way. According to Sāṅkhyas, the Prakṛti, the material cause (Upādānākāraṇa) of the world, consists of three Guṇas, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas and so every Kārya also contains these three Guṇas which produced happiness misery and insensibility respectively. It may be argued, how can these three qualities happiness etc., which are internal, be identified with the external things? In reply to this argument, it is said that their being internal is the result of their reflection in the internal mind, and so the Sukha etc., can be identical with the external object. Now another question arises. If every object is considered to be Sukha-Duhkha-Mohātmaka, it should leave the same impression on the mind of all the people; which is not generally the case. This question is answered like this. The impre-

ssion, that is expected to be produced by an object on the mind of a perceiver is guided by his Vāsanā. Thus the one and the same beautiful damsel as explained by Vacaspatimisra, produces pleasure in the mind of her husband, hatred in her cowife and unhappiness in a man who longs for her, invain, because the three Guṇas Sattva, Rajas and Tamas are at work, respectively in the case of such three different types of persons. (Sāṅkhya tattvakaumudi. P. 287-8). Thus when the Sukhākāra of the latent feelings like Rati reflects in the mind it is called Sthāyibhāva. The Sthāyibhāva appears only as Sukhasvarūpa, because of its association with proper Vibhāvas etc. Therefore according to this system Rasa is the Sthāyibhava which is kindled in the minds of the spectators or a man of taste in the form of Sukha. As can be seen from this account, Bhaṭṭanāyaka's theory is completely different from the Sāṅkhaya theory.

According to K.C. Pande. Baṭṭanāyaka takes the help of both the systems of Sāṇkhya and Vedānta but his explanation of Rasā-Bhukti is mainly based on Vedānta. (Cumparative aesthetics Vol. I pp. 72-73 and 83). Dr. Pande cites to prove his theory, the commentary of Baṭṭan āyaka on the first verse of Bharata, which he intreprets according to the Vedāntic system. Some scholars contend, if Abhinavagupta's theory is based on the Śaivādvaia, the theory of Bhaṭṭanāyaka is based on Śaiva-Dvaita, a fact which accounts for the difference between the views of these two critics. But the extracts from Bhaṭṭanāyaka can be intrepreted in either way (to suit Vedānta system or Śaiva system) and in the absence of convincing arguments, we need not feel that Dr. Pande's views are totally incorrect. The use of the word 'Brhamānanda by Bhaṭṭanāyaka, which is a favourite phrase of only Vedāntins makes us believe that Bhaṭṭanāyaka is having Vedāntic tendencies. And such words like 'Samvid' etc., are not new to the Vedāntins; e.g. the 'Samvid Bhāmati' (P. 42). Such words like 'Samvid viśrānti' can be very well explained in the light of Upanisadic saying:- "प्राज्ञेनात्मना सम्परिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं वेद नान्तरम्" etc. (Br. UP. IV. 3-21)

It was not quite clear wherefrom Bhaṭṭanāyaka adopted these two more Vyāpāras (Bhāvanā and Bhoga) of the Śabda. Perhaps it is his own invention made on the strength of the result (Phalabalakalpita).

According to some Scholars (R S.G S.A., P. 150), the Bhāvanā, the additional Vyāpāra of the śabda, has been suggested to Bhaṭṭanāyaka by the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, where two kinds of Bhāvanā, śābdībhāvanā and Ārthībhāvanā are accepted. In support of this contention it is shown that Bhaṭṭanāyaka is described as the follower of Jaimini, by Abhinavagupta in two or three places and that Abhinavagupta uses the language of Mīmāṁsakas while refuting the Bhāvanāvāda of Bhaṭṭanāyaka in Locana (pp. 188-190).

Bhaṭṭanāyaka may be having some Mīmāṁsic predilections, but it cannot be a proof to establish that the Bhāvanā also has been borrowed from Mīmāṁsā. Because Bhaṭṭanāyaka introduces the Bhāvanā for a specific purpose, the purpose of universialisation, and he takes it as an additional power peculiar to a Kāvyaśabda where as the Bhāvanā, as expounded by the Mīmāṁsakas is common to all the Ākhyātas.

Now it can be seen that Bhaṭṭanāyaka does not mean such kind of Bhāvanā when he talks of it in the context of Rasaniṣpatti. Bhaṭṭanāyaka also opines that, as explained above, Bhāvanā is the peculiar power of śabda and that is why Abhinavagupta (Locana pp. 188-190), takes objection to limitng this Bhāvanā to śabda alone, because Artha also is helpful in the Rasaniṣpatti. Therefore, the main objection against this Bhāvanā, is that it has no established authority and that its purpose is served even by Vyañjanā which is having wider field and needs to be accepted. It is also not correct to say on the strength of the Mīmāṁsic language employed by Abhinavagupta that Bhāvanā is, borrowed from Mīmāṁsāśāstra. It is the general practice of the Śāstrakāras to suggest, in course of arguments,

such alternatives which are never thought of by the Pūrvapakṣins, and at times quite absurd, and refute them with a hidden sense of ridicule. Here Abhinavagupta is reminded of the Bhāvanā of Pūrvamīmāṁsakas on hearing the word from the Mīmāṁsic Bhaṭṭanāyaka and tries to explain away the futility of this theory because there is nothing newely said (Locana. P 188). This argument is advanced only in a lighter vein, as when he remarks in different contexts "यत्तु भट्टनायकेनोक्तं सिद्धेरपि नटादेरङ्गत्व व्रजन्त्या: तत्पक्षेयमिति तेन नाट्याङ्गता समर्थिता फलञ्च पुरुषार्थत्वादिति केवलं जैमिनि रनुसृत इत्यलमनेन" H.S.P. 224 and "जैमिनिसूत्रे ह्येवं योज्यते, न काव्येपीत्यलम्" Locana P.173.

Therefore, it may not be wrong to think that the clue to Bhaṭṭanāyaka's theory of Bhāvanā, might have been suggested by the original sense of the word 'Bhāvanā' itself which means 'contemplating over a thing again and again' (पुन: पुनरनुसन्धान) Taking this as an additional Vyāpāra of the Kāvyaśabda he explains that it is helpful in Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa. PR.'s statement "कारणञ्च तदवच्छिन्ते भावनाविशेष: पुन: पुनरनुसन्धानात्मा" also is helpful in understanding the significance of this Bhāvanā expounded by Bhaṭṭanāyaka. Therefore, it is unlikely that the 'Bhāvanā' has been borrowed by Bhaṭṭanāyaka from Mīmāṁsa.[1]

It is interesting to note that the same Bhaṭṭanāyaka who had previously refuted Sādhāranīkaraṇa because such things like crossing the Ocean, etc., are too extrodinary to be generalised, is

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1. In the context of Bhāvakatva S. K. De (S.P.P. 124), writes "the Bhāvakatva (or Rasabhāvanā) which as Abhinavagupta suggests, is apparently derived from Bharata's general definition of Bhāva" etc. Again in Page 131 he writes "Bharata's dictum' Kāvyarthān bhāvayantīti bhāvāh' implies that Bhāvakatva is an inherent capacity of all Bhāvas" etc.,

now accepting Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa without properly meeting the objections raised by himself. It cannot be a justification just to invent a new name like 'Bhāvanā', without giving satisfactory answer to the objections. Perhaps his main objection to Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa is only if it is to be accepted through Abhidhā itself, because in such case Sādhāraṇikaraṇa can be brought about by every spoken word having Abhidhā. He does not object to have the Sādhārṇikaraṇa under certain peculiar circumstance, when on the strength of the result, one wants to ascribe a peculiar power called Bhāvanā to the word.

Before establishing his own theory of Rasa, Abhinavagupta refutes some of the views of Bhaṭṭanāyaka in Abhinavabhāratī. First, he finds fault with his assertion that the Rasa is not at all an experience (Raso Na Pratīyate), because we never come across such a thing in the world, which is not experienced, but enjoyed at the same time. There may be different kinds of experiences (Pratītis) on account of the difference of the Sādhana like Pratyakṣa Anumāna, Śabda. recollection and the Yogipratyakṣa etc., but their being experience (Pratītitva) cannot be denied. The Rasa Pratīti, also known as Carvaṇa, Āsvādana, and Bhoga etc., may be of peculiar nature on account of the peculiarity of its cause like Vibhāvas etc., but on the strength of the peculiarity it is not correct to say that it is not a Pratīti at all. Such expressions like 'Rasāh Pratīyante' should be understood like the expressions "Odanam Pacati" etc., because there is no experience of Rasa which is diferent from Rasa (the experience itself being Rasa). This Rasapratīti may take, at the first instance, as its cause, the Anumāna in Nāṭya and the Śabdajñāna in Kāvya, but ultimately it is peculiar and different from the Laukika anumāna or the Śābdajñāna. The Bhoga can safely be included in Dhvani or Dhvanana which will have to be accepted and is quite different from the Ahbidhā and which rests not only with the Śabda but the Artha also. The Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa can be effected by employing suitable Guṇas and Alaṅkāras in Kāvya and by the use of musical instruments and the four kinds of Abhi-

naya in the Nāṭya and there is no need to accept a separate Vyāpāra like Bhāvanā for this pupose. Moreover it is not correct to say that the Śabda alone is having Bhāvanā, because it cannot be found when the meaning is not understood, and it can rest with neither the Artha alone, because the Artha understood through another Śabda (Laukikavākya) cannot have the Bhāvanā. Therefore, both the Artha and Śabda are to be accepted as having Bhāvakatva and that is why it is said by Dhvanikāra "Yatra arthaḥ Śabdo vā" etc., and so the Bhāvakatva is no other than Dhvanana. The Bhoga is the mental state of the spectator, otherwise called 'Āsvādana' which consists of Druti, Vistāra and Vikāsa and it (Bhoga) is brought about by the Kāvya only, through the Dhvanana-Vyāpāra. In other words the nature of Bhoga, as accepted by Bhaṭṭanāyaka, is as follows. The Sthāyibhāva is latent in the mind of the spectator. When Ajñāna covering the Ānandāṁśa of the Ātman is removed and it (Sthāyin) becomes the object of such Ātman (स्वरूपभूतानन्दचैतन्यविषयीकृत) it is called Bhoga. As Bhaṭṭanāyaka himself accepts the Svarūpānanda is ever exising ('स च प्रधानभूतोऽशः सिद्धरूप इति' Locana P. 183.) and therefore the Bhoga cannot be other than Abhivyakti (of the Svarūpānanda). Now Bhaṭṭanāyaka's contention that if the Rasābhivyakti is to be accepted there may be degrees of difference in the Abhivyakti and so in the Rasa also, is unfounded; because there is nothing wrong in acceptiag the Abhivyakti of the ever existing Ānandāṁśa. Similarly the latent Sthāyibhāvas are made congnised (experienced) by the combination of Vibhāvas etc., and this experience being the Abhivyakti it may be given another name of Bhoga.

After thus refuting the views of Bhaṭṭanāyaka Abhinavagupta explaines the Rasasūtra in his own way. The spectators or Sahṛdayas are accustomed to infer the Sthāyin, in their day to day life, on seeing its causes like the damsels etc. But the same causes etc., while presented by a Kāvya or Nāṭya, will have special power (more than the ordinary Kāraṇas) and thereby loose their individuality and some kind of universalation is effected.

Such Kāraṇas etc., which are given special names like Vibhāvas etc., make the Sthāyibhāva experienced through a supernatural consciousness removed of all the obstacles, when it is called Rasa. Regarding the cause and the effects etc, (Vibhāvādi), the Sahṛdaya does not feel 'these are mine' 'these are not mine' 'these are my enemy's' or 'these are not my enemy's' 'these are of some X' 'these are not of some X' etc., and so they are universalised. If they were to be taken as associated with himself, the spectator, in the persence of many others, will feel shy. If they were to be understood as associated with any enemy he will certainly have hatred for them, and if as associated with some X he cannot have interest at all. They cannot even be felt as having no connection with any body, because in such case they would appear false and the spectators may lose inclination to the Rasa itself.

This universalisation (Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa) should not be, as Kāvyapradīpakāra cautions us, misunderstood in the sense that the Vibhāvas etc., are felt as associated with all. It means only the non-appearance or the absence of the cognition of the connection with any particular individual or a feeling 'this belongs to this' but not 'this belongs to this alone'. (Kāvyapradīpa (K.P.) P.67). The Vibhāvas and Vyabhicāribhāvas, which are thus universlised, bring about some kind of universalisation in Sthāyibhāvas also, though they differ with each individual, and that is what accounts for the same kind of Rasāsvāda by many spectators on seeing a Nāṭya or hearing a Kāvya. The universalised Sthāyibhāva which is expereinced by the consiousness is called Rasa. The Ātman is of the nature of both Cit and Ānanda and so the consciousness implies Ānanda also a fact which accounts for Rasa being Ānandarūpa.

There is identity of views between Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta regarding the seat of Rasa. Both of them rightly accept Rasa as seated in Sahṛdaya. Because the poet composes his Kāvya niether for the Rasānubhūti of Rāma etc, who are no more, or for that of Naṭa who is interested only in earning some

money. If a Naṭa also is found having similar experience of Rasa, he should be included among the Sahṛadayas. The experience of Rasa, being dependent on the experience of the Vibhāvas etc., lasts as long as the latter last ; because the Vibhāvas etc., rouse the latent Sthāyibhāva, by way of removing the cover of ignorance, they also cause the Abhivyakti of the Ātman which is Cidānandarūpa. And so the cessation of the action of the Vibhāvas etc., results in the spectator's going back into his previous state of Ajñāna.

The experience of Rasa is a collective cognition (Samūhālambanajñāna) of the Vibhāvas etc., but this Samūhālambanajñāna differs from the ordinary Samūhālambanajñāna, in that the Vihbhāvas etc , are not experienced in this jñāna individually. It is therefore generally compared with the enjoyment of the taste of a good drink prepared of Sugar and many other condiments and spices etc., the taste of which is not experienced individually. The unique nature of this collective cognition is itself a proof in its being Lokottara (extraordinary). Another proof to establish that Rasāsvāda is Lokottara, is that the different Sthāyibhāvas of day to day life are causing different effects like pleasure and pain etc., where as the Sthāyibhāvas of the Sahṛdaya result in happiness only. Rasa is producing the Alaukikacamatkāra only because the Sthāyibhāva is being experienced (by Sahṛdaya) with no sense of its being related to himself or any outsider. For, if the Sthāyibāva is felt as Svagata then 'Śoka' would give greif and Rati would give pleasure and it may cause shyness even, in the presence of other people. Once the sense of Svagatatva (of Sthāyin) is not there, it cannot produce grief or pleasure. Therefore a Sāttvic collective cognition comprehensive of the Sthāyibhāva, associated with the Anubhāvas and Vibhāvas and the saṁcāribhāvas unveils the great bliss which is the Svarūpa of the Ātman and same is termed Rasa. The word 'Rasaniṣpatti' in the Rasasūtra is to be understood not as the Niṣapatti of Rasa, because as explained above it is over

existing, but as the niṣpatti of the Rasana i.e. the experience of Rasa.

It may be argued that the Rasa should be accepted as Kārya because it is being produced only by the experience of Vibhāvas etc. But it is not correct. If the Vibhavādijñāna is accepted as the cause it can be accepted only as a Nimittakāraṇa. The disappearance of the Nimittakāraṇa does not result in the loss of the Kārya as in the case of the potter and the pot. But here we see that the Rasāsvāda ceases to continue with the cessation of the experience of Vibhāvas etc. It may be said that even the Nimittakāraṇanāśa results in the Kāryanaśa in some cases, as when the Dvitva (the idea 'these are two') is lost on the loss of the Apekṣābuddhi (the sense that this is one and this is one) (Kārikāvali 107-109). But even in this case, the Dvitva is accepted to be Nitya (by Mīmāṁsakas), the Apekṣābuddhi being only its Abhivyañjaka. Again it may be cited that the happiness caused by the Chandanasparśa, disappears on the disappearance of the Nimittakāraṇa i.e. Chandanasparśa. But even here the disappeaance of the happiness is the result of the disapearance of the rootcause itself i e. Chandana and the happiness originally produced at the beginning is removed by the appearance of some other Guṇas of alien nature.

It is also not correct to say that Rasa is Jñāpya by the Vibhāvas etc., because as explained above, the experience of the Rasa itself being a collective cognition of the Vibhāvas etc., how can it be Jñāpya by them? In places where things like Ghaṭa etc., are said to be the Jñāpyas of the Dīpa and the light, we find that these things, unlike in the present case, are quite different from each other. It may be argued, when the Vibhāvas etc., are accepted as the helpers in the realisation of Rasa, the Rasa, in the absence of the third alternative, should be accepted as their Kārya or Jñāpya; and if, as explained above, the two alternatives are not tenable, the Rasapratīti will be meaningless. Yes; the two alternatives are not tenable, and it is an undeniable fact that there is the experience of Rasa. In the absence of any common explanation, the Rasacarvaṇā is said

to be supernatural (Alaukika) because it is quite different from all the common expereiences ; but not because it is connected with supernatural things. The Rasa, as explained above, is ever existing and so such expressions 'Rasa is produced' should be understood to mean that the Rasa Charvaṇā, the experience of Rasa is produced.

The Rasa Carvaṇa is quite different from all the other worldly experiences. For example the cognition of Ghaṭa which is produced by a pratyakaṣapramāṇa does not include the pramāṇa (Cakṣurindriya) also, whereas the experience of Rasa includes the Vibhāvādi also which is the Pramāṇa. It is not like the cognition of a Yogin (Yuñjāna) who experiences his own self as different from the world ; because in the Rasa pratīti there is no Bhedajñāna. It is not like the cognition of a Yogin (Yukta) who experiences only his Ātman with no connection with the outer world because the Rasapratīti includes the Vibhāvādipratīti also and that is why the Rasa carvaṇā (the cognition of Rasa) can be accepted neither as Savikalpajñāna nor Nirvikalpakajñāna and this unique nature of the Rasacarvaṇa is the reason in accepting it as Alaukika. Thus Abhinavagupta propounds the theory of Rasa quite elaborately, in a systematic way, (This theroy is explained here on the basis of Kāvyapradīpa (K.P.) pp. 96-102) and as he himself says, Abhinavagupta adopts every thing that is found useful for his theory from the older writers and rejects such things which he finds as baseless or unnecessary (H A.B., P. 469).

It is to be noted that according to Abhinavagupta the Rasa is quite different from the Sthāyibhāva. The Sthāyibhāva may be ever exisiting either in the latent state or in a roused state. But the Rasa is only a temporary thing lasting as long as the experience of Vibhāvas etc., is there, though it is no other than the enjoyment of the bliss of the self (Svarūpānanda) which is everexisting. Abhinava wites :— "अलौकिकनिर्विघ्नसंवेदनात्मकचर्वणागो

चरतां नीतोऽर्थः चर्व्यमाणतैकसारः, न तु सिद्धस्वभावः, तात्कालिक एव व तु चर्वणातिरिक्तकालावलम्बी स्थायिविलक्षण एव रसः" (H.A.B., P.483.)

In his work 'The aesthetic experience according to Abhinavagupta' Mr. Raniero Gnoli writes "Rasa is not a thing in itself, formed previous to the act of consciousness by which it is perceived, but the consciousness itself, (and therefore the perception) which freed from external inteference and from all practical desires, becomes Rasa or aesthetic consciousness'. P. XXII.

It has been believed by some, that Abhinavagupta's theory of Rasa is based as the Vedānta system. (Comparative aesthetics Vol. I P. 87). Abhinavagupta's exposition of Rasa can be explained according either to Vedānta or to Kashmir Śaiva-Philosophy and so some scholars must have thought it to be based on Vedānta. Dr. K.C. Pande, in his valuable work' comparative aesthtics' proved that Abhinava's theory is completely based on the Śaivādvaita. The conclusion that this theory is based on Śaivādvaita. is arrived at not only because Abhinava wrote a work 'Pratyabhijñā vivṛti vimarśinī on Śaivādvaita but also because he makes an explicit reference, in one place in the above work, to his Rasa theory expounded in Abhinavabhārati, which indicated its relation with Śaivādaita:- Iśvarapratyabhijñā vimarśinī Part-II P. 179.

The main difference between the Śaivādvaita and Vedānta has been succinctly brought out by Dr. Caudhary in his Kāvyatattvasamīkṣā (P. 170).[1] According to the Śaivasiddhānta the Jīvātman is identical with the Paramātman. Consciousness (Caitanya) and bliss (Ānanda) are the nature (Svarūpa) of the Ātman. The bliss (Ānandāṁśa) is unvieled at the time of the endjoyment of Rasa. According to Vedānta the eternal bliss is attained by making one self free from all the feelings (Bhāva), where as, according to the Śaivism, it is to be attained through the intensified Bhāva reaching the highest state of Camatkāra when it is called Rasa. This bliss, which is other wise known as Rasa, is enjoyed by the Jīvātman who is only an atom (Aṇu).

According to Vedānta the knower (Jñātṛ) is identical with the knowledge (Jñāna) and therefore there is no existence of a different being enjoying Brahmānanda. But, in Śaivism, the Sahṛdaya who is called Paśu, in the Śaiva terminology, enjoys the Rasa, the great bliss. The Brahmānanda is attaind through renunciation where as the Rasa is attained by finding beauty in every thing. This shows how Abhinavagupta based his theory of Rasa on the Śaivism.

The importance of Rasa has been recognised not only by the commentators on Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra but also by many independent writers. There are some writers, in the post-dhvani period, who are inclined to accept the supremacy of the Rasa, though they are opposed to the Dhvani system. Dhanañjaya, the author of Daśarūpaka, and Dhanika, his commentator, (who wrote their works according to P.V. Kane (H S.P. PP. 237-37), in last decade of the 9th century and the first decade of the 10th century respectely), appear to be following Bhaṭṭanāyaka in explaining the theory of Rasa. But they do not accept the additional Vyāpāras, Bhāvanā and Bhoga. The Bhāvakatva as accepted by them, is limited to the Bhāvya-bhāvaka-sambandha as opposed to Vyaṅgya-vyañjaka-bhāvasambandha between Rasa and the Kāvya, because, according to them, the Vyañjanā can be included in the Tātparya. Here Dhanika takes the help of the Mīmāṁsakas (Prābhākaras) who opine that every Vākya, whether Laukika or Vaidika, is Kāryapara i e. conveys some action or other which is to be performed. The Kāvyaśabdas have Svānandodbhava i.e. the experience of Rasa, as their Kārya and for its expression the Kāvyaśabda does not require any Vyāpāra other than Tātparya (Daśarupaka P. 95). Abhinavagupta and the authors of Daśarūpaka are too near in time to quote the views of each other and so the theory of the latter was to be refuted by Mammaṭa.

Kuntaka who tries to include all varities of Dhvani under Vakrokti, accepts the importance of Rasa, but adds nothing new

to the Rasa theory. Mahimabhaṭṭa, who "most probably flurished in the first quarter of the eleventh century" ('The theories of Rasa and Dhvani' P. 133.) accepts Rasa as the soul of poetry:- (Vyaktiviveka P. 102 and 111). But like Śaṅkuka, Mahimabhaṭṭa opines that the Rasa can be inferred (Anumeya) and according to him, the Sthāyibhāvas though not really existing are being enjoyed by the spectators because of their Hṛdayasaṁvāda (the syspathitic reaction of heart) Vyaktiviveka P.16).

Bhoja who flurished in the later part of the eleventh century, tries to bring some Novelty into the theory of Rasa. According to him, there is only one Rasa and it is Śṛṅgāra which is quite distinct from the usually known Rasa of that name. This is named by him 'Abhimāna' or 'Ahaṅkāra' and this is the only fundamental Rasa. Ofcourse, there are some Bhāvas which are capable of becoming Rasa but the name Rasa can be given to them only by Upacāra. The word Ahaṅkāra, as is used in this context should be understood not in the sense of Egotlsm, but as a philosophical concept meaning Ego. Thus Rasa is only one and is the one element of Ahaṅkāra, Secondarily it is the developed state of Bhāvas like Rati etc.

Like Rudraṭa (Kāvyālannkara XII 4). Bhoja also feels that all the 49 Bhāvas can be developed into Rasa (in the secondary sense of the word) and so it is not correct, according to him, to limit the number of Rasas to eight or nine. From Sarasvatīkanṭhābharaṇa it may appear that Bhoja is in favour of accepting 12 Rasas instead of eight, but Dr. Rāghavan explains that Bhoja introduces four more Rasas to prove that, on this analogy, every Bhāva can become a Rasa. (Śṛṅgāraprakāśa P. 113).

That Rasa is only one in its highest state has been estabelished by Abhinava himself (H.A.B: P. 635-37), and so there is nothing much new in what Bhoja says, and therefore naturally

his views could not get any special recognition. As for the Philosophic background of Bhoja's theory, Dr. K.C. Pande feels (Comparative aesthetics Vol. I P. 195) that this conception of Ahaṅkāra is based on the Dualistic Śaivism or Siddhānta-śaivisim of which Bhoja himself was an exponant in the Tattvaprakāśa.

The theory of Rasa as expounded by Abhinava has been well established by Mammaṭa by refuting the views of those who are opposed to the theory of Dhvani. In the fourth chapter he states the views of the predecessors of Abhinava i.e. Lollaṭa, Śrī śaṅkuka, and Bhaṭṭanāyaka before he expounds the views of Abhinavagupta. In all cases he explains the different theories from the point of view of the spectator. But he states the different theories with such brevity that it is, very difficult to understand the philosophical background of these theories without studying Abhinavabhārati or a good commentary. But after the appearance of Kāvyaprakāśa almost all the old works on poetics were thrown into background, as it were, and every later writer depended on Kāvyaprakāśa only for the views of the older writers. It had its own undesirable effect. All the later rhetoricians began to understand the theory of Rasa of Abhinava, not in its background of Śaiva-philosophy but in that of Vedānta, because such words like 'Cit' 'Samvit' 'Viśrānti' and 'Ānanda' etc., used in expounding the Rasa theory, can be intrepreted either from Śaiva point of view or the Vedāntic point of view. Perhaps, Mammaṭa, being a man more interested in the result (i e. the realisation of Rasa) than in the subtilities of the process, did not trouble himself much about the philosophical differences; because both the theories are almost similar so far as the Rasa is concerned. But it cannot be said that Mammaṭa, being a Kāshmirian very close to Abhinava by time, does not know the philosophical predilections of Abhinavagupta, where as the same cannot be said of the later writers like Viśvanātha and Jagannātha, who were quite apart from Abhinava in time. By this time, the popularity of Śaivism was disappearing with the rise of Vedānta. But undoubdtedly, the credit of establishing Dhvani-

Siddhānta on firm ground, and of maintaining the Rasa theory on the lines of Dhvani, goes to Mammaṭa. Almost all the later writers–whether his commentators or the authors of independent works–closely follow his theory of Dhvani and Rasa, with negligible changes here and there.

Viśvanātha tries to explain the Rasa on the basis of Vedānta His Vedāntic tendency has been clearly expressed in his definition of Rasa:—

"सत्वोद्रेकादखण्डस्वप्रकाशानन्दचिन्मयः ।
वेद्यान्तरस्पर्शशून्यो ब्रह्मानन्दसहोदरः ॥
लोकोत्तरचमत्कारप्राणः कैश्चित् प्रमातृभिः ।
स्वाकारवदभिन्नत्वेनायमास्वाद्यते रसः" ॥

(Sāhityadarpaṇa III. 2 & 3).

"The Rasa arising from an exaltation of the quality of Sattva or good ness, indivisible, self manifested made up of their joy and thought in their identity, free from contact of aught else perceived akin to the realisation of Brahman and having for its essence supernormal wonder (Camatkāra) is enjoyed by those competent in its inseperableness (as an object of knowledge) from the knowledge of itself" (S.P. Part II P. 263).

Viśvanātha is not the first writer to give Vedāntic-turn to the theory of Rasa. Kumārasvāmin, the commentators on Pratāparudriyam, quotes the views of one Naraharisūri who holds similar views about Rasa. According to Naraharisūri, as Quoted by Kumārasvāmin, (Prataparudriyam P. 211-212), it is not correct to say that Rasa is situated in Sāmājika, because, Rasa being Brahman himself is not situated in any one place, and so such expressions "रसः सामाजिकाश्रयः" etc., should be understood as only Aupacārikaprayogas, like the expressions "ईश्वरो योगिमनोनिवासी" etc. In fact, Narahari says, every Ānanda is only one phase of the supreme bliss with the difference that the Ānanda caused by worldly objects is called Laukikānanda where

as Rasa expressed through Vibhāvas etc., is called Alaukika (transcendental). In this connection Kumārasvāmin quotes a verse from 'Svātma yoga pradīpa':—

"या स्थायिभावरतिरेव निमित्तभेदात्
शृङ्गारमुख्यनवनाट्यरसीभवन्ती ।
सामाजिकान् सहृदयान्नटनायकादी-
नानन्दयेत् सहजपूर्णरसोऽस्मि सोहम्" ॥ (P.212)

All these above discussions show how long before PR, the Vedāntic tendency in Rasa theory was well established.

Let us now examine, under this background, the theory of Rasa as expounded by PR. As was already noted, he mentions, in Rasagaṅgādhara eleven different views on Rasa. He begins with mentioning the views of Abhinavagupta which are generally taken as the last word on the theory of Rasa. Of the eleven theories mentioned by PR. the first six theories have got some important points of their own and the last three theories, which are mentioned just because they were expounded by some ancient writers, cannot get, as PR. says, the approval of Bharata.

According to the last three theories only the Vibhāva (9th view) or the Anubhāva (10th view) or the Vyabhicārabhāva (11th view) which is being relished (Bhāvyamāna) is the Rasa. The last two theories are reminiscent of the views of Rudraṭa and Bhoja, who believe that every Bhāva can be developed to the state of Rasa; and the first theory is related to the prehistoric conception of even Vibhāva becoming Rasa, a theory which is not found in any of the extant works. The seventh theory that all the three things–Vibhāvas, Anubhāvas and the Vyabhicāribhāvas, together constitute Rasa, results, evidently, from understanding, in a most general way, Rasasūtra of Bharata where only these are mentioned without the explicit referense to the Sthāyibhāva. The eighth theory holds that one of the three which ever can produce Camatkāra is Rasa, and that none of them can

become Rasa if it fails to produce the same. This theory again must have been the outcome of the nineth, tenth and eleventh theories, according to which, each of the Vibhāvas etc., can become, as explained above, Rasa. Thus all these five theories represent the views of the earlier writers, and historically speaking, they should, most probably, be placed in the following order :- "१) भाव्यमानो विभाव एव रसः २) अनुभावः तथा ३) व्याभिचार्येव तथातथा परिवणमंति ४) त्रिषु य एव चमत्कारी स एव रसः ५) and विभावादयः त्रयः समुदिताः रसः''

PR. understands the weakness of these theories and disposes them off with one remark without any comment there on. Even Abhinavagupta mentions similar theories only in a passing remark. 'अन्येतु शुद्धं विभावम्, अपरे तु शुद्धमनुभावम, केचिन्तु स्थायिमात्रम् । इतरे व्यभिचारिणम्, अन्ये तत्संयोगम्, एके अनुकार्यम्, केचन सकलमेव समुदायं रसमाहुरित्यलं बहुना'' ।

In the theories of Bhaṭṭalollaṭa, Śrīśaṅkuka and Bhaṭṭanāyaka, presented by PR as the fifth sixth and the second theories, we do not find much difference from what is written about them by Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa.

PR. refers to the theory of Bhaṭṭalollaṭa in the following words :-

"मुख्यतया दुष्यन्तादिगत एव रसः रत्यादिः कमनीयविभावाद्यभिनयप्रदर्शनकोविदे दुष्यन्ताद्यनुकर्तरि नटे समारोप्य साक्षात्क्रियते" इत्येके, मतेऽस्मिन् स क्षात्कारो दुष्यन्तोऽयं शकुन्तलादिविषयकरतिमान् इत्यादि॰, प्राग्वद्धर्म्यंशे लौकिकः आरोप्यांशे त्वलौकिकः" By the sentence beginning with 'Matesmin', PR. explains how the Rasa-sākṣātkāra can be had by the Sāmājika when, according to Lollaṭa, the real Rasa rests with the original character only. The Sāmājika will be having a peculiar Sākṣātkāra 'दुष्यन्तोऽयं शकुन्तलादिविषयकरतिमान्' i.e. 'This Duṣyanta is having Rati about Śakuntalā. Here this cognition is a Lankikapratyakṣa so far as the Idantāṁśa, 'this', is concerned and Alaukikapratyakṣa so far as the 'Rati' is concerned, as in the case of the

cognition 'सुरभि चन्दनम्' etc., which is Laukikapratyakṣa so far as 'Candana' is concerned which is Cakṣuḥsaṁyukta and Alaukikapratyakṣa so far as Saurabha is concerned which is in contact with the Cakṣus by Jñānaviṣayapratyāsatti (Muktāvalī P.270 & 280).

This is how this passage of Rasa-Gaṅgādhara has been explained by Dr. Chaudhury (Kāvyatattva samīkṣā P.175) & this explanation seems to be quite proper and bringing out the views of PR. But some commentators (Saralā (R. G.) P.34; Chadrikā Part I P.124; Hindi R.G. Part I 67.) understand this passage to mean that the Pratyakṣa is Laukika so far as the Idaṁtvāṁśa is concerned and Alaukika in the Duṣyantatvāṁśa. There may be nothing technically wrong in this explanation besause the Āropyamāṇa, according to the Naiyāyikas, is Alaukikapratyakṣaviṣaya. But does not convey the correct idea of PR. who wants to explain how the Rati etc., can be the object of the cognition of the spectator (Sāmājikapratyakṣa viṣaya) because in the first sentence quoted above, he says 'Raso Ratyādi.........Sākṣātkriyate' and in the second sentence he explains the nature of Sākṣātkāra of Ratyādi, and therefore to explain this passage without any reference to Ratyādi is only to neglect the spirit of this passage.

PR. sumsup the views of Śrīśaṅkuka in the following words:– "दुष्यन्तादिगतो रत्यादिर्नटे पक्षे दुष्यन्तत्वेन गृहीते विभावादिभिः कृत्रिमैप्यरकृत्रिमतया गृहीतैः, भिन्ने विषयेऽनुमितिसामग्र्या बलवत्वात् अनुमीयमानो रसः इत्यपरे" (R.G., P.34)Thus according to P.R. the main difference between the views of Lollaṭa and Śaṅkuka is that according to the former the Rati etc., the ascribed to Naṭa. taken as Duṣyanta, is Pratyakṣa viṣaya (of course Alaukika it is) of the Sāmājika, and according to the latter it is Anumeya. The form of Anumiti will be like this– "रामोऽयं सीतादिविषयकरतिमान्। सीताद्यालम्बनविभावरोमाञ्चाद्यनुभावोत्सुक्यादि सञ्चारिभाववक्त्वात्। यो यदात्मकविभावत्त्वे सति अनुभावसञ्चारिभाववान् स तद्रतिमान्".

Here Naṭa is recognised only in the form of Duṣyantādi not as Naṭa, as the Naṭapratyakṣa is obstructed by the Anumiti of the Rati etc., because when there is Sāmagrī both for the Pratyakṣa

and the Anumāna, the Sāmagrī of Anumāna is considered to be powerful, provided the objects of them (Pratyakṣa and Anumāna) are different.

Here Dr. Chaudhury raises a question which deserves a brief reproduction. (Kāvyatatvasamīksā P.182.) While explaining the theory of Lollaṭa it was said that the Rati etc., is Alaukikapratyakṣaviṣaya. Now it is not proper to say, on behalf of Śaṅkuka that the Rati etc.. is Anumeya; because there is also the Sāmagrī for the Pratyakṣa of Rati etc. In other words, the Rati etc., being the object of both the Pratyakṣa and Anumiti, the Anumitisāmagrī cannot be more powerful than the Pratyakśasāmagrī and on the contrary Pratyakśasāmagrī should suppress the Anumitisāmagrī and produce Pratyakṣa and so Śaṅkuka's theory is baseless. This objection is answered by Dr. Chaudhury by quoting the views of Śrīnivāsācārya, the commentator on Nyāyapariśuddhi, who maintains that Anumitsāmagrī is always powerful whether the objects of Pratyakṣa and Anumiti are different or the same. In view of this explanation, Dr. Chaudhury feels, P R.'s words 'Bhinne viṣaye' etc., are to be considered as used by oversight. (Kāvyatatvasamīkṣa pp. 183-84.

PR. deals with the theory of Bhaṭṭanāyaka (second in his order more elaborately and at the end remarks that the only difference between this theory and the theory of Abhinavagupta is in accepting a new Vyāpāra i.e. 'Bhāvakatva (R.G. P.30)

Coming to Abhinavagupta's theory of Rasa as explained in Rasagaṅgādhara, it can be observed that PR. also like some of his predecessors understood it from the Vedāntic point of view but not on the basis of Śaivism. According to Abhinava, as explained by PR., the Vibhāvas, Anubhāvas and Vyabhicāribhāvas presented to the Sahṛdaya, through a beatiful poem, lose their individualistic character and get universalised on account of his Sahṛdayatva and his Bhāvanā (imagination). All the Vibhāvas etc., when they get together, will have a peculiar supernatural (Alaukika) action (Vyāpāra) called Vyñjanā. This Vyāpāra re-

moves the veil of ignorance covering the Ānandāṁśa of the individual spectator, who on account of the removal of this veil loses his own individuality and the limitations of the knowledge etc. At this state he enjoys the latent feelings (Sthāyibhavas) like Rati etc., along with his natural bliss and thus the Rati etc., experienced along with the Svarūpānanda is called Rasa. In this connection, PR. gives an analogy of a lamp covered with a pot which is well known to the Vedāntins. When the pot is removed the lamp (light) shines and makes other things also shine. Likewise, the Ātmacaitanya also while itself shining, makes the Rati etc., associated with the Vibhāvas etc., shine. Because all the Antahkaraṇadharmas like happiness and misery, are, according to Vedāntins, Sākṣibhāsya i. e. while all the external things are illuminated by the Ātman only through the Antaḥkaraṇa, these (Antaḥkaraṇadharmas) are to be illuminated by the Ātman directly. The Utpatti and Vināśa are ascribed to Rasa, where as, in fact they are connected with the experience (Carvaṇā) of the Vibhāvas etc·, or the removal of the veil of ignorance. In this connection he gives the example of letters (Varṇas). Varṇas, according to some, are eternal are free from Utpatti or Vināśa, but the action of the palate etc., (Tālvādi sthāna) being thier Vyañjaka, its Utpatti or Nāśa is ascribed to the Varṇas. It is the same case with the experience of the Vibhāvādi (which is the Vyañjaka of Rasa) and the Rasa. The moment the expereince of the Vibhāvādi ceases to exist, the Prakāśa is again veiled and the Sthāyin, though existing, does not shine.

According to the above theory, it is to be expected that the Vibhāvādi has got Vyāpāra called Bhojakatva or Vyañjakatva which helps in the Āvaraṇabhaṅga. PR. puts forth another view by accepting which there will be no need of accepting the inter mediary Vyāpāra. According to this view, the Sahṛdaya will have an Antaḥkaraṇavṛitti, having the Svarūpānanda, delimitted by Sthāyin, as its object, and this Cittavṛitti is similar to that of a Yogin. In this theory there is no need of accepting the Āvaraṇabhaṅga. But in this case also the Anthahkaraṇavṛitti would ultimately result in the Āvaranabhaṅga i.e. Ajñānanāśa.

It should be noted here that PR. is not the first man to accept such Antahkaraṇavṛitti. Śrīvtsalāñchana, in his Kāvyaparīkṣā (P.17) talks about this vṛitti and he maintains close resemblence between this and the one which is said to be produced by the Tattvamasyādivākyas by the Vedāntins. Similarly Madhusūdansvasvatī explains Rasa as Sukhasvarūpāntahkaraṇavṛtti. (Bhagavdbhaktirasāyana III 21.) While concluding, PR. says that according to Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa etc., the Sthāyibhāva, associated with the unvieled Caitanya, is called Rasa. But PR. contends that Rasa is the Caitanya itself which is delimited by the Sthāyin (रत्याद्यवच्छिन्ना भग्नावरणा चिदेव रसः) (R. G., P.27), because Śrutis like " रसो वै सः; रसं ह्येवायं लब्ध्वाऽऽनन्दीभवति " (Taittīriyopaniṣad II 7.1) indicate that Rasa is no other than the Ātman itself. Thus PR. introduces a slight modification in the theory of Abhinavagupta. 1

Even in explaining Rasa as the 'स्थाय्युपहितभग्नावरणचित् ' and in quoting the above Śruti in support thereof, PR. does not appear to be the first man as is generally believed. (The theories of Rasa and Dhvani P.3). Śrīvatsalāñchana expounds his theory of Rasa in similar language quoting the same Śruti. (K. Parikshā P.16) Madusūdanasarsvati also cites the same Upanishads. (B.B. Rasayana III 22) Thus so far as this point is concerned we do not find any thing new in what is written by PR.

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1. Dr. K.C. Pande feels that PR. while saying that "इत्थञ्चाभिनवगुप्तमम्मटभट्टादिग्रन्थस्वारस्येन भग्नावरणचिद्विशिष्टो रत्यादिः स्थायिभावो रसः" (R.G., P.27) does not present the views of Abhinava correctly because, he says, "he (A. Gupta) does not hold that aesthetic experience is the experience of Sthāyin related to the self, (Cit)" (Comparative aesthetics P.140). But the follwing sentence of Abhinavagupta written while summing up his theory of Rasa, appears to be in favour of PR.'s conclusion "तेन साधारणीभूता सन्तानवृत्तिरेकस्या एव वा संविदो गोचरीभुता रतिः शृङ्गारः" H.A.B. P.489.

In spite of all that is written by these scholars, it is not quite convincing how the Śabda of a poem or a drama can have such extraordinary power as to remove the veil of Ajñāna like a Mahāvākya. Because a Mahāvākya mainly dealing with the Ātman alone may be able to produce such Aparokṣātmajñāna, that too only when a man has got all the Sādhanasampatti. That is why Madhusūdanasarsvatī is in favour of accepting Bhakti only as the real Rasa because it is directly connected with Paramātman:-(B.B. Rasāyana. P.49). Perhaps all this elaborate explanation is inteded to prove, that every kind of Ānanda being one phase of the Supreme Bliss, the Kāvyānanda which is of some what superior nature, should be accepted as nearer to Brahmānanda (Brahmānanda-Subrahmacāri). And because the Rasa is said to be Brahmānanda-Subrahmacāri, our rhetoricians have taken this as an opportunity to introduce the process of the realisation of Brahmānanda with all its subtilities into the field of Rasānubhūti also. In fact, such explanation of Āvaraṇabhaṅga etc., is possible in the case of the enjoyment of every pleasure and it can be compared with Brahmānanda, because all such factors like Vedyāntaraśūnyatā can be talked of in the case of every Ānanda, & every Ānada when intencified, can be termed as transcendental (Alaukika). Even Śruti compares Brhamānanda with Vaiṣayikānanda when it says that just like a man who cannot have the cognition of any thing else either external or internal, while he is in the delicate embrace of his beloved, so also the Jīvātman, in close association and identity with Paramātman cannot have any other feeling (Br. UP. IV-3.2). Here simply because the Brahmic state is compared with the state of a man embraced by his beloved, the rhetorians are not prepared to accept the amorous pleasure as Alaukika; similarly there should be nothig objectionable if the Rasāsvāda also is accepted as only Laukika. It would have been sufficient if they could confine themselves to the exposition how the imagination of Sahṛdaya is stirred by the presentation of Vibhāvas etc., in a poem or a drama and how he can thereby get some peculiar pleasure. Every Ānanda being Aṁśa of the Brahmānanda, as is described in the Tittirīyopanishad, "सैषानन्दस्य मीमांसा भवति' etc.,

Taittiriyopanisad. II-8. 'लौकिकोप्यानन्दो ब्रह्मानन्दस्यैव मात्रा'' etc., Sāṅkarabhāṣya on the above passage P.185) the Rasāsvāda also could be understood as Brahmānandasabrahmcārin in a simpler way without pressing the analogy much further.

Siddhicandragaṇi in his Kāvyaprakāśa-Khaṇḍana explains the Rasa, like PR., as the 'स्थायिभावावच्छिन्ना' भग्नावरणकचित् He adds further "अयमभिप्रायः– वेदान्तिनये सर्वस्मिन्ज्ञाने आत्मभानन्नैयत्यात् काव्यदर्शन श्रवणमहिम्ना उक्तया अभिव्यक्तया चिदात्मनः अज्ञानांशे आवरणभङ्गःक्रियते. आवरणन्त्वज्ञानमेव, तथा च (न) रत्याद्यवच्छिन्नं चैतन्यं आनन्दांशे भग्नावरणम् आनन्द रूपतया प्रकाशमानं रस इति निर्गलितोऽर्थः'' K.P.K. P.16. (Here the 'Na' shown in brackets by me, seems to have crept by mistake.) At the end he states that all this explanation of Rasa is according to old rhetoricians. According to the modern writers, he states, Rasānubhava is only laukika like any other pleasure. "इति प्राचां निष्कर्षः । तदपेक्षयां कामिनीकुजलशस्पर्शचन्दनानुलेपनादिनेव नाट्य दर्शन काव्यश्रवणाभ्यां सुखविशेषो जायते। स एव तु रस इति नवीनाः'' (K.P.K. P.16)

Even Madhusūdana sarasvatī after explaining the theory of Rasa on the basis of Vedānta at last feels that all the Rasa excepting Bhakti are only Laukikas. "अत एवानवच्छिन्नानन्दघनस्य भगवतः स्फुरणात् भक्तिरसे अत्यन्ताधिक्यं आनन्दस्य लौकिकरसे तु विषयावच्छिन्नस्यैव चिदानन्दांशस्य स्फुरणात् तत्रानन्दस्य न्यूनतैव, तस्माद् भक्तिरस एव लौकिकरसानुपेक्ष्य सेव्य इत्यर्थ.'' (B.B. Rasāyana, P.49). Therefore all this Philosophic colouring of the Rasa theory appears to be quite unnecessary.

But all the rhetoricians, in their enthusiasm to emphasise on the supremacy of the aesthetic pleasures could not resist the temptation of introducing the process of the Brahmānandaāsvāda in the Rasāsvāda also. Viewed in this light there is nothing wrong or nonhistorical, as was objected by Dr. Śaṅkaran (The theories of Rasa and Dhvani P.3) in PR.'s quoting this Śruti "Raso vai saḥ". Old writers like Patañjali quoted Śrutis like 'चत्वारि शृङ्गा' etc , and interpreted them in their own way, for, when one is prepared to

accept the introduction of the Philosophical principle, why should one object to quoting a Śruti which is the basis of such philosophy? And it may not be wrong in believing that the name 'Rasa' itself might have been suggested to the earlier rhetoricians who spoke on Rasa, by, not only the Pāka-Rasa but the above Śruti also. Bharata while talking about the names Śṛṅgāra etc., states that only such names as are handed down by tradition are adopted in his Nāṭyaśāstra (H.S B; P. 517).

After briefly stating the theories of Abhinavagupta and Bhaṭṭanāyaka P.R. advances two more theories under the headings 'Navyāstu' and 'Paretu'. It is not known whose theories he is reproducing here; because these two theories are not to be seen in any of the extant works on Rasa. Perhaps these are the product of the fertail brain of PR. himself which he hesitates to put forth boldly on the face of the generally accepted theory of Abhinavagupta though he must be having some secret inclination towards, at least one of the theories (most probably towards the first one beginning with 'Navyāstu').

The first theory also is based on Vedānta. On account of some defects, the defect of the eyesight and the dimness of light etc., a man on seeing the piece of the pearl-oyster gets the wrong impression that it is silver. A cognition cannot be produced unless the object of cognition exists before. Therefore, the Vedāntins accept that a peculiar kind of Rajata which is technically called Prātibhāsika is produced there on the seep by the above defects and this śilver is beyond definition (Anirvacanīya) for, it is neither existing because it is not of any consequence nor nonexisting, because it is being accutally seen by the perceiver. Applying the same principle, this theory believes that the Rasa also which is no other than Rati etc., is Anirvacanīya. When the Vibhāvas etc., are presented by the poet or the Naṭa, the Sahṛdaya, on account of the Vyañjanāvyāpāra, first gets the cognition of Rati etc., about Śakuntalā and the like, as associated with Duṣyantādi. The spectator being a Sahṛdaya, possesses Bhāvanā which is a kind of defect (Doṣa) and this Bhāvanā

produces in him a sense of identity with Duṣyantādi (Duṣyantādyabheda Buddhi) which in its turn, produces Rati etc, about Śakuntalādi in him. The Rati etc., like any other Prātibhāsika, is Sākṣi bhāsya i.e. cognisible through the direct contact with the caitanya, and at this state it is called Rasa. Immediately after this cognition of Rati etc., a peculiar transednental joy is being experienced which is wrongly identified with the cognition of Rati, and this is why Rasa is said to be Sukharūpa. This Rasa is Kārya because it is produced by the defect i e. bhāvākatva which is invariably existing in Sahṛdaya, and is Nāśya because it disappears with the disappearance of the defect. It cannot be said to be Vyaṅgya in the strict sense of the word, but it is called so because it is identified with the Rati etc., of Duṣyantādi which only is really Vyaṅgya. Even the Duṣyantatva ascribed to himself by Sahṛdaya is Anirvacanīya like the Ratyādi, and it conceils the reality of Sahṛdaya, and this also is the result of the Doṣa i.e. Bhāvakatva, inherent in him. It is inevitable, the Navyas contend, to accept this Doṣa in a Sahṛdaya, because without this it is not possible to justify the universalisation (Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa) of Vibhāvas etc. Once this Doṣa is accepted, it can be justified that the Sahṛdaya identifies himself with Duṣyantādi on account of the same Doṣa.

Here one question may be raised. Some Sthāyibhāvas like Rati which are the source of pleasure by nature, may be able to produce pleasure in the Sahṛdaya when they are born in him by the above process. But the same cannot be said of the Sthāyibhāvas like Śoka which are the source of greief by nature in the ordinary world but are considered to be pleasing in a Kāvya. This objection is met by these critics like this:- If it is the experience of the Sahṛdaya to get pleasure even from the Kāvyas with Karuṇa as a dominent sentiment, we have to accept that the same Vyāpāra of Kāvya, while producing pleasure, can also obstruct the feeling of grief. And if there is the experience of both pleasure and grief, then let us accept that both pleasure and grief are natural in a Rasa. People are inclind towards such

works because the quantity of pleasure is more than that of grief. Here it may be questioned, how it is, only grief is experienced when a man identifies himself wrongly with the grief-stricken Daśaradha etc., in a dream or in a state of delirium, with no touch of pleasure? The answer is that only a beautiful Kāvya has got this power of presenting the unpleasant Śoka etc., in a pleasant manner which cannot be found in dreams or delirium.

After stating this theory of Navyas PR. puts forth another theory under the headings of 'Paretu' (R.G; P. 32). According to this theory there is no need of accepting Vyañjanāvyāpāra or the Anirvacanīyakhyāti as explained in the previous theory. The Sahṛdaya on account of the Bhavanā–Doṣa, will have a feeling, identifying himself with the character presented on the stage or by the Kāvya as having Rati etc., about Śakuntalādi. Only this feeling of identification which is produced by the Bhāvanā of the Kāvyārtha is capable of causing Camatkāra but not the one produced in dreams etc. The Rati is not existing in Sāmājika; he may feel the Rati because he wrongly identifies himself with the one, having it. In a Bhrama, a thing which is acutually existing in some other place may appear as existing in a different place as in the cause of Śukti–Rajata-Jñāna where the Rajatatva is ascribed to idaṁkarāspada, that is Śukti, though it (Rajatatva) is really associated with Rajata only which is in a different place and this is technically called Anyathākhyāti 1 of Naiyāyikas (Bhāmati P.29–30). Thus this theory instead of accepting Anirvacanīya–Khyāti as in the previous theory, appears to be inclined to accept Anyathākhyāti.

The identification of Sahṛdaya with Duṣyantādi may be in three different ways with slight difference in the Viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva. The first Bodha is " शकुन्तलाविषयकरतिविशिष्टोऽहं दुष्यन्तः" The second Bodha is " शकुन्तलाविषयकरतिविशिष्टः दुष्यन्तः अहमस्मि," and the third Bodha is "अहं दुष्यन्तत्वेन शकुन्तलाविषयकरत्या च विशिष्टः," In all these Bodhas the ultimate meaning is the same, though there is difference in the Uddeśyavidheya-bhāva.

In the first Bodha Duṣyantatva is ascribed to Ahaṁtva. In the second Ahaṁtva is ascribed to Duṣyantatva where as in the third Bodha Dushantatva and Rati are, ascribed to Ahaṁ. In all these three Bodhas Rati is Viśeṣaṇa. Its cognition is not a Śābdajñāna because it cannot be expressed by Śabdas. In this theory Vyañjanā also is not accepted; therefore the cognition of Rati etc , is Anumāna. For, at first the Sāmājika infers Rati in Duṣyanta etc., with the help of the action of the actor. Next the defect in the Sahṛdaya, referred to above removes the sense of difference betwern himself and Duṣyanta which ultimately results in one of the three kinds of cognitions identifying him with Duṣyanta. Now the Rati can be the object of direct cognition (Sākṣātkāra) of Sahṛdaya by Jñānarūpapratyāsatti, as was shown above while discussing about Lollata's theory. These two theories are perhaps. the amplification of the one that is briefly stated in the Locana (—P.186):-

"अन्येतु अनुकर्तरि यः स्थाय्यवभासः अभिनयादिसामग्र्यादिकृतः भित्ताविव हरि तालादिना अश्वावभासः स एव लोकातीततया आस्वादापरसंज्ञया प्रतीत्या रस्यमानो रस इति नाटयाद् रसाः नाट्यरसाः"

Here the word 'Sthāyyavabhāsaḥ' might have given clue to PR. to develop a theory establishing the Rasānubhava to be a kind Bhrāntijñāna.

Dr. N.N. Chaudhury states that these two theories are not, satisfactory and he rises the following objection against them. If the Sahṛdaya, as stated in the above theories, experiences the Rati about Śakuntalā within himself, he will have some sense of shame to express it in the presence of others. If the Rasāsvāda were to be mere Bhrāntijñāna it will not be an object of attraction for the wise men. To state that Soka also, when presented by a poem can be a source of pleasure, is to attach much importance to the Lokottaratva of a Kāvya without giving satisfactory reasons. Unless the process of Ajñananāśa, as explained in the theories of Abhinava and others is accepted, it is not possible to establish that Rasāsvāda is Ānandarūpa. If, moreover, the

Sahṛdayatva is only a cause of Bhrāntijñāna, it will be perhaps, like madness, a thing more to be ditested than to be worthy of acquisition· Thus Dr. Chaudhury feels that these two theories are not even worthy of serious consideration (Kāvyatattva-samīkṣā. P. 207)

In spite of all that is said the theory contending the Rasāsvāda to be a kind of Bhrāntijñāna, cannot be brushed aside as worthless. PR. himself appears to be in favour of this theory. The exponants of all theories of Rasa are unanimous, in spite of the difference in the procedure, in accepting that there is jñāna involved in Rasa. Whether a Jñāna is a Pramā or Bhrama is to be decided by the nature of the object of the cognition but not by the cognition itself No body can dispute regarding the existence of a Jñāna whether it is Pramā or Bhrama, irrespective of the existence or otherwise of its object. Thus a Jñāna can be produced by the really existing things or the spurious ones. Such being the case, it cannot be altoghther ignored that a Rasa also can be Bhrāntijñāna or the result of Bhrāntijñāna, because it is being produced by things which are really nonexisting at least at the time of their presentation After all Plato is quite correct in stating that the object of art is twice removed from truth. ('Principles of Literary Criticism' P. 79). Whether he is right in condemning art on that ground is altoghther a different question. The famous poet, Shakespear places, though in a lighter vein, the poet by the side of a mad man and a lover (A Mid Summer Night's Dream. V.I Sc.) clearly suggesting that the work of a poet consists in producing illusion (Bhrānti Jñāna) though perhaps a happy one.

Even while stating the theory of Abhinavagupta, PR. indicates that Rasāsvāda is, to certain extent, is illusory. There, first, he states:-

"यथा हि शरावादिना पिहितो दीपस्तन्निवृत्तो सन्निहितान् पदार्थान् प्रकाशयति, स्वयञ्च प्रकाशते. एवमात्मचैतन्यं ,बिभावादिसंवलितान् रत्यादीन्, अन्तःकरणधर्माणां साक्षिभास्यत्वाभ्युपगते:" । (R.G. P.26)

Here a question would arise. It may be correct that Rati etc, being the Anthahkaraṇa-Dharmas, should be Sākṣibhāsyas. But how can the Vibhāvas etc. be Sākṣibhāsyas? In reply to this probable objection he says : "विभावादीनामपि स्वप्नतुरगादीनामिव रङ्गरजतादीनामिव साक्षिभास्यत्वमविरुद्धम्" । (R.G., P.26)

In fact, PR. could have established the Sākṣibhāsy-Vibhāvas etc, by following the famous dictum of Vivaraṇācārya. सर्वं वस्तु ज्ञाततया अज्ञाततया वासाक्षिचैतन्यविषयः" । (Pañcapādikāvivaraṇam P. 99). But he prefers to take the Vibhāvas etc, as the creation of imagination on the analogy of Svapnaturagādi, and so the Vibhāva-Jñāna should be considered only as a Bhrāntijñāna. Once the Vibhāvādijñāna is accepted as a Bhrānti, there should be no objection. in accepting the Rasānubhava as the result of Bhrānti; because it is the result of the Vibhāvādijñāna, and in fact, as explained above while stating Abhinavagupta's theory, is the Samūhālambanajñāna of the Vibhāvas etc.

Though it is Bhrāntijñāna, there is nothing wrong if it is sought by the wise, men, when they are sure to get pleasure of peculiar nature from it. Only because it is Bhrāntijñāna, we can not deny the existance of Ānanda or the mixture of Sukha and Duhkha as the case may be; and this can induce the Sahṛdaya towards the drama or any kind of poetical work. Only this is how we can explain the craze of the people for reading the detective novels, which may be in our technical language, the source of Adbhuta Rasa. That Sahṛdaya would feel ashamed also need not be a serious draw back because, according to the above theories, the Sahṛdaya ascribes Duṣyantatva on himself and so there is, no question of experienceing the Rati etc., as Ātmagata. More over even if he has such Rati he need not have the sense of shame because he does not express it normally. It is not clear how far the Ālaṅkārikas are justified in applying the process of Bhahmānandāsvāda (the Āvaraṇa bhaṅga etc.,) in the case of Rasāsvāda; just because they call it be Alaukika. The Ā majñāna being directly connected with the Brahman which is

Ānandarūpa, there may be Āvaraṇabhaṅga etc., acceptable on the authority of Upaniṣads, but how such things can be talked of in the context of Rasāsvāda? If it is the question of simply importing the Philosophic process in this sphere also, why, even a glutton can talk of such Āsvāda which is Brahmāsvāda-sabrahmacārin, and which is produced by a unique well-proportioned mixture of different ingredients in a delishous dish! Therefore in the absence of such, strong authority like Upaniṣads, acceptable atleast to one section of people, all the above procedure appears to be over burdening an otherwise simple theory, of aesthetic enjoyment. It may be a peculiar pleasure, but its peculiarity does not wrrant accepting all this procedure.

If the Ālaṅkārikas are so particular, they can accept the whole procedure, even if the Rasapratīti is accepted only a Bhrāntijñāna, rather the result of Bhrāntijñāna, because according to the Vedāntins the whole process leading to Brahmajñāna is only Mithyā Why; even Brhmākāravṛtti, is Mithyā for them. As explained by Śaṅkarabhagavtpāda, 1 Vācaspatimiśra 2 and Vivaraṇakāra, a real result may be achieved even through an unreal means. Thus there should be no objection in a Brāntirūparasāsvāda leading to, nay, being identical with Ānandānubhava.

Moreover, it is, against the common experience to accept that the Āsvāda of every Rasa is a source of only pleasure. Many

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1. "कथन्त्वसत्येन वेदान्तवाक्येन सत्यस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्वस्य प्रतिपत्तिरुपपद्यते, नहि रज्जुसर्पेण दष्टो म्रियते...नैष दोषः। शङ्काविषादिनिमित्तमरणादिकार्योपलब्धेः" Brahasūtraśāṅkara Bhāṣya P.458.

2. "श्रवणाद्युपायः आत्मसाक्षात्कारपर्यन्तः वेदान्तसमुत्थोपि ज्ञाननिचयो ऽसत्यः। सोऽपि हि वृत्तिरूपः कार्यतया निरोधधर्मा"। Bhāmati P.458.

3. "ननु ब्रह्मज्ञानस्याप्यध्यासोपादानत्वात् मिथ्यात्वमापन्नम्? यदि तावत् स्वरूपमिथ्यात्वमुच्यते अङ्गीकृतमेव तत्। अर्थविषयमिथ्यात्वं न। ब्रह्मणि बाधाभावात्" Pañchapādikāvivaraṇa Part I. P.441.

of the rhetoricians, having once declared the Rasāsvāda as Brahmānanda-Sabrahmacārin, strive hard to explain that even in such cases like Śoka the Sāmājika gets pleasure only as in the case of Nakhakṣatas etc. But all such explanations are against our general experiences, because in Karuṇa etc., we get a peculiar feeling of sadness rather than pleasure; and the peculiarity can not be a proof to establish that it is only Ānanda. Even Abhinavagupta declares, in inambiguous terms that in all most all the Rasas, there is a mixture of both Sukha and Duhkha; with only some difference of degrees.

"लोकस्य सर्वस्य साधारणतया स्वत्वेन भाव्यमानश्चर्व्यमाणोऽर्थो नाट्यम्। स च सुखदुःखरूपेण विचित्रेण समनुगतो न तु तदेकात्मा। तथाहिः-रतिहासोत्साह विस्मयानां सुखस्वभावत्वम्। तत्र तु चिरकालव्यापिसुखानुसन्धिरूपत्वेन विषयोन्मुख्य प्राणतया तद्विषयाशंसाबाहुल्येन अपायभीरुत्वात् दुःखांशानुवेधो रतेः। हासस्य सानुसन्धानस्य विद्युत्सदृशस्तात्कालिकोऽल्पदुःखानुवेधः सुखानुगतः। उत्साहस्य तात्कालिक दुःखायासनिमज्जनरूपानुसन्धिना भाविबहुजनोपकारिचिरतरकालभाविसुखसमाचिकीर्षात्मना सुखरूपता। विस्मयस्य निरनुसन्धानतडित्तुल्यसुखरूपता। क्रोधभय शोकजुगुप्सानान्तु दुःखरूपता। तत्र चिरकालदुःखानुसन्धिप्राणः विषयगतात्यन्तिक नाशभावनातदाकाङ्क्षाप्राणतया सुखदुःखानुवेधवान् क्रोधः। निरनुसन्धितात्कालिकदुःखप्राणतया तदवगमाकाङ्क्षेत्प्रेक्षितसुखानुसंभिन्नं भयम्। द्वैकालिकस्त्वभीष्टविषयनाशजः प्राक्तनसुखस्मरणानुविद्धः सर्वथैव दुःखरूपः शोकः। उत्पाद्यमान दुःखानुतन्धानजीवितविषयात् पलायनपरायणरूपा निषिध्यमानशङ्कितसुखानुविद्धा जुगुप्सा। समस्तपूर्वदुःखसञ्चयस्मरणप्राणितः सम्भावितदुपरमबहुलसुखमयो निर्वेदः। एवं व्यभिचारिप्रभृतिष्वपि वाच्यम्" (H.A.B., PP. 219-229).

Here the Sthāyibhāvas stated as Ubhaya-svabhāva by Abhinavagupta stand for their respective Rasas, because in another place Abhinava says:- "इत्यानन्दरूपता सर्वरसानाम्। किन्तु उपरञ्जक विषयवशात् तेषामपि कटुकिन्तास्पर्शोऽस्ति वीरस्येव, सहि क्लेशसहिष्णुतादि प्राण एव"। (H.A.B., P.478)

There are some others who believe some Rasas as Sukharūpa and others as Duhkharūpa. For example, Rāmacandra and

Guṇacandra the authors of Nāṭyadarpaṇa state:- "तत्रेष्टविभावादिप्रथितस्वरूपसम्पत्तयः शृङ्गारहास्यवीराद्भुतशान्ताः पञ्च सुखात्मानः। अपरे पुनः अनिष्टविभावाद्युपनीतात्मानः करुणरौद्रबीभत्सभयानकाश्चत्वारोदुःखात्मानः" (Nāṭyadarpaṇa P.141).

The Nāṭyadarpaṇa (P. 141) further argues:-People are averse to Bhayānakarasa. If at all there is some Camatkāra, it is not because of the Rasas like Bībhatsa, but because of other things presented next to them by a skillful actor; and being deceived by this Camatkāra even wise men declare that even the Rasas like Karuṇa are a source of pleasure. Madhusūdanasarasvati also states that there is a difference of degree in the experience of different Rasas and it is not correct to say that all the Rasas give same kind of pleasure. (B. B. Rasayana. P. 22). Thus the general experience compells us to belive that all the Rasas do not consist of pure Ānanda, and that there is a mixture of Duhkha at least in some Rasas. This fact is proved beyond doubt. by the popularity of some works of some Rasas only even to day.

Some rhetoricians are not prepared even to give the status of Rasa to Karuṇa, Bhayānaka and Bībhatsa because there is no element of pleasure in them. Siḍḍlicandragaṇi writes in this context:- "न च तेषां (करुणादीनां) तथाभूतत्वेऽपि अभिव्यक्तानन्दचिदात्मना सहाऽभिव्यक्तकानां रसत्वमिति वाच्चम्। एवमपि स्थाय्यंशे रसत्वविरोधात्, ... यत्तु शोकादयोऽपि रत्यादिवत् स्वप्रकाशज्ञानसुखात्मका इति तदुन्मत्तप्रलपितम्। किञ्च सामाजिकेषु मृतकलत्रपुत्रादीनां विभावादीनां शोकादिस्थायिभावस्य चर्वणीयेन अजमहीपालादिना सह सामानाधिकरण्यम्। अश्रुपातादिदर्शनात्। वर्णनीयतन्मयीभवनञ्चापेक्षितमिति चेत् कथं ब्रह्मानन्दसहोदररसोद्बोधः। कथं वा नामाङ्गल्यम्। अत एव केचिदजविलापादिकं न पठन्ति। बीभत्से तु मांसपूयाद्युपस्थित्या वान्तनिष्ठीवनादिकं यन्नभवेत तदेवाश्चर्यम्। कुतस्तादृशपरमानन्दरूपरसोद्बोध इति। एवं भयेऽपि। शान्तस्य त्यक्तसर्ववासनेषु भवतु नाम कथञ्चिद्रसत्व, विषयिषु पुनः सर्वविषयोपरमोपस्थित्या कथं रसत्वम्" (K. P. K. P. 16-22) Gaṇi does not accept Vīra and Raudra as seperate Rasas because their Vibhāvas etc., are the same.

In view of these contradicting theories and on the strength of the common experience, one would naturally get a doubt whether some of the old theories discussed above, are away the point on hand. Because the revealing of Ānandāṁśa by Sattvodreka or by any such cause, being a common thing, according to them, in all the Rasas there would be no satisfactory reason to explain why there is the feeling of grief or the like, in Karuṇa etc., instead of pure Ānanda. If one has to come forward with such explanations like the effect of Upādhi etc., (nature of Sthāyibhāva), all the previous elaborate explanation would become futile. Under these circumstances, instead of loading the Rasa theory with so many Philosophical arguments, there is nothing wrong in accepting that the Rasānubhava is the result of a peculiar kind of Bhrāntijñāna which produces different effects like pleasure, melancholy-pleasure etc.

This consideration has, perhaps, prompted PR. to put forward the third and fourth theries under the names of 'Navyas' and 'Pare'. And it may not be improper to believe that PR. attached much value to these theories (or atleast to the first of the two because we find him generally identifying himself with 'Navyas') and he names his work 'Rasagaṅgādhra' because he feels that he, for the first time, has given a new turn to the theory of Rasa on the face of the well established theories of Abhinavagupta and others. The same cannot be said of the first theory (first in the order of Rasagaṅgādhra and based on Vedānta) because, as shown above, PR. cannot claim any originality in that respect.

THE NUMBER OF RASAS

After a brief discussion about different theories of Rasa, PR. proceeds to ennumerate the of Rasas. At the outset, on the authority of Bharata, he says that Rasas are nine in number. Next he quotes the views of some critics who contend that Śānta cannot be a Rasa because it is to be developed from out of Śama which cannot be expected in an active actor. This objection he meets on the following grounds.

The objection "Naṭa cannot have Śama" is untenable, because the Rasāsvāda is accepted as resting with Sāmājika only but not with the Naṭa. It is, not necessary that Naṭa also should have Śama for presenting it on the stage, because as in the case of other Rasas, he will be able to present it with the help of his training and practice. The use of music and the musical instruments etc., cannot be a hindrance to the experience of Śāntarasa because once the Śāntarasāsvāda is accepted on the ground of the experience of Sahṛdayas, the musical instruments etc., can be accepted as helpers rather than obstacles in the Rasāsvāda. PR. concludes saying that even if one is not prepared to accept Śānta-Rasa in a Dṛśyakāvya, he will have to accept it in the Srvyakāvyas like Mahābhārata.

There is a great controversy among the rhetoricians as to whether the Śānta can be accepted as a nineth Rasa. According to some texts of Nāṭya Śāstra, Bharata enumertas only eight Rasas excluding Śānta, though it is included in some texts. [The passage beginning with the words 'अथ शान्तोनाम शामस्थायिभावा त्मकः मोक्षप्रवर्तकः" ending with five Ślokas in Nāṭya Śātra is said to be missing in some editions. H.A.B., P. 629 (FN)] Abhinavagupta while commenting on "Śṛṅgāra Hāsya Karuṇa" etc.. writes: "तेन प्रथमं रसः । ते च नव, शान्तापलापिनस्तु अष्टाविति पठन्ति"(H. A. B; P. 429). Again he writes at the end of the sixth chapter :
"तस्मादस्ति शान्तो रसः' तथा च चिरन्तनपुस्तकेषु 'स्थायिभावान् रसत्वमुपनेष्यामः' इत्यनन्तरं 'शान्तोनाम शामस्थायिभावात्मकः' इत्यादिकं शान्तलक्षणं पठयते," (H A:B. P.63).

Abhinavagupta is in favour of accepting Śānta Rasa even in Nāṭya and he ably refutes all the objections and establishes it as a nineth Rasa. And he goes even to the extent of accepting Śānta as the Prakṛti Rasa of all the other Rasas. (H.A.B; P. 637)

Regarding the Sthāyibhāva of Śānta, he mentions the views of some writers (H.A.B; P. 433) who contend that Utsāha or Jugupsā or all the Sthāyibhāvas or the Nirveda born out of

Tattva Jñāna may be the Sthāyibhāva of Śānta. At last, he states his own view and accepts that Tattvajñāna which is no other than Ātmasvarūpa and which is otherwise called Śama is the Sthāyibāva of Śāntarasa.

Mammaṭa accepts Nirveda as the Sthāyibhāva of Śānta against the views of Abhinava. If by 'Nirveda' is meant some kind of Tṛsṇākṣaya which is almost synonymous to 'Śama' it would be acceptable to Abhinavagupta also. But it cannot be the Sthāyibhāva in its generally accepted sense of the grief caused by poverty and the like. That is why while commenting on the following words of Ānandavardhana "शान्तस्य तृष्णाक्षयसुखस्य यः परिपोषः तल्लक्षणः रसः प्रतीयते एव" (Dhvanyāloka P. 390) Abhinava writes 1:- तृष्णानां विषयाभिलाषाणां यः क्षयः सर्वतो निवृत्तिरूपः निर्वेदः तदेव सुखं तस्य स्थायिभूतस्य यः परिपोषः रस्यमानताकृतः तदेव लक्षणं यस्य स शान्तो रसः" ।

Abhinava after establishing that Tattvajñāna or Ātmajñāna or svarūpa only can be the Sthāyin for Śānta, says that there could be no objection in accepting the Śama or Nirveda also as the Sthāyibhāva, if it means only change in name with no change in the import. If nirveda is to be understood as the Tattavajñānaja-Vairāgya, he says, it cannot be the Sthāyin. In view of what he writes in Abhinavabhārati, Tṛṣṇākṣaya which is said to be the Sthāyibhāva of Śānta by Abhinavagupta in Locana, is to be understood as synonymous to Tattvajñāna or Ātmasvarūpa.

PR. following Mammaṭa accepts Nirveda as the Sthāyibhāva of ŚāntaRasa and he defines it:- "नित्यानित्यवस्तुविचारजन्मा विषयविरागाख्यो निर्वेदः" । (RG; P. 39). This definition does not purport in

1. Dhvnyāloka P. 390. In this passage which was quoted in 'Number of Rasas' (P. 63) instead of 'सर्वतोनिवृत्तिरूपः निर्वेदः' we find 'सर्वतोनिवृत्तिरूपः निरोधः' । And this reading seems to be correct in view of Abhinava's criticism of Nirveda being Sthāyibhāva, in Abhinavabhārati.

making 'Nirveda' as synonymous to Tattvajñāna or Ātmasvarūpa as is required by Abhinavagupta. That this definition is acceptable to Mammaṭa also, can be inferred by the example given by him (Mammaṭa) because he did not give any definition of Nirveda (KP. P. 124)

Now this question arises why Mammaṭa and PR. accept Nirveda as the Sthāyibhāva of Śānta against so many arguments put forth by Abhinava in Abhinavabhārati? Inspite of all that is, said by Abhinava while establishing śānta as a seperate Rasa with śama as its Sthāyibhāva, one will be compelled to feel that Abhinava's Philosophical predilections over weighed with him as to lead his arguments to a state of impracticablity. Because when śama is according to him, Tattvajñāna and the Ātmasvarūpa itself, the Śānta, the intensification of śama, should be nothing less than Mokṣa, and the same being Anirvacanīya, cannot find place not only in Dṛśyakāvya but in śryakāvya also. That is why Dhanañjaya and Dhanika are against accepting this as a Rasa in this particular Lakṣaṇa i. e. Ātmasvarūpatva. While commenting on the 45th Kārika of 4th Prakāśa Dhanika writes:-

"ननु शान्तरसस्यानभि(ने) धेयत्वात् यद्यपि नाट्येऽनुप्रवेशो नास्ति तथापि सूक्ष्मातितादिवस्तूनां सर्वेषामपि शब्दप्रतिपाद्याधतायविद्यमानत्वात् काव्यविषयत्वं न निवार्यते, अतस्तदुच्यते–"शमप्रकर्षो ऽनिर्वाच्यो मुदितादेस्तदात्मता"। शान्तो हि यदि तावत्– 'न यत्र दुःखं न सुखं न चिन्ता न द्वेषरागौ न च काचिदिच्छा। रसस्तु शान्तः काथितो मुनीन्द्रैः सर्वेषु भावेषु शमप्रधानः।" इत्येवंलक्षणः तदा तस्य मोक्षावस्थायामेव आत्मस्वरूपापत्तिलक्षणायां प्रादुर्भावात्तस्य च स्वरूपेणानिर्वचनीयता। तथा हि श्रुतिरपि "स एष नेति नेति" इत्यन्यापोह रूपेणाह। न च तथाभूतस्य शान्त रसस्य स्वादयितारः सहृदयाः सन्ति" etc.

Here the beginning of the argument with the conditional phrase 'Yadi tāvat' clearly indicates that śānta is not acceptable to Dhanañjaya and Dhanika with only śama as its Sthāyibhāva, because it will be the state of pure Ātman which is beyond definition and comprehention. With Nirveda or some such thing

as its Sthāyibhāva, it is perhaps acceptable to them, 1 because in such case the nature of śānta Rasa becomes entirely different from what is found in Abhinava's theory.

Now coming to PR. we find him having no objection to śama also being the Sthāyibhāva of śānta as can be inferred from his arguments while refuting the objections in the verse "śāntasya śama-śādhyatvāt" etc., where ;

"नटे शमाभावादिति हेतुरसङ्गतः । नटे रसाभिव्यक्तरस्वीकारात् । सामाजिकनां शमवत्वेन रसोद्बोधे बाधकाभावात्। न च तस्य शमाभावात् तदभिनयप्रकाशकत्वानुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम्। तस्य भयक्रोधादेरप्यभावेन तदभिनयप्रकाशकताया अप्यसङ्गत्यापत्तेः" etc. (R.G., P.36)

These arguments, here, clearly indicate that PR, is inclined to give śama like the Bhaya and Krodha, the place of a Sthāyibhāva. But, while enumerating the Sthāyibhāvas, he mentions Nirveda as the Sthāyin of śānta. It is not possible to believe that PR. does not know that Nirveda, in the sense of Vairāgya is not acceptable as the Sthāyin of śānta to Abhinavagupta (H.A.B;' 618). Inspite of Abhinava's objections he, like Mammaṭa, accepts Nirveda as the Sthāyibhāva. Therefore it can be presumed that 'śama' also means 'Nirveda' only for PR. but it is not Ātmasvarūpa or any such thing. He feels that śānta with śama as Sthāyin, as propounded by Abhinava, may be of highest order being the Prakṛtirasa and Mokṣasvarūpa, but it is quite impracticable as a Rasa and can be presented neither in a Dṛśyakāvya nor in a śravyakāvya. The śānta-rasa which is introduced by P.R. with

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1. S.K. De opines that Dhanika doesnot accept śānta even with Nirveda as Sthāyibhāva. ('Some problems in Sanskrit Poetics' P. 141). Perhaps, the Kārikā "Nirvedādi" etc., (Dasarupaka IV 36), which says that the Vyabhicāribhāvas like Nirveda etc., cannot be Sthāyibhāvas. as was supposed by Rudraṭa is understood by him in the above sense, because it immediately follows the line "śamamapi ke cit prāhuh puṣṭih nāṭyen naitasy".

Nirveda as Sthāyin is, of more mundane character and can be presented through the Vibhāvas etc., like the 'Purāṇaśravaṇa-satsaṅga -puṇyavanatīrhāvalokanādi, and this is on a par with all the other eitht Rasas, being to the likiog of the people of a purticular taste. But the śānta as explained by Abhinava can find place only in works of Philosophy and to the liking of only Mumukṣus. With all this sense of discrimination, PR. mentions Nirveda as the Sthāyin of śānta on the face of strong objections of even Abhinavagupta. He is satisfied even if his śāntarasa find a place in only śravyakāvyas R.G., P. 37.

Ānandavardhana who accepts Tṛṣṇākṣaya as the Sthāyin of śānta according to the passage quoted above, seems to be in favour of Nirveda as the Sthāyin of śānta because Tṛṣṇākṣaya is no other than Vairāgya and as can be seen from the definition given by PR. Nirveda also is synonymous to Vairāgya.

After giving the names of the Sthāyibhāvas and their Lakṣaṇas PR. classifies śṛṅgāra into two varities Sambhoga and Vipralambha and his definitions of these two types are novel and precise· He says that Saṁyoga and Viyoga should not be understood as the staying of lovers in one place and different places, because even when they are in one place there is the possibility of the feeling of Viy ,ga on account of īrṣyā and the like. Therefore, he says that Saṁyoga and Viyoga are the two opposite feelings in the form of 'I am united with' and 'I am away from 'my' beloved' respectively. (R.G; P. 41)

Where ever opportunity arises, PR. lays stress on an important point that the name 'Rasa-dhvani' can be given only when the Ratyādi does not become subordinate (Gunībhūta) to any thing. Therefore he rightly finds fault with A.D. who states that there is śṛṅgārarasadhvani in the verse 'Vāgarthāviva' etc., (Raghuvaṁś'a.' I. 1) because the love between Pārvati and Parameśvara is subordinated to the Rati of the poet about the parents of the world.

PR. is not in favour of accepting five varieties of Vipralaṁbha described by the old writers on account of five different causes i.e. Pravāsa, Abhilāṣā, Viraha, Īrṣyā and Śāpa, because, he contends, there is no substantial difference in all these varieties as to deserve seperate classification.

After dealing with Śṛṅgāra, Karuṇa, Śānta, and Raudra by giving suibable examples, PR. deals with Vīrarasa. He states that Vīra is of four varities according to the four different kinds of Utsāha for Dāna, Dayāyuddha and Dhrama is named Dāna Vīra, Dayā-Vīra, Yuddhavīra and Dhrmavīra. He illustrates all the four varieties with suitable examples. Then he introduces a brief discussion regarding the number of varieties of Vīra in the following words;- इत्थं वीररसस्य चातुर्विध्यं प्रपञ्चितं प्राचामनुरोधात्'' वस्तु तस्तु बह्वो वीरसस्य शृङ्गारस्येव प्रकारा निरूपयितुं शक्यन्ते (R.G; P. 50).

From these words and the arguments that follow them, it is not clear whether PR. is in favour of introducing some more varieties or in accepting not even four varieties but only one; because all his arguments can be intreprepted as those put forth in a lightar vein and also with seriousness.

Before coming to a coclusion about PR's views about Vīra and its virieties, let us examine the views of some old writers on this subject. Three varieties of Vīra are mentioned by Bharata, Dānavīra, Dhrmavīra and Yuddhavīra (H A.B; P. 606). Hemacandra (Kāvyanuśāsanam P.93), Rudraṭa & (Kavyalamkāra P. 164), and other writers mention only the above varieties. It is not clear who was the first writer who introduced the fourth variety, Dayāvīra. But we find in Daśarūpaka (P. 72). Dayāvīra in the place of Dhrmavīra. Seeing Dayāvīra in some works and Dhramavīra in others some one might have introduced both the varieties, thus making the total four. That is how we find these four varieties enumarated in works like Kāvyaparīkṣā (P. 20) and Sāhityadarpaṇa (P. 187). These four varieties are accepted by the rhetoricians, as was mentioned by PR. on account of the difference of the four Upādhis governing the Utsāha. But how far

they are justified in accepting like this is a question to be considered.

It is quite evident that the Utsāha in the Yuddhavīra is quite different in nature from that of Dayāvīra. Similar is the case with other types of Vīra also. Excepting the Utsāhatva, there is nothing common in the Utsāhas of all these varieties. Now, when we are prepared to accept four varieties of Vīra on account of the different nature of Sthāyıbhāva i.e. Utsāha, will it not be necessary to accept Bhakti, Vātsalya, Sneha etc., as vareities of Śṛṅgāra on account of the different nature of Rati. associated with them and thus have a few more varieties of Śṛṅgāra like Bhatkiśṛṅgāra, Vātslyaśṛṅgāra, and Snehaśṛṅgāra etc., ? But as we know, many of the rhetoricians are not prepared to accept so many varieties in Śṛṅgāra and they are content, simply saying that the Bhakti etc., are mere Bhāvas, with no scope for the full development to the state of Rasa, as in the case of Vanitādirati. The same thing can be said in this case also and the Dayā etc., can be dispensed with as mere Bhāvas. The word 'Vīra' which is derived from the root 'Vīra' (शूर वीर विक्रान्तौ) can be properly used only to mean Yuddhavīra.

Inspite of the fact that there is a verse in Nāṭyaśāstra, mentioning three varieties of Vīra (as quoted above) the earlier section dealing with vīra Rasa, beginning with "अथ वीरो नाम उत्तम प्रकृतिरुत्साहात्मकः" etc., and the Abhinavabhārati (H. A. B. D. 593-96) thereon, clearly indicate that only Yuddhavīra is meant by Vīra. In this light the words Dhramavīra and Dānavīra, as used in Nāṭyaśāstra may be understood in a different sense. When a battle was fought for the protection of Dhrama and charity (as in the case of Raghu's intended war against Kubera in Rghuvaṁśa), the Vīra in this connection, might have been called Dharmavīra and Dānavīra respectively. But later on understanding these words in their present sense some of the later writers must have included Dayāvīra also.

We do not find this classification in the writings of some old Ālaṅkārikas. Mammaṭa for example, does not mention these varieties. He appears to have been accepting, as his example would show us (K.P;P. 116), only Yuddhavīra. Even some other later writers like Vidyānātha illustrate only Yuddhavira. (Pratāparudriyam). Thus, 'Vira' originally appears to be of only one variety.

PR's. writing on Vīra is slightly confusing, because as was stated above, this passage can be explained in either way. Almost all the scholars. (Hindi Rasa Gaṅgādhara Part I P. 101; Hindi Candrikā Part I P. 179. and Saralā (R.G. P. 51). with a few exceptions, understand this passage to mean that few more varieties apart from the well-known ones should be accepted in Vīrarasa. But on close examination it will be clear that PR. is not in favour of accepting so many varieties in Vīrarasa. While writing about Śṛṅgāra, he states that he is not prepared to accept many varieties of Śṛṅgāra (Vipralambha) though they were mentioned by old writers, because there is no substantial difference in them :- "इमञ्च पञ्चविधं प्राञ्चः प्रवासादिभिः उपाधिभिः आमनन्ति, ते च प्रवासाभिलाषविरहेर्ष्याशापानां विशेषानुपलम्भात् नास्माभिः प्रपञ्चिताः" (RG. P. 42).

Here while discussing about Vīrarasa he states :-इत्थं वीररसस्य चातुर्विध्यं प्रपञ्चितं प्राचामनुरोधात् । वस्तुतस्तु बहवो वीररसस्य शृङ्गाररसस्येव प्रकारा निरूपयितुं शक्यन्ते" । (R.G; P. 50).

Here by saying 'निरूपयितुं शक्यन्ते' (it is possible to mention 1 many more virieties) he indicates that it is not his intention

1. It cannot be argued, in this connection, that PR. does not accept the varieties of Vipralambha only but not of Śṛṅgāra in general. Because if the varieties of Vipralambha are discorded there would be only two main varieties of Śṛṅgāra i.e. Sambhoga and Vipralambha which cannot be called 'Bahavah'.

to accept them. This attitude of him is clearly indicated by mentioning Ṣṛngāra by way of analogy. in the case of which he has openly refused to accept many varieties. In the light of this, all his ensuing discussion should be viewed as introduced only in a lighter vein as was rightly pointed out by Dr. Raghavan. (Number of Rasas. P. 76). The Candrikā (Sanskrit R. G. Part I P. 175.) and V. A. Ramasvamaiśāstri Jagannāthapaṇḍita P. 111). rightly understand this passage in this way only.

Perhaps, this is the only point where PR. gets the fullest suyport of his worst critic, Nāgeśa, who in his Uddyota says that Yuddhavīra is the only Vīra. Commenting on the words of Pradīpa "स च त्रिधायुद्धवीरो, दानवीरो, दयावीरश्चेति", Nāgeśa writes:- त्रिधेति—धर्मवीरेण चतुर्धा इत्यन्ये...केचित्तु निरुपपदस्य वीरस्य युद्धवीर एव प्रयोगः ! अतो नैतौ वीररसौ। अन्यथापलायनवीरादिभेदेन आनन्त्यंस्यात् । दानाद्युत्साहस्तु भाव एवेत्याहुः ।" (Uddyota (K.P.) P. 116.) Of course we are not sure that Nāgeśa also understands this passage of Rasagaṅādhara in the same way as we have done, in which case only he can be believed as supporting PR.

One thing appears to be against our interpretation of this passage of Rasagaṅgādhra. After giving an example for Garva, (RG. P. 104), PR. tries to distinguish it from Vīra. In this connection, he says that in the verse 'Āmūlādratnasānoh', Garva appears as a mainly important Bhāva whereas in the verse 'Api vakti girām patih' etc., cited as an example for Pāṇḍityavīra the Utsāha of the scholar which is associated with Garva appears as the Pradhāna. Thus he appears to be introducing Pāṇḍityavīra sincerely. If this is to be accepted, his analogy of Śṛṅgāra at the beginning of the discussion cited above appears misleading. Perhaps he agrees with his Pūrvapakṣin and accepts that Pāṇḍityavīra is a phase of Yuddhavīra only because he does not contradict his (Pūrvapakṣin's) statement "ननु चात्र युद्धवीरत्वम्, युद्धत्वस्य वादसाधारणस्य वाच्यत्वात् इति चेत्; क्षमावीरे किं ब्रूयाः"? (R. G. P.50)

Any way the views of PR. regarding the varieties of Vīra appear somewhat ambiguous.

Siddhicandragaṇi who generally presents the views of Navyas (among whom PR. also can be included) states that Dānavīra etc., should not be accepted as Rasas. "दानवीरादीनां प्रभावातिशयवर्णन एव कवीनां तात्पर्यमिति न तेषां रसत्वम् ।" (K. P. K. P. 22)

It is interesting to note Achyutarāya, the author of Sāhityasāra, enumerates 21 varieties of Vīra (Sāhityasāra pp. 119-127). If such trend were to be approved all the Rasas can be included under Vīrarasa)

After explaining Hāsyarasa with suitable illustrations, PR. like many of his predecessors states that Hāsya is of three types as Uttamastha, Madhyamastha and Adhamastha, with further classification into six varieties Smitam, Hasitam etc , but all this he states as the opinion of others but not of his own, because he is not perhaps, in favour of accepting them as Hāsyabhedas (RG. P. 54) because all these things may be accepted as different conditions (Avasthās) caused by Hāsya, like the ten or twelve Avasthās caused by love (Manmathāvasthās) which are not said to be the varieties of Śṛṅgāra. That is why PR simply quotes the verses of ancient writers, without offering any comments of his own. If all such things are to be taken as differiciating factors, one will have to accept such varieties in other Rasas also. For example in Bībhatsarasa one person may have vomitings on seeing a repulsive object; a second man may experience rheeling sensation and a third man may have some other effect like spitting etc., but can we call all these external effects as the differenciating factors in Bībhastarasa? Evidently no rhetorician is prepared to accept it in the case of Bībhastsa. Then why not the same principle in the case of Hāsya also?

There is a great controversy regarding the number of the Rasas and this point has been extensively discussed by Dr. Raghavan in his 'Number of Rasas'. Abhinavagupta is of firm

opinion that there can be only nine Sthāyibhāvas. and thereby nine Rasas. According to him, every man, immediately after he takes his birth, will have a desire for enjoymeut (Rati); thinking high of himself he laughs at others (Hāsa). He is perturbed on his seperation from the object of his love (Śoka). He is angry with people causing such seperation etc., (Krodha). On account of his incapacity to protect himself he is affraid of others (Bhaya); he wants to acquire something (Utsāha). He has a sense of repulsion for bad things (Jugupsā). He gets wonder on seeing some of the extraodinary deeds of his own and others (Vismaya). And he wants to give up some things (Nirveda).

''स्थायित्वञ्चैतावतामेव, जात एव हि जन्तुरियतीभिः सविद्भिः परीतो भवति। तथा हि- 'दुःखसंश्लेषविद्वेषी सुखास्वादनसादरः' इति न्यायेन सर्वो रिरंसया व्याप्तः, स्वात्मन्युत्कर्षमानितया परमुपहसन्, अभीष्टवियोगसन्तप्तः, तद्धेतुषु कोप परवशः, अशक्तौ ततो भीरुः, किञ्चिदर्जिजीषुरपि अनुचितवस्तुविषयवैमुख्यात्म कतयाक्रान्तः, किञ्चिदनभीष्टतया अभिमन्यमानः, तत्तत्स्वपरकर्तव्यदर्शनसमुदित विस्मयः किञ्चिच्च जिहासुरेव जायते'' H.A.B. P.480).

H.A.B., P. 479. Here "Kiñcicca jihāsureva jāyate" indicates that Abhinava, perhaps unconsciously, accepts Nirveda as the Sthāyibhāva of Śānta.

It is interesting to note that only nine moods of almost similar nature are acceptable even to some western critics. "Every truth which a human being can enunciate, every thought, even every outward impression which can enter into his consciousness, may become poetry when shown through an impassioned medium, when invested with the colouring of joy, or grief, or pity, or affection, or admiration, or reverence, or awe, or even hatred or terror: and unless so coloured, nothing, be it as interesting as it may, is poetry" (Quoted from Mill in the prefece of 'Mirror of Composition' P. VIII.)

PR. on the other hand, while discussing the possibility or otherwise of the increase in the number of Rasas, does not put

forth these or similar arguments. He simply says that regarding the number of Rasas etc., only the views of Bharata should be accepted. lest every thing should end in a confusion. This is just the same argument which Abhinava criticises. Why does PR. refrain from putting forth some strong arguments, like Abhinava, to fix the number of Rasas? The answer is self evident. PR. is of the opinion that the arguments of Abhinava fixing the number of the Sthāyibhāvas and thereby of Rasas also, is of little strength. Being a permanent in-born one, does not entitle a Bhāva to be styled as Sthāyin, because every Bhāva is latent in the mind of every person and so may be Sthāyin. Therefore Sthāyin should be the one which is kindled again and again. When such is the case, where is the rule that only nine Bhāvas should be named Sthāyins[1]? Again there is no stead fast rule that only the nine Rasas are helpful in the fulfilment of Puruṣārthas but not others. In fact, as Madhusudana Sarasvati states, only Bhakti will have to be accepted as Puruṣārthaviṣayaka. And where is the Compulsion that only nine Rasas are relishable and other Bhavas are not?

Therefore the arguments of Abhinava and others like Pratīhārendurāja are not convincing. Therefore P.R., perhaps, shares the views of writers like Lollaṭa, Rudraṭa and Bhoja etc., who believe any Bhāva can be developed to the state of Rasa. But as a man having great respect for Bharata he feels that there is nothing wrong in giving the name of Rasa to nine Bhavas just for the sake of convinience, and calling others only as Bhāvas. This feeling might have prompted PR. to put forth intentionally, such slender argument like Munivacanānurodha, in determining the number of Rasas.

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1. While writing about the Sthāyins Paṇḍitarāja states (R.G , P.37):- "तत्र आप्रबन्धस्थितत्वादमीषां भावानां स्थायित्वम्, न च चित्तवृत्तिरूपाणामेषां आशुविनाशित्वेन स्थिरत्वं दुर्लभम्। वासनारूपतया स्थिरत्वन्तु व्यभिचारिष्वतिप्रसक्तमिति वाच्यम्। वासनारूपाणममीषां मुहुर्मुहुरभिव्यक्तेरेव स्थिरपदार्थत्वात्"

THE BHĀVAS

The discussion on Bhāvas occupies an important place in R G. Apart from the useful repetition of all that was said by others on this subject, we find, in this sectiou, some independent views of PR. on some points, and as usual the lucidity of expression and clearness of deffinitions have been maintained throughout the discussion.

Though the word Bhāva, in its general sene means Sthāyibhāvas, Vyabhicāribhāvas and the Sāttviktbhāvas. PR. lika Mammaṭa (K P; P. 123), restricts its scope to the Vyabhicāribhāvas only, while discussing about the Bhāvdhani and defines it accordingly. Perhaps, he feels that there is no need of including the Sthāyibhāvas and Sāttvikabhāvas in this definition because the former were already dealt with while discussing about Rasas, and the latter, being mainly the extrnal bodily effects, do not come under the purview of Bhāva in the strict sense ofthe word 'Bhāva' which means according to Abhinavagupta, only the mental state;- वयन्तु ब्रूमः । भावशब्देन तावच्चित्तवृत्तिविशेषा एव विवक्षिताः । ये त्वेते ऋतु माल्यादयो विभावाः, बाह्याश्च बाष्पप्रभृतयोऽनुभावाः एकान्तजडस्वभावाः ते न भाव शब्दव्यपदेश्याः" (Abhinavabhārati Vol. I P.342.) Here the phrase 'बाष्पप्रभृतयोऽनुभावाः" includes all the Sāttvikabhāvas of which the Bāṣpa is one.

Before giving his own definition on the lines of Mammaṭa, P R. examines two alternatives and discords them as incorrect. "Bhāva is the one suggestive of Rasa being other than vibhāva Anubhāva" is the first alternative suggested by pūrvapakṣin. (R.G; P. 91). But this Lankaaṇa suffers from Ativyāpti, because it includes the Vākya of kāvya which is suggesteve of Rasa through Artha. To avoid this Ativyāpti the word 'द्वारान्तरनिरपेक्षत्वेन' may be added before 'Rasavyañjakatvam' and Kāvyavākya being

Rasavyañjaka through Śabda only, can be precluded from the scope of this Lakṣna. But now it would suffer from other defects, Asambhava and Ativyāpti. Even the Bhāvais suggestive of Rasa, only through Bhāvanā and so there is the defect Asambhava; and Bhāvanā suggests Rasa, dircetly without any intermediary (Dvārāntranirapekṣa)and so there is an Ativyāpti of this Lakṣaṇa, in Bhāvanā. The same Ativyāpti would be there eveu if we add the phrase "Śabda-bhinntve sati" More over, in a place where a Bhāva is mainly suggested (Pradhāna dhvanyamāna Bhāve) this Lakṣaṇa would suffer from Avyāpti because in such places the Bhāva does not suggest Rasa. If even in such cases, it is accepted that there will be the suggestion of Rasa ultimately, the Bhāva-dhvani will have to loose its seperate existence. It may be argued that in such cases, it will be called only Bhāvadhvani because Bāva alone is the source of Camatkāra there but not the ultimately suggested Rasa. But this argument is not correct. For, it is a contradiction in terms to call it Rasa without being the source of camatkāra. Even if the above argument were to be accepted, there will be Ativyāpti of this Lakṣaṇa in a Vākyārtha which conveys the padārthas like place, time, age and condition etc., becuse it is both other than Vibhāvānubhāvas and suggestive of Rasa.

The pūrvapakṣin next suggests another Lakṣaṇa. "Bdāva is a state of mind which is the object of Carvaṇā (enjoying) and suggestive of Rasa" (R. G; P. 93) Here the phrase 'Carvaṇāviṣaya' is added to avoid Ativyāpti in the Bhāvādicarvaṇā, because such Carvaṇā being a Chittavṛtti suggests Rasa. By adding this phrase the Atiyyāpti is avoided becuse such Bhāvādicarvaṇā cannot be the object of further Carvaṇā. But even this definition, PR. contends, suffers from Ativyāpti. In this connecton he cites the following verse where a damsel suffering from seperation is said to have felt the paste of Kālāguru as similiar to Hālāhala ;-

"कालागुरुद्रवं सा हालाहलवद्विजानती नितराम् ।
अपि नीलोत्पलमालां बाला व्यालावलिं किलामनुते" । (R G. P 93)

Here the Hālāhalasadṛśatvaprkārakajñāna is a mental state which is the Object of Carvaṇā suggesteve of Rasa. But it is Anubhāva only and therefore the Ativyāpti is inevitable.

Here Nāgeśa suggests that this Ativyāpti can be avoided by simply adding 'Anubhāva bhinnatve sati' in the Lakṣaṇa. (GMP. P.93) But the previous objection of Avyāpti in Bhāvadhvani stands unanswered. But one thing should be pointed out here. If PR. thinks that the above objection is unanswerable he would not have given this Lakṣaṇa at all with no provision to meet the above objection. It clearly indicates that P R. is not so particular in maintaining that there can be no coexistence between the Bhāvadhvani and the ultimate Rasadhvani. This is clearly explained by Badarīnāthaśarma in Chandrikā. (R. G. Part. I. - P.290. Candrikā) Therefore there should be nothing wrong in accepting the Lakṣaṇa with the addition of 'Anubhāvabhinnatve sati'. But addition of such phrases in a Lakṣaṇa is to be accepted only as a last resort, in the absance of a better and simple Lakṣaṇa. This must have prompted PR. to give a final Lakṣaṇa in conformity with the Views of Mammaṭa.

P R.'s Lakṣaṇa of Bhāva is ;- विभावादिव्यज्यमानहर्षाद्यन्यतमत्वं तत्त्वम् (भावत्वम्) (R G. P. 93). (Bhāva is a thing suggested by Vibhāvādi, being one of the Harṣa etc.,). Regarding the Bhāvadhvani, PR. mentions three theories, but it is not known who are their original exponants. These theories are stated in the following order;- "हर्षादीनां समाजिकगतानामेव स्थायिभावन्यायेन अभिव्यक्तिः। सापि रसन्यायेनेति केचित्। व्यङ्गयान्तरन्यायेनेत्यपरे मन्यन्ते।" (RG. P.93)

The Sthāyibhāvas which are latent in the mind of Sahṛdaya are expressed through their Vibhāvas etc., without being disturbed by other Bhāvas, Sajātīya or Vijātīya. The Vyabhicāribhāvas also are being suggested in the similar manner. This is the first theory which is perhaps acceptable to P R , because he states this without adding 'Kecit' or 'Anye' etc. According to the second theory, the Vyañjanā of Bhāvā is like that of Rasa. When the Sattva is brought into prominance by the Vibhāvādi-Sāmagrī,

and the cover of illusion is removed, the Ātmānanda delimited by Sthāyibhāva is said to be the Rasa. In the same manner after the similar process of Sattvodreka etc., the Bhāvas shine in association of the Ātmānanda (Bhagnāvaraṇa cidviśiṣṭa bhāvah). According to this theory all the Bhāvas will have to be accepted as Ānandarūpas only, which is against the common experience.

The third theory is as follows :- When the Vācakapada and the Lakṣakapada express the Vācyātha and Laksyārtha respectively, another meaning which may be Vasturūpa or Alaṅkārarūpa is suggested to the hearer like an echo. The Bhāvas are also suggested to the mind of the hearer in a similar way. This theory relegates. Bhāvadhvani to the position of mere Vastudhvani or Alaṅkāradhvani which is against the generally accepted superiority of the Bhāvadhvani over them. Thus when the second theory raises Bhāvadhvani to greater heights,the third one brings it down to a lower level. Therefore the first theory alone must have had the approval of PR.

After stating these three theories, PR. says that the Bhāvas are suggestd mainly by Vibhāvas and Anubhāvas; and there is no need of other Vyabhicāribhāvas for this Purpose; because then such Vyabhicāribhāva itself would become prominent (pradhāna). But, in fact, PR. hastens to add, when a particular Bhāva is understood to be important. with the help of context etc., there is nothing wrong even if there is another Vyabhicāribhāva suggested by the Sāmagrī, which only becomes subordinate to the main Bhāva, as in the case of Amarṣa in the context of Garva, or of Garva in the context of Amarṣa. In such cases it need not be called Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya, because only when the second Bhāva is suggested by seperate Vibhāvas etc., and is Subordinated to the first Bhāva. it can be called Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya, but not where both the Bhāvas (main and the subordiante) are suggested by the same Vibhāvas etc. Another imporant point PR. wants ta mention here is that in the case of Bhāvadhvani, unlike Rasadhvani, there is no need of both the kinds of Vibhāvas, i.e. Ālambanavi-

-vidhāva and the Uddīpanavibhāva. It will sufiice if any one of them is introduced; of course there is nothing wrong if both are there. Thus P R. introduces a valuable discussion in this section, which is not to be found in any other extant work of Alaṅkāra-śāstra.

After explaining the general nature of Bhāvas PR. gives a list of thirty three of them, beginning with Harṣa & ending with Nirveda. And following Mammaṭa (K P. P. 126). he adds the Rati connected with God etc , as the thirtyfourth Bhāva. Mammaṭa after enumerating all the thritythree Bhāvas does not make it clear whether such of the Sthāyibhāvas which are not fully developed also belong to the catagory of Vyabhicāribhāvas. But later writers like Viśvanātha clearly maintain that such Sthāyibhāvas also come under Vyabhicāribhāvas (S. D. III. p 214 & 235). Govinda ṭhakkura ascribes the same views to Mammaṭa also while commenting on the line "Ratirdevādiviṣayā" etc. (K. P. Pradipa. P. 126). In support of this view he rightly cites the sentence of Mammṭa "तदेवाह वृत्तिकारः कान्तादिविषया तु व्यक्ता शृङ्गारः ।" (KP., P.126) Here the word 'Vyakta' indicates that the 'Avyakta', i. e. the Kāntā-viṣayakarati which is not fully developed, belongs to the catagory of Devādivisayakarati and hence Vyabhicāribhāva. Thus Mammṭa also does not seem to have any objection to accept the Udbuddhamātrasthāyins as Vyabhicāribhāvas. But it is wrong to tnnik, as some scholars do, (R. G. S.A. PP. 225-227), that Mammaṭa is against accepting the Anudbuddhasthāyins as Vyabhicāribhavas and P R also is of the same opinion. It is true, Mammaṭa does not say clearly that such sthāyins also come under Vyabhicāribhāvas; perhaps be does not feel its necessity because he has already given the definition of sthāyibhāvas. When they are not fully developed their stāyitva is automatically lost and only the Bhāvatva remains. As the epithet, 'Vyābhicārin', "विशेषेण अभितः चरन्ति चारयन्ति वा व्यभिचारिणः) can be, under such circumstances, added to these Bhāvas also there is nothing wrong in calling them Vyabhicāribhāvas. Whether they are called sthāyins or Vyabhicā-

rins, their inherent individualistic character continues to be the same. But, it is not the case with the Kāntā-divişayakarati and the Devādivişayakarati. They widely differ from each other inspite of their common name 'Rati'. This is why Mammaṭa mentions this Rati seperately to be included among the Vyabhicāribhāvas. Another point to be noted here is that the Devādi-Vişayakarati is to be called Vyabhicāribhāva only when it ts completely Vyañjita. The word 'Añjitah' in the verse "रतिर्देवादिविषया व्यभिचारी तथाञ्जितः" is to be applied to 'Rati' also by Lingaviparyaya. Perhaps to indicate this contrast that while the Kāntādivişayakarati, fully Vayñjita, is called Rasa the Devā-divişyayakarati can be called only a Bhāva even under such circumstances. Mammaṭa writes "कान्ताविषया तु ब्यक्ता शृङ्गारः" (KP P. 126). Finding the similarity of the case P. R. adds "प्रतिपक्षकृतधिक्कारादिजन्मा निर्वेदश्चेति त्रयस्त्रिंशद् व्यभिचारिणः" (RG. P.95) becuse Nirveda, in two different senses, is accepted like Rati, both as the sthāyibhāva and Vyabhicāribhāva byboth Mammaṭa and PR.

His fixation of the number of the Bhāvas as 'Catustrimśat' caused the misconception that P R. is not in favour of including the undeveloped sthāyins under Bhāvas. (R. G. SA; P. 27). But, that P R's. views are just contrary to it, is indicated by what he writes and quotes in another place. While giving the general definition of the sthāyibhāvs he writes;- "केचित्तु रत्याद्यन्यतमत्वं स्थायित्वमाहुः । तन्न, रत्यादीनामेकस्मिन् प्ररूढे अन्यस्याप्ररूढस्य व्याभिचारित्वोपगमात् । प्ररूढत्वाप्ररूढत्वे बह्वल्प विभावजत्वे । तदुक्तं रत्नाकारे– "रत्यादयः स्थायिभावाः स्युर्भूयिष्ठविभावजाः । स्तोकैर्विभावैरुत्पन्नाः त एव व्यभिचारिणः" इति। एवञ्च वीररसे प्रधाने क्रोधः,रौद्रे चोत्साहः, शृङ्गारे हासः,व्यभिचारी भवति, नान्तरीयकश्च । यदा तु प्रधानपरिपोषार्थं सोऽपि बहुविभावजः क्रियते तदा तु रसवदलङ्कार इत्यादि बोध्यम् ।" (RG. P.38)

The one important feature that marks the treatment of Bhāvas by P R. is that he lays great stress on their mainly being mental

states causing Physical effects. *This fact is often ignored by many* of his predecessors. For example there can be no controversy, in many of the Bhāvas like Harṣa, Smṛti and Vrīdā etc., being mental states. But there are some Bhāvas like śrama, Nidrā, Vyādhi etc., which appear te be more of Physical effects than of mental states in nature. That is why writers like Dhanañjaya (Daśarūpaka. IV 12; 2 3, 29). And Viśvanātha (S. D; P.), difine them as of the former naturs only. But P R. Realises it to be a contradicetion in terms to define them as Physical conditions and call then Bhāvas. Therefore in defining each Bhāva, he is careful in bringing out the fact that it is a menral state. About Maraṇa be writes:- "रोगादिजन्या मूर्छादिरूपा मरणप्रागवस्था मरणम्।' न चात्र प्राणवियोगात्मकं मुख्यं मरणं उचितं ग्रहीतुम्। चित्तवृत्त्यात्मकेषु भावेषु तस्याऽप्रसक्तेः। भावेषु च सर्वेषु कार्यसहवर्तितया शरीरप्राणसंयोगस्य हेतुत्वात्।" (R.G. P. 110).

This indicates how P R. like Abhinava lays emphasis on the mental aspect of the Bhāva. In defining each Bhāva, P R. gives its Vibhāvas and other imporatant things connected with it. explaining even the slighest difference betwean one Bhāvā and another, and thus his treatment of Bhāvas is so compelete that no scope for ambiguity is given any where. Such elaborate treament of Bhāvas is not found in any orher works on rhetorics. Like all the other rhetoricians P R. also deals wite Bhāvaśānti, Bhāvodaya, Bhāvasandhi and Bhāvaśabalatā. He defines Bhāva-Śānti as:- "भावस्य प्रागुवतस्वरूपस्य शान्तिर्नाशः; स च उत्पत्त्यवच्छिन्न एव ग्राह्यः, तस्यैव सहृदयचमत्कारित्वात्" (RG. P.124)

Here the important point that P R. wants to lay stress upon is that a Bhāva immediatly after it is born, should be described as disappearing, and this will be an instance of Bhāvaśānti. Accordingly while explaining the Bhāvaśānti in the verse "Muñcasi nādyāpi ruṣam" etc.. he writes "उत्पत्तिकालावच्छिन्नः रोषनाशो विभावः" (RG. P.124).

After explaining the Bhāvodaya also with suitable illustriation he states that it is not possible to find an exclusive place for

Bhāvaśānti and Bhāvodaya because Bhāvaśānti is invariably followed by the appearance of another Bhāva, and Bhāvodaya is preceded by Bhāvaśānti. But, he says, their position is to be determined according to the Camatkāra produced by them; in other words, if the desappearing Bhāva is the source of pleasure it should be named Bhāvśānti and if it is the appearing Bhāva it will be Bhāvodaya, because Camatkāra cannot be produced by both Bhāvaśānti and Bhāvodaya existing in a same place, simultaneously.

Bhāvasandhi is explained as the confluence of two different Bhāvas which are not suppressed by each other inspite of the fact that they should be so, being antagonistic with each other by their nature (RG. P.125). If such two Bhāvas, nullifying the effects of each other are brought together, there will be no Camatkāra from either of them Similarly there will be no Camatkāra from the confluence of such Bhāvas which are not of opposite nature. This appeais to be the innovation of P R. in ihe defintion of Bhāvasandhi.

Bhāvaśabalatā is defiined by P R. as:- "भावशबलत्वं भावानां बाध्यबाधकभावम् आपन्नानां उदासीनानां वा व्यामिश्रणम् "। (RG. P.126). Unlike in Bhāvasandhi, many Bhāvas either antagonistic with each other or of neutral nature can be combined in a beautiful way, in Bhāvaśabalatā Here P R. criticises the commentators on Kāvyaprakāśa, evidently Govindathakkura (Pradipa.-K. P. P. 133), and his followers, who hold that Bhāvaśabalatā consists of the nullification (or subversion) of the prceding Bhāvas by the following Bhāvas, because it is against the views of Mammaṭa who says in the fifth Ullāsa (K. P. P. 195). that, in the verse "Pasyet kaścit" etc.. there is a combination of śaṅkā, Asūyā, Druti, Smṛti, śrama, Dainya, Mati and Autsukya though the Preceding Bhāva is not uppressed by the following one. Therefore, P R. says that neither there is the suggestion of the oppression of the Preceding Bhāva nor ther is any charm in such

Upamarda. The Peculiar charm is not in the supperssion of one Ehāva by the other but in happy combination of many Bhāvas as in the admixture of coconut water, milk, sugar and plantainfruit. (RG. P. 127).

After examining the Bhāvaśānti etc., PR. introduces a fine discussion as to the imqortant element in Bhāvaśānti etc., and all this appears to be his own original theory. According to this theory, the Bhāvaśānti' Bhāvobaya and the Bhāvaśabalatā should be considered as Bhāvadhvanis only. Because while the Bhāva is being enjoyed as existing (Vidyamānatayā)in the Bhāvadhvani, the same is being enjoyed as appearing. disappearing, associating and coexisting in the Bhāvodaya etc., and thus Bhāva alone being]he sorce of pleasure, it should be considered important (Pradhāna). It may be argued that while the śāntyādi and the Bhāva are being equally enjoyed, how can it be decided that Bhāva alone is imporant but not the śānti etc. In reply to this. he shows the Bhāvadhvani as the deciding factor. In the Bhāvadhvani i, e. in the sthithyavasthā of a Bhāva, the Bhāva alone is considered Pradhāna but not its Sthiti. On the same analogy, the Bhāva alone should be considered as Pradhāna in Bhāvaśānstyādi also. In support of his contention, P R. Advances another argument. If Bhāva were not to be taken as important but only the Praśamādi, in such places where Bhāvas are suggested and the śāntyādi is expressed we cannot call them Bhāvaśāntidhavani, because the important one śāntyādi is not suggested but evpressed. In this connecton, he cites the following verse :-

''उषसि प्रतिपक्षनायिकासदनादन्तिकमञ्चति प्रिये ।
सुदृशो नयनाब्जकोणयोरुदियाय त्वरयारुणद्युतिः'' ।। (RG. P. 128)

Here the word 'Udiyāya' expresses the appearance of the Bhāva though Bhāva is suggestd. If the Udaya were to be considered more important than Bhāva, this verse cannot be an example of Bhāvodayadhvani because the main thing Udaya is expres-

sed. But according to the Siddhāntin who takes Bhāva as important, it can be Bhāvodayadhavani ; because the Bhāva is suggested though the Udaya, which is Apradhāna, is expresed, aceording to the wellknown dictum "प्राधान्येन व्यपदेशा भवन्ति" ! Again he gives another example where the Bhāvaśānti is expressed by words but Bhāva is suggested :-

"क्षमापणैकपदयोः पदयोः पतति प्रिये ।
शेमुः सरोजनयनानयनारुणकान्तयः" ॥ (RG. P. 128).

Here also the same objection arises, if Bhāva alone is not acceped Pradhāna.

Here the Pūrvapakṣin raises a question. The word 'Śemuh' is directly connected with 'Nayanāruṅakāntayah' but not with the suggested Bhāva i. c. Roṣa. Therefore Aruṇakāntipraśama may be Vāchya but not the Roṣapraśama; and hence there is nothng wrong in calling this Bhāvapraśamadhvani. The same case with the previous example also where the verb 'Udiyāya' is directly connected with Arunadyuti but not with the Amarṣa. PR; while concedicg to the views of the Pūrvapakṣin, shows another instance where the Bhāva is expressed (Vācya) but the Udaya is suggested ;-

"निर्वासयन्तीं धृतिमङ्गनानां शोभां हरेरेणदृशो धयन्त्याः ।
चिरापराधस्मृतिमांसलोपि रोषः क्षणप्राधुणिको बभूव" ॥ (RG. P.129).

If the Udaya were to be accepted as Pradhāna, this would have been an instance of Bhāvodayadhvani, because though the Bhāva is expressed, the important element, Udaya, is not expressed but suggested. It may be argued that Bhāvodayadhvani etc., arise only when both of them, Bhāva and Udaya, are suggested and none of them is expessed. Accordingly in the above Verse, it cannot be called Bhāvodayadhavani because one of the two i. e. Bhāva, has been expressed. In reply to this PR. says (RG. P.129) that if it were to be accepted that Bhāvodayadhvani would be only, there where both the Bhāva and the

Udaya etc., are suggested, the first two Ślokas cannot be the instances of Bhāvodayadhvani and Bhāvapraśamadhvani, because the Udaya and Praśama are expressed in them respectively. It will be against the accepted opinion of the Sahṛdayas not to call them Bhāvodayadhvani etc. Therefore, he concludes, that Bhāva alone being Pradhāna, is the source of pleasure even in Bhāvapraśama etc. But the Praśama etc., is only Apradhāna and so there is nothing wrong even if they are expressed (Vācya). The only difference between the Bhāvadhvani and the Bhāvapraśamādidhvani is that where as in the former only the Bhāva becomes Carvaṇāviṣaya, in the latter, Praśamādi also becomes Carvaṇāviṣaya along with the Bhāva.

Inspite of all that is said, PR.'s argument appears to be Somewhat deffective. As is shown above, he concedes to the objection raised by the Pūrvapakṣin who contends that in the above two verses the words 'Udiyāya' and 'Śemuh' are directly conneted with the 'Dyutiḥ' and 'Kāntayaḥ' but not with the Bhāvas and that they could therefore be called Bhāvodayadhvani and Bhāvapraśamadhvani. Thus accepting his first argument untenable, he advances another argument quoting the verse "Nirvāsayantī" etc. Again when the Pūrvapakṣin says that in a Bhāvapraśamadhvani, both the Bhāva and the Praśamādi should be suggested, he cites the same verses where he has already accepted (though impliedly by way of suggesting another alternative) that the Bhāvodaya and Bhāvaśānti were not expressed but suggested. Thus PR.'s arguments appear to be self contradictory.

And judged with the help of PR.'s own verses, the argument of the so called Pūrvapakṣin that both of them should de suggested seems to be correct because in the verse : "Uṣasi" etc., Amarṣa and its Udaya are suggested though Arunadyutyudaya is expressed. Likewise in the verse "Kṣamāpaṇaika padayoḥ" etc., both the Roṣa and its Praśama are sug gested, though the

Aruṇakāntipraśama is expressed. And therefore, both these verses can be taken as the examples for Bhāvodayadhvani and Bhāvapraśamadhvani respectively. But there is no Bhāvodayadhvani in the verse "Nirvāsayantīm" etc., because the Bhāva is expressed. Moreover, when PR. is prepared, at the end, to accept the difference, however insignificant it may be, between the Bhāvadhvani and Bhāvapraśamādidhvani, where is the scope for his first statement :-"य एते भावशान्त्युदयसन्धिशबलताध्वनयः उदाहृताः तेपि भावध्वनय एव" etc. (RG. P. 127). Does not his conclusion "इदं पुनर्भावध्वनिभ्यो भावशान्त्यादिध्वनीनां चमत्कारवैलक्षण्ये निदानं-यदेकत्र चर्वणायां भावेषु स्थित्यवच्छिन्नामर्षादित्वं, अमर्षादित्वमेव वा प्रकारः। अन्यत्र तु प्रशमावस्थत्वादिरपीति", (RG. P.129), run against this first statement ? Thus all this discussion of PR., does not alter much the generally accepted respective position of Bhāvadhvani and Bhāvodayadhvani etc.

At the end of this section PR. says that on the analogy of Bhāvodaya and Bhāvaśānti etc , we cannot have Rasodaya and Rasaśānti etc., because Rasa being Sthāyimūlaka, its Śānti cannot be described, for, the Sthāyin will have to lose, then, its Sthāyitva. Moreover there is no Camatkāra in such Rasapraśama etc. (RG P 130).

But Abhinavagupta appears to be in favour of accepting the Rasapraśama etc., also. While commenting on the Kārikā "Rasabhāvatadābhāsa" he writes :-"क्वचित्तु व्यभिचारिणः प्रशमावस्थया प्रयुक्तः चमत्कारः। यथोदाहृतं प्राक् "एकस्मिन् शयने पराङ्मुखतया" इति। अयं तत्र प्रशम इत्युक्तः। अत्र चेर्ष्याविप्रलम्भस्य रसस्यापि प्रशम इति शक्यं योजयितुम्"। (Locana P. 176).

Here Abhinava clearly states that there can be accepted Śṛṅgārapraśama in the above verse. Bālapriyā comments on this ;-"इत्युक्त इति। पूर्वैरिति शेषः। स्वाभिप्रायमाह-अत्रेत्यादि"। (Bālapriyā. P. 176).

Perhaps while writing the sentence ("Rasasya tu sthāyimūlakatvāt") PR. had Abinava in his mind. However Abhinava does not appear incorrect, because there is nothing wrong in accepting Vipralambhapraśama in the verse "Ekasmin śayane" etc. and there is no lack of Camatkāra in it. Sthāyitva being a relative position it need not stand in the way of accepting Rasapraśama, because it is generally accepted that one Rasa can be relegated to a lower level by introducing another Rasa, though the first Rasa also is Sthāyimūlaka as in intercepting two antagonistic Rasas wih a third Rasa.

Is rasādi also Saṁlakṣyakrama ?

It is generally accepted by all the rhetoricians that the Abhidhāmūla Dhvani can be divided into two groups, Asaṁlakṣyakrama-dhavni and Saṁlakaṣkramadhvani. The Rasa-dhvani and Bhāvadhvani etc., come under the first catagory, while the latter includes Vastu-dhvani. The Rasādi which is suggested by the Vibhāvādi is said to be Asaṁlakṣyakrama because the sequence of the cognitions of the suggestive and the suggested is not recognised i.e. the Rasa is experienced immediately after the cognition of Vibhāvādi with such quickness, as though there is no sequence at all. Against this accepted theory, PR. introduces, rather brings to light. a new theory on the authority of Āuandavardhana and Abhinavagupta that even the Rasādi dhvani can come under the Saṁlakṣyakrama dhvani. He says that the Rati etc., is called Asaṁlakṣyakram-Vyaṅgya because it is quickly experienced by Sahṛdaya when the context is clear and the Vibhāvas, Anubhāvas and Vyabhicāribhāvas are understood at once. But in such places where the context is not clear or the Vibhāvas etc., are to be inferred, the delay in the cognition of the Sāmagrī results in the delay of Camatkāra also and thus the Ratyādi would be Saṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgya. In this connection PR. cites the following verse as an example :-

"तल्पगतापि च सुतनुः श्वासासङ्गं न या सेहे,
सम्प्रति सा हृदयगतं प्रियपाणिं मन्दमाक्षिपति"

Here a Sahṛdaya cannot have the experience of Rati unless the word 'Saṁprati' is explained to mean 'the night preceding the day of intended departure of the Nāyaka'. Here the context which is indicated by the word 'Samaprati' tells us that the Nāyikā is a Pravatsyatpatikā, a fact which intensifies 'Rati'. Because of the delay in uderstanding the context, there is delay in the experience of Rati also. Thus the Rati is Saṁlaksyakrmavyaṅgya. In support of this theory PR. cites the statement of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. In the context of Saṁlakṣyakramadhvani, Ānandavardhana quotes the verse :–

"एवं वादिनि देवर्षौ पार्श्वे पितुरधोमुखी ।
लीलाकमलपत्राणि गणयामास पार्वती" ॥ (Dhvanyāloka P. 248)

and explains it thus. The counting of the lotus petals with bent head, is possible becuse of childish nature also and so it cannot invariably indicate the Vrīḍā, unless the context, that is, the conversation about her marriage, is understood and so this Vrīḍādhvani is Saṁlakṣyakrama. PR. quotes (R. G., P. 130) the words of Abhinava also where he says "Rasa and Bhāva etc., are always to be suggested but not expressed. Even then all of them need not be Asaṁlakṣyakrama". Thus as quoted by PR. Āndadavardhana aud Abhinavagupta appear to be in favour of accepting Rasabhāvādidhvani as, at times, Saṁlakṣyakrama also.

After quoting Abhinavagupta in favour of his opinion PR. raises one question. If we were to believe that Abhinava is in favour of accepting Rasādi as Saṁlakṣyakrama also, it will be against the enumeration of the number of varieties of Saṁlakṣyakrama-

dhvani by Abhinavagupta himself[1] and his follower Mammaṭa, for, both of them state, in the context of Anuraṇanadhvani that Arthaśaktimūladhvani is of twelve varieties. By accepting Rasādi also as Saṁlakṣyakrama the number of the Artha śakti-mūla-dhvani would increase by six more varieties, totalling to eighteen, because the Vācya which is of six kinds is to suggest Rasādi also (as Saṁlakṣya-karma-vyaṅgya.).

This objection is answered by PR. by intrepreting the views of Adhinava and Mammaṭa in this way. The Sthāyibhāva can develop into the state of Rasa only when it is suggested by inambiguous Vibhāvas, without the knowledge of sequence. After all what is the meaning of Rasībhāva ? It is only the Sthāyibhāva becoming the object of Alaukika-camatkāra (transcendental enjoyment) without slightest delay "रसीभावो हि नाम झगिति जायमानालौकिकचमत्कारविषयस्थायित्वम्" (RG. P. 131), Therefore the Sthāyibhāva which is suggested with the cognition of sequence can be taken only as a Vastu but not Rasa. This is how PR. interprets Abhinava's words to avoid self-contradiction. "But" he adds, "we have to find out justification for this explanation" (RG. 132). Lastly he says that the word 'Rasa' in Abhinava's sentence, रसभावादिरसौ ध्वन्यमान एव न वाच्यः" etc., should be understood to mean Ratyādi. Thus he appears to be in favour of accepting Rasa and Bhāva etc., as coming not only under Asaṁlakṣya-krama-vyaṅgya but also under the Saṁlakṣya-krama-vyaṅgya.

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1. Their enumeration of the varieties of Artha-śakti-mūla-dhvani is as follows. Artha is of two kinds, Vastu and Alaṅkāra. Each of them are of three kinds, Svatassambhavi, Kavi-Prauḍhokti-Niṣpanna, and Kavi-Nibaddha-Vaktṛ-Prauḍhokti-Niṣpanna. This Artha which is thus of six varieties suggests either Vastu or Alaṅkāra. Thus Artha-śakti-Mūla-dhvani is of twelve varieties. For the purpose of this enumetation, Abhinava and Mammṭa have taken into account only the Anuraṇanadhvani i. e, Saṁlakṣyakrama-vyaṅgya, because they have disposed of the

Nāgeśa and many later writers (Hindi Rasagaṅgādhara part I P. 251.) following him criticise the views of PR. as untenable. Commenting on the sentence :- "उपपत्तिस्त्वर्थेऽस्मिन् विचारणीया" Nāgeśa says (G. MP. 132), that it is accepted by all that the Rasānubhūti is Vigalita-vedyāntara i. e. the experience of Rasa cannot be coexisntant with the experience of any thing else. Therefore if it is accepted that the Sahṛdaya can have the cognition of the sequence between the Vibhāvādijñāna and the Rasapratīti, it will be against the universally accepted theory of Vigalita Vedyāntaratva. Thus the Rati etc., cannot be named Rasa when the sequence between them and the Vibhāvādi is cognised by Sahṛdaya. After showing this objection, Nāgeśa puts forth another objection also as the view of Navyas. The Navyas opine that only such Vibhāvādijñāna which is accompanied by the knowledge of the peculiarity of the speaker and the context etc., can produce Rasapratīti. The delay in understanding the context etc., my result in the delay of the Vibhāvādijñāna; but once the Vibhāvādi is understood, there can be no delay in the experience of Rasa. What is meant by the 'Krama' in 'Saṁlakṣya-krama-vyaṅgya' etc. is the sequence between the Vibhāvādi-pratīti and the Rasa-pratīti. Now where is the question of Rasa being Saṁlakṣya-krama also ? Thus Nāgeśa and all the commentators and translators of Rasagaṅgādhara are one in refuting the so called theory of PR. that the Rasa also can be Saṁlakṣyakrama–vyaṅgya.

One point should be noted here. What is actually meant by Saṁlakśya-krama and Asaṁlakṣyakrama ? Certainly these words should not mean that the krama or the sequance, between the Suggested and the suggestive is perceived or not perceived by the Sahṛdaya at the very same time of enjoying the Rasādi or Alaṅkārādi. Because. as our common experience shows, at the time of the experience of not only Rasādi but of the Alaṅkārādi also,

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Rasadhvani etc., as belonging to only one variety i. e. Asaṁlakṣya-krama-vyaṅgya, inspite of the fact that they can be divided into innumerable varieties. (K. P., P. 152).

the Sahṛdaya does not experience the sequence (Krama) though it is existing there; whether minutely or otherwise, for, two cognitions cannot coexist in the mind at the same time. He may be knowing about the existance of the Krama only after the experience of Rasādi or Vastvādi, only through the Anuvyavasāyajñāna. Therefore the Saṁlakṣyatā or Asaṁlakṣyatā of the Krama is not in relation with the Sahṛdaya at the time of experience of Rasādi or Alaṅkārādi, but in relation with the Sahṛdaya after the experience is over, or the Taṭastha or the critic who dissects the experince of Sahṛdaya. Therefore the first objection of Nāgeśa on the ground of Rasa being Vedyāntara-śūnya does not seem to be unquestionable because on the ultimate analysis the cognition of Vastvādi also is proved Vedyāntaraśūnya.

All this criticism proceeded under the erroneous conception that Rasa is accepted by PR. as Saṁlakṣyakrama also. But it is to be noted that he never said that Rasa can be Saṁlakṣya-Krama-Vyaṅgya. Following the views of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta he clearly states that Bhāvas including the Sthāyibhāvas, can be Saṁlakṣya-krama-vyaṅgya and he is careful enough to avoid the mention of Rasa in any place. The following places are to be carefully noted.

While explaining the verse "Talpagatāpi" etc., given as an example of the Dhvani, PR. states :-"इदञ्च पद्यं मन्निर्मितप्रबन्धगतत्वेन पूर्वसाकाङ्क्षमिति दिङ्मात्रेण व्याख्यायते" (RG. P. 14) (this is a justification of Saṁlakṣyakramatā which he is going to explain at the end of the Rasaprakaraṇa) "अत्र शनैः स्वस्थानपापणात्मना मन्दाक्षेपेण रत्याख्यः स्थायी संलक्ष्यक्रमतया व्यङ्ग्यते। उपपादयिष्यते च स्थाय्यादीनामपि संलक्ष्यक्रमव्यङ्ग्यत्वम् !"

Here PR. says only 'Sthāyyādīnāmapi' but not 'Rasādīnāmapi' and therefore the commentary Saralā which runs "मार्मिकतमेन प्रमात्रा रसतया व्यपदेश्यः सोऽयं रत्यादिः" (RG. P. 14) is misleading.

Again in the present context also PR. does not use the word 'Rasa' but uses only the words 'Ratyādi';- "सोऽयं निगदितः सर्वोपि रत्यादिलक्षणो व्यङ्ग्यप्रपञ्चः" "न खलु धर्मिग्राहकमानसिद्धं रत्यादिध्वनेरलक्ष्य क्रमव्यङ्ग्यत्वम्". (RG. P. 130)

Therefore it is not correct to say that Rasa is, according to PR. is Samlakṣya-krama-vyaṅgya also. In fact he clearly states that Rasa is Asamlakṣya-krama-vyaṅgya only.

At the end of the Rasa Section he writes :-"एवञ्च संक्षेपेण निरू. पिता रसाः.... एते चासंलक्ष्यक्रमव्यंग्याः। सहृदयेन रसव्यक्तौ झगिति जायमानायां विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिविमर्शक्रमस्य सतोपि सूचीशतपत्रपत्रवेधक्रमस्येवालक्षणात्" (RG. P. 56).

Were he in favour of accepting Rasa as Samlakṣya-krama also he would have written here (as in the case of Sthāyibhāvas) "वक्ष्यते च रसस्यापि संलक्ष्यक्रमत्वम्"। Moreover in such case, he would be contradicting himself unless it is believed that he is against Abhinava whom he cites as an authority of his views, when he says, in justification of Abhinava's views that only such Ratyādi can become Rasa when it is suggested by the clearly known Vibhāvādi but not otherwise :-"अत्रोच्यते-प्रकटैर्विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिभिः अलक्ष्यक्रमतयैव व्यज्यमानः रत्यादिः स्यायिभावो रसीभवति न संलक्ष्यक्रमतया। रसीभावो हि नाम झगिति जायमानालौकिकचमत्कारविषयस्थायित्वम्" (RG. P. 131). (In the kāsi edition of R. G. with candrikā (P. 394) 'रसादि' is wrongly added instead of रत्यादि.)

Again in the context of examining the verse "Alasa-śiromaṇ·ḥ" etc., given as an example of Vastudhvani, by Mammaṭa, PR. remarks :-"न च भावध्वनेः संलक्ष्यक्रमत्वापत्तिः द्वारस्य संलक्ष्यक्रमत्वादिति वाच्यम्। इष्टापत्तेः। न चापसिद्धान्तः। तस्य प्रगेवोद्धारात्।" (RG. P, 166) Thus according to PR only Bhāvas, both Sthāyibhāvas and the Vyabhicāribhāvas, can be Samlakṣya-krama but not Rasa.

In fact PR. talks, under a different context, about the Samlakṣya-kramatā of Rasa as 'Kecinmata' which he perhaps

intends to reftue here :–एवं संक्षेपेण निरूपिता रसाः । एषां प्राधान्ये ध्वनिव्यपदेशहेतुत्वम् । गुणीभावे तु रसालङ्कारत्वम् । केचित्तु प्राधान्य एवैषां रसत्वम् अन्यथा अलङ्कारत्वमेव । रसालंङ्कारव्यपदेशस्तु अलङ्कारध्वनिव्यपदेशवत् । ब्राह्मणश्रमणन्यायाम् । एवं असंलक्षक्रमतायानेव, अन्यथा तु वस्तुमात्रम् ।" (RG. P. 156).

This passage clearly indicates the existance of the controvarsy even before PR. which perhaps resulted from the wrong interpretation of Ānandavardhana and Abhinava, whether Rasa can be Saṁlakṣya-krama also.

As PR. says, this theory receives the full support of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. Commenting on the verse "Rasabhāva" etc., Abhinava writes "यो रसादिरर्थः स एवाक्रमो ध्वनेरात्मा न त्वक्रम एव सः । क्रमत्वमपि तस्य कदाचित् भवति । तदार्थशक्युद्भवानुस्वानरूपभेंदतेति वक्ष्यते" (Locana P. 174). While explaining this passage Bālapriyā clearly states that Abhinava believes Rasabhāvādi as Asaṁlakṣya-krama also :–" रसेत्यादिकारिकायाम् अङ्गिभावेन भासमानो रसभावदिः अक्रमो ध्वनेरात्मा व्यवस्थितः इत्यन्वयो वक्तव्यः । तथा च तथाविधरस भावादि सामान्यं असंलक्षक्रम इत्यर्थः सिद्धयति । सचार्थो बाधितः । क्वचित्भावादेः संलक्षक्रमत्वस्याप्यङ्गीकृतत्वात्, अतो विवक्षितमर्थ व्याचष्टे–यो रसादिरित्यादि । ....न त्वक्रमएव स इति । रसभावादिरक्रम एव भवतीति तु नैवेत्यर्थः । ....वक्ष्यत इति । एवं वादिनि देवर्षौ" इत्युदाहरणपूर्वक वक्ष्यत इत्यर्थः । Dhvanyāloka P. 174).

All this goes to prove that Abhinava accepts, on the authority of Ānandavardhana that Rasādi can be Saṁlakṣya-krama also. Here Abhinava appears to be including Rasa also along with Bhāvādi but as will be seen presently, he excludes Rasa from this contexi, and that is why Bālapriyā is cautious enough to write "क्वचिद् भावादेः संलक्ष्यक्रमत्वस्याप्यङ्गीकृतत्वात्" etc.

Again in the present context, cited by PR. as his authority Abhinava clearly states, while commenting upon Ānandavardhana, that Bhāvadi is, at times, Saṁlakṣya-krama vyaṅgya :-

"इह पद्मदलगणनं अधोमुखत्वञ्चान्यथापि कुमारीणां सम्भाव्यते इति झटिति न लज्जायां विश्रमयति हृदयम् । अपितु प्राग्वृत्ततपश्चर्यादिवृत्तान्तानुस्मरणेन तत्र प्रतिपत्तिं करोतीति क्रमव्यङ्ग्यतैव ।" (Locana P. 249-50)

After this we find an important sentence which states that once the Vyabhicāri-svarūpa is known (i. e. Lajjā is undehstood), the Rasa that is suggested by it, is Asaṁlakṣya-krama-vyaṅgya only "रसस्त्वत्रापि दूरत एव व्यभिचारिस्वरूपे पर्यालोच्यमाने भातीति तदपेक्षया अलक्ष्यक्रमतैव । लज्जापेक्षया तु तत्र लक्ष्यक्रमत्वम् । अमुमेव भावमेवशब्दः केवलशब्दश्च सूचयति" (Locana P. 250).

By this Abhinava clearly indicates that only Bhāvas may come under the catagory of Saṁlakṣya-kramas but not Rasa; a fact which is elaborated by PR. in the passage :– "प्रकाटैर्विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिभिरलक्ष्यक्रमतया" etc.

One thing is to be noted here. PR. first states that Ratyādi can be saṁlakṣya-krama-vyaṅgya also and cites Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta as authority. Next he finds some incongruity in the statement of Abhinavagupta "Rasabhāvādi rarthah" etc. and his enumeration of the varieties of Saṁlakṣya-krama-vyaṅgya and he tries to set right the same. In this effort he talks of only Rasa and nothing about Bhāvādi, and his main concern appears to be only about Rasa; because he himself is not in favour of accepting Rasa as Saṁlakṣya-krama-vyaṅgya, and explains the position of Abhinava accordingly. But this does not fully meet the above objection of the incongruity because as the Bhāvādi-dhvani, though not Rasadhvani, is accepted as Saṁlakṣya-krama also, there is the possibility of increase in the number of the varieties of Saṁlakṣya-krma-dhvani. PR. does not give any proper answer to this objection. Perhaps he accepts the suggestion of Ānandavardhana, that Bhāvadhvani also can come under the Vastudhvani, because in the context of Saṁlakṣya-krama-vastudhvani he (Ānandavardhana) writes :-अर्थशक्त्युद्भवस्त्वन्यो

यत्रार्थः स प्रकाशते । यस्तात्पर्येण वस्त्वन्यद्व्यनक्त्युक्ति विना स्वतः"—यत्रार्थः स्वसामर्थ्यादर्थान्तरमभिव्यनक्ति शब्दव्यापारं विनैव सोर्थशक्त्युद्भवोनाम अनुस्वानोपम व्यङ्ग्यो ध्वनिः । यथा–"एवं वादिनि"...··etc. अत्र हि लोलाकमल-पत्रगणनमुपसर्जनीकृतस्वरूपं शब्दव्यापार विनैव अर्थान्तरं व्यभिचारिभावलक्षणं प्रकाशयति" (Dhvanyaāloka. P. 248).

This clearly indicates that atleast in such cases Ānandavardhana has no objection in accepting the Bhāvadhvani as coming under Vastudhvani. The same might have been acceptable to PR. also and that is why he talks mainly about Rasa but not Bhāva because the Saṁlkṣya-kramatā of Bhāvadhvani does not alter the number of the varieties of the Saṁlakṣya-krama-dhvani, as explained above. The same cannot be said of the Rasadhvani which is one of the three important varieties of Dhvani and that is why PR. strives hard, as it were, to establish that Rasadhvani cannot be Saṁlakṣya-krama and says that the Ratyādi which is suggested as Saṁlakṣya-krama cannot attain the state of Rasa but it remains Bhāva only :-संलक्ष्यक्रमतया व्यज्यमानस्य रत्यादेस्तु भाव-तैव । न रसादित्वम्" (RG. P. 131).

Here the Kāśi edition reads ·रत्यादेस्तु भावतैव, न रसादित्वम्' R. G. (Kāśi edition) P. 167. which is corrected by the Nirṇaya-sāgsra edition as ·वस्तुमात्रतैव' । But in view of the above explanation this correction does not appear to be necessary. That is why PR. wants the word Rasa in the sentence "Rasa-bhāvādirarthah" etc., of Abhinava to mean Ratyādi. Thus PR. establishes on the authority of Ānandavardhana that Bhāvādidhvani can be Saṁlakṣya-krama also while Rasadhvani is Asaṁlaksya krama only.

Now it may be argued that if Samlakṣya-krama-bhāva-dhvani were to be included under the Vastu-dhvani, all these efforts of PR. to establish the Saṁlakṣya-kramatā of Bhāvādi would become futile because it does not alter the already accepted existing position. But this argument does not hold water.

Even if the name Vastu-dhvani is given to such Bhāvādi·dhvani just for the sake of convenience or other reason, Bhāvadhvani remains as Bhāvadhvani. Therefore it is wrong to think that PR. does not win any point in this connection.

As explained above, Nāgeśa wrongly thinks that PR. is in favour of accepting Rasa also as Saṁlakṣya-krama and raises an objection under the name of 'Navyas'. Now this does not apply to Rasa because PR. never intends Rasa to de Saṁlkṣya-krama. The same objection may be applied to the Saṁlakṣya-kramatā of Bhāvadi-dhavni, but it is well met by Dr. Gupta (RG. S. A; P· 97), himself being under the impression that PR. is in favour of Saṁlakṣya-kramatā of Rasa also.

In fact A. D. appears to be mainly responsible for this misinterpretation of PR.'s words. A. D. in his Citramīmāṁsā (P. 34), maintains that Rasa also may be Saṁlakṣya-krama and he cites Abhinavagupta and Ānandavardhana as the authority. With his interpretation in his mind Nāgeśa must have thought that PR. also is of the same opinion because he also quotes the same authors (and the same passages) as his authority.

THIRD CHAPTER

THE GUNAS

After dealing with the Rasas, PR. lays down certain broad principles to avoid the Anaucitya in Rasas and in their combination etc., and it is only a repetition of what is already said by the old writers on this subject. The next important topic that is dealt with by him is 'The Guṇas'.

The conception[1] of Guṇas in the Alaṅkāraśāstra is as old as that of Alaṅkāras, but it has at different periods and at the hands of different writers, undergone considerable change. Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra is perhaps the first extant work to mention the ten Kāvya-Guṇas along with Alaṅkāras and Lakṣaṇas, (Nāṭyaśāstra XVI. 96). He does not draw any line of distinction between the Guṇas and the Alaṅkāras. He calls all the ten Guṇas simply as Kāvya-Guṇas without naming them as Śabda-guṇas or Artha-guṇas. But according to the definition given by him afterwards, some Guṇas appear to be Śabda guṇas, some Artha-guṇas and some Ubhaya-guṇas. It is interesting to note that Bharata while defining the Guṇas generally as the reversal of the Doṣas, anticipates the views of the later writers like Mammaṭa who entertain the same idea and thus try to reduce the number of Guṇas. (Nāṭya śāstra XVII-95).

After Bharata, we find a passing reference to only three Guṇas by Bhāmaha, (Kāvyālaṅkāra II 1-3). which made scholars to believe that Bhāmaha is in favour of accepting only three Guṇas-Mādhurya, Prasāda and ojas, which are ultimately established as the only Guṇas by Ānandavardhana, Mammaṭa and others.

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1. A detaited account of the development of the conception of Guṇas is given by Dr. Rāghavan in Sṛṅgāraprakāśa (pp.249-351) and by Dr. P. C. Lahiri in 'Concept of Rīti and Guṇa'.

Bhāmaha does not attempt at defining the Guṇas with suitable examples as can be seen from their absence for Mādhurya and Prasāda. He does not introduce even a brief argument that the number of Guṇas should be reduced to three only. In the absence of such arguments, one need not necessarily jump to the conclusion that Bhāmaha, accepts only three Guṇas: for, the trend of the earlier writers was, as in the case of Alaṅkāras, more towards gradually increasing the number of items rather than reducing it. Perhaps Bhāmaha is inclined to give more importance to the three Guṇas and he may not have any objection in accepting the other Guṇas also as expounded by Bharata and others according to the famous dictum "अनुक्तमन्यतो ग्राह्यम्" ।

Daṇḍin mentions the same ten Guṇas as found in Bharata (Kāvyādarśa I-41). He accepts these ten Guṇas as the differenciating qualities between the Vaidarbhīriti and the Gauḍīriti which he calls as two different Mārgas. Of the ten Guṇas four i.e. Śleṣa, Samatā, Sukumārata, and Ojas are the Guṇas of Śabda; Prasāda, Arthavyakti, Udāratā, Kānti and Samādhi are Artha-guṇas and Mādhurya is the Guṇa of both Śabda and Artha. (Commentary of Kāvyādarśa P. 37). Daṇḍin does not seem to bother to distinguish Guṇas from Alaṅkāras.

The next important writer after Daṇḍin, is Vāmana. He gives according to his own conception of Rīti as the soul of poetry, much importance to Guṇas. In the hands of Vāmana their number increases from ten to twenty. While adopting the same names of the Guṇas, Vāmana accepts two sets of them one of Śabda-guṇas and the other of Artha-guṇas (K. A. Sūtra. III 1.4 and III 2.1). Vāmana is perhaps the first man to differenciate the Guṇas from Alaṅkāras. According to him, Guṇas produce beauty in Kāvya, where as the Alaṅkāras help in increasing it. He states that even without Alaṅkāras, the Guṇas are capable of producing beauty in a Kāvya but the Alaṇkāras cannot have independent existence, and therefore he calls the Guṇss as Nityas.

An interesting point to note is that Vāmana accepts Doṣas as Guṇābhāvarūpa (K. A. Sutra II 1.1) where as some later writers like Mammaṭa try to prove that some Guṇas are Doṣābhāvarūpa. But one point is to be remembered in this connection. One thing may be the negation of every thing else (Anyābhāvarūpa), but it has got its own positive qualities with the help of which it can well nigh be defined. In this connection we may apply the analogy, cited by PR. in a different context. (R. G. P. 521) Foolishness is a Doṣa and Vidyā may be the negation of such Doṣa. While being so, it has got its own positive qualities. Thus, Guṇa may be said to be Doṣābhāvarūpa and Doṣa as Guṇābhāvarūpa, but each has got its own possitive nature. Therefore it may be a vain effort to dispence with the Guṇas as Doṣābhāva or vice versa. Perhaps this is the idea which prompted Vāmana to state, while writing about Doṣas, that they also should be explained with their qualities, though they may be Guṇābhāvarūpas. (K. A. Sūtra P. 14).

Even after Vāmana, some writers like Bhoja are in favour of increasing the number of Guṇas. Bhoja accepts 24 Śabdaguṇas and Arthaguṇas of even number totalling to 48 Guṇas. (V. Raghavan's S. P., P. 304). He also introduces special kind of Guṇas called Vaiśeṣika-guṇas (Ibid P. 302).

Vidyānātha, though he is said to have been following Bhoja, (Ratnāpana P. 274), mentions only 24 Guṇas but not 48 (Prataparudriya P. 274). At the end of the Guṇaprakaraṇa he says that Guṇas should not be accepted as pertaining to Artha also, because they are mainly considered to be the Dhrma of Saṅghaṭanā. (Pratāparudriyam P. 285).

What ever may be the position of other writers, Vāmana a conception of Guṇas appears to be self contradicting, because a the beginning he states that Rīti is the soul of poetry and defines it as "Viśiṣṭa padaracanā rītih" and again he clarifies Viśeṣa as Guṇarūpa. From these definitions, it is quite evident that originally Vāmana thinks Guṇas as Padaracanādhrma only; and now

where is the scope for accepting Artha-guṇas, unless he probably wants to show some improvement over Daṇḍin by introducing ten more Artha-guṇas, which are Guṇas only by a Guṇa–prayoga ? That is why Kumārasvāmin (Pratāparudriyam P 274) states that Gunas are ten (but not twenty) according to Vāmanādis, and twentyfour (not fortyeight) according to Bhoja. The fallacy in Vāmana's stand is clearly shown by Vidyānātha (Prataparudriyam P. 285–86). Vidyānātha introduces, on the authority of some earlier writers, a new point of distinction between Guṇas and Alaṅkāras. The āśraya of Guṇas is the arrangement of words (but not actually the word alone), whereas the Āśraya of Alaṅkāras is Śabda and Artha. As Ratnāpaṇa (P. 242–43), explaines Vāmana's theory that Guṇas are Kāvyaśobhākara and Alaṅkaras are Tadatiśayahetu is not acceptable to these writers.

Abhinavagupta also refers to similar views held by old writers, according to whom, while Śabdasaṅghaṭanāśrayas are the Śabda-Guṇas, the Arthasaṅghaṭanāśrayas are called Arthaguṇas (Locana P. 16). Thus we find that the Gunas are introduced into Kāvya long before the importance of Rasa in it was realised, therefore naturally the Guṇas have been associated, in the early writings, with Śabda or with Śabda and Artha with some variations in their number and with slight changes in their conception.

An entirely new trend has been introduced into the conception of the Guṇas, along with the introduction of the importance of Rasa in Kāvya, as a result of this their number has been reduced to three.

Dhvanikāra is perhaps the first man[1] to associate the Guṇas with Rasa dissociating them from Śabda and Artha or the

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1. N. D. Barhatti (in his introduction to Kāvyālaṅkāra sāra saṅgraha) is of the opinion that there have been coming down two schools of thought in Alaṅkāraśāstra from the early days which may be named as the Kāshmirien-school and the

Śabdasaṅghṭanā. According to him the Guṇas are related to the Rasas and the Alaṅkāras are associated with Śabda and Artha; and this he considers as the distinguishing factor between Guṇas and Alaṅkāras. (Dhvanyāloka P. 204).

While Ānandavardhana and Abhinavapupta are content by saying that the Guṇas, Mādurya, Prasāda and Ojas are the qualities of Rasa etc., but not of Śabda etc.. Mammaṭa comes out with a firm assertion that there can be no more Guṇas than these tree and that they are the qualities of Rasa only : (K. P; P. 39),

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Vaidarbhian-school, the former being represented by the writers like Bhāmaha, Ānandavardhana and Mammaṭa etc, hailing from Kashmir and the latter by Daṇḍin and others. Perhaps for the convenience of this division he does not consider Vāmana as altogether a Kashmirian. (Foot not in page XVIII). Thus the nonacceptance of more than three Guṇas and figures like Leśa, Hetu and Sūkṣkma, and of the importance of Rītis etc., is the peculiar characteristic, according to this writer, of the Kashmirian school.

But this argument does not appear quite convincing. Vāmana also is believed to be a Kashmirian (H. S. P., P. 147) and the fact that he holds views different from the socalled Kashmirian school is a proof that there is no such school. Moreover Rudraṭa whose being a Kashmirian is not doubted even by Barhatti, accepts the socalled Vaidarbhian Alaṅkāras Hetu, Sukṣma,and Leśv, (Kāvyālaṅkāra (of R) pp. 92, 95 and 96). As was shown above the conception of ten Guṇas as is seen in Bharata himself might have further been developed by later writers by way of increasing their number, and attaching some new importance to them. As the available text indicates, it cannot deffinitly be said that Bhāmaha's treatment of Guṇas is complete and he is in favour of accepting three Guṇas only. Therefore in the absance of any strong evideuce, this kind of division into two schools does not appear to be unquestionable.

Another point to be noted with Mammaṭa is that while, according to Ānandavardhana,[1] the Guṇas can be associated not only with Rasa but with Bhāvas and Rasādyābhāsas also, he consideres them to be the qualities of Rasa only. Perhaps he feels that the Druti, Vistṛti and Vyāpti caused by Mādhurya, Ojas, and Prasāda respectively cannot be found in Bhāva and Rasābhāsa etc. The views of Mammaṭa regarding the nature of Guṇas has been accepted by many of the later writers like Viśvanātha with slight changes.

This change in the conception of Guṇas is the result of the recognition of the importance of Rasa in poetry also, and of the socalled effects of different Rasas on the heart of Sahṛdaya. We find Dhanañjaya talking about such four effects Vikāsa, Vistāra, Kṣobha and Vikṣhepa produced on the Manas of a Sahṛdaya. (Daśarūpaka IV. 43 & 44) These four kinds of affects might have been suggested to Dhanañjaya by Bharata who accepts Śṛṅgāra, Vīra, Bībhasta and Raudra as the Prakṛti Rasas (H.A B; P. 517). Or there might have been some direct reference to these effects in some lost portions of Nāṭyaśāstra. Bhoja also talks about similar effects in his Sarasvatīkanṭhābharaṇa (P. 720-21). Having these effects in their mind Abhinavagupta and others try to understand the Mādhurya etc., in similar sense and ascribe them, conttrary to ther original conception, to the Rasas. But these critics do not appear to have their final say on this subject. For example, the Druti which is said to be the effect of Mādhurya, is considered to be the essential quality of not only Śṛṅgāra, Karuṇa and Śānta etc., but of all the Rasas, as contended by Madhusūdanasarsvatī in the Bhaktirasāyana :-(I.4 and 5)

What ever may be the nature and position of Mādhurya ect., according to the new school, here arises a question, how far the

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1. Ānandavardhana, in his Vṛtti under the Kārikā "Tamarthamavalambante" writes "ये तमर्थं रसादिलक्षणं अङ्गिनं सन्तं" etc. Here the word Rasādi includes Bhāvādi (Dhvanyāloka P. 204).

later writers are justified in giving an altogether new turn to the conception of Guṇas. It would have been quite appropriate if they, taking hint from the effects like Vikāsa, Vistāra, Kṣobha, Vikṣepa, ascribed to the Rasas, develope a trio of new Guṇas without trying to identify them with the already accepted ones. This intention of viewing the old Guṇas in the light of their own newly conceived ones compels them to put forth some arguments to refute the old Guṇas; which could have been avoided taking them as entirely different from each other; because the theory as expounded by Daṇḍin and Vāmana, cannot be said to be unreasonable. As was shown avove, it is not correct to dispense with some of the Guṇas by simply saying that they are Doṣābhāvarūpas because they have got their own positive aspect also. Will it be a complete and correct definition, though logically sound if a man is said to be the Paśvabhāvarūpa without describing some of the positive qualities of his own? Why not Doṣas themselves, as was actually done by Vāmana, be considered as the Abhāva of Guṇas? Therefore it is better to cansider the trio of new Guṇas as entirely different from the old Guṇas of the same name.

In fact the real conflict between the old and the new conception of Guṇas starts from pressing too much the analogy of a man and from a desire to draw an effective line of difference between the Guṇas and Alaṅkāras. The new rhetoricians contend that just like the qualities like Śaurya which are associated with the soul of man, the Kāvya-guṇas also should be accepted as cheifly associated with the soul of Kāya i. e. Rasa, where as the Alaṅkāras, like the ordinary ornaments decorating the outward body, are associated with the body of the Kāvya i. e. the Śabda and Artha. This, these writers believe, is the real difference between the Guṇas and Alaṅkāras. But all this argument is after all, not free from fallacy. According to these writers even in the case of Alaṅkāras, the Alaṅkārya is Rasa only, but they do not have any objection in accepting the Alaṅkāras Śabdagata and Arthagata. (K. P. P. 375). Like-wise the Doṣas which are also

considered to be mainly related to Rasa (K. P. P. 245) are accepted by them as associated with Śabda and Artha etc,, and are classified into several groups like Padadoṣa. Vākyadoṣa etc. It is not clear why the same cannot be said of the Guṇas also because as in the case of Alaṅkāras which are said to be the Upaskārakas of Rasa through Śabda and Artha, the Guṇas also can be said to have been associated with the Rasa not directly but only through the Śabda and Artha etc. Ānandavardhana clearly states, while talking about Ojas, that the Guṇas are indicated through Śbda and Artha.

"रौद्रादयो रसा दीप्त्या लक्ष्यन्ते काव्यवर्तिनः ।
तद्व्यक्तिहेतू शब्दार्थावाश्रित्योजो व्यवस्थितम् ।।" (Dhvanyāloka II.9)

This statemnet is almost similar to the statement of Mammaṭa, "उपकुर्वन्ति तं सन्त येऽङ्गद्वारेण जातुचित्." (K. P; P. 375), made in connection with the Alaṅkāras. Such being the case there is nothing wrong in acepting the Guṇas also as the Śabdārthadharmas. Too much of interest in the analogy, of a man need not stand in our way in accepting Guṇas as Śabdārthagatas. The Guṇas, if one is so particular in maintaining the analogy, may stand,not for the Śaurya etc., but for the Lāvaṇya and the symmetrical buildup of the body etc. In fact, this analogy does not completely hold good, even in the case of Alaṅkāras as explained in the previous section. Therefore all this controversy about the number and the nature of Guṇas appears to be unnecessary. Under this background let as now examine what PR. has to say about the Guṇas.

PR. begins this section on Guṇas with stating the views of writers like Mammaṭa who accept only three Guṇas, Mādhurya, Ojas and Prasāda, which, according to them, are the Dharma of Rasa. The Mādhurya which is the cause of melting of heart, is according to same writers, to be found in saṁbhogaśṛṅgāra, Karuṇa, Vipralambhaśṛṅgāra, and Śānta in increasing degrees.

According to some writers, the order of Rasas having the Mādhurya in increasing degrees is SaṁyogaŚṛṅgāra, Karuṇa and Śānta, and Vipralambha. According to others, Mādhurya is to be found in a lesser degree in the Saṁbhogaśṛṅgāra, and in higher degree in all the three Rasas i. e. Karuṇa, Vipralaṁbha and Śānta with no degree of difference among them. The second, Ojas, is to be found in Vīra, Bībhatsa and Raudra in increasing degrees and it is the cause of Dīpti. Both these Guṇas Mādhurya and Prasāda, are to be found, according to some writers, in Adbhuta, Hāsya and Bhayānaka and only Prasāda according to some. But this Prasāda is common to all the Rasas. These three Guṇas, Mādhurya, Ojas and Prasāda, produce the cittavṛttis called Druti, Dīpti and Vikāsa respectively. In other words these three Cittavṛttis are being produced by the Rasas having these three Guṇas as their Dharmas. Thus, the Guṇas being the Rasadharma, such expressions like 'Madhurā racanā' and 'Ojasvī Bandhah' etc., ascribing the Guṇas to the Racanā and Bandha, should be understood only as Aupacārikaprayogas. (R.G. P. 67. By saying here 'Mammatabhaṭṭādayah' PR. perhaps indicates that the earlier writers like Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta are not of the same opinion.)

After thus briefly stating the views of Mammaṭa and his followers PR. proceeds to examine this theory. First he questions the validity of the assertion that the Guṇas are the Dharma of Rasa; because there in no any Pramāṇa to support this assumption. It is not established by Pratyakṣa; because as in the case of the fire where we feel the heat quite differently from the burning effect (Dāhakārya), we do not experience, in the case of Rasas, any Guṇas different from the mental states like Druti etc. It may be argued that the Rasas are capable of producing such effects like Druti only because of their having these Guṇas (Guṇavaiśiṣṭya) and Guṇaviśiṣṭa Rasatva becomes the Kāraṇyatāvacchedaka, and thus the Gunas are to be inferred (Anumeya) as the Dharmas of Rasa. but PR. says that there is no need of taking Guṇaviśiṣṭa-Rasatva as the Kāraṇatāvcchedaka when it is

possible to accept the Rasas themselves, in their individual capacity (Prātisvikarūpa) like Śṛṅgāratva and Vīratva etc., as the cause of these mental states. It may be argued further that there are three Rasas, Śṛṅgāra, Karuṇa and Śānta which produce Druti and so instead of accepting Śṛṅgāratva etc., as the Kāraṇatāvacchedaka, is it not simple to accept that Mādhuryaviśiṣṭa-Rasatva as the Drutikārṇatāvacchedaka which includes all these three cases? This argument does not hold ground; because according to the differeuce of degrees in the Kārya (Druti) the above three Rasas will have to be said as Madhura, Madhuratara and Madhuratama and thus Madhuraśṛṅgāratva is Drutikāraṇatāvacchedaka. Mabhuratarakaruṇatva is Adhikadrutikāraṇatāvacchedaka and Madhuratamaśāntatva is Adhikataradrutikāraṇatāvacchedaka. Instead of thus including Mādhurya etc., in the Kāraṇatāvacchedaka koṭi, is it not simple to accept Śṛṅgārrtva etc., as the Kāraṇatāvacchedaka? Moreover, Rasa being Ānandrūpa and Ātmarūpa, it cannot have, like Ātma, any Guṇas. This argument of PR. seems to be quite stronng, for, let alone the fact of the Ātman being Nirguṇa, when all he Rasas are accepted as Ānandrūpa, where is the question of their having the Druti etc,, ? Ofcourse they may be the after effects of the Rasāsvāda but they can not be the Rasadharmas.

Further, the Guṇas cannot be said to be the Dharmas of the Upādhis of Rasa i. e. Ratyādi because the Ratyādi being Sukhasvarūpa, and thus Guṇa, they cannot have any Guṇas on them. Therefore, we cannot find, PR. declares, either Pratyakṣa, or Anumāna to support that the Guṇas are the Dharmas of Rasas.

Then, how are such expressions like 'Śṛṅgārah Madhuraḥ' etc., to be justified? PR.'s reply to this question is as follows. The capacity to cause the mental states like Druti etc., (द्रुत्यादिचित्त-वृत्तिप्रयोजकत्वम्) is called Mādhurya, which is ascribed to Rasā. In the language of Naiyāyikas, this Mādhuryādi of Śṛṅgāra etc., is the Drutyadi itself by a Sambandha, called Prayojakatā. Such

usages like 'Śṛṅgāro Madhuraḥ' should be considered on a par with the usages like "वाजिगन्धाउष्णा" where the herb Vādigandhā (which produces heat when taken in,) itself is called Uṣṇa. (RG. P. 69).

Here the sentence "एवं तर्हि द्रुत्यादिचित्तवृत्तिप्रयोजकत्वम्" etc., is somewhat confusing and appears to be contradictory. Till now PR. has been saying that there is no Pramāṇa to prove that the Guṇas are Rasadharma. But here he says that Mādhuryādi is Drutyādi-Ppayojakatva which leads us to understand that such Mādhurya rests with the Rasa, and this would naturally contradict his previous statement. Therefore, the sentence is to be understood, in the following way. The Mādhurya which is hither to ascribed to Rasa, is the capacity to produce Drutyādi which (Drutyādi) is, in fact, no other than Mādhuryādi itself. Rasa is said to be Madhura ect., because it is the Prayojaka of Mādhurya etc., that is Drutyādi. This interpretation is indicated by PR. through the analogy of Vājigandhā. The Vājigandhā, which is the Prayojaka of heat is itself called hot (Uṣṇa). Similarly, the Rasas, which are the Prayojakas of Mādhurya etc., i. e. Drutyādi, are themselves called Madhura etc.

Thus Mānhurya etc., are the Dharma of Citta[1] and Rasas are only their Prayojakas. Like Rasas, the Śbda, and Artha and

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1. Perhaps this views of PR. regarding the three Guṇas is influenced by the statement of Abhinava, where he maintains that Mādhuryādi is mainly associated wish Sahṛdaya and with the Rasas and Śabdārthas by Upacāra :- "एवं माधुर्यौजः प्रसादाः त्रयो गुणाः उपपन्ना भामहाभिप्रायेण। ते च प्रतिपत्त्रास्वादमयाः मुख्यतया,ततः आस्वाद्ये उपचारिता रसे, ततस्तद्व्यञ्जकयोः शब्दार्थयोरिति ताप्तर्यम् ।" (Locana P. 213). But the credit of putting it in inambiguous terms and going further by placing Rasa and Śabdarthas etc., on the same footing, goes defnitely to P.R. only.

and Racanā also can be the **Prayojakas** of Mādhurya and therefore, there is no need to accept Upacāra in the case of even Śbda and Artha etc. Thus PR. purports that the Guṇas are the Dharmas of neither Rasas only nor Śabdārthādi only but they are Dharma of all of them (Rasas, Śbda, Artha and Racanā). Therefore all of them have got equal right to be called Mādhuryādiviśiṣṭa by Prayojakatāsambandha.

Pratīhārendurāja, while discussing about the difference between the Guṇas and Alaṅkāras remarks, after explaining it (difference) on the lines of Vāmana, that the three Guṇas which are helpful in realising Rasa are situated in Śbda and Artha: (Kāvyālaṅkārasārasaṅgraha P. 81.)

After thus introducing some improvement in the theory of Guṇatrayavādins, PR. states the views of the old writers like Daṇḍin and Vāmana, who accept the Guṇas as the Dharmas of both the Śbda and Artha with no reference to Rasa. Mainly he reproduces all that is said by Vāmna, about Gnṇas, by way of defining and illustrating all of them-ten Śabdaguṇas and ten Arthaguṇas. Even while repeating the old theory, PR. introduces many improvements over what is said by old writers. But the credit of introducing the improved definitions does not entirely go to PR. because he appears to have been influenced by his contemporary writers like Siddhicandragaṇi, who in their turn. follow, almost verbatim, the writings of scholars like Śrīvatsalāñchana. This we can observe by a comparative study of what is written by Vāmna, Siddhichandragaṇi and PR.

The ten Śabdaguṇas are defined by Vāmana, Siddhicandragaṇi and PR. as follows :-

1. Śleṣa : Vāmana :-"मसृणत्वं श्लेषः । मसृणत्वं नाम यस्मिन् सति बहून्यपि पदान्येकवद् भासन्ते ।" (KA. S; P. 31)

Siddhicandragaṇi :- "बहूनां पदानामेकवद्भासनं श्लेषः । सन्धिसौष्ठवादेकस्थानीयवर्णविन्यासात् ।" (KPK. P. 66)

Paṇḍitrāja :-"शब्दानां भिन्नानामप्येकत्वप्रतिभानप्रयोजकः संहितया एकजातीयवर्णविन्यासविशेषो गाढत्वापरपर्यायः श्लेषः ।" (RG. P. 70)

2. Prasāda :- V. "शैथिल्यं प्रसादः ।" (KAS. P. 30).

S. "श्रुतिमात्रेण शब्दानां येनार्थप्रत्ययो भवेत् । साधारणः समग्राणां स प्रसादो गुणो मतः ॥" (KPK. P. 66).

PR. :-"गाढत्वशैथिल्याभ्यां व्युत्क्रमेण मिश्रणं बन्धस्य प्रसादः ।" (RG.P.70).

Here evidently PR. follows Vāmana who ultimately, defines Prasāda as an admixture of Śaithilya and Ojas. "गुणः प्रसादः; ओजसा सह संप्लवात् । स शुद्धस्तु दोष एवेति ।" (KAS. P. 30)

But Siddhicandragaṇi follows Kāvyaparīkṣā (P. 70), verbatim.

3. Samatā :- V. 'मार्गभेदः समता',....येनोपक्रमः तस्यात्याग इत्यर्थः" (KAS. P. 32).

S. "समता मार्गाभेदः । यया रीत्या उपक्रमः तया समापनं मार्गाभेदः ।" (KPK. P. *66*).

PR. "उपक्रमादासमाप्ते रीत्यभेदः समता ।" (RG. P. 71).

4. Mādhuryam :- V. "पृथक्पदत्वं माधुर्यं, ।" (KAS. P. 33).

S. "पृथक्पदत्वं माधुर्यं, सुश्रवत्वं वा ।" (KPK. P, 66).

PR. "संयोगपरह्रस्वातिरिक्त वर्णघटितत्वे सति पृथक्पदत्वं माधुर्यम् ।" (RG. P. 71). Here the Satyanta is added by him,

5. Sukumāratā :- V. "अजरठत्वं सौकुमार्यम् ।....अजरठत्वं अपारुष्यम्" (KAS. P. 34).

S. "सुकुमारता परुषेतरवर्णशालित्वम्" (KPK. 66).

PR. "अपरुषवर्णघटितत्वं सुकुमारता" (RG. P. 71)

6. Arthavyakti ;- V. "अर्थव्यक्तिहेतुत्वमर्थव्यक्तिः । यत्र झटित्यर्थप्रतीतिहेतुत्वं स गुणोऽर्थव्यक्तिः ।" (KAS. P. 34)

S. "अर्थव्यक्तिः झटित्यर्थसमर्पणम्" (KPK. P. 66).

PR. "झटिति प्रतीयमानार्थान्वयकत्वम् अर्थव्यक्तिः" (RG. P. 72).

7. Udārata :- V. "विकटत्वमुदारता। बन्धस्य विकटत्वं यदसावुदारता। यस्मिन् सति नृत्यन्तीव पदानि इति जनस्य वर्णभावना भवति तद्विकटत्वं, लीलायमानत्वमित्यर्थः" (KAS. P. 34).

S. "उदारता विकटत्वरूपा। विकटत्वञ्च पदानां विच्छेदात् नृत्यत्प्रायत्वम् ।" (KPK. P. 66).

PR. "कठिनवर्णघटनारूपविकटत्वलक्षणोदारता ।" (RG. P. 72).

Here PR. defines Vikaṭatva as the arrangement of hard letters (Kaṭhinavarṇaghaṭanārūpa) and after giving a suitable example digresses into a discussion. Some commentators of Mammaṭa take the Vikaṭatva to mean the Nṛtyatprāyatva of the words and give the line "स्वचरणविनिविष्टैर्नूपुरैर्नर्तकीनां झटिति रणितमासीत्" as its example, following Vāmna. In fact, almost all writers take this only in this sense. But PR. conteds that to understand Vikaṭatva in this senses is against the views of Mammaṭa: who feels that it is to be included in the Ojas. In the example given by them, PR. says, there is no much of Ojas and even the Nṛtyatprāyatva is not experienced by Sahṛdaya.

It is to be pointed out here, that PR. instead of finding fault with Mammaṭa, is criticising his commentarors; because Mammaṭa mentions the Śabdaguṇas etc.,only to criticise the views of older writers like Vāmana, and what is said by him about these Guṇas should be only the Anuvāda (reproduction) of the old theory without his own additions; and therefore his defiinition of Udāratā should be in conformity with the one given by Vāmana. Thus the commentators are correct in their interpretation. It may be the fault of Mammaṭa himself to try to include this under Ojas, when it is not possible to do so, as is shown by PR. In spite of this criticism levelled against the commentators of Mammaṭa, PR. appears, as his example indicates, to be in favor of accepting

this definition of Vikaṭatā, because we feel some kind of dancing effect in this verse, especially in "छटो हठोद्धतजटोद्भटो गतपटो नटो नृत्यति।"

8. Ojas :– V. "गाढबन्धत्वमोजः ।" (KAS. P. 30).

S. "ओजो गाढबन्धत्वम् ।" (KPK. P. 66).

PR. While accepting the same definition, further defines Gāḍhatva as 'संयोगपरह्रस्वप्राचुर्य ।' (RG. P. 72).

9. Kānti :– V. "औज्ज्वल्यं कान्तिः ।" (KAS. P. 34)

S. "कान्तिरौज्ज्वल्यम् । हालिकादिसाधारणपदविन्यासपरित्यागेन (अ ?) लौकिकशोभाशालित्वम् ।" (KPK. P. 66). Avoidance of the words used by the rude and the rustic.

PR. "अविदग्धवैदिकादिप्रयोगयोग्यानां पदानां परिहारेण प्रयुज्यमानेषु पदेषु लोकोत्तरशोभारूपम् औज्ज्वल्यं कान्तिः" (RG. P. 73).

This is only an amplification of the above statement and there is nothing PR.'s own.

10. Samādhi :– V. "आरोहावरोहक्रमः समाधिः ।" (KAS. P. 32).

S. आरोहावरोहरूपः समाधिः । आरोहो गाढता । अवरोहः शैथिल्यं तयोः क्रमः ।" KPK. P. 66).

PR. "बन्धगाढत्वशिथिलत्वयोः क्रमेणावस्थापनं समाधिः ।" RG. P. 73).

Even in the case of Arthaguṇas we find the influence of predecessors on PR.

1. Śleṣa :– V. "घटना श्लेषः। क्रमकौटिल्यानुल्बणत्वोपपत्तियोगो घटना । स श्लेषः ।" (KAS. P. 38).

S. "क्रमकौटिल्यानुल्बणत्वोपपत्तियोगरूपघटनात्मा श्लेषः । अस्यार्थः :– क्रमः क्रियापरम्परा, विदग्धचेष्टितं कौटिल्यम् । अप्रसिद्धवर्णनविरहः अनुल्बणत्वम् । उपपादकयुक्तिविन्यासः उपपत्तिः । एषां योगः, स स्वरूपं यस्या घटनाया स श्लेषः ।" (KPK. P. 67).

PR. "एवं क्रियापरम्परया विदग्धचेष्टितस्य तदस्फुटत्वस्य तदुत्पादक-युक्तेश्च सामानाधिकरण्यरूपः संसर्गः श्लेषः ।" RG. P. 74).

Thus there is nothing original on the part of PR. here also.

2. Prasāda:- V. "अर्थवैमल्यं प्रसादः ।" (KAS. P. 38).

S. "प्रसादोऽर्थवैमल्यं; यावदर्थपदता ।" KPK. P. 67).

PR. "यावदर्थकपदत्वरूपमर्थवैमल्यं प्रसादः ।" (RG. P. 74.)

3. Samatā :- V. "अवैषम्यं समता । अवैषम्यं प्रक्रमाभेदः समता ।" (KAS. P. 39).

S. "अवैषम्यरूपा समता क्रमाभेदः ।" (KPK. P. 67).

PR. "प्रक्रमाभङ्गेनार्थघटनात्मकमवैषम्यं समता ।" RG. P. 75).

4. Mādhuryaṁ; V. "उक्तिवैचित्र्यं माधुर्यम् ।" (KAS. P. 41).

S. "माधुर्यमुक्तिवैचित्यम् । एकस्यैवार्थस्य भङ्ग्यन्तरेण कथनं तदेव नवीकृतत्वम् ।" (KPK. P. 67).

PR. "एकस्या एवोक्तेर्भङ्ग्यन्तरेण पुनः कथनात्मकमुक्तिवैचित्र्यं माधुर्यम् ।" (RG. P. 75).

5. Sukumāratā; V."अपारुष्यं सौकुमार्यम् । परुषेऽर्थे अपारुष्यं सौकुमार्यमिति ।" (KAS. P. 41).

S. "सुकुमारता अपारुष्यम् । अकाण्डे शोकदायिताभावः ।" (KPK. P. 67).

PR. "अकाण्डे शोकदायिताभावरूपमपारुष्यं सुकुमारता ।" (RG. P. 75).

6. Arthavyakti :- V. "वस्तुस्वभावस्फुटत्वमर्थव्यक्तिः।"(KAS. P. 41)

S."वस्तुस्वभावस्फुटत्वर्थमव्यक्तिः। वस्तुनः स्वभावस्य स्फुटत्वं वर्णनीयव्यक्तीकरणं यत्र रसाभिव्यक्तिकृतचारुत्वाय परं भवति इति शोषः। स चोदाहृते पारावतः परिभ्रम्येत्यादौ, स्वभावोक्तिस्तु अलङ्कारकृत चारुत्वाय परंभवतीति ततोऽस्य भेदः।" (KPK. P. 67).

PR. "वस्तुनो वर्णनीयस्यासाधारणक्रियारूपयोः वर्णनमर्थव्यक्तिः ।............ अयमेवेदानीन्तनैः स्वभावोक्त्यलङ्कार इति व्यपदिश्यते ।" (RG. PR. 75-76).

As can be seen from the above, Siddhicandragaṇi tries to distinguish between Arthavyakti and Svabhavokti by saying that the former is intended to be employed in places where there is charm resulting from suggesting Rasa, and the latter in places where there is beauty resulting from Alaṅkāra. The same has been mentioned by Śrivatsalāñchana also. (Kavyaparikṣā P. 72). But this distinction appears to be confusing. When the Svabhāvokti itself is an independent Alaṅkāra, what is the meaning of its being employed in place of Alaṅkārakṛitachārutva ? PR. therefore, shrewdly avoides this distinction and simply remarks: "अयमेवेदानीन्तनैः स्वभावोक्त्यलङ्कार इति व्यपदिश्यते" (RG. P. 76)

PR.'S explanation appears to be correct. Because it is not proper to bring in Rasa as the basis of distinction while discussing the views of old writers like Vāmana according to whom the existence of Rasa (in the present sense of the word) in a Kāvya, is not beyond question. Moreover Vāmana does not accept Svabhāvokiti as an Alaṅkāra. Therefore it is correct to say that Arthavyakti itself is called Svabhāvokti by later writers.

7. Udāratā :- V. "अग्राम्यत्वमुदारता ।" (KAS. P. 41)

S. उदारत्वं वाच्यतावैदग्धी यथा "कामं कन्दर्पचाण्डालो मयि वामाक्षि निर्दयः" इत्यादौ. (KPK. P. 67).

PR. "चुम्बनं देहि मे भार्ये कामचाण्डालतृप्तये" इत्यादिग्राम्यार्थपरिहारः उदारता । (RG. P. 76).

While Siddhicandra deals with the positive aspect of Udāratā, P R. deals with its negative aspect.

8. O J A S :— Regarding Ojas, Siddhicandragaṇi (KPK.P,68) and PR. (RG.P. 76), follow Vāmana verbatim and quote the same verse as quoted by the latter ;-

'पदार्थे वाक्यरचनं वाक्यार्थेच पदाभिधा ।
प्रौढिर्व्याससमासौ च साभिप्रायत्वमस्य च ' (KAS. P. 37).

9. Kānti :- V. "दीप्तरसत्वं कान्तिः। दीप्ताः रसाः शृङ्गारादयः यस्य सः दीप्तरसः। तस्य भावो दीप्तरसत्वं कान्तिः"। (KAS. P. 42).

S. "अथ कान्तिः दीप्तरसत्वरूपा। यत्ररसोद्दीपनैकहेतुत्वं चारुत्वेनालङ्कारादि सम्भिन्नम्" (KKP. P. 68).

PR. "दीप्तरसत्वं कान्तिः। तच्च स्फुटप्रतीयमानरसत्वम्।" (RG. P. 78).

10. Samādhi :- V. "अर्थदृष्टिः समाधिः।.....अर्थो द्विविधः। अयोनिरन्यच्छायायोनिर्वा।"(KAS. P. 39).

S. "तथा अर्थदृष्टिः समाधिः। अर्थश्चद्विविधः। अयोनिरन्यच्छायायोनिश्च।" (KPK.P. 68).

PR. "अवर्णितपूर्वोऽयमर्थः पूर्ववर्णितच्छायो वेति कवेरालोचनं समाधिः।" (RG. P. 78).

Thus excepting the clear exposition, we do not find anything new in what PR. writes about the Śabdaguṇas and Arthaguṇas. Ofcourse it is but natural that all this being the reproduction of the views of the older writers, there should bo no scope to many additions excepting by way of exposition. and even for this PR. appears to have been indebted to his predeceesors and contemporaries.

PR. concludes this section with breifly stating the views of Mammaṭa and his followers, who believe that the number of Guṇas is only three and that all the Guṇas mentioned by writers like Vāmana can either be included in these three Guṇas or explained away as Doṣābhāvarūpas or even, at time, as Doṣas.

Now it is to be examined—does PR. fully endorse the views of Mammaṭabhaṭṭa? We cannot get any direct answer to this question ftom PR. But as his treatment of the three Guṇas of Mammaṭa and that of the twenty Guṇas of "Jarattaras" shows, PR. appears to have been viewing them as two sets, having two entirely different purposes and effects and belonging to two different spheres and with no possibility of dispensing with one

set by accepting another. But his conclusoin of this section with narrating the views of Mammaṭa and his followers may make us think that he also is in favour of Mammaṭa's views.

Dr, P. C. Lahiri, remarks in his 'Concepts of Rīti and Guṇa', that PR. leans towards the position taken by his predessors, viz. those of the Dhvani school. He also feels that PR, tries to effect a synthesis of the views of the old school and those of the new by borrowing material from both. "This was" according to him, "to a great extant responsible for the curious combination and apparent contradiction;' ('Concepts of Rīti and Guṇa' pp. 265-268.) But we shall presently see how there is no contradiction or confusion on the part of P R-

Though having some independent views of his own, P R. appears to have been generally following the views of of the writers of a school, emerging in his time, to which he refers as 'Navyāh'. As we shall see presently, the Navyas are inclined to accept all tha Guṇas expounded by the Jarattaras. Moreover, if he were to be in favour of dispensig with these Guṇas, P R. would not have expatiated on this subject at such length. He would have touched them in a passing reference.

Śrīvatsalāñchana says that all the twenty Guṇas should be accepted as explained by Vāmana. He writes :- "नपुनर्दशेति– एते श्लेषादयो न गुणाः । गुणा हि रसधर्माः। एतेषान्तु शब्दधर्मत्वात् कथं गुणत्वम् । वस्तुतस्तु गुणा रसधर्मा इत्यत्र प्रमाणाभावात् एते शब्दगुणाः स्वीकार्या एव । रसोत्कर्षकत्वात्। नच तथासति गूणालङ्कारयोर्विभागोऽनुपपन्न इति वाच्यम्– काव्यशोभायाः कर्तारो धर्माः गुणाः, तदतिशयहेतवस्त्वलङ्कारा इति विभागोपपत्तेः। तथा अर्थगुणा अपि स्वीकार्याः ।" (Kāvyaparīkṣā pp. 71–72),

After mentioning the Artha-guṇas he again writes in conclusion :- "इत्यास्वादोत्कर्षहेतूनां गुणानामपलापः कर्तमयोग्यः पूज्यपादानामिति । अपिच यदुक्तं केचिदन्तर्भवन्त्येषु तदचारु । शब्दार्थधर्माणां गुणानां रसधर्मेषु माधु– र्यादिष्वन्तर्भावस्यान्याय्यत्वात् । यदपिच दोषत्यागात्परे श्रिताः इति अनेन गुणा

दोषाभावा एवेत्युक्तम्, तदपि तुच्छम्; दोषा एव गुणाभावाः सन्तु इत्यस्य ापि सुवचत्वात् । तथापि विनिगमनाविरहात् द्वावपि पृथक् । यदप्युक्तम् अन्ये भजन्ति दोषत्वंकुत्रचित् इति तदपि क्वचिद्वक्त्राद्यौचित्यवशाद् द्वयो रप्यन्यथात्वम् अभ्युपेतमेव। (Kāvyaparīkṣā P. 74).

The above arguments, especially the one against Antarbhāva appear to be quite plausible. Thus we find that the theory of Mammaṭa is not unquestioned and it is a kind of anachronism on the part of Mammaṭa, to try to identify the Guṇas, which were developed long before the advent of Rasa into the sphere of poetry, with the Guṇas ascribed to Rasa.

Siddhicandragaṇi who almost copies Srīvatsalāñchana verbatim has to express similar opinion about the views of Mammaṭa. (Kavyaprakasakhandana pp. 66-67.)

After explaining the Artha-guṇas he adds :-"इत्यास्वादहेतूनां मुणानामपलापः कर्तुमशोग्यः प्रकाशकृतामिति नवीनाः" (KPK. P. 68)

Even Abhinavagupta does not have any objection in accepting two sets of Gunas, one set as expounded by Vāmana, etc , and the other suggested by Dhvanikāra, because, as Dr. Raghavan points out, (Dr. Rāghavan's śṛṅgāraprakāśa pp. 270 & 350.) he follows Vāmana while commenting on Nātyaśāstra and talks about the three Guṇas in his Locana. Therefore, PR., as a believer in reason, must be in favour of accepting two catagories of Guṇas. It is interesting to note Pratīhārendurāja tries to effect a compromise, as it were, between the two catagories. He holds that the number of Guṇas is only three; but instead of accepting them as Rasadharmas (i.e. produced by Rasa) he takes them only as śabdārthadarmas, helpful in producing Rasas. Thus the relation between the Rasa and Guṇa is reversed because Rasas are placed in the position of being Guṇadharmas. But Pratihārendurāja does not seem to have any following. (Kāvyālaṇkārasārasaṅgraha P. 81.)

After this section of Guṇas, P R, diverges into a detailed discussion as to what should be avoided in adopting a particular sytle, and as Mathurānātha śāstry says, in his valuable Sanskrit introduction of Rasagaṅgādhara (P. 24), this is perheps the first attempt in this direction. In postulating the rules about the style P R , as a great poet-critic shows his theoritical knowledge supported by the practical genius, and this section is really a unique contribution of P R. in this field. Judged from the standards, set up by him some of the verses of even great poets like Amaruka (R G. P. 91). (so far as the style is concerned) fade into insignificance.

Fourth Chapter

DHVANI

Varieties of Dhvani

The general tendency of our old writers, what ever subject they may be dealing with, is towards increasing the number of varieties irrespective of their practicabililty, usefulness or otherwise. For instance, in Vyākaraṇa, they are not tired of producing hundreds of Rūpas of one śabda. The same trend is to be seen in the Ālaṅkārikas also who go on increasing the number of the vārieties of the different subjects of their śāstra.

Abhinava, following the views of the Dhvanikāra, enumerates 35 varieties of Dhvani. (Locana. P.281); First, he classifies Dhvani into two groups: (1) Avivakṣita - Vācya and (2) Vivakṣitānya-para-vācya. The first is of two kinds: (1) Atyanta-tiraṣkṛta-vācya and (2) Arthāntara-saṅkramita-vācya. The second, Vivakṣitānya para-vāacya, is of two kinds: (1) Alakṣya-krama and (2) Anuraṇana-rūpa. The Alakṣyakrama is taken as only one single variety, though it is in fact consiting of innumerable varieties which defy definition and enumeration. But it is said to be having mainly five varieties on account of the difference of its Vyañjakas, i. e. Varṇa, Pada, Vākya, Sāṅghaṭanā, and Prabandha. Anuraṇana-rūpa is of two kinds - Śabdaśaktimūla and Arthaśaktimūla. The Artha-śakti-mūla is of three kinds: (1) Kavi-prauḍhokti-siddha, (2) Kavi-nibaddha-vaktṛ pauḍhokti-siddha and (3) Svatassambhavi. Each of them is of two kinds (1) Vastu and (2) Alaṅkara. The Vyañjaka also being of two kinds, Vastu, and Alaṅkāra, the total of the Artha-śakti-mula is twelve. These twelve varieties are as follows ; —

(1) कविप्रौढोक्तिसिद्धवस्तुना वस्तुध्वनिः (2) कविप्रोढोकतिसिद्धवस्तुना अलङ्कारध्वनिः (3) कविप्रौढोक्तिसिद्धालङ्कारेण वस्तुध्वनिः (4) कविप्रौढो-

क्तिसिद्धालङ्कारेण अलङ्कारध्वनिः(5 कविनिबद्धवक्तृप्रौढोक्तिसिद्धवस्तुनावस्तुध्वनिः (6) तेन अलङ्कारध्वनिः (7) कविनिबद्धवप्रौढोक्तिसिद्धालङ्कारेण वस्तुध्वनिः (8) तेन अलङ्कारध्वनिः (9) स्वतःसम्भविना वस्तुना वस्तुध्वनिः (10) तेन अलङ्कारध्वनिः (11) स्वतस्सम्भविना अलङ्कारेण वस्तुध्वनिः (12) तेन अलङ्कारध्वनिः ।

By including the first three varieties i e. Atyanta-tiraskṛta-vācya, Arthāntara-saṅkramita-vācya and śabda śakti-mūlānu-raṇana-rūpa-dhvani their total number will be fifteen and this total increases to thirty because each of these varieties are of two kinds: (1) Padaprakāśya. and Vākyaprakāśya. Finally the number increases to thirtyflve when the flve kinds of Asamlakṣya-krama-dhvani are also added. Thus Abhinava enumerats thirtyfive main varieties of Dhvani. As the Dhvanikāra himself says that the varieties of the Dhvani are innumerable (Dhvanyāloka P.516), Abhinava increases the number to 7, 420, ultimately. (Locana. PP. 501-2)

Taking hint from this statement of Dhvanikāra Mammaṭa increases the total number of the varieties of Dhvani to 10455. But he mainly accepts 51 varieties which are explained in Pradīpa in the following words:- "अविवक्षित वाच्यस्य द्वौ भेदौ । तौच प्रत्येकं पदवाक्ययोरिति चत्वारो भेदाः । विवक्षितान्यपरबाच्येषुमध्ये अलक्ष्यक्रमव्यङ्ग्यः पदवाक्यतदेकदेशघटनावर्णप्रबन्धभेदेन षड्विधः । लक्ष्यक्रमेषु शब्दशक्तिमूलस्य द्वौ भेदौ । तौ च प्रत्येकं पदवाक्ययोरिति तस्य चत्वारो भेदाः। अर्थशक्तिमूलस्य द्वादश भेदाः । तेच प्रत्येकं पदवाक्यप्रबन्धेष्विति षड्त्रिंशदस्य भेदाः। उभयशक्तिमूलस्तु वाक्य एवेति ।" (Pradīpa (K. P.) P. 182.)

While Abhinava accepts śabda-śaktyudbhava as having only two varieties (Padagata & Vākyagata), Mammaṭa accepts four varieties of the same. Thus two more varieties are to be added. The Ubhaya - śakitimūla - dhvani the twelve varieties of the Prabandha-gatārtha-śakti-mūla-dhvani and the one variety of the Prabandhagata-saṁlakṣya-krama-dhvani increase the number of the dhvanis by sixteen which are accepted by Mammaṭa besides those thirtyfive varieties accepted by Abhinava and thus the total

number of the varieties of the Dhvanis which are supposed to be main, is fiftyone. Again, Mammaṭa increases their number, by applying so many permutations and computations, to 10455, whichare evidently beyond our ordinary comprehension and practical application.

Pradīpa, in this context, mentions the views of some 'Arvācīnas' who find falut with this computation of Mammaṭa. According to them the mixture of Arthāntarasaṅkramita-vācya-dhvani and Atyanta-tiraskṛta-vācya-dhvani and the mixture of Atynta-tiraskṛta-vācya-dhvani and Arthāntara-saṅkramita-vācya dhvani are to be taken, for all practical purpose as only one variety, but not as two, as was taken by Mammaṭa. Thus they contend that the total number of the mixed Dhvanis can be 5304. but not 10404. Ofcourse Pradīpa tries in its own way to justify Mammaṭa's enumeration.

Writers like Vidyānātha, though verbatim following Mammaṭa about the 5I main varieties, stick to the number 5304 only in the case of the verieties of mixed Dhvani(Pratāparudtirya. P. 56).

Kumārasomapīthin criticises the number given by Mammaṭa in the following words:- "तर्हि किंनिमित्तं काव्यप्रकाशकारोऽन्तर्मीत्रयातः यामानपि कतिचन भेदान् सङ्गृह्य चतुरुत्तरचतुश्शतीयुतायुतसंख्याकान् (10404) संसृष्टिसङ्करायत्तभेदानजीगणत् !? को वेद किं वा तत्र निमित्तम् ? तत्पुनःत एव तत्रभवन्तो विदाङ्कुर्वन्तु। अस्माभिस्तु "युक्तियुक्तं वचो ग्राह्यं न तु पुरुषगौरवात्" इति न्यायसरणिरनुसरणीयेति विद्यानाथहृदयम्।" (ibid. P. 56)

PR. does not engage himself in piling up these varieties which are of little practical use, and is content with simply mentioning the main varieties. At the beginning of the Rasa section he breifly states:— "तत्र ध्वनेरुत्तमोत्तमस्य असंख्यभेदस्यापि सामान्यतः केऽपि भेदाः निरूप्यन्ते। — द्विविधो ध्वनिः-अभिधामूलो लक्षणामूलश्चेति। तत्राद्यस्त्रिविधः रसवस्त्वलङ्कारध्वनिभेदात्। रसध्वनिरित्यलक्ष्यक्रमोपलक्षणात् रसभावतदाभासभावशान्तिभावोदयभावसन्धिभावशबलत्वानां ग्रहणम्। द्वितीयश्च द्विविधः। अर्थान्तरसङ्क्रमितवाच्योऽत्यन्ततिरस्कृतवाच्यश्च" (R. G. P. 25).

Thus PR first, mentions only five main varieties of Dhvani–three kinds of the Abhidhā-mūla-dhvani and two kinds of the Laksaṇā-mūla-dhvani.

As was seen above, Abhinava accepts, even in the Alakṣya-Krama-vyaṅgya, five varieties, according to their different vyañjakas, Pada, Vākya, Padāṁśa, Racanā and Varṇa. By adding one more Vyañjaka i. e. Prabandha, Mammaṭa increases the number to six. But PR. in conformity with his own views regarding the nature of Guṇas, does not accept the Varṇas and the Racanā etc., as the Rasa-vyañjakas because according to his theory, they are the Vyañjskas of the Prasāda etc. Therefore, first, he states the views of the Prāchīnas who contend that the Varṇas and the Raeanā etc., also, though they are included in the Pada and Vākya should be seperately considered as the Vyañjakas of the Rasādi, because there is no basis to decide whether the Pada-vākya-viśiṣṭa-Racanā is the Rasādi-vyañjaka or the Racanā-viśiṣṭa-Pada-vākya is Rasādi-vyañjaka. Then he shows his own views that the Varṇas and the Racanā-viśeṣa are the Vyañjakas of the Mādhuryādi-guṇa only, but not the Guṇin i. e. Rasādi. (R.G.P. 133). Pada, Vākya, Padāṁśa and Prabandha and even Rāgādi (music) are acceptable to PR. as the vyañjakas of Rasādi, but from the way in which he presents his views (R.G.P. 132), he appears not to be so particular about accepting them as the differenciating factors to deserve to be named as diffirent varieties.

coming to the Saṁlakṣyakrama-dhvani we find that P.R. reduces its varieties also to the minimum. He divides the Abhidhā-mūlaka Saṁlakṣya-Krama-dhvani into two groups (1) śabda-śakti-mūla and (2) Artha śakti-mūla. The formar is of two kinds by the difference of the Vyaṅgya i.e. Vastu and Alaṅkāra. The Artha śakti-mūlaka is of eight varieties. The Vyañjaka is, first, of two kinds vastu and Alaṅkāra, each of which are of two kinds, Kavi-prauḍhokti-siddha and Svatassaṁbhavi. The vyañjakārtha which is thus of four kinds suggests two things Vastu and Alaṅkāra. Thus the Artha-śakti-mūla-dhvani is of

eight varieties (R.G,P. 135). Besides these two varietres-śabda-śakti-mūla and Artha-śakti-mūla, P R. like Mammaṭa accepts another variety Ubhayaśakti-mūla also which is only Vākyagata.

It is to be noted here that P R, unlike Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa etc, accepts only two kinds of Artha-śakti-mūla-dhvani-svatassembhavi and Kavi-Prauḍhokti-siddha. He docs not accept the Kavi-nibaddha-vakṛ-paruḍhokti-siddha, because though such Ukits are put in the mouth of another person by the Kavi, those are in fact, the words of Kavi only and therefore come under Kavi-prauḍhokti-siddha. If such varieties are to be given a seperate status, P R. says, there will be no end to such varieties because Kavi-nibaddha-nibaddha-vaktṛ-prauḍhokti-siddhas etc., also will have to be accepted as adbitional varieties (R.G.P. 135). Thus P R. drops four varieties in the Artha-śakti-mūlaka-dhvani. But Nāgeśa tries to up hold the views of the old writers and says that there is peculiar Camatkāra in the Kavi-nibaddha-vaktr-paruḍhokti and so it should be accepted as a seperate variety. Such Camtkāra, according to him, cannot be found in the Kavi-nibaddha nibaddha etc., and so there is no need to add any more varieties. Such arguments based entirely on abstract statements cannot be questioned so easily but after all, the argument of P R. is not beseless. Because the opposite of the 'natural' (Svatassambhavi) is only the 'unnatural' (Parauḍhokti-siddha) and it is immaterial whether it is in the Kavi's words or in the words of a character invented by the Kavi. It is interesting to note, in this connection that Hemacandra goes one step further and declares that even the 'Svatassambhavi' comes under the Kavi-prauḍhokti-siddha because, as he contends, every thing that is found in a Kāvya, whether it is natural or unnatural, is from the imagination of the poet only. (Kāvyānuśāsanam. pp. 55-56).

But when we look into this question from the point of naturalness or otherwise, that is, the probablity or the improbability of the Artha, the two fold division does not seem to be unnecessary, which might have prompted P R. and some other rhetoricians to accept the two varieties.

It does not seem to be correct to think (RGSA. P. 87), that the Dhvani kāra and Ānandavardhana are, like P R, in favour of accepting only the first two varieties and that it is only Abhinava that is responsible to include the third variety i. e. Kavi nibaddha vaktṛ prauḍhokti siddha. On closely examining Dhvanyāloka we can see that not only Abhinava but Ānandavardhana also is in favour of accepting this variety. While commenting on the phrase 'Prauḍhokti mātraniṣpanna śarīrah' of the 24th Kārikā of the Dvitīyodyota, Ānandavardhana writes :— "कवेः कविनिबद्धस्य वा वक्तुः प्रौढोक्तिमात्रनिष्पन्नशरीरः एकः; स्वतस्सम्भवी च द्वितीयः।" Again he gives two seperate examples for both of them "Sajjo hi surahimāso" for Kavi-prouḍhokti-mātra-niṣpanna-śarīra and 'śikharini' etc., for Kavi–nibaddha-vaktṛ-prauḍhbti-mātraniṣpanna. (Dhvanyāloka. pp. 254-55). Ofcourse he takes both of them as belonging to one variety because of their common feature Prauḍhokti-mātraniṣpanna-śarīratva but by giving two different examples he indicates that he is aware of their difference also. What Abhinava does (P. 254) is only to explain what is implied in Ānandavardhana's statement. Thus it is only on the authority of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta that Mammaṭa introduces these three varieties. It is to be noted that PR. is not the first man to reject the Kavi-nibaddha-vaktṛ prauḍhokti-siddha. Even before him this variety has been refused by some thetoricians. For example Narendraprabhasūri, the author of the Alaṅkāramahodadhi, (P. 103), does not accept this variety. Śrīvatsalāñchana also expresses same views. (Kavyaparikṣā. P. 26).

PR. cannot be said, thongh theree is no clear statement, to be against the further classification of these (Śabda-Śaktyudbh-va and the Artha-Śaktyudbhava) Dhvanis, as Padagata and Vākyagata, because he clearly states that all these kinds of the above Dhvanis are said to be Padagata when they are suggested by Pada and as Vākyagata when suggested by the Vākya. It is not correct to relie upon the absance of such phrases 'Ṣoḍaśavi-

dhah' and 'Vimśatividhah' etc., to prove his disinclination towards further classification, when the basis of such classification is clearly mentioned. (R. G. P. 176).

PR. though accepting the Padagatatā and the 'Vākyagatatā of the Saṁlakṣvakramadhvani, does not follow Mammaṭa by accepting it as Prabandhagata also. He appears to be quite correct. Because neither a Vastu nor an Alaṅkāra cvn be maintained, like the Rasa and Bhāva etc., thorughout a Prabandha, whether It is a short one or a long one. This practical difficulty might have prevented PR. from accepting the Prabandhagatatā of the Saṁlakṣya-krama-also. Therefore he seems to be in favour of accepting only sixteen varieties of Artha-śakti-mūla-dhavani.

What is the critarian to name a particular Dhvani as Śabda-śakti-mūla or Artha-śakti-mūla when the function of both the śabda and Artha is equally inportant in all the Dhvanis? PR.'s answer to this question is as follows :- When such words which cannot be replaced by other synonymous words are used in large number it is called Śabda-śakti-mūla and when such words are lesser in number it is named Artha-śakti-mūla. (RG. P. 174). when the number of such words is equal, PR. says, it is called Ubhaya-mūla which is acceptable to Mammaṭa also. This answer of PR. is ofcourse, an amplification of what is said by Mammaṭa. (KP. P. 70&82). Like Mammaṭa PR. also accepts the Ubhaya-mūla-dhavani as Vākyagata only. But according to him Vākya need not be a complete sentenee (RG. P. 174). it can be a group of words also. And this dofinition facilitates to include such Samāsas which consist of Nānārtha-padas and Anānārtha-padas, under the Ubhaya-śakti-mūla-dhvani.

Instead of calling this as a seperate variety of Dhvani, can it not be named as the Saṅkara of the Śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani and artha-śakti-mūla-dhvani ? In answer to this question, PR. says that Saṅkara arises only there where two seperate Dhvanis

are suggested by Śabda and Artha independenly; but in Ubhaya-śakti-mūla, only one Dhvani is suggested by both the Śabda and Artha. The following verse is given as an example of Ubhaya-śakti-mūla-dhvani :-

"रम्यहासा रसोल्लासा रसिकालिनिषेविता ।
सर्वाङ्गशोभासम्भारा पद्मिनी कस्य न प्रिया ।।" (RG. P. 174).

In the above verse, a comparison between a beautiful damsel of Padminījāti and the lotus creeper is being suggested by the Śabda-śakti and Artha-śakti and so this is an instance of the Ubhaya-śakti-mūla-dhvani. The words Hāsa, Rasa, Āli and Padminī cannot be replaced by other words, where as some words can be used in the place of the remaining words 'Sarvāṅgaśobhā-saṁbhārā' etc.

Now PR. presents the views of some writers who think that the Ubhaya-śakti-mūla-dhvani need not be accepted. Their contention is as follows :- That a Dhvani is Artha-śakti-mūlaka can be accepted where there is complete absence of the use of homonyms; because there are many instances where there is Dhvani even without the employment of homonyms. The same cannot be said in the case śabda-śakti-mūlaka i.e. we cannot say that for calling a Dhvani as Śabda-śakti-mūlaka there should be complete absence of Artha-śakti-mūlakatva; to put it in other-words, Śabda-śakti-mūlaka arises only there where all the words employed are homonyms; because such instances where all the words are homonyms are very rare. Therefore Dhvani in such places like "Ramyahāsā" s etc., where there is the use of homonyms also, should be treated as Sabda-śakti-mūlaka only.

It is not clear whose views PR. is presenting here. It is not improbable that he himself is in favour of this view. But Nageśa and others like Candrikākāra think that the use of 'Anye tu' is indicative of PR.'s disapproval because when there is a definite scope for the Ubhaya-śakti-mūlaka, as explained by the old

rhetoricians, there is no point in refusing it. (GMP. P. 175). But one thing appears to be in favour of giving weight to the views of the 'Anye tu'. In places like 'Ramyahāsā' etc., only the use of the homonyms first gives rise to the Dhvani which is carried further by other words also. Because in the absence of words like 'Rasikālinișevitā' 'Padminī' etc., there is no scope for Upamā-dhvani at all and therefore we may conveniently call it Śabda-śakti-mūlaka only. Perhaps only with this consideration in his mind, PR. does not criticise this theory.

Lakṣaṇāmūla-dhvani :- According to PR. Lakṣaṇā is of six varieties (1) Gauṇi sāropā (2) Gauṇī Sādhyavasānā (3) Śuddhā sāropā (4) Śuddhā sādhyavasānā (5) Jahatsvārthā. and (6) Ajahatsvārthā. The first four varieties result into Alaṅkāras:-

1. Gauṇī sāropā in Rūpakālaṅkāra.

2. Gauṇī Sāddhyavasānā in Atiśayokti and

3. & 4. Śuddhā Sāropā and Śuddhā sādhyavasānā in Hetvalaṅkāra. Only the remaining two varieties of Lakṣaṇā i. e. Jahatsvārthā and Ajahasvārthā lead to Dhvanis, Atyanta-tiraskṛta-vācya and Arthāntara-saṅkramita-Vācya respectively. According to his general statement = द्व्युत्थातिरिक्ताः सर्वेपि ध्वनयः एकस्मिन् वाच्ये यद्येकपदमात्रगताः तदा पदध्वनितया व्यपदिश्यन्ते। नानापदगतता-यान्तु वाक्यध्वनितया ।" (RG. P. 176).

PR- also is in favour of further division of the Laksanāmūla-dhani as Pada gata and Vākyagata. Therefore Lakṣaṇāmūla-dhvani also is, of four kinds which makes the total number of saṁlakṣyakramadhvani 24 only. With the addition of one variety of the Asaṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgya the total number of the Dhvani-bhedas according to PR. is 25; and 26, at the most, if Ubhayaśaktimūla also were to be accepted. Thus PR. tries to minimise the number of Dhvanis and shows least interest in the innumerable varieties found in Mammaṭa. But PR.'s acceptance of Bhāvādi as Saṁlakṣyakrama also makes a slight variance in

the total number of the Saṁlakṣya-krama-vyaṅgyas, or it may be included under Vastu-dhvani as explained above. The varieties of Dhvani according to PR. may be listed as follows –

1.	Asaṁlakṣya-krama-dhvani :-	1 variety
2.	Śabda-śakti-mūla :-	4 varieties
3.	Artha-śakti-mūla :-	16 varieties
4.	Ubhaya-śakti-mūla :-	1 variety
5.	Lakṣaṇā-mūla :-	4 varieties

Total number of the varieties of Dhvani :- 26.

ŚABDA-ŚAKTI-MŪLA-DHVANI

At the beginnig of the second chapter, PR. classifies Dhvani broadly into ten varieties, the first of which is Śabda-śakti-mūlaka. Next he introduces an elaborate important discussion as to the nature and the scope of the Śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani. In this connection he mentions two views of the Prāchīnas like the Dhvanikāra and Mammaṭa which he ultimately refutes to establish his own theory.

When the Dhvani arises from the Śabda it is called Śabda-śakti-mūla. Such Dhvani can arise only when words, expressive of more than one sense are employed and so the use of the Nānārtha-śabda is inevitable in the case of the Śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani. There is difference of opinion among scholars about the process of how Vyañjanā works in such places where homonyms are used and the followiag discussion will explain different theories.

When a man of learning and strong memory happens to hear a homonymous word he is reminded of all its meanings, because he had Saṅketa-graha equally about all of them. But he will have doubt about what is actually meant by these words in that particular context. Next he would come to a conclusion with

the help of the context etc., as to the Tātparya (intended meaning) of the word. Then he would have a second cognition of particular sense of the word which ultimately leads to the understanding of the Vākyārtha. For example the doubt which arises on hearing the words like 'Payas' in 'Payo ramaṇīyaṁ' is set aside by the understanding of the intended meaning and this Tātparya–nirṇaya would be in the form of "अत्रत्यं पयःपदं दुग्धतात्पर्येणोच्चारितम्।" Thus there is the cognition of the words like 'Payas' in the second Jñāna also which is called Tātparya–nirṅaya. Through this Tātparya–jñāna he gets the cognition of only one meaning pertaining to the context. Now one question arises. As in the first instance, why all the meanings of the second word do not flock into his mind at the second instance also? In answer to this question, it is accepted that the realisation of context etc., or the Tātparya-Jñāna obstructs the hearer from recollecting the other meanings. Otherwise all the meanings will have to find place in the Vākyārtha also, which is against the common experience. This has got the approval of the famous Kārikā of Bhartṛhri, which ends with "Anavacchede viśeṣa-smṛti-hetavaḥ" which means that Saṃyoga etc., help in recollecting a particular meaning when there is doubt about the Tātparya. Thus the cognition of the second meaning expressed by sentences like 'Surabhi-māṁsam bhakṣyati' is the result of Vyañjanā-vṛtti because it cannot be the result of the Abhidhāvṛtti the scope of which has been restricted as explained above, to the contextual meaning. It is not correct to argue that after the contextual meaning is expressed by one Śakti the second meaning will be expressed by second Śakti; because the obstacle like the Prakaraṇādi jñāna still remains there. If the obstacle were to be ineffective the noncontextual meaning would have been expressed along with the contextual meaning by the first Sakti itself. It may be argued that when the Prakaraṇādi-jñāna obstructs the cognition of every meaning other than contextual, how, even

Vyañjanā can express the second meaning ? This argument does not hold water. Because the Prakaraṇādi-jñāna does not obstruct the cognition of the meaning to be conveyed by Vyañjanā, the very purpose of which is to express the non-contextual meaning. Or the Vyañjanā-jñana will be accepted as the obstacle of an obstacle (Uttejaka). All this has been intended by Mammaṭa when he says (KP. P. 71) that Vyañjanā is the Vyāpāra which suggests the inexpressible meaning when the Vācakatva of the homonymous word has been restricted by the Saṁyoga etc.

After stating the Views of Mammaṭa, PR. puts forth another view under the heading 'Apare tu āhuḥ' which slightly differs from the first one. Even when the Tātparya-nirṇaya is believed as the means for the cognition of only the contextual sense, there is no need either to accept that there should be the recollection of only one sense or to hold that the Tātparyanirṇaya would be an obstacle in the cognition of the second meaning. Even without accepting all these things one can have the cognition of the contextual meaning with the help of Tātparya-jñāna. At the same time he will have the cognition of the non-contextual meaning also from the same word, and it is where the Vyañjanā begins to function, because unless it is accepted, the cognition of the second meaning would be inexplicable. This cannot be expressed by Śakti which unlike Vyañjanā does not come into action without the help of Tātparyanirṇaya. In view of what is said above, the phrases "Viśeṣa smṛti hetavah" and "Vācakatve niyantrite" etc., in the Kārikas of Bhrtṛhari and Mammaṭa respectively are to be explained like this :- The 'Smṛti' here means 'Niścaya' and thus 'Viśeṣa smṛti' means 'fixing of the intended meaning' (Viśeṣa-tātparya-nirṇaya), "Saṁyogādyaih Vāckatve Niyantrite" means "when the Saṁyoga etc., make the Śabdajñāna possible through producing the Tātparya nirṇaya jñāna."

One objection may be raised here. One cannot have Padār-

tha jñāna unless he has Pada-jñāna. Now how is the cognition of the second sense possible when the Pada-jñāna ceases to exist after producing the Prākariṇikārtha-jñāna ? This objection is met by the Vyñjanāvādins in two ways. According to some, the Pada-jñāna, though ceasing to exist, is capable of producing the Dvitīyārtha-jñāna, through its Vyāpāra which is no other than Prathamārtha-pratīti itself. In the opinion of others, the cognition of the Pada also continues associated with the congnition of the first meaning, and thus the cognition of the first meaning itself can be considered as the Pada-jñāna for the purpose of the congnition of the second meaning. That Padārtha-jñāna is invariably associated with the Pada-jñāna, is clearly mentioned in the famous Kārikā of Bhartṛhari :-

"न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते ।
अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन भासते ।।" (Vākyapadīya I. 123).

According to the third view the Pada jñāna can be had by repeating the same Pada (RG. P. 136).

PR. seems to be indifferent to this third view as the abrupt use of the word 'Kaścit' indicates. Perhaps he thinks, as explained by Chandrikā (RG. vol. I. P. 13). that when one of the two views can be accepted there is no need of the Padāvṛtti. Thus the second theory expounded under the heading 'Aparetvāhuh' mainly differs from the first view in not accepting the Pratibandhakatā of the Tātparya-jñāna in the cognition of the second meaning.

After breifly stating the views of the followers of Dhvanikāra, regarding the Śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani, in the Nānārthasthala, PR. begins to criticise the same in order, ultimarely, to establish his own theory, in deciding as to the place of the Śabda-śakti-mūlaka-dhvani. He takes up all the points one after another for criticism.

It is not correct to contend (as shown while explaining the first view)that the Vākyānvaya requires the cognition of only one meaning of the Nānārtha-padas. Because Padajñāna being the Sāmagrī (all that is required) for the Padārtha-jñāna, the hearer will naturally have the cognition of the other meanings also, but after knowing the Tātparya with the help of the context etc., he can have the the cognition of the Vākyārtha, intnded by the poet. It is not correct to contend that the cognition of the context etc., or the Tātparaya-jñāna would act as an obstacle in recognising the second meaning. Because it is beyond the common experience to talk of obstructing the Smṛti when there are the Saṁskāra and its instigator (Udbodhaka). When sentences like 'Payo-ramaṇīyam', are uttered it is generally observed people of strong Saṁskāra about many meanings are having the cognition of the two meanings, water and milk; and that is why such people are found correcting ignorant men, that the word 'Payas' means milk but not water in the particular context. Thus the first theory accepting Pratibandhakatva of the Prakaraṇa-jñāna etc., does not hold water.

The second theory which contends that the second meaning, which is understood, after the first contextual meaning is fixed by Tātparya-jñāna etc , is the result of the Vyañjanā-vyāpāra, cannot stand close scrutiny. Is this function of Vyañjanā to be accepted every where, where there is the employment of homonyms, or only in certain places? The first alternative is not correct; because if it were to be accepted that, both the contextual and the noncontextual meanings find place in the Śādabodha every where, it would be useless to accept Tātparya jñāna which is intended to produce the cognition of only the contextual mean ing avoiding the noncontextual. It may be contended that the Tātparya jñāna is required for the cognition of Abhidhā mūlaka Śābda bodha, where as the Vyañjanā janya Śābda bodha can be had even without the help of the Tātparya jñāna; because when it is accepted that the homonym would invaraibly convey, both the senses intended, (Tātparya viṣaya) and the non intended,

both of them could equally be expressed by Abhidhā as well; and so where is the need to accept the Vyañjanā specially for expressing the second meaning? In other words, when a homonym is sure to express both the meanings it is immaterial whether it expresses them by Abhidhā or Vyañjanā and this Tātparya jñāna need not be accepted It may be argued that if the Tātparya jñāna, were not to be accepted as the cause for the Abhidhā janya padārtha jñāna, a homonym may express the unintended sense in the beginning itself. By accepting the Kārya kāraṇa bhāva between the Śaktija śābda bodhe and Tāiparya jñāna, the latter will be helping to express the contextual meaning only in the beginning. The Śābda jñāna (second) can be explained away as the result of the Vyañjanā. Even this argument cannot support the need for accepting the Tātyparya jñāna. As in the case of the Śleṣa kāvyas like "Sovyādiṣta bhujaṅga hāra valayasvām sarvado mādhavah" etc., there is nothing wrong in accepting that both the contextual and noncontextual meanings are expressed by Abhidhā only. Here it may be argued that in the places of Śleṣa both the meanings, being contextual, there is Tātparya jñāna about both of them; and so they can be understood simultaneously. But in the persent case the Tātparya jñāna will be only about one meaning, on account of Prakaraṇa etc., and therefore both the meanings cannot be expressed simultaneously. This argument is unfrounded: because Tātparya jñāna has already been refuted as a thing not needed for Śābda bodha. Thus both the meanings of a homonym can be expressed by the Śakti itsels without the aid of Vyañjanā.

After refuting the first alternative, PR. examines the second alternative also. He says, it is not correct to contend that instead of accepting the Vyañjanā in whereever there is Nānārthaka pada, it will be accepted, to avoid the above criticticism, only in a few places; because there is no sufficient reason for such contention. Poet's intention (Tātparya) cannot be given as the reason for accepting Vyañjanā in a few places, because it is accepted even by the Pūrvapakṣin that Tātparya jñāna cannot be taken as the

(cause) Hetu, in the Vyañjanā–janya–śābda–bodha. Moreover in such places of Aślīla, the noncontextual unpleasant meaning cannot be said to have been intended by the poet. Therefore the contention that the Tātparya jñāna helps the Vyañjanā also, is against the general experience.

It may further be argued that the peculiar Śakti of the hearer would instigate Vyañjanā into action, and that as can be judged by the result, it instigates only to suggest a pleasant meaning, but not the unpleasant one; and thus Vyañjanā comes into action only in certain cases. But instead of accepting the Śakti of the hearer, as the instigator of the Vyañjanā, why can it not be taken as the instigator of Abhidhā itself which has been restricted by Saṁyogādi ? Morever, it is a fact that in places like "Ullāsya-kāla-karavālamahāṁbuvāhaṁ" etc., where homonyms are used, a man who is not aware of their Abhidhā, for the second meaning, or forgets about it, cannot have the cognition of the second meaning. But according to the above theory he will have to recognise the second meaning also by Vyañjanā, because his Śakti (mental power) would instigate it into action. To avoid this fallacy, a new Kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva may be tried to be evolved to the effect that the knowledge of the Śakti of a word to convey some particular sense, is helpful in instigating the Vyañjanā to suggest the same. In other words, Vyañjanā suggests only the sense which is known by the hearer as the Śakya of the particular word. If this Kārya-kārana-bhāva were to be accpted, verses like 'Niśśeṣacyuta-candanam' etc., cannot suggest the sense Ramaṇam etc., because no one had the cognition of the Śakti of the word 'Adhama' in the above sense. It may be argued that the Kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva is applicable only in the Nānārtha-sthala. But is it not without ground to evolve such Kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva ? Moreover, the same 'Śakti-graha may be taken as the means for the cognition of the second sense also instead of accepting it to be the instigator of the Vyañjanā which in its turn has to suggest the second meaning; according to the famous dictum "तद्धेतोरेव तदस्तु किं तत्कथनया" which means

"if the result can be achieved direct from the cause of the cause, where is the need for the second cause in the midde?" It may be argued that we can accept the noncontextual meaning also to be cognised through Ṣakti-jñāna itself. only when such meaning is not Bādhita (contradicted). But in places like "जैमिनीयमलं धत्ते रसनायामयं द्विजः ' where the second unpleasant meaning is Bādhita, as the meaning of such sentences like "Vahninā siñcati" etc., it cannot be said to be the result of Sakti-jñāna; because it is a well-known fact that the well established sense of negation is an obstacle for the sense of existance "बाधनिश्चयस्य तद्वत्ताज्ञानं प्रति प्रतिबन्धकतायाः सर्वजनसिद्धत्वात् । " The same cannot be said of the vyañjanā the very purpose of which is to express even a Bādhitārtha Even this argument does not hold water. Because there are many expressions like "Gāmavatīrṇā satyam Sarasvatīyam Patañjali vyājat" and "Saudhānām nagarasyāsya milanthyarkeṇa maulayah" etc, where the Ṣakti itself conveys meanings which are Bādhita. The same justification which may be found in these places, may be applied, in the Nānārthasthala also; or else Vyañjanā will havt to be accepted in almost all the Alaṅkāras. Thus PR. writes, in conclusion of this theory, that the views ofthe old writers accepting the function of Vañjanā in expressing the noncontextual meaning of the homenym, appear to be based on weak arguments. Though this discussion has been started by PR. in third person (Atrāpare pratyavatiṣṭhante), it is evident, in the absence of any criticism, that all his sympathies are on the side of this last theory, which refuses to accept the function Vyañjanā, in Nānartha-sthala, and that is why he has to show some proper place for the Ṣabda-ṡkti-mūla-dhvani as will be seen presently.

Before proceeding with the presentation of his own theory, PR. shows one place where the Vyañjanā is to be accepted even in a Nānārtha-sthala and thereby tries to justify the stand of the Prāchīnas. He says even if Vyanjanā is not going to be accepted, in general, to convey the noncontextual meaning in a

Nānārtha-sthala, according to this theory, it may find place at the most, to suggest the similitude (Upamāropaṇīya-bhāva) between the contextual sense and the noncontextual as is generally accepted by the rhetoricians, in verses like :.

"उल्लास्य कालकरवालमहाम्बुवाहं देवेन येन जरठोर्जितगर्जितेन ।
निर्वापितः सकल एव रणे रिपूणां धाराजलैस्त्रिजगति ज्वलितः प्रतापः ॥"
(KP. P. 135).

lest they should be considered as conveying irrelevant meaning "प्राकरणिकाप्राकरणिकयोरर्थयोरुपमायान्तु सा कदाचित् स्यादपि ।" इति । अत्रास्माकं प्रतिभाति ।"1

As is evident from the phrase 'Kadācit syādapi' they do not appear to be quite serious about this justification of the existance of Vyañjanā in Nārārtha-sthala even for suggesting Upamā, because as explained by Nāgeśa, Upamā in such places need not be Vyaṅgya, for, it can be deduced with the help of Arthāpatti. (GMP. P. 144)

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1. R.G., P. 144. Here the punctuation in the Nirṇayasāgara edition is misleading. Instead of reading 'सा कदाचित् स्यादपीति । अत्रास्माक प्रतिभाति' as is correctly found in the Kāśi edition, it combines the whole as one sentence. Natuallly the commentary Candrikā is misled by this punctuation and explains it as the view of PR. himself (31), and applies the comments of Nāgeśa to PR's view. In fact the theory of the critics, referred to in "Atrapare Pratyavatiṣṭhante" ends with "Sā Kadacit syat" and the 'Iti' indicated its end. The exposition of PR's views begins with "Atrāsmākam pratibhāti". If PR. himself were to feel, depending on Arthāpatti, that Upamavyaṅgya need not be accepted as expliained by Candrikā, his words (RG. P. 147.) at the end of this topic would be self contradicting.

(A) "एवं स्थिते नानार्थस्थलेप्युपमायाः प्राकरणिकाप्राकरणिकार्थगतायाः प्रतिपत्तये अवश्यंवाच्यया व्यञ्जनयैव" etc. (RG. P. 147).

When it is established according to the above theory1 that even the noncontextual sense can be expressed by Śakti itself without the need for accepting Vyañjanā, it would appear that there is no Śabda-śakti-mūlaka-dhvani at all. Now there fore, PR. shows a distinct place for it. In the verse, :- "अवलानां श्रियं हृत्वा वारिवाहैः सहानिशम् । तिष्ठन्ति चपला यत्र सकालः समुपस्थितः ॥" besides the the Vācyārha pertaining to the advent of the rainy season, there is also another meaning that the unchaste woman are sporting with the men carrying water, after taking away the wealth of the weak men. Here the three words 'Abalā', Vāri-vāha' and 'Capalā' are Yogarūḍhas. The second meaning cannot be seid to have been conveyed by these words through the Yogarūḍhi, because we do not find reference to the clouds etc., in the second meaning. It cannot be conveyed by mere Yoga even, because a Yogarūḍha-pada cannot be deprived of its Rūḍhi. Therefore it is inevitable to accept that the second meaning is being conveyed by these words thorugh Vyañjanā only. Thus a Yogarūḍha-pada always conveys only the Rūḍhārtha by Vācyavṛtti but never Yogārtha according to the famous saying acceptable to all the Śāstra-kāras that Rūḍhi suppresses the Yoga (रूढियोंगापहारिणी). Therefore, the expression of the second meaning, associated with the Yogārtha, cannot be justified without the help of Vyanjanā. The same rule applies in places where words of Yaugikarūḍhi are used.

1. It is not clearly known who is the first originator of this theory. But we can see from Vṛtti-vārtika (pp. 11-17) that it has got the support of AD. also and it is probable that he might have originated this theory. But the way in which it is presented by PR. without the use of pungent words and without the mention of Dīkṣita's name makes us think that he also followed the theory enunciated by some of his predecessore. But Vaidyanātha commenting on Kāvyapradīpa states that Dīkṣita also is not in favour of accepting Vyanjanā in Nānartha-sthala, but only the Upamā-nopameya-bhata between the contextual and noncontextual is acceptable to him. Kavyapradīpa P. 43.

After explaining another verse where the Yogarūḍha–padas suggest a second sense through Vyañjanā, PR. cites the views of some Śāstrakāras in support of his contention. According to the Naiyāyikas, Yogarūḍha words like 'Paṅkaja' may be able to mean lilies etc. only through Lakṣaṇā because the Yogārtha (Paṅka–jani–kartṛtva) is suppressed by the Rūḍhyartha (lotus). Again Bādarāyaṇa while explaining the meaning of the word 'Īśānah' in :– "ईशानो भूतभव्यस्य स एवाद्य स उ श्वः", writes "शब्दादेव प्रमित:" (Brahmasūtra 1–3–24.) The word 'Īśanah' can mean only Paramātman by its Yoga-rūḍhi. If we take Yoga alone, it may mean any person weilding power (ईष्टे इति ईशानः). But Bādarāyaṇa says in the above Sūtra that the word Īśāna being Yoga-rūḍha, can only mean Para mātman but not any other person. All this proves that the Yoga in a Yogaruḍha–pada becomes ineffective. The second meaning cannot be said as Lakṣyārtha because there is no Anvayānupapatti which is the main cause of Lakṣaṅā. It may be contendedthat Tātparyānupapatti (but not Anvayānupapatti) will be taken as the cause of Lakṣaṇā and so Lakṣaṇā can be accepted here to justify the Tātparya of the speaker about the second meaning. But PR. calls this contention incorrect because how can we know that it is the intention (Tātparya) of the speaker unless we understand the second meaning ? Only thorugh this Vyañjanā–vyāpāra, one can have the cognition of the second meaning by which he will be able to know the Tātparya of the speaker. Here, therefore, we cannot accept Lakṣaṇā, based on Tātparyānupapatti. Thus PR. proves, by his convincing arguments, that the Yogrūḍhastala is the place for Śabda–śakti–mūla–dhvani but not Nānārtha–sthala. In conclusion, he sums up his theory in the following Kārikā, which runs almost parallel to the famous Kārikā of Mammaṭa "Anekārthasya śabdasya" etc :–

"योगरूढस्य शब्दस्य योगे रूढ्या निन्त्रिते ।
धियं योगस्पृशोऽर्थस्य या सूते व्यञ्जनैव सा ॥" (RG. P. 147).

At the end he tries to justify the stand taken by the old writers also by saying that when it is inevitable to accept Vyañjanā in order to justify the Upamānopameya-bhāva between the contextual and noncontextual meanings, why should we not accept the same in the case of noncontextual meaning also ? Inspite of what he says here, PR. appears to be not in favour of accepting Vyañjanā (as shown above) in Nānārtha-sthala. The last sentence is just like a Namaskārabāṇa shot at the end instead of beginning. This section is one of the important contributions of PR. to the Alaṅkaraśāstra.

After showing a proper place for Śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani PR. explains, with precise difinitions and proper examples, all the fourteen items, the Saṁyoga etc., which are responsible for restricting the Vācakatva of the word. While explainng them he gives almost the same expamples as given by older writers like Mammaṭa, with slight variations in one or two places and he tries to give a definite shape to their Lakṣaṇas so as to distinguish the one from the other, by introducing short but effective discussions under many of them.

1. Saṁyoga :- He defines it as the relation (of something) well known as existing in one particular thing expressed by a Nānārthaka-pada but not existing in any other thing meant (expressed) by the same word. (RG. P. 147). In the example "सशंखचक्रो हरिः" Śaṅkha is wellknown as associated with god Viṣṇu but not with anybody else like Devendra etc., The difference between the Saṁyoga and the Liṅga, PR. explains, lies in the fact that Liṅga cannot exist in any thing other than what is meant, where as the Śaṅkha etc., can be borne (associated with) by Devendrādi even.

2. Viprayoga :- It is defined as Viśleṣa, dissociation. As in the case of Samyoga, Viprayoga also is to be qualified by the phrase "नानार्थशव्दशक्यान्तरवृत्तितया अप्रसिद्धत्वे सति तच्छक्यवृत्तितया प्रसिद्धः" Thus the dissociation of the veapons in general, or

Pāśāṅkuśādi in particular, does not come under the Viprayoga. 'अशङ्खचक्रो हरिः' is the example for Viprayoga. Here PR. puts a pertinent question. In all the cases of Viprayoga there must be Saṁyoga also as the condition precedent, and therefore, cannot Saṁyoga itself be taken as the Abhidhā-niyāmaka in the places of Viprayoga also ? While admitting the validity of this argument in principls, PR. says that though the Saṁyoga is understood as the condition precedent of Viprayoga, it is only in a subordinate position while Viprayoga is the Pradhāna, and so Viprayoga is given a special place according to the famous saying — "गुणप्रधानयोः सन्निपाते प्रधानानुरोधः" (RG. P. 148); or if it is felt that there will be a kind of Gauravam in giving a seperate pesition to Viprayoga also, it (Viprayoga) may be understood as another aspect of Saṁyoga itself (RG. P. 148). Thus PR. gives a new significance to the Viprayoga.

3. Sāhacarya :- Sāhacarya is implied to be the association of two words, by A. D. when he elucidates it by saying "रामलक्ष्मणौ इत्यत्र रामपदस्य लक्ष्मणसाहचर्यात् रघुपुङ्गवे" (vṛttivārtika. P. 7). But PR's definition is slightly diferent and it maintains the importance of the meaning aspect of the word. His definition is :- "साहचर्यमेकस्मिन् कार्ये परस्परापेक्षित्वम्" (RG. P. 148). In places like 'Rāmalakṣmaṇau' Lakṣmaṇa's Sāhacarya restricts the meaning of the word Rāma to 'Dāśarathi'; because Rāma and Lhkṣmaṇa are well-known as being engaged in doing some works like fighting, in association with each other.

Here PR. introduces a discussion in course of which, he tries to distinguish Sāhacrya from Saṁyoaga. He raises a question suggesting two alternatives. Is this interdependence (Parasparasāpekṣatvam) only in doing a few works or in doing all ? If the first alternative were to be accepted even the 'Ghaṭa' Pada would become Rāmapada-śakti-niyāmaka, because there is possibility of Sāhacarya in some work between Rāma and Ghaṭa also. The second alternative also does not hold water, because

in such case even Lakṣmaṇa-pada cannot be Niyāmaka for, there is no interdependence even between Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa in all works. And in both the cases, in placss like 'Rāmāyodhye' and 'Raghurāmau' where Ayodhyā and Raghu are the Śakti-niyāmakas there will be the Avyāpti because Ayodhyā, an inanimate object, and Rvghu who died long before Rāma was borne, cannot help him in any work. It may be argued that Sāhacarya is the well known ralation between the thing that is meant by the word associated with the Nānārtha-pada and the thing that is meant by the latter. This relation may be of many kinds :- Eka-janyatva (brotherhood), Dampatya, Janya-janaka-bhāva, Svāmi-bhṛtya-bhāva, and Sva-svāmi-bhāva etc., and this Sahacarya acts as the Niyamaka in places like Rāmalakṣmaṇau, Sitā-rāmau, Rāma-dāśarathau, Rāma-hanumantau and Rāmāyodhye etc. But according to this argument, even in places like 'Saśaṅkha-cakro Hariḥ' etc., the same relation (Sāhacarya which is Sva-svāmi-bhāva-rūpa) can be the Niyāmaka without the necessity of Saṁyoga as a seperate Niyāmaka and there is no reason why Saṁyoga alone should be seperated from the general Sambandha. It may be contended that Saṁyoga is to be accepted as Niyamaka when it is directly expressed as in 'Saśaṅkha-cakraḥ' etc., where as Sāhacarya is to be accepted where only the Sambandhin is mentioned but not the Sambandha, as in 'Rāma-lakṣmṇau' etc. But according to this contention, in places 'Salakṣmaṇo-Rāmaḥ' and 'Vilakṣmaṇo-rāmaḥ' etc., (if not in 'Rāmalakṣmṇau'), Saṁyoga will have to be accepted as in the case of 'Saśaṅkha-cakro-hariḥ' which is not correct because of the following reason. Saṁyoga and Vibhāga are among the twentyfour Guṇas of Naiyāyikas, and according to them Saṁyoga means close contact with each other and the Vibhāga is its absence. Evidently such Saṁyoga and Vibhāga cannot be expected in places like 'Salakṣmaṇo-ramah' and 'Vilakṣmaṇo-rāmaḥ' and therefore Sāhacarya alone has to be taken as the Niyāmaka in the above places. The same Sāhacarya can be accepted in 'Saṣaṅkha-cakraḥ' and 'Aśaṅkha-

cakraḥ' etc., also. Thus according to the Pūrva–pakṣin, there is no need of seperately accepting Saṁyoga also as Niyāmaka. ("सलक्ष्मणो रामः विलक्ष्मणो रामः इत्यत्र संयोगविभागयोर्गुणयोः अप्रतीत्या साहचर्योदाहरणतायां प्रसक्तायां 'सशङ्खचक्र' इत्यादेरपि तदुदाहरणताया एवोचित्यात् ।" R. G., P. 150. The above explanation of this passage appeass to be correct and as shown by Candrikā (p.45) (Saralā does not carry the intended meaning of PR.)

Now PR. justifies the seperate mention of Saṁyoga on the following grounds. The Saṁyoga stands for any relation in general but not Saṁyoga of the Naiyāyikas and when it is mentioned by the Śabda, it will be Śakti–niyāmaka. But when the Sambandhin alone is expressed by the Dvandva–samāsa it will be an instance of Sāhacarya. Thus 'Sagāṇḍīvorjunaḥ' is an instance of Saṁyoga because the Saṁbandha is clearly expressed by the particle 'Saha', and 'Gāṇḍīvārjunau' is of Sāhacarya because the Sambandhin Gāṇḍīva is expressed here. Thus PR. draws a line of distinction between Saṁyoga and Sāhacarya.

4. Virodhitā :- Virodhitā is defined as well-known animosity between two or the absence of coexistence. After giving its traditional example 'Rāmārjunau' PR. examines the criticism by AD. of the above example. AD. contends that 'Rāmārjunau' etc., cannot be the example of 'Virodhitā' because both the words 'Rāma' and 'Arjuna' being homonyms, depend upon each other for determining their meanings. Unless 'Rāma' is known to mean 'Bhārgava-rāma' 'Arjuna' cannot be under–stood as meaning 'Kārtavīrya' and vice versa which results in Anyonyāśraya-doṣa. Therefore only snch places like Rāma–rāvaṇau where the meaning of the one of the two words is well-established are to be taken as the examples of Virodha. The presence of such word immediately reminds the hearer the well-known Virodha and thus restricts the Śakti of the another word like 'Rāma'.

PR. refutes the arguments of AD. on the following grounds :- Even in places like 'Rāma-rāvaṇau' the same Sāhacarya can be accepted as Śakti-niyāmaka as in the case of 'Rāma-lakṣmaṇau' etc., because the Sāhacarya may be of many kinds like the one well-known with father, brother, wife, son, servant, and town etc., and the Sambandha among them. If enmity is to be given a seperate place as Śakti-niyāmaka even friendship etc., will have to be taken as the additional Niyāmaka. Therefore in effect 'your' example also is defective as the one given by the old writers.

One thing is to be noted here. In view of the definition of Sāhacarya as given by P. R. (RG. P. 148), it is not clear how he finds that Rāma-rāvaṇau, can come under the Sāhacarya, because we do not know Rāma and Rāvaṇa as assitting each other in any work, unless we take it as a kind of Parasperāpekṣitva to fight with each other because Rāma cannot fight with Rāvaṇa unless the latter also participates in it; and vice versa. But in fact, as can be seen from the discussion that has been introduced while determining the nature of Sāhacarya, PR. accepts the Sāhacarya as a kind of general relation like Saṁyoga with the only difference that in the case of Sāhacarya, Sambandhin will be mentioned where as in the case of the latter the Sambaddha alone is expressed. Keeping only this fact in his view PR. contends that the 'Rāma-rāvaṇau' etc., can be covered by the Sāhacarya.

While criticising the example given by Mammaṭa, A. D. has stated (Vṛttivārtika. P. 7), that only where the meaning of one of the Padas has been fixed, the Virodha can be remembered and such places can be taken as the example for Virodha. But according to PR, even this contention is not correct as can be seen from the following example. The meaning of the words Hari and Nāga are doubtful in the phrase 'Harināgasya'. But the singular number of this Dvandva-samāsa indicates that the component words must be meaning the animals having natural

antipathy, a fact which gives Ekavacana to the Samāsa according to a Pāṇini-sūtra (2. 4. 9). Now this Virodha indicated by Ekavacana is responsible for the simulaneous restriction (Niyamana) of the Śakti of both the words Hari and Nāga, even without the prior fixation of the meaning of either of the words.

Again, A. D's contention that 'Ramārjuna-gati-stayoḥ'; can be an instance of Śabdāntara-sannidhi is refuted by PR. on the following ground. There is vast difference in the nature of "Niṣadham-paśya-bhūbhṛtam" "Nāgo-dānena-rājate" etc., which are given as the examples for Śabdāntara-sannidhi by AD. himself and the present one "Ramārjuna-gatistayoh". Because in the first two cases, there would be no proper Vākyārthānvaya unless the Śakti of the words Niṣadha and Nāga is restricted to the Niṣadha-parvata and the elephant; where as, there is no such impropriety of Anvaya in the case of the latter even if it is taken to mean Śrīrama and Pārtha. How can examples of such different nature be placed on par with each other ?

After criticising the views of AD., PR. upholds the example, given by Mammaṭa and explanis how there is no, Anyonyāśrayadoṣa. "Rāmājuna-gatistayoḥ" is said in the context of describing the enmity between two rival kings and thus the Virodha having been indicated by the context itself, the Śakti of 'Rāma' and 'Arjuna' can simultaneously be restricted as in the case of "Harināgasya" as explained above. In such case, it may be argued, that is would be an instance of Prakaraṇa, instead of Virodha. But PR. explains that though the Virodha is contextual (prākaraṇika) Bhārgava and Kārtavīrya expressed by the restricted Śakti are not contextual, thereby he implies that the scope of Prakaraṇa will be only there where the objects of dispute (Sandigdhārtha-padas) are Prākaraṇika. 'Chāyātapau' is the example for the second type of Virodha (Asāmānādhikarṇya).

5. Artha :- Artha is defined as the purpose expressed by the Caturthī-vibhakti etc. The Śakti of the word 'Sthāṇu' in "Sthāṇumbhaja-bhavacchide" is restricted to Śiva in view of the purpose, salvation, expressed by the Caturthī-vibhakti. Here again, PR. introduces a discussion as to the difference between the Prayojana and Liṅga. Liṅga is said to be Dharma directly expressed by Śabda which exists in only one Śakya of a Nānārtha-pada (not in other Śakyas). This Lakṣaṇa, the Pūrvapakṣin contends, is applicable in the above example also; because Bhava-ccheda-janaka-bhajana-karmatva (being the object of worship which cuts down the Saṁsāra) is existing in Śiva only but not in the other 'Śakyas' like the trunk of a tree. In reply to this PR. says that the 'Bhava-ccheda-janaka-bhajana-karmatva' Dharma is understood only indirectly, after the Śābda-bodha which does not contain any reference to such dharma, because, according to the Vaiyākaraṇa-theory of Śābda-bodha the sentence "Sthāṇum-bhaja bhavachide" means

"भवच्छेदफलकं चैत्राद्यभिन्नकर्तृकं स्थाणुकर्मकं भजनम्".

where as in places like "Kupito-makaradhvajaḥ" which are taken as the instance of Liṅga, the Kopādi-rūpa-dharma is directly expressed.

After giving this reply which is perhaps acceptable to him, PR. refers to a Kecinmata which contends that Liṅga is only one Padārtha with no association with any other Padārtha, whereas the 'Artha' is associated with other Padārthas. [In other words, 'Kopa' etc., is one Akhaṇḍa-padārtha and does not have connection with any other Padārthas, whereas Bhava-ccheda-janaka-bhajana-karmatva etc., consiting of many Padārthas, cannot be called as one Akhaṇḍa-padārtha. Evidently this theory does not have the approval of PR., because according to this theory 'Devasya tripurārāteh' where the words 'Tripurārāti' are not one Akhaṇḍa-padārtha, would not come under the Liṅga whila they should come, according to PR.

8. Anyaśabdasannidhi :- After briefly explaining the sixth and the seventh items, Prakaraṇa and Liṅga, PR. defines Śabdantara-sannidhi as the association (of a Nānārthaka-śabda) with a word expressive of the meaning which can be connected with only one meaning of the former (Nānārthaka-śabda).1 After giving "करेण राजते नाग:" as the example for Śabdāntara-sannidhi, where the two Padas help in restricting the Śakti of each other, PR. says that there is no fear of Anyonyāśraya-desa in these places, because the Śakti-niyamana of each other is not interdependent. The Śakti of both the words is restricted at the same time, because if any other meanings, other than the 'trunk' and the 'elephant' were to be accepted there would be no pessibility of Anvaya. Thus according to him the main cause that is responsible for the Śakti-niyamana in these cases is Anvayānupapatti.

A. D. 2 tries to avert the Anyonyāśraya-doṣa on the stre-

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1. "शब्दस्यान्यस्य सन्निधि: नानार्थपदैकार्थकार्थमात्रसंसर्ग्यर्थान्तरवाचकपदसमभिव्याहार:" (नानार्थकपदस्य एकार्थमात्रेण संसर्गि यत् अर्थान्तरं तस्य वाचकं यत् पदं तेन समभिव्याहार:) R. G., P. 153.

It is doubtful if the word 'Arthāntara-vācaka' can mean Nānārthaka as was explained by Candrikā (P. 57). Saralā also connects the word 'Arthāntara-vācaka pada' (instead of 'Arthāntara)' with 'Samsargi' (P. 153). That, 'Artha' is to be connected with Saṁsargi is indicated by what Nāgeśa writes in Uddyota (P. 64. "नियतत्वञ्च नानार्थपदीयैकार्थमात्रसंसर्ग्यर्थवाचकत्वम् ।"

2. "नह्यत्र समभिव्याराहृतशब्देन तदर्थप्रतिपादनं अभिधानियमायापेक्ष्यते. किन्तु स्वार्थेन गृहीतसंसर्गेऽर्थे व्युत्पन्न:य: शब्द: तत्समभिव्याहरमात्रम्, तथाच सम्बन्धिदर्शनात् सम्बन्ध्यन्तरस्मृतिस्थले गृहीतसम्बन्धस्य सम्बन्धिनो दर्शनमात्रं सम्बन्ध्यन्तरस्मरणायाऽपेक्ष्यते, नतु तद्दर्शनानन्तरं तत्सम्बन्धस्मरणमपीति नान्योन्याश्रय: तथेहापि निषधभूभृत्पदयो: अभिधानियमनाय गृहीतस्वार्थव्युत्पत्तिक भूभृन्निषधशब्दसभिव्याहारमात्रमपेक्ष्यत इति तत्तदर्थप्रतिपादनस्यापेक्ष्यमाणत्वात् न अन्योन्याश्रय: ।" (Vṛtti vārtika P. 8.

ngth of some other argument which has been commended by Candrikā (P. 58). It is not clear what is exactly meant by AD. in the passage quoted below. As can be made out from what he writes, AD. feels that there is no Anyonyāśraya because it is not required that the meaning of Samabhivyāhṛta-śabda should be understood for restricting the Abhidhā. Only the Samabhivyāhāra (association) of a word, the meaning of which is known as associated with the meaning of the word in question, is required for Abhidhāniyamana. To illustrate with an example, the word Niṣadha requires the association of the word 'Bhūbhṛt' the meaning of which is known as connected with the Svārtha, the meaning of Niṣadha. In this connection he gives an example. According to the dictum "एकसम्बन्धिदर्शनमपरसम्बन्धिस्मारकम्" a man who happens to see one Sambandhin is reminded of the another Sambandhin, without the need of recollecting the Sambandha. The same rule, AD. contends, should be applied in this case also. According to this theory, he expects, a prior knowledge of the association between the meanings of the two words 'Niṣadha' and 'Bhūbhṛt' etc., before their Sannidhi is helpful in restricting the Śakti.

This appears to be a strange explanation which would make the Padāntara-sannidhi as almost synonymous to Sāhacarya. It is not convincing to say that the sight of one Sambandhin reminds one of the another Sambandhin. but not Sambandha; because the cognition of Sambandha invariably underlies the Sambandhi-jñāna, although in the quickness of the mental action, we may not be able to notice its existence. Like wise, if it is accepted that the knowledge of the ralation between the Arthas of the two padas is a pre requisite condition, it goes without saying that the Artha-prati-pādana is being required for the Śakti-niyamana. Moreover, is it not possible to remove the Anyonyāśraya-doṣa which he raises in the case of 'Rāmārjuna' etc., by applying the same princilple ? Thus AD.'s contention appears to be vague and confusing. Therefore PR.'s explanation seems to be more plausible.

As is seen above, Anvayānupapatti is the important factor in the Śabdāntara-sannidhi. Viewed in this light, the example "देवस्य पुराराते:" as given by writers like Mammaṭa cannot came under Padāntarn-sannidhi because there is no Anvaya, even if we take the meanings of the words 'Deva' and 'Purārāti' as king and the enemy of the cities respectivly or as god and the enemy of Asura-viśeṣa. It ay by argued that the Purārāti-pada being Yogarūḍha, means Śiva only and helps in the Niyamana of the Śakti of 'Deva'. But where is the authority that 'Purārāti' is Yogarūḍha ? Even if the reading is 'Devasya tripurārāteh' as is found in Pradīpa, the Tripura-vairitva being a Liṅga, it can be the example of Linga only.

Next, PR. finds fault with the commentators like Govinda ṭhakkura of Kāvyaprakāśa who contend that Śabdāntara-sannidhi is the Sāmānādhi-karaṇya with a word of fixed meaning. (Pradīpa (K. P.) P. 64.) because there will be Avyāpti of this definition in "Kareṇa-rājate nāgah" etc., where both the words are homonyms and Ativyāpti in places like "Kupito makaradhvajaḥ" etc., ('Kupita' being Niyatārthaka) which according to their mūlagrantha are the examples for Liṅga.

9. Sāmarthyaṁ :- To be a cause of something is called Sāmarthyam. In its example "मधुना मत्त: कोकिल:" the Śakti of 'Madhu' is restricted to 'Vasanta'; because Vasanta is the cause of the intoxication of the Kokila.

Here with an intention of differentiating Sāmarthya from Liṅga, PR. first examines the views of some of the commentators of Kāvya-prakāśa, who contend that it cannot be identified with Liṅga because only Vasanta is capable of intoxicating cuckoo whereas the wine is a general intoxicator. PR. questions-how can this explanation serve as an answer to the main question? because though the Mādana-sāmarthya can be found in wine also, Kokila-mādakatā is to be found only in Vasanta, a fact

which justifies its inclusion under Liṅga. If it is said, inorder to get out of this trouble, that wine being a general intoxicator, can intoxicate the Cuckoos also, then Sāmarthaya cannot be said as the Niyāmaka in this case, and it will be a contradiction of your earlier statement that wine cannot intoxicate Kokila. If you depend upon prasiddhi and claim that Vasanta alone is well-known as the intoxicator of Cuckoo it is tantamount to accee-pting it as another name of Liṅga.

After proving the fallacy in the arguments of Mammaṭa's commentators PR. distinguishes Sāmarthya from Liṅga in two ways. The Śābda-bodha of "Kupito-makaradhvajah" an instance of Liṅga is "कोपाश्रयाभिन्नमन्मथः" and thus the Liṅga (Kopa) also direetly finds place in Śābda-bodha. But the Sāmarthya cannot find place in the Śābda-bodha of "Madhunā Mattaḥ Kokilah" which runs as "मधुकरणकमदाश्रयः कोकिलः" It can find place only in the subsequent. Mānasika-bodha. The difference can be explained in the following manner also. Liṅga is the meaning of one Pada only where as the Sāmarthya is of many Padas. In "Kupito-makaradhvajaḥ" Kopa is the padārtha of only one Pada i.e. Kupitha but Sāmarthya in "Madhunā Mattaḥ Kokilaḥ" is the Padārtha of more than one Pada i. e. 'Kokila' and 'Matta'.

Next PR. defines the remaining items, Aucitī, Deśa, Kāla, Vyakti and Svara and the Abhinayādi and illustrates them by giving the traditional examples.

After explaining the Saṁyoga etc., with precise definitions and proper discussions, PR. in his own characteristic way tries to minimise their number by finding out their underlying important principles. Thus he says that only Kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva but nothing else is the niyāmaka in places of Artha, Sāmarthya, and Aucitī, i. e. in "Sthāṇum bhaja bhavacchide" "Madhunā mattaḥ kokilaḥ" and "Pātu vo dayitā mukhaṁ." Seperate

names are given by the old writers, PR. says, only because of the difference of the Bodhakas (of Kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva). And going one step further, he says thati f the Saṁyoga etc., are found commonly with Arthāntaras also they can not be the Śakti-niyāmakas of the homonyms. If it is tried to prove that they are the Asādhāraṇa things because of the Prasiddhi, then all of them would come under the fold of Liṅga only.

Thus PR. evolves a new theory about the real nature of the Samyoga etc., which is perhaps emulated by later writers, who as quoted by Nāgeśa in Laghumañjūṣā 1 contend that Sāmarthya alone is the Niyāmaka, all the others being its own exposition in different ways.

All these views expressed by PR. about the nature of the Niyāmakas and the place of Śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani find full support of Nāgeśa also who repeats them almost verbatim in the Kāvy-pradīpoddyota. (K. P. P. 65-66). Ofcourse, it is true, this passage of Nāgeśa is not found in one manuscipt 'Ka' (K. P. P. 65 foot note). But complete absence of any abverse criticism by him in Gurumarmaprakāśa of this section stands in support of the contention that the above passage in Uddyota can be genuine.

1: "अत्र सामर्थ्यमेवैकं मुख्यं नियामकम् । संयोगादयस्तद्व्यञ्जकप्रपञ्चः । तैः सामर्थ्यस्यैवाभिव्यक्तेः, इति परे" । (Vaiyākaraṇa laghu mañjūṣā P. 91).

Note :- Saralā (P. 157) does not seem correct in understaning this passage to mean that "Samyoga etc., should be differenciated from one another only according to my (PR.'s) explanation but not that of old writers;" because as explained above, PR. wants to establish that all these varieties can safely be brought under one name i. e. Liṅga.

THE ILLUSTRATONS OF SOME VARIETIES OF DHVANI.

After elaborately discussing about the nature and scope of the Śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani and about the fourteen Niyāmakas of the Śabda-śakti, PR. illustrates some of the main varietics of Dhvani by giving suitable examples. The importance of this section lies in the detailed discussions that follow almost each example, than in the example itself, and these discussions, like any of PR., reflect some of his original views on the topic on hand, and at times they try to set right the views of the old writers by way of finding their intentions.

PR. cites the following verse as an example for Śabda-śakti-mūlālaṅkāra-dhvani :-

"करतलनिर्गलदविरलदानजलोल्लासितावनीवलयः ।
धनदाग्रमहितमूर्तिः जयतितरां सार्वभौमोऽयम्" ॥ (RG. P. 157).

In this verse, as in the case of verses like "भद्रात्मनो दुरधिरोहतनोः" etc., given in Kāvyaprakāśa, (K. P. P. 68) there is the suggestion of Upamālaṅkāra, because though the Śakti of the words like Kara, Dāna, Dhanada and Sārvabhauma is restricted by the context, to one meaning, a second meaning, related to the elephant, Sārvabhauma, is being suggested by the power of the above words, and lest it should be irrelevant, an Upamānopameya-bhāva is ultimately suggested as the Pradhāna-vākyārtha. Thus PR. explains this as an example of Upamā-dhavni following the views of older writers in similar cases. But with an intention of ultimately esablishing that it is a case of Rūpaka-dhvani but not of Upamādhvani, he introduces the following discussion.

In the Samāsokti of homonymous adjectves (as in "अयमैन्द्रीमुखं पश्य रक्तश्चुम्बति चन्द्रमाः"), the suggested irrelevant action (Aprakṛta-vyavahāra) is being ascribed to the relevant Dharmin

and this being the ornamental to the relevant (Prkṛta-vācyārthopaskāraka), it is said to be an instance of Guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya. Similarly the suggested Upamā in the present verse and th verses cited by old writers, is deffinitely ornamental to the relevant meaning by way of proving the greatness of the king. Therefore the Upamā in these verses also should be accepted only as Guṇibhūta-vyaṅgya. It may be pointed out, as a point of difference, between the Samāsokti and the present case that whereas the Pradhāna-dharmin in the Samāsokti (Candra) is mentioned by a word of only one meaning (Candramas), it is conveyed, in the case of Upamā, by a homonym (Sārvabhauma); but how does it alter the position of the Aprkṛta-vyaṅgyārtha being the Prakṛtopaskāraka, which is the sufficient casue for calling a Dhvani 'Guṇībhūta'? It may be argued that any Alaṅkāra is naturally beautiful and, though suggested by Aprakṛta-vastu cannot become the Aṅga of any Vastu, just like the Alaṅkāra based on the Prakṛta-vastu which is not considered to be Guṇī-bhūta to any Vastu. Even in the case of Samāsokti, the whole Alaṅkāra is taken as the Upaskāraka of the Vastu and the Aprakṛta-vyavahāra which is only a part of Samāsokti, and so not Alaṇkāra, cannot be the Upaskāraka of the Vastu. In reply to this argument, PR. says that it is a vain effort to prove one thing on the analogy of some other thing without giving proper reply to the objections raised. When it is explained that the suggested Upamā is Prakṛtārtha-poṣaka and thus Guṇī-bhūta, how can any analogy disprove it? When the objection is so strong it can be applied even to the case cited as an analogy. (RG. P. 159). If the Alaṅkāra suggested by the relevant Vastu is found to be the Poṣaka of thc same, even this should be treated, PR. implies, as Guṇībhūtālaṇkāra-dhvani only.

It is further argued that Upamā is consisting of three things Upamāna, Upameya and the Sādhāraṇa-dharma. In the present

case, Upameya is the Prakṛta. Now even if the Upamālaṇkāra acts as the Upaskāraka of the Prakṛtārtha i. e. Upameya, it does so only in the case of one of its own ingredients which cannot be called Para; and how can it be, therefore, called Aparāṇga ? Because though the Aprkṛtārtha-vyavahāra in Samāsokti is taken as the Upaskāraka of the Prakṛta, the Samāsokti which is consiting of the Prakṛta and Aprekṛta is not said to be Aparāṇga. Even if this argument is accepted, PR. says, like the Samāsokti the present Upama also will have to be accepted as Guṇī-bhūta-vyaṅgya, though not on the score of being Apaāṅga but because of the Tulya-prādhānya of the Vācyārtha and the Vyaṅgyārtha. Thus he proves that Upamādhvani cannot be accepted in this verse "Karatala" etc., and in the verses, cited by old writers.

Here Nāgeśa, as usual, tries to criticise PR.'s wiews mainly on the ground that there is more Camatkāra in the Upamālaṅkāra than in the Vastu and so it can be named 'Alaṅkāradhvani'. (RG. P. 159). But such abstract things like Camatkāra cannot precisely be measured to the approval of every person, and so arguments on such grounds are apt to be too impressionistic to be analysed. Moreover, as can be seen presently, PR.'s main concern seems to be in establishing that it is Rūpakālaṅkāra that is suggested in the verses 'Ullāsyakāla-karavāla' etc., but not Upamā as was thought by the old writers like Mammaṭa; and this has not been refuted by Nāgeśa.

In conclusion, PR. says :- It is a well established fact, among the Ālaṅkārikas, that in the Śleṣālaṅkāra there is a kind of Abhedādhyavasāna between the two things expressed, based on Ślesa. What is the reason for this Ahedādyavasāna ? On closely examining, we do not find any reason other than their being expressed by one single word. In all these verses in question, the two senses are expressed by one Śabda. Therefore only Rūpaka must be suggested but not Upamā even here, because

there is Abhedādyavasāna. It may be contended that there is no comparison in these two cases because in Śleṣa both the senses are expressed simultaneously, where as in the present context one sense is expressed and the second is suggested at different times. But PR. argues that this slight diffrence cannot effect the Abhedādyavasāna which is the result of a Ekapadopāttava. Thus he states, in conclusion, that Rūpaka alone, independent of Upamā, should be accepted as Vyaṅgyālaṅkāra in the above verses, and it is through this Alaṅkāra, they are taken as being examples of Śabda-śakti-mūlālaṅkāra-dhvani.

By way of giving another example of Śabda-śakti-mūlālaṅkāra-dhvani, PR. cites a prose passage :- "रविकुलप्रीतिमावहन्ती नरविकुलप्रीतिमावहति । अवारितप्रवाहा सुवारितप्रवाहा" (RG. P. 160). and explains how Virodha is being suggested between the Prakṛtārtha and the Aprakṛtārtha. Here by way of explanation he remarks that this can be an instance of Virodha being Vācya if the particle 'Api' is added between "Ravikulaprītimāvahantī" and "Na ravikulaprītimāvahantī" etc.,

Now one question arises :- How in such case, it is said by Mammaṭa that there is Virodhā-laṅkāra as Vācya in the verse "Abhinava-nalini" 1 etc., because in the absance of 'Api' it should be Virodhālaṅkara-dhvani. It may be argued that Virodha-viśiṣṭābheda is the Saṁsarga between Mṛṇālavalayādi and the Davadahana-rāśi and thus Virodha also being expressed, it can be only a Vācyālaṅkāra but not Dhvani. But how these two thiegs-Virodha and Abheda, which are antagonistic with each other can be accepted as a Saṁsarga at the same time? Moreover, Abheda alone is generaly accepted as the Saṁsarga between the Nānārthas but not Virodha. And in view of the Virodha, a Sādṛśya will be accepted in "Dava-dahana-rāśih"

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1. "अभिनवनलिनीकिसलयमृणालवलयादि दवदहनराशिः ।
सुभग कुरङ्गदृशोऽस्याः विधिवशतस्त्वद्वियोगपविपाते" K. P., P. 517.

etc., (Dava-dahana-rāśi-tulyah) and as such there will be finally no Virodha at all. Thus it cannot be taken as an example of Virodhālaṅkāra.

Accepting the above argument PR. says that it is simply intended as an instance of Virodhālaṅkāra even by Mammaṭa, and it is immaterial whether it is Vācya or Vyaṅgya. If it is insisted that it should be accepted as has been given as an instance of Vācyālṅkāra only beccuse it is found in the Alaṅkāra-prakaraṇa, PR. suggests that there should be understood the presence of 'Api' (implied). Thus, by introducing this discussion PR. establishes that there can be no Vāchya-Virodhālaṅkāra unless there is the use of such particles like 'Api' expressive of Virodha.

At the end of this discussion, PR. mentions a 'Kecinmata' which contends, on the analogy of Samāsokti which is called Vācyālaṅkāra, though one part of it (the Aprakṛtāṁśa) is suggested, that the Virodhālaṅkāra can be called as Vācya even when the Virodha is suggested, because both the things having Virodha (Virodhi-dvaya) are expressed. As is rightly pointed out by Candrika, (RG. Part II P. 84), this Kecinmata cannot have the approval of PR. because even though Samāsokti is accepted as Vācyālaṅkāra by force of circumstances (Agatyā) the same round-about way need not be followed in this case also.

After giving another example for Śabda-śakti-mūlālaṅkāra-dhvani, "Kṛṣṇa-pakṣādhika-rucih" etc., PR. deals with the Śabda-śakti-mūla-vastu-dhvani and gives the following verse as its example :-

"राज्ञो मत्प्रतिकूलान्मे महद्भयमुपस्थितम् ।
बाले वारय पान्थस्य वासदानविधानतः" (RG. P. 163).

Here the Vastu "please give me an opportunity of enjoying your company" is suggested by the word 'Rājñaḥ' because only

after the moon is suggested by this word, the suggestion of the above Vastu is possible.

Here it is suggested by the Pūrvapakṣin that there can be Upamādhvani by accepting the Upamānopameya bhāva between the moon and the king or Rūpaka–dhvani by accepting Rājatvāropa on the moon; but not Vastu–dhvani. But PR. says that the Nṛpatvārtha is taken just only to conceal the Candra-rūpārtha and so there is no Tātparya of the poet in the Upamānopameya–bhāva or Āropyāropaka-bhāva and so there is no simultaneous cognition of the Upamāna and Upameya which is the pre riquisite condition of Upamālaṅkāra and Rūpakālaṅkāra. There is no possibility of Vākya-bheda-dośa even, in conveying the second meaning "Upabhogam dehi" etc., by the same sentence, because the scope for Vākya–bheda is only there where two meanings of equal importance are intended to be conveyed by the same sentence. Here there is no cognition of the Acchādakārtha at the time of the cognition of the Acchādyārtha and vice versa and so both the senses cannot be considered as of equal importance (Tulya–kakṣyatā). In fact Vākya-bheda arises only when the same Vākya will have to be repeated for the sake of expressing two meanings. But in the case of Vyaṅgyārtha, there is no such necessity at all because the same sentence conveys two meanings with its two different powers-Abhidhā and Vyañanā.

Here Nāgeśa feels (G. M. P., RG. P. 163) that the use of the word 'Bāle' makes thn Vyaṅgyārtha almost expressed (Vācyāyamāna). But it is not clear how the whole Vyaṅgyārtha is expressed by single word 'Bāle'. If even this is to make the Vyaṅgya as Vācyāyamāna, there will be no scope for Vyaṅgya at all, because in every place of Vyaṅgya there will invaribly be one or two words occupying key position on which alone the Vyaṅgyārtha depends for its existence.

Now, again PR. finds an occasion to examine the example given by Mammaṭa :-

"शनिरशनिश्च तमुच्चैर्निहन्ति कुप्यसि नरेन्द्र यस्मै त्वम ।
यत्र प्रसीदसि पुनः स भात्युदारोऽनुदारश्च ॥"

Here some of the commentators (not Govindaṭhakkura) explain the sentence of Mammaṭa :-"अत्र विरुद्धौ द्वावपि त्वदनुवर्तनार्थ-एकं कार्यं कुरुत इति ध्वन्यते" :- as meaning that it is being suggested that the two things Sani and Aśani, the Udāra and Anudāra are performing one action of Killing and shining respectively. Here PR. says, though there is the possibility of Ekakārya-kartṛtva by Śani and Aśani the same is not possible in the case of Udāra and Anudāra because both of them are the Viśeṣaṇas of the Tatpadārtha, 'Sah', which is directly connected with the action. Therefore "Viruddhau dvau" etc., is applicable only to the first half of the above verse and there is Virodhābhasa in the second half. That, there is Virodhābhasa in second half is, ofcourse, explained by some of the commentators of Mamnaṭa. ("द्वितीयार्धस्तु नोदाहरणम् । तत्र चशब्दस्याप्यर्थत्वे विरोधस्य वाच्यत्वात् । समुच्चयार्थत्वे तु विरोधस्यैव व्यङ्ग्यत्वात् ।" (Pradipa (K. P,) P. 139. and also 'Kāvyaprakaśasaṅketa' P. 72). But what PR. specially wants to explain is even in the Uttarardha there can be Vastu-dhvani because though the words 'Udāra' and 'Anudāra' happen to be Viśeṣaṇas only, they also can be associated with 'Kurutaḥ', being first associated with the Tatpadārtha ('Sah'), by Abheda-saṁsarga. But the Vastu that is suggested in both the Ślokardhas, is mixed with Virodha. The Virodha in the first half is like this. When Śani is killing him even the Aśani (the Śani-viruddha) is doing the same, though he is expected to help him by being a Mitra according to the wellknown general understanding that the enemy of an enemy will be a friend. Again, in the second half, the Virodha between the Udāratva and Anudāratva which are said to be existing on the same object (Ekādhikaraṇa-vṛtti) is clear. Thus PR. contends that the Vastu-dhvani in both the places is mixed with Virodha.

Nāgeśa tries to criticise the contention of PR. and says that there is possibility of enemy's enemy also being one's enemy and therefore there is no Virodha in the first half (Gurumarmaprakāśa R. G. 164). But it cannot be said that PR. does not understand this simple point. His contention is mainly based on the general rule that the enemy of an enemy becomes one's friend, as explained in works like Arthaśāstra, and it is not correct to apply strict rules of logic especially while discussing the points of literary beauty. Even if the contention of Nāgeśa is to be accepted, it may be said that the Virodha is according to the general rule and the Virodha parihāra by applying this logic, besides the usual way of understanding the second sense.

Another instance where PR. tries to give a proper explanation of Mammaṭa's views is the place of Vastu-dhvani by Vastu. Mammaṭa gives the following Śloka as an example of Vastu-dhvani by Vastu :-

"अलसशिरोमणिर्धूर्तानामग्रणीः पुत्रि धनसमृद्धिमयः ।
इति जल्पितेन नताङ्गी प्रफुल्लविलोचना जाता ।" (KP. P. 141).

According to Govindaṭhakkura the Vastu that "he is to be enjoyed by me only" is suggested by another Vastu of having blooming eyes. (Pradipa KP. P. 141). In this context PR. questions, which Vastu is to suggest the Vastu 'ममैवोपभोगयोग्यः'? It cannot be suggested by the abjectives like 'Alasa-śiromaṇiḥ' etc., because the adjectives being mentioned by another women like a Dhātrī the Ākāra of the suggested Vastu would be 'तवैव उपभोगभोग्यः' but not 'ममैवोपभोगयोग्यः', as was said by Mammaṭa. It cannot be suggested by Pariphulla-nayanatva even. Because being the Anubhāva of Harṣa, it cannot suggest the Madupabhoga-yogyatva which is the Vibhāva of the Harṣa-bhāva. It is generally accepted that Anubhāvas are suggestive of Bhāvas only, but not of their Vibhāvas. Moreover, the simple Pariphu-

lla-Vilocanatva can not suggest the Madupa-bhoga-yogyatva, because it may be caused by the Harṣa resulting from other Vibhāvas as well, like the birth of a son or the gain of wealth etc. In reply to this objection PR. says, the Praphulla-nayanatva alone may not be enough to suggest the Madupa.bhoga-yogyatva. But the same, said to have resulted after hearing the 'Alasa-śiromaṇiḥ' etc., can suggest the Vastu 'Madupa-bhoga-yogyah' etc., which is the Vibhāva of Harṣa, and through its suggestion, it finally suggests the Harṣa. This is how the statement of Mammṭa should be understood.

If this procedure is to be accepted, it is questioned, does it not amont to accepting Harsha-dhvani as Saṁlakṣyadhvani? Because the Harṣa is being suggested through the suggestion of its Vibhāva. But PR says that he does not have any objection, as already established on previous occasion, in acce ping the the Bhāva-dhvani as, at times, Saṁlakṣya-krama also. In fact, PR. appears to have introduced this discussion, just to show once again how a Bhāvadhvani can be Saṁlakṣya-krama also.

Next PR. gives the following Śloka as an instance of Alaṅkāra-dhvani by the Svatassambhavi-vastu :-

"मृद्वीका रसिता सिता समसिता स्फीतं निपीतं पयः
स्वर्यातेन सुधाप्यधायि बहुधा रम्भाधरः खण्डितः ।
तत्त्वं ब्रूहि मदीयजीव भवता भूयो भवे भ्राम्यता
कृष्णेत्यक्षरयोरयं मधुरिमोद्गारः क्वचिल्लक्षितः ॥ (RG P. 166).

Here the Vastu, the question addressed to the Jīva, suggests that the uttering of the name of god is almost the same as the great Yoga which only enables a person to know every thing that has taken place in the previous births. Thus the Tādātm-

yādhyavasāya-rūpātiśyokti is being suggested by the Vastu, i. e. the above question.

Now the Pūrvapakṣin contends that the Nānā-janma-vṛttānta-jñāna need not be taken as Vyaṅgya, because it can be inferred by the Arthāpatti, in view of the question which implies such knowledge. Thus how can it be an instance of Vyaṅgya? And even if the Vyaṅgyatva of the above Atiśayokti were to be accepted, it can be Guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya only, the same being the Vācya-siddhyaṅga, because it helps the Vācya i. e the Praśna as explained above. The same case with the example "Tada-prāpti-mahāduḥkha" etc., given by Mammaṭa. (KP. P. 159). Because even here, in veiw of the Vācya-mukti-gamana, some Abheda (Nigiraṇa) has to be accepted between these two pairs the Duḥkha that is caused by Śrī Kṛṣṇa's seperation and the Duḥkha that is to be suffered in many births; and the Sukha that is caused by the contemplation on the lord and the Sukha to be enjoyed in many births, and thus it will be an instance of Arthā-patti; or even if Atiśayokti is accepted, it will be Vācyasiddh-yaṅga. In reply to this objection PR. lays down a broad rule that a Vpaṅgya can be said 'Vācyasiddhyṅga', only when there is no other justification, excepting the Vyaṅgyārtha for the Vācyasiddhi. When there is another justification the Vyaṅgya need not be taken as Vācyasiddhyaṅga. In the present case, the interrogation can be justified by the Sarvajñatva which may result from the Bhagavannāmasmaraṇa and, as such, Yogābheda alone need not be inferred by Arthaāpatti. (RG. P. 168). This principle Paṇḍitarāja reiterates, lest even the "Niśśeṣa cyuta-candanaṁ" etc., be Guṇī-bhūta-vyaṅgya, because the Vyaṅg-

yārtha also justifies the Adhamatva which is Vācya. By accepting this principle, it need not be taken as Vācyasiddhyaṅga, because there are many causes like the troubles given previously. in order to justify the Adhamatva.

Thus PR. introduces learned discussions at the end of almost all he examples which are quite useful in understanding many of the important pricnples of Alaṅkārasāstra. He concludes this section by giving some more examples of other varieties of Artha-sakti-mūla-dhvani and Lakṣaṇā-mūla-dhvani etc.

Fifth Chapter

SABDA VRTTIS

The next important topic that is dealt with by PR. elaborately is two Śaktis-Abhidhā and Lakṣaṇā, which are said to be the origin (Mūla) of Vyañjanā. Vyañjanā he does not feel it necessary to deal with so elaborately, as it has already been discussed thread bare by the old and the contemporary rhetoricians and he does not have any thing more to add to what is said by them. Ofcourse, some of the important points to be noted about Vyañjanā are mentoned by PR. while discussing about the nature of Śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani and on such other occasions. PR. appears to be the first Ālaṅkārika to introduce such an elaborate discussion about the nature of Abhidhā and Lankṣaṇā; though it is mostly in the form of reproducing what has already been said by other Śāstrakāras about them. But the importance of this discussion lies in its precision and pointedness with which PR. arrives at conclusions acceptable to Āliṅkārikas.

The Śabda-vṛttis are discussed by three Śastrakāras, Niyāyikas, Mīmāṁsakas and the Vaiyākaraṇas, and each Śāstrakāra has been holding divergent views about the nature and purpose etc., of these Vṛttis, on their own grounds. These discussions generally hover round the well-known topics, the nature of Śabda, its function in a sentence and its capacity to convey the meaning etc. Being a Śāstra, solely dealing with what is conveyed by Śabdas, Alaṅkāraśāstra also naturally has to make its own contribution to the discussions on the above topics. But the Ālaṅkārikas mainly follow the Vaiyākaraṇas in determining the Śabda-vṛttis and in fact they cliam to have received the suggestion for the third Vṛtti, Vyañjanā, from the Sphoṭavāda

of Vaiyākaraṇas. That is how we find the greatest Ālaṅkārika paying a glowing tribute to Vaiyākaraṇas. (Dhvanyāloka. PP, 133–35). What is attempted by PR. here is to show that their accepting some of the views of the Vaiyākaraṇas is not without ground and that they do not have any objection to accept the views of other śāstras also (as in the case of Lakṣaṇā) in consideration of the strength of their arguments.

PR. difines Abhidha in the following words :-"शक्त्याख्योऽर्थस्य शब्दगतः, शब्दस्यार्थगतो वा सम्बन्धविशेषोऽभिधा" (RG. P. 176). Abhidhā, otherwise called śakti, is a peculiar relation (Sambandhaviśeṣa) between the śabda and Artha. The relation being connected with two objects, one of them is technically called 'Pratiyogin' and the other 'Anuyogin'. But in the absence of any deciding factor (Vinigamanā-viraha) in the present context both of them can be called Pratiyogins or Anuyogins and so PR. says "Arthasya śabda-gataḥ" in other words "अर्थप्रतियोगिकः शब्दानुयोगिकः" and "Śabdasvārthagato vā" i. e. "शब्दप्रतियोगिकः अर्थानुयोगिकः" etc.

After giving his own definition of Abhidhā PR, mentions the views of other Śāstrakāras in the following words :- "सा च पदार्थान्तरमिति केचित्। अस्माच्छब्दादयमर्थोऽवगन्तव्य इत्याकारेश्वरेच्छैवाभिधा। तस्याश्च विषयतया सर्वत्र सत्त्वात् पटादीनामपि घटादिपदवाच्यता स्यात्। अतो व्यक्तिविशेषोपधानेन घटादिपदाभिधात्वं वाच्यम्" इत्यपरे। एवमपीश्वरज्ञानादिना विनिगमनाविरहः स्यात्। अतः प्रथममेव ज्यायः इत्यपि वदन्ति।" (RG. P. 123).

Here 'Kecit' refers to the Mīmāṁsakas and Vaiyākaraṇas and 'Apare' to the Nayāyikas. Again the 'Evamapi' etc., is the quotation of the views of the former with approval.

The views of the Naiyāyikas are as follows. Abhiadh is the Saṅketa which cannot be taken as a seperate Padārtha,

because it is no other than the desire of god that 'this word should mean this thing.' This Īśvarecchā can be in two forms "अस्मात पदात् अयमर्थो बोद्धव्यः"(this meaning should be understood from this word) or "इदं पदममुं अर्थं बोधयतु" (let this word convey this meaning). There is no material difference in what is meant by these two Bodhas axcepting the difference in the mode of expression. To use the language of the Naiyāyikas the Īśvarecchā in the first Bodha is "शब्दप्रकारिका अर्थविशेष्यिका" and in the second "अर्थप्रकारिका शब्दविशेष्यिका" But if the Īśvarecchā is to be accepted only in a general way, there will be some inconvenience. This (Īśvarecchā), being only one and permanent (Nitya), is there in the Paṭa also as in the Ghaṭa by Viṣayatā-sambandha and so Paṭa also will have to be meant by the word 'Ghaṭa'. This is avoided by accepting Icchā not in a general way but by making it different by the Upādhibheda. Thus the Īśvarecchā will be "घटपदजन्यबोधविषयतावान् घटो भवतु", "पटपदजन्यबोधविषयतावान् पटो भवतु" etc.

According to some later Naiyāyikas Icchā alone (but not Īśvarecchā) is acceptable as Abhidhā, so that even such words which are coined by men, like the names of persons etc.,can have Abhidhā,because such words cannot be said to be having Īśvarecchā. On the strength of the general Īśvarecchā expressed by "एकादशेऽहनि पिता नाम कुर्यात्" etc., even the modern names may be said to have Śakti. But the same cannot be said of the names like Guṇa, Vṛddhi, Nadī etc., invented by the grammarians. Therefore Icchā in general is to accepted as Śakti (Muktāvalī P, 359),

This theory of Naiyāyikas accepting Īśvarecchā as the Abhidhā is criticised by both the Mīmāṁsakas and Vaiyākaraṇas. They contend that according to this theory the Īśvarecchā is eternal one, and all comprehensive. Īśvara, being Omniscient, is having the knowledge which is also eternal one

and all-comprehensive. Now the question arises whether his Icchā should be accepted as Abhidhā or his Jñāna. In the absence of any deciding factor, both of them will have to be accepted as Abhidhā which only results in needless Gaurava. Therefore it is better to accept Abhidhā as a seperate Padārtha. This Abhidhā may be Bodhya-bodhaka-bhāva, Bodhakatva, Bodyatva or Tādātmya between the word and meaning.

After mentioning the views of the different Śāstrakāras on Abhidhā, PR. examines the definition given by A. D. in Vṛttivārtika. Abhidhā is defined by him as :- "शक्त्या प्रतिपादकत्वम् अभिधा" (P. I.). This PR. finds as uselese definition (Tuccha). Firstly, "प्रतिपादकत्वमभिधा" itself is wrong. Because what is intended by this definition is to find out the principle that is responsible for the cognition of the Artha of a pada. Now by simply knowing that there is Artha-pratipādakatā in a word the meaning cannot be understood and thus how can it be the Lakṣaṇa of Abhidhā ? It may be contended that the Pratipādakatva which is in the Śabda is a Vyāpāra effecting Pratipatti (cognition) and this Vyāpāra will be useful in the cognition itself only being known. Even then, PR. contends, there is Anyonyāśraya in the definition. By saying "शक्त्या प्रतिपादकत्वं" etc., it is meant that there is power either in the Śabda or in the Artha which is responsible for the cognition of the Artha. Thus the Śakti cannot be other than Abhidhā and so finally the definition would be "अभिधया प्रतिपादकत्वम् अभिधा" which is absured on the face of it and is subjected to Ātmāśraya-doṣa.

Nāgeśa tries to justify the definition of AD. "अभिधया प्रतिपादकत्वम् अभिधा" on the analogy of "धान्येन धनवान्" etc. But this analogy is deceptive. Dhānya being Viśeṣa and Dhana Sāmānya, such expression "Dhānyena dhanavān" etc., meaning "धान्याभिन्नधनवान्" may be correct. But how can it be correct when the same thing is mentiened at both the ends "Abhidhayā

pratipādakatvaṁ abhidhā"? Is it not like snying "धान्येन धान्यवान्"? It may be conteded that Abhidhā is a Viśeṣa like Dhānya and the Pratipādakatva is a Sāmānya like Dhana and so there is nothing wrong in saying "Abhidhayā pratipādakatvaṁ abhidhā". But it may be correct so far as "Abaidhayā pratipādakatvam" is concerned; but when it is said that such Pratipādakatvam itself is Abhidhā the Anyonyaśrayadoṣa stands un-answered; and this sentence sounds, if we use the same analogy "धान्येन धनवत्त्वं धान्यं or धान्यवत्त्वम्" । therefore PR.'s contention seems to be correct.

Next PR. divides the Abhidhā into three varieties Kevala-samudāya-śakti, Kevalāvayava-śakti and Samudāyāvayava-śakti-saṅkara which are otherwise called Rūḍhi, Yoga and Yogarūḍhi respectively. After explaining the three varieties with proper examples he mentions the three difinitions as given by Appayadīkṣita (Vṛttivārtikam. P. 1–3), and shows the same defects as in the definition of Abhidhā, in these definitions also, becuse as explained above they would ultimately be 'रूढ्या प्रतिपादकत्वं रूढिः' 'योगेन प्रतिपादकत्वं योगः, and योगरूढ्या प्रतिपादकत्त्वं योगरूढिः" etc., which evidently are having Anyonyāśrayadoṣa.

After examining the definitions of AD., PR. lists out a few words like "अश्वगन्धा, अश्वकर्ण, मण्डप, निशान्त and कुवलय etc., which do not normally come under any of the varieties mentioned above, and tries to find out the particular variety of Śakti coming into action in these words. First he mentions the opinion of those who accept different varieties of Śakti in different contexts. In places like 'अश्वगन्धारसं पिबेत्' etc., the word 'Aśvagandhā' means a herb by its Samudāyaśakti alone and in 'अश्वगन्धा वाजिशाला" it means 'having the smell of horses' by Kevala yogaśakti. Though these words are having both the śaktis-Samudāyaśakti and Yogaśakti, one of them will be ineffective when the

other is at work as explained avove and that is why they are called Kevala–samudāya-śakti and Kevala–yoga–śakti because each of them is expressing a sense which is incompatible with the one expressed by the other. Some others are of the opinion that there is no scope for Kevala–samudāya-śakti or Kevala-yoga-śakti in the 'Aśvakarṇa' etc., because there can be no Kevalatva in the strict sense of the word. Therefore they accept two varieties of Saṇkara, Yoga-rūḍhi and Yaugika-rūḍhi, and Paṅkaja etc., are the examples of the former while Aśvakarṇa etc., are the examples of the latter. Instead of taking it as a sub-division of Saṅkara, some are in fåvour of accepting Yaugika-rūḍhi as the fourth variety of Abhidhā.

After mentioning these theories, PR. at last talks about the Paramasiddhānta according to which there is no question of accepting Yoga because all this analysis as Prakṛti and Pratyaya etc , is quite artficial (Kālpanika) and there is only one variety of Abhidhā which is Rūḍhi. This theory is based upon the famous verse of Bhartṛhari :-

"पदे न वर्णा विद्यन्ते वर्णेष्ववयवा न च ।
वाक्ये पदानामत्यन्तं प्रविभागो न विद्यते" (Vākyapadīya. I. 73).

Though he mentions this theory only as a Pāramārthika-satya, PR. does not have any objection in accepting, in Vyāvahā-rika level, the above mentioned three or four varieties of Abhidhā and this assumption is justified by the ensuing discussion on the basis of Yoga etc.

PR. cites a verse where two pairs of Yoga-rūḍha-padas and Rūḍha-padas are used, and raises a question if there is Punarukti. Thé verse is this :-

"गीष्पतिरप्याङ्गिरसो गदितुं ते गुणगणान् सगर्वो न ।
इन्द्रः सहस्रनयनोऽप्यतद्भुरूपं परिच्छेत्तुम् ॥" (RG. P. 180).

There is Punarukti in this verse, says the Pūrvapakṣin, because the words 'Gīṣpatiḥ' and 'Sahasra-nayanaḥ' are expressing, by their Rūḍhi, the same senses as expressed by 'Āṅgirasaḥ' and 'Indraḥ'. It may be argued that in places like this where the words of both Rūḍhi and Yogarūḍhi are used, the Yogarūḍha-pada would express only the Yogārtha, because that alone is useful in suggesting some Atiśaya in the context. But how is it possible that a Yogarūḍha-pada should express the Yaugikārtha alone when its Rūḍhi is not obstructed by anything like Prakaraṇa ? Morever, it will be a useless attempt to restrict the Rūdhi by Prakaraṇādi, because when the same word is capable of expessing the Rūḍhyartha and the Yaugikārtha which is required to suggest some Atiśaya, where is the need of using another Rūḍha-pada also and trying to restrict the Rūḍhyartha of the inevitable Yogarūḍhapada by introducing some Prakaraṇa etc ? Thus the Purvapakṣin contends, the Punarukti-doṣa is unanswred.

The above objections are met by PR. in the following way :– In fact, in such cases like 'गीष्पतिराङ्गिरसः' and "इन्द्रः सहस्रनयनः" etc., both the Yogārtha and the Rūḍhyartha of 'Gīṣpatiḥ' etc., are first expressed, because both of them being Eka-padopātta their Ākāṅkṣā is Antaraṅga and thus the meanig of the words 'Gīṣpatiḥ' and 'Sahasranayanaḥ' will be "वाक्पत्यभिन्नः बृहस्पतिः" and "सहस्रनेत्राभिन्नः इन्द्रः" etc. Again in the next step this 'Viśiṣṭārtha alone but not the torn-out one (Aviśaklita) is to be associated with the Rūḍhapadārtha and thus the final Śābda-bodha of 'Gīṣpatirāṅgirasaḥ' etc., is "आङ्गिरसः वाक्पत्यभिन्नः आङ्गिरसः" and "इन्द्रः सहस्रनेत्राभिन्नः इन्द्रः" etc. Such Śābda-bodhas are not improper because according to the Navīnas such expressions like "घटो नीलघटः" "दण्डवान् रक्तदण्डवान्" etc., can be used which are generally said in answer to the Saṁśaya :-"घटो नीलघटो वा न वा?" दण्डवान् रक्तदण्डवान् वा न वा"? etc.

All this explanation is, PR. says, when sense is expressed by Abhidhā. But in view of the intention of the poet with which he specially uses such words 'Gīṣpati' and 'Sahasranayana' etc, it is proper that only the Yogārtha is expressed by the above words to suggest the intended Atiśaya in the context. And therefore, it is accepted that these words express the Yogārtha only by Lakṣaṇā, because if Abhidhā were to be accepted as coming into action it would express the Rūḍhyrtha also. Thus the use of Rūdhapada by the side of Yoga-rūḍha will be purposeful. Because in the absence of Rūḍhāpada the Yogarūḍhapada itself will have to express the Rūḍhārtha also; and once the Rūḍhārtha is conveyed by it, there will be doubt, in the mind of the reader, whether the Yaugikārtha of the word is intended or not; for, there are such places like 'Paṅkajākṣī' wnere the Yogarūḍhapadas (Paṅkaja etc.,) are understood only in their Rūḍhārtha almost devoid of Yaugikārtha, which is not useful to the context. Thus the effectiveness (Kurvadrūpatā) of the Yogārtha being lessened by this doubt, the suggestions of the Prakṛtopayogyatiśayaviśeṣa will be, contrary to the intention of the poet, doubtful. But the use of Rūḍha-pada by its side almost divests the Yogarūḍhapada of the Rūḍhārtha and the only remaining Yaugikārtha will be helpful in such suggestion. This is how the use of two words Rūḍha and Yogarūḍha, is to be justified. But in places like "पुष्पधन्वा विजयते जगत् त्वत्करुणावशात्" the Yogarūḍha word 'Puṣpadhanvā' alone expresses the Rūḍhayrtha i. e. Manmatha and also suggests the weakness etc., by its Yogaśakti. The selection, by the poet, of the particular word 'Puṣpadhanvā' of all the words makes the Yogārtha effective and purposeful. Thus in affect, PR. says, there is nothing wrong whether the second word is used or not.

There can be also other instances where the Yogarūḍhapada loses its Rūḍhayrtha and expresses only the Yogārtha. This can be found when a Rūḍha-pada conveying the sense, other than what is expressed by the Rūḍhi of a Yogarūḍhapada, is used by

the side of the latter and it (Yogarūḍhapada) expresses only the Yaugikārtha by Lakṣaṇā. For example the word 'Jalajāni' which is used in association with (as adjectival to)'Kumudāni' in "दिशि दिशि जलजानि सन्ति कुमुदानि" conveys only the Yaugikārtha by Lakṣaṇā becuse its Rūḍhartha i. e. Padma is not of the same Jāti as that of Kumuda.

After discussing about the nature and varieties of Abhidhā in detail, PR. deals with the nature of Abhidheya which has also been a point of dispute among the Śāstrakāras. According to the Naiyāyikas, the śakti of the word is in expressing the Jāti-viśiṣṭa-vyakti, where as it is in the Jāti alone according to Mīmāṁsakas. But according to Vaiyākaraṇas the Śakti of a Pada expresses four things Jāti, Guṇa, Kriyā and Yādṛcchika which are collectively called Upādhi. The Ālaṅkārikas appear to have been mainly following the Vaiyākaraṇas, but they do not seem to have any objection in finally accepting the views of Mīmāṁsakas; and that is why we find Mammaṭa quoting both the views with approval :- "सङ्केतितश्चतुर्भेदो जात्यादिर्जातिरेव वा" (KP. II. 8).

PR. starts this section with reproducing the views of Vaiyākaraṇas. He states :- The Abhidheya is of four kinds Jāti, Guṇa, Kriyā and Yādṛcchika. Words like 'Gauh' express the Jāti, Gotva etc., which is made known by a particular kind of body (Saṁsthāna-Viśeṣa-vyaṅgya) and is therefore Pratyakṣa-siddha. Likewise the words 'Ghrāṇa' and 'Rasanā' etc., express the Ghrāṇatvādi-Jāti which is not Pratyakṣa-siddha but Anumāna-siddha, the Ghrāṇādi etself being Anumeya through their different functions. The Śakti cannot be accepted in Vyakti instead of Jāti becuse the number of Śaktis will be innumerable according to the number of the Vyaktis. Moreover if we take the example of 'Go' Śabda it is impossible to have the Pratyakṣa of all the Govyaktis of the whole world and of past, present and future; and it cannot be said that a man who is able to understand the Śakti of Go-Śabda in a particular cow can understand

another cow also with the help of the same Śakti–Jñāna, because it would lead to Vyabhicāra-doṣa. In Jātiśakti–vāda, Jāti being one, the Śakti also can be one only; and there will be no Vyabhicāra because the eternal Gotvādi–jāti is constantly present in all the Gavādi-vyaktis of past, present and future.

Now the Vyaktiśaktivādins try to meet the above objections on the strength of the following argument :– "ज्ञातगोत्वादिरूपया गोत्वादिज्ञानरूपया वा प्रत्यासत्त्या प्रत्यक्षेण परिकल्पितासु सकलतदीयव्यक्तिष्वभिधायाः कल्पने नास्ति दोषः ।" (R. G. P. 182).

According to the Naiyāyayikas, the pratyakṣa is of two kinds Laukika-pratyakṣa and Alaukika-pratyakṣa. Laukika-prtyakṣa is the one which is produced by the contact of the senses with the objects which is effected by six kinds of Sambandhas Saṁyoga, Saṁyukta-samavāya, Samyukta-samaveta-samavāya, Samavāya, Samaveta Samavāya, and Viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva. Alaukika-pratyakṣa is produced by three kinds of Alaukika-sannikarṣas which are called Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti, Jñāna lakṣaṇa-prayāsatti and the Yogaja-pratyāsatti. (Muktāvalī I. 59-63). The meaning of the Sāmāny-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti is explained in Muktāvali(P.272) as a Sāmānaya-rūpa-patyāsatti. Though the Sāmānya is not directly connected with the Indriyas, it is said to be Sannikarṣa because it is Prakārī-bhūta in the Indriya-sambaddha-viśeṣyaka-jñāna. For example when there is contact of Indriyas with Dhūmādi there arises a Dhūmajñāna in which Dūmatva is a Prakāra i. e. Viśeṣaṇa. By the help of this Dhūmatva-sannikarṣa one can have the knowledge of all the Dhūmas, past, present and future. It is necessary to accept the Sāmānya-lakṣaṇā-Pratyāsatti, because unless all the Dhūmas and the Vahnis are known by Dhūmatva and Vahnitva respectively there can be no Saṁśaya about the Vahni-vyāpyatva of, the Dhūma which is a condition precedent for the Anumāna, for, the Vahni-sambandha of the pratyakṣa-dhūma is known without

doubt by Pratyakṣa itself and other Dhūmas are not knoūn. (Muktāvali. P. 280).

The 'Sāmānya' in the 'Sāmānylakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti' need not necessarily mean, Muktāvalī states, the Nitya-jāti alone. According to the Vigraha "समानानां भावः सामान्यम्" it can mean such Anitya-padārthas like Ghaṭa also. Thus once a Ghaṭa is known as existing on the ground by Saṁyoga-sambandha or on the Kapāla by Saṁavāya-sambandha, one can later on have the knowledge of all such Bhūtalas and Kapālādi with the help of this Sāmānyalaksaṇa-pratyasātti. (Muktāvali. P. 275). But one inconvinience appears cropping up here by accepting the Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti as Sāmānya-rūpa-pratyāsatti. When the Ghaṭa is lost and even if the place having the Ghaṭa is remembered, all the places having the Ghaṭa cannot be cognised by Sāmānya-pratyāsatti, because the Sāmānya i. e. Ghaṭa is no more. In order to avoid this Avyāpti, the word 'Lakṣaṇa' in the 'Sāmānya–lakṣaṇa–pratyāsatti' is explained to mean Viṣaya and thus Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa–pratyāsatti is to be understood as Sāmānya–viṣayaka-jñāna–pratyāsatti. In the above place, even though the Ghaṭa is lost, its Jñāna which is still existing can help as Pratyāsatti and thereby produce the cognition of all the Bhūtalas having Ghaṭādi.

Now coming to the point on hand, the Pūrvapakṣin contends that there is nothing wrong even if the Abhidhā is only in the Vyakti because all the Vyaktis can be the object of Pratyakṣa by the above Pratyāsatti whether it is ज्ञातगोत्वादिसामान्यरूपप्रत्यासत्ति or गोत्वादिसामान्यज्ञानरूपप्रत्यासत्ति ।

PR. refutes this contention by simply saying that the Sāmānya-pratyāsatti is not acceptable and that the Gaurava–doṣa levelled against your theory is not answered :- (RG. P. 183). The following is the contention of the Siddhāntin :- It is not necessary to accept the Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa–pratyāsatti Even with-

out its help, the Cakṣussaṁyoga with one Govyakti which is Gotvāśraya, can produce the cognition of other Govyaktis which are at a distance, by the Laukika-sannikarṣa of Samyukta-samaveta-samavāya. Like wise, the Govyaktis of distant time can be known by becoming Buddhi-viṣaya trhough the same Sambandha because they also are Gotvāśraya. To know the Govyakti as Gotvāśraya is inevitable even in the Vyakti-śakti-vāda. Because a man may know the Śakti of Gopada in only one Vyakti at the first instance. But on a second occasion when he sees an elderly man ordering a young man saying 'Gāmānaya', 'Gāṁ-naya', 'Gāṁ-badhāna' etc., and the young man brings, takes and ties the cow accordingly, he understands that the second cow also is having the Gotva-jāti and that is being meant by the Go-pada as the previous one. It may be contended, as explained above, that Sāmānya-pratyāsatti is required for Vyāpti-saṁśaya and Vyāpti-jñāna etc. But the Vyāpti-jñana can be had in the Mahānasīya-dhūma in the Dhūmatva-rūpa itself. It may be argued again thot there can be no Vyāpti-saṁśaya, because there is Vyāpti-niścaya in the Dhūma which is actually seen, and other Dhūmas do not come to the mind of the perceiver (Anupasthita) But this argument is unfounded, because even though there is Vyāpti-niścaya in a particular Dūma, there is scope for Vyāpti-Saṁśaya by Dhūmatva in general.

Moreover, Sāmānya cannot be taken as Sambandha at all; because every Sambbandha invariably implies the existance of Anuyogin and Pratiyogin which are not found in the case of Sāmānya. Again we do not find also Viśiṣṭa-buddhi which is produced by the Sambandha.

Thus in the absence of Sāmānya-lakṣāṇa-pratyāsatti the Vyabhicāra-doṣa, pointed out in the Vyakti-śakti-vāda, remains unanswered. Even if the Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-prātyasatti were to be accepted, where is the answer for the Gaurava-doṣa raised above ? because innumerable Śaktis will have to be accepted according to the endless number of the Vyaktis.

Again PR. refers to another argument of the Pūrva-pakṣin in answer to the Vyabhicāra-doṣa and says that the persistance of the Gaurava-doṣa makes it useless. The argument of Pūrvapakṣin runs as follows : of the three things; Śakti-graha, Padārthopasthiti and Śābda-bodha, each preceding one is the cause of the following, and in all of them only one thing shonld appear as Prakāra or Viśeṣaṇī-bhūta (Samāna-prakāratayaiva) but all of them need not have only one Viśeṣya. In other words, Gotva-prakāraka-śakti-graha is the cause for the Gotva-prakārako pasthiti. Gotva Prakārakopasthiti is the cause of Gotva Prakāraka-śābda-bodha. It need not be taken that Gotva-prakāraka-śakti-graha is the cause of Gotva viśeṣyakopasthiti. Thus even if the Śakti-graha was only in a Vyakti-viśeṣa, one can have, with the help of the above Śakti-graha, the Śābda-bodha when a particulr Vyakti is not taken as Viśeṣya and so there is no Vyabhicāra though there is no Śakti-graha in all the Vyaktis. Inspite of this explanation to avoid Vyabhicāra, PR. says, Gaurava-doṣa can not be avoided.

In fact the above Kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva among Śakti-graha, Padārthopasthiti and śābda-bodha itself is defective. Because if it is not accepted that Tatprakāraka-śakti-graha etc , is the casue of Tadviśeṣyaka-padārthopasthiti etc., the Gotva-prakāraka-śakti-graha may produce Aśva-viśeṣyakopasthiti and Gotva-prakārakopasthiti would result in Gotva-prakārakāśva-viśeṣvaka-śābda-bodha.

After establishing the Jātyādi-śaktivāda by refuting the Vyakti-śakti-vāda PR. says that Vyakti-bodha can be had by Ākṣepa i. e, Arthāpatti, because the Jāti can not exist without Vyakti; or by Lakṣaṇā because there can be no Anvaya of Jāti in Vākyārtha. The Lakṣanā theory is favoured generally, because the Śābda-bodha connected with a particular Artha can be produced by the Padārthopasthiti depending upon the Vṛtti-jñāna about that particular Artha only.

The Jāti which is established as the Śabdārtha is considered to be very important and is said 'Prāṇada', because it gives Vyavahāra-yogyatā to a word. In this connection PR. cites the well-known passage of Vākyapadīya as quoted by Mammaṭa. "गोः-स्वरूपेण न गौः, नाप्यगौः, गोत्वाभिसम्बन्धात् गौः" (KP. P. 32). This he explains, in a beautiful way with the help of Yukti (RG. P. 144).

A cow cannot be called cow in her individual capacity, unless the Gotva is known; nor she can be said to be other than cow. If the Dharmi-svarūpa-mātra were to be accepted as Vyavahārahetu without the knowledge of Gotva, one would have the cognition, after an indistinct perception of a distant cow, that 'it is cow' or 'it is not cow'. Moreover a Padārtha as an individual object cannot produce the Vyāvṛtti-jñāna unless Jāti is accepted. For example the idea that Ghaṭa is different from Paṭa cannot be had unless Ghaṭatva which is Anusyūta in all the Ghaṭas, but not the Paṭas, is accepted. Once the Jāti is accepted the Vyāvṛttatva-jñāna can be had as Ghaṭa is different from Paṭa, because it is having Ghaṭatva which is not found in 'Paṭa'. Thus such Vyāvṛtti-jñāna removes the scope for having Gojñāna on Paṭa and Go-bhinnatva-jñāna on the Go.

The Guṇas like 'Śukla', 'Pīta' etc., are the Abhidheyas of the words like 'Śuklaḥ', 'Pītaḥ', etc., and Kriyā is the Abhidheya of the 'Calana', 'Pāka' etc. The Guṇas and the Kriyās may appear to be innumerable according to the number of their Āśrayas. But all the Guṇas and Kriyās should be taken as one Guṇa and Kriyā, to avoid Gaurava which is explained in the Vyakti-śakti-vāda. Moreover we find the Pratyabhi-jñāna in these things as this 'Śukla is the same as that one', and 'this Calana is the same as that Calana' etc., which also proves their being one. In this connection PR. quotes Mammaṭass words. "गुणक्रियायदृच्छानां वस्तुत एकरूपाणां आश्रयभेदात् भेद इव लक्ष्यते (KP. P. 34). Thus he concludes that the Bheda-jñāna is only a Bhrānti. Not only Bheda-

jñāna even the Utpatti-vināśa-jñāna (of the Guṇas and Kriyās) as that of the letters like Gakāra according to the Varṇa-nityatāvādins, is only Bhrānti-jñāna.

A meaning which is ascribed, by the speaker according to his will, to the words like Dittha is called Yādṛcchikābhidheya. There are three views about the yādṛcchika-dharma. According to the Vaiyākaraṇas the yādṛcchika-dharma which is said to be the Vācya of Ditthādi-śabdas, is only the Akhaṇḍasphoṭa which is being made known (Abhivyakta) by the last letter of the Śabda, associated with the Saṁskāra produced by the cognition of previous letters. The last letter alone has to be accepted suggesting the Sphoṭa in the above procedure because it cannot be suggested by the Varṇa-samudāya, for, all the Varṇas which perish immediately after they are uttered, cannot be grouped together at all. This Sphoṭa rests in direct contact with Ākāśa only but it is said to be in contact with the object (Artha) indirectly by the Saṅketa effected by Pitrādi (RG. P. 184). It is the opinion of some scholars, who are not in favour of accepting the additional Sphoṭa, that the Dharma is only the Varṇa-samudāya, i.e. the Varṇas arranged in an order (RG. P. 184).

Varṇas cannot be grouped together as explained above. Therefore, some are of the opinion that the individual Vyakti alone is the Dharma meant by words like 'Dittha' etc, (RG. P. 184). According to the first two theories the words like 'Dittha' would first convey the Dharma Sphoṭa or Varṇa-samudāya and in the next step they produce the cognition of the Vyakti inferred by Sphoṭa etc., which ultimately leads to the Savikalpaka-jñāna, the Jñāna of the Vyakti as associated with the above Dharmas. But according to the third, theory, the words convey directly the Vyakti itself and this 'Jñāna' being devoid of Viśeṣaṇa is called Nirvikalpaka.

Thus, according to the Vaiyākaraṇas, the Jāti, Guṇa, Kriyā, and the Yādṛcchika-rūpa are the Abhidheyas of the Śabdas, and this theory is mainly based upon the famous statement in Mahābhāṣya (P. 101) "चतुष्टयी शब्दानां प्रवृत्तिः, जातिशब्दाः, गुणशब्दाः क्रियाशब्दाः यदच्छाशब्दाश्चतुर्थाः"

At the conclusion of this section PR. refers to the views of some scholars who take only Jāti as the Abhidheya of all the Śabdas. Thus in the case of Guṇa-vācaka-śabdas like 'Śukla' 'Śuklatva'-jāti as found in many Śuklas will be the Pravṛtti-nimitta and this is the same case with the Kriyā-vācaka-śabdas which can have 'Calanatva' and 'Pākatva' etc , as their Abhidheya. The same cannot be said of the Ḍitthādi-śabdas which mean only one Vyakti. Therefore these words, as uttered by different people, are taken in their plurality and all of them are said to be having Ḍitthatva-jāti. But such Ḍit hatva-jāti unlike Gotvādi may be resting with the Ḍittha-padas but not with the objects. To avoid this difference it is considered that the particular person named Ḍittha should be taken as different persons according to the difference of his age etc. Thus Ḍittha the child is different from Ḍittha the young. Therefore one Ḍitthatva-jāti, Anugata in all these Ḍitthas, can be accepted. Thus Jāti, alone is considered to be the Abhidheya of all Śabdas by Mīmāṁsakas, and PR. like Mammaṭa appears not to have any objection to accept this view.

LAKṢAṆĀ.

After examining the nature and the scope of Abhidhā PR. deals with Lakṣaṇā which, like Abhidhā, has been the subject matter of discussion of all the Śāstrakāras, mainly the Vaiyākaraṇas Mīmāṁsakas and the Naiyāyikas who hold different views. The Ālaṅkārikas maintain their own theory to suit their purpose. Mukulabhaṭṭa, appears to be the first Ālaṅkārika who has intro-

duced a systamatic discussion on the Vṛttis of the Śabda to be followed by Mammaṭa and other writers like AD. and PR.

While many of the Vaiyākaraṇas are in favour of accepting Lakṣaṇā as a seperate Vṛtti, some appear to be of the opinion that it is only one phase of Abhidhā and that there is no need to accept it as a seperate Vṛtti. (Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra P. 252). That Lakṣaṇā is acceptable to many Vaiyākaraṇas also is evident from the elaborate discussion about the same in the Vaiyākaraṇa-laghumañjūṣā of Nāgeśa (PP. 94–133), where he finally defines it as 'Śakyatāvacchedaka-rūpa' (P. 112). By accepting this kind of Lakṣaṇā the Vaiyākaraṇas contend that for conveying the sense, there is no need of accepting seperate Kāryakāraṇa-bhāva in Lakṣaṇā-sthala :- (Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntalaghumañjūṣā P. 112, 13).

The Naiyāyikas define Lakṣaṇā as "Śakya-sambandha" (Muktāvali 3 & 5). And as can be seen presently PR. follws the Naiyāyikas in defining Lakṣaṇā. There are certain places where a Śabda cannot express the intended meaning (Tātparya-viṣayībhūtārtha) through Abhidhā only, thoguh the meaning is associated with the Mukhyārtha, and it is there the Lakṣaṇā comes into action. Thus 'Gaṅgāyām' in 'Gaṅgāyām ghoṣah' expresses the meaning 'Gaṅgātīre' according to the intention of the speaker and the secondary meaning 'Tīra' as expressed by 'Gaṅgā' is associated with the river Gaṅgā. (Muktāvali P. 386).

Mukulabhaṭṭa while accepting that the Lakṣyārtha is connected with the Mukhyārtha, contends that the Lakṣaṇā is mainly the Vyāpāra of the Mukhyārtha because the secondary meaning is expressed indirectly by the Śabda through the medium of the Mukhyārtha. He writes :-

"शब्दव्यापारतो यस्य प्रतीतिस्तस्य मुख्यता ।
अर्थावसेयस्य पुनः लक्ष्यमाणत्वमुच्यते ॥" (Abhidhāvṛttimātṛkā. P. 1).

Thus he draws a clear distinction between the Mukhyārtha and the Lakṣyamāṇārtha in that the former is expressed by Śabdavyāpāra and the latter is by Artha-vyāpāra. The etimology of the word'Mukhya'as explained by Mukula, is quite interesting. He says that just as the face which is seen first before the other limbs, like hands etc.. are seen, the sense which is expressed first, is called Mukhya. (Abhidhāvṛttimātṛkā P. 1.) After explaining that the Gotva is the Mukhyārtha of the word 'Gauḥ' in 'Gauranubandhyaḥ', he states that the individual cow 'Go-vyakti' is the Lakṣyārtha of the above word because it is understood ofter knowing the Mukhyārtha i. e. Gotva which cannot directly be expressed by Abhidhā, according to the famous rule "विशेष्यं नाभिधा गच्छेत् क्षीणशक्तिर्विशेषणे", that the Abhidhā which ceases to function after expressing the Viśeṣaṇa cannot express Viśeṣya. Here the Abhidhā having completed its function by exnressing the Gotva which is the Viśeṣaṇa i. e. Prakāra in the Gotūpārtha, does not express the Go-vyakti also and this is to be conveyed by Lakṣaṇā-vṛtti. (Abhidhāvṛtti matṛkā. P. 4) It is interesting to note that Makula appears to treat Lakṣanā as one phase of Abhidhā only. According to him Abhidhā has two Vyāpāras (functions) Mukhya Vyāpāra and Lākṣaṇika Vyāpāra, which Convey Mukhyārtha and Lākṣaṇikārth respectively (Abhidhāvṛttimātṛkā P. 4.) That is why he names his small treatise where he discusses about the Abhidhā and Lakṣaṇā, as 'Abhidhā-vṛttimātṛkā' only. Perhaps this was the practice prevalent among old writers which is justified by the well-known anpellation given to Lakṣaṇā 'Abhidhā-puccha' that it is the tail of Abhidhā.

Mukula's definition of Lakṣaṇā apperas to be on the authority of Bhaṭṭavārtika where it is defined in similar terms :-

"मानान्तरविरोधे तु मुख्यार्थस्यापरिग्रहे ।
अभिधेयाविनाभूतप्रतीतिर्लक्षणोच्यते ॥"

Here the second half consists of the definition of Lakṣaṇā and the phrase 'अभिधेयाविनाभूतप्रतीतिः' is to be understood 'अभिधेया विनाभूतस्य अर्थस्य प्रतीतिः यया सा ।' The first half gives the reason for the function of Lakṣaṇā. Thus according to the Mimāṁsakas only such Artha which is associated with the Mukhyārtha can be Lakṣyārtha; in other words, the Lakṣyārtha is conveyed by a Śabda through the medimum of its Mukhyārtha as is explained by Śabarasvāmin :- (Mīmāṁsādarśana (1-6 Chapters) PP. 69-70).

Mammaṭa's definition of Lakṣaṇā is as follows ;-

"मुख्यार्थबाधे तद्योगे रूढितोथ प्रयोजनात् ।
अन्योर्थो लक्ष्यते यत्सा लक्षणारोपिता क्रिया ॥" (K.P., P. 37.)

In this Kārikā, Mammaṭa combines the definition of Lakṣaṇā, its cause and its purpose which are to be seperated carefully. As has been explained by Mammaṭa himsef (KP. P. 39). the presence of Lakṣaṇā anticipates three things- (1) The incongruity of the Mukhyārtha, (2) connection between the Vācyārtha and the Lakṣyārtha, and (2) any of the two-Rūḍhi or Prayojana. Though all the three are said to be the three Hetus in general, the Hetutva of all of them cannot be taken as of similar nature. Mukhyārthabādha is a real Hetu in the strict sense of the word. But the Mukhyārtha-yoga is the Svarūpa of the Lakṣaṇā which is to be explained in other words"Śakya-sambandhaḥ Lakṣaṇā". 'Prayojanāt' explains the reason why Lakṣaṇā has to be accepted at all. Thus the definition of Lakṣaṇā as given by Mammaṭa is almost like the one given by Naiyāyikas "Lakṣaṇā śakya-sambandhaḥ Tātparyānupapattitaḥ". (Muktāvali P. 285).

Rūḍhi is given as one of the Hetus of Lakṣaṇā ba Mammaṭa, in places like "Kaliṅgah śūrah" where the word 'Kaliṅga' which is the name of a country is used to mean its inhabitant. This

Lakṣaṇā is almost similar to Abhidhā, in that, only particular words can be used in particular sense with no provision to coin similar words as explained by Tantravārtika. :-

"निरूढा लक्षणाः काश्चित् सामर्थ्यादभिधानवत् ।
क्रियन्ते साम्प्रतं काश्चित् काश्चिन्नैव त्वशक्तितः॥"(Tantravārtika)

In the above Kārıkā Kumārilabhaṭṭa mentions three categories of Lakṣaṇā. The first one is Nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā which is almost similar to Abhidhā because the words with such Lakṣaṇā are capable of expressing only particular senses. The Lakṣaṇā of the second type can be coined by writers where as the Lakṣaṇā of the third catagory cannot, in fact, exist at all, because though coined afresh, it cannot convey the intended meaning.

Mukulabhaṭṭa gives the words 'Lipta' 'Suhṛd' and 'Rāma' etc., in the verse "स्निग्धश्यामलकान्तिलिप्तवियतो" etc., as belonging to the second catagory becusue they can be coined by writers and convey the intended meaning; and the word 'तुरङ्गकान्तानन–हव्यवाहज्वाला' in the verse :-

"मध्येसमुद्रं ककुभः पिशङ्गीः या कुर्वतीकाञ्चनभूमिभासा ।
तुरङ्गकान्ताननहव्यवाहज्वालेव भित्त्वा जलमुल्ललास ॥"

as belonging to the third category, because though coined afresh, it does not have the capacity of conveying the intended meaning Bāḍabāgni. (Abhiddhāvṛttimāṛkā pp. 11-12.)

According to Pradīpa, Mammaṭa's defininiton of Lakṣaṇā is based on that of Some old writers :–'शक्यसम्बन्धेनाशक्यप्रतीतिर्लक्षणा" (Lakṣaṇā is the cognition of the secondary meaning in its relation with the primary sense). Becuase the cognition itself cannot be the Vṛtti, which is the cause of such cognition, he makes an amendment and says that Lakṣaṇā is the relation with the Ṣakyārtha

which is the cause of sueh Pratipatti. (Pradīpa (K. P.) P. 38.) This point has been clearly cxplained by Dr. Chaudhury.(Kāvyatattvasamīkṣā P. 72.)

Like the Mīmāṁsakas and their follower Mukula, Mammaṭa also accepts Lākṣaṇā as mainly the Vyāpāra of the Mukhyārtha ascribed to the Śabda. This is what he means when he writes :- "स आरोपितः शब्दव्यापारः सान्तरार्थनिष्ठः लक्षणा" which is explained by Pradīpa (KP. P. 39) "शक्यव्यवहितलक्ष्यार्थविषयकत्वात् शब्दे आरोपित एव स व्यापारः वस्तुतः अर्थनिष्ठ एव"। Therefore Dr. Chaudhury(Kāvyatattvasamīkṣā P. 72.) is right in finding fault with the explanation of Vamanalankara Jhalkikar, which, as he says, is against the explanation of Pradīpa. In fact, Mammaṭa himself states, in inambiguous words that Lakṣaṇā is mainly Vācyārthā śraya, in his small treatise Śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra (P. 2) "एवं वाच्यवाचकार्थ निष्ठौ व्यापारावभिधालक्षणे" Here 'वाच्यवाचकार्थनिष्ठौ' is to be understood as :- 'वाच्यस्य वाचके–अर्थात् पदे; अर्थे च' etc.

Mammaṭa's definition of Lakṣaṇā is acceptable to almost all the Ālaṅkārikas including Viśvanātha. But PR. following the Naiyāyikas and the Vedāntins, defines Lakṣaṇā in simple words as "शक्यसम्बन्धो लक्षणा" (RG.P. 185) and it is to be understood, as explained by Sarala (RG. P. 185), as the expression, by a word, of a secondary sense, as is related with the primary sense. Next PR. examines the Lakṣaṇā-hetus (RG. P. 185.) There are two views—one, accepting Anvayānupapatti as the root of Lakṣaṇā and the other accepting Tātparyānupapatti. Of these two views the former cannot be correct because if it were to be accepted there can be no Lakṣana in places like "काकेभ्यो दधि रक्ष्यताम्'and 'नक्षत्रं दृष्ट्व ावाचं विसृजेत्' which are accepted as the instances of Lakṣaṇā by all the Śāstrakāras; because ven if we do not take them in their Lākṣaṇikārtha, thier Mukhyārthas are not incongruous. Therefore Tātparyānupapatti is to be accepted as the Lakṣaṇā-bīja. Now there can be Lakṣaṇā in the above examples

because the intention of the speaker, here, is to say that the curds should be protected from all the creatures which eat them and the silence can be broken after a particular time when the stars appear on the sky. But even this Tātparyānupapatti can be explained in two ways : either as :- "मुख्यार्थतावच्छेदकाधिकरणक: तात्पर्यविषयान्वयितावच्छेदकताया: अभाव:" or "तात्पर्यविषयान्वयाधिकरणक: मुख्यार्थतावच्छेदकरूपेण मुख्यार्थप्रतियोगिकताया अभाव: ।'

In simple language it may be said that the Mukhyārthatāvacchedaka (Gaṅgātva etc.,) should not be the same as Tātparya-Viṣayānvayitāvacchedake and then only Lakṣaṇā arises. Or it may be explained that the Mukhyārtha, in its capacity of being Mukhyārtha should not be associated with the intended Anvaya while giving rise to Lakṣaṇā. But the first explanation of Tātparyānupapatti is against the accepted theory of Ālaṅkarikas, because in places like "Gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ" etc., they accept, in order to facilitate the suggestion of Pāvanatva cte., that the cognition of the Taṭa is only Gaṅgātva-rūpa. Thus Tātparya-viṣayānvayitāvacchedakatā rests with the Gaṅgātva itself. Thereforc the second explanation of the Tātparyānupapatti can be accepted because, in the above example, we get the cognition of the 'Tīra' only, though in the form of Gaṅgātva, and so Taṭa only (but not Gaṅgā) is the Pratiyogin in the Ādhārādheyabhāva. Thus the Tātparyānupapatti is one of the Lakṣaṇā-hetus, according to PR. the other being Rūḍhi or Prayojana. It is to be noted, PR. does not take Mukhyārthayoga as one of the Lakṣanā-hetus, because, as explained above, it is the Lakṣaṇā-svarūpa but not its Hetu.

The above contention of the Ālaṅkārikas as presented by PR. that the cognition of the Lakṣyārth is Śakyārtha-prakāraka, is objected to by some critics on the following ground. In the verse :-

"कचतस्त्रस्यति वदनं वदनात्कुचमण्डलं बिभेति ।
मध्याद् बिभेति नयनं नयनादधर: समद्विजति ॥"

the words Kaca, Vadana, Kuca, Madhya, Nayana and Adhara are used to mean by Lakṣaṇā, Rāhu. Moon, Lotus, Lion Deer and sprout respectively. But if the Śakyatāvacchedaka i. e. Kacatva etc., also were to be included in the Lakṣya-śābda-bodha, the statement that the Vadanaṁ etc., are afraid of the Kaca etc., would be improper. Such statement can be justified only when the Kaca etc., are taken completely as Rāhu etc., without any tinge of Kacatva, Vadanatva etc., in them. This objection is voiced in the Darpaṇa commenting on the following lines of Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra. 'लक्षणायामलङ्कारिकाणां शक्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारक एव बोधः ।" (P. 65.)

While repeating the above objection, Candrikā shows another objection also. In 'काकेभ्यो दधि रक्ष्यताम्'the word 'Kākebhyaḥ' means by Lakṣaṇā, 'Dadhyupaghātakebhyaḥ' and accoding to the contention of PR. the Lakṣyārtha 'Dadhyupaghātakebhyaḥ' will be Śakyatāvacchedaka-prakāraka. Now Kāka also being one of the Dadhyupaghātakas, comes under the general Lakṣyārtha which is Kākatvaprakāraka. Thus the Mukhyārtha (Kāka) is the Pratiyogin (Saṁbaddha) in the Tātparya-viṣayānvaya (i. e. Avadhyavadhimadbhāva in the present context) and this Pratiyogitā of the Mukhyārtha is Mukhyārtha-pratiyogitāvacchedaka-rūpa (i. e. Kākatvā) only. Thus in the absence of such Pratiyogitā, how can it be accepted as an instance of Lakṣaṇā? After posing this question, Candrikā itself suggests a method to avoid this trouble. If it is said that the Mukhyārtha alone should not be the Pratiyogin in such Sambandha, the above objection can be got over, because in the present case Kāka only is not the Pratiyogin of such Sambandha but the Biḍālādi also. But even if this objection is met, Candrikā contends, the first objection stands unanswered. (Candrika Part II pp. 150-151.)

It may be pointed out here, this objection is not so formidable as is opined to be, by Candrikā. Even if the Rāhu and Candra etc., are cognised in their Kacatvādyavacchinnarūpas, importance is to be given to their Rāhutvādi only in view of the

Vidheya i. e. Trāsa, and the Sakyatāvacchedaka fades into insignificance. Thus there is nothing wrong in accepting the above theory. Moreover the same objection can be raised in the well-known example of Lakṣaṇā "Gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ" etc., because even after the Tīra-lakṣaṇā, how can it be taken as the Ādhāra of Ghoṣa when the Gaṅgātva is lurking in the mind of the hearer? Whatever answer is found to meet this objection, can be applied in this case also, because it is against the common experience that the Kacādi-rūpārtha would completely disappear from the mind of the hearer when he cognises the Lakṣyārtha.

In fact it is doubtful if this comes under Lakṣaṇā at all. There is a possibility of taking it as an instance of Gauṇī-lakṣaṇā only; but even this does not seem to be justified here. For, it cannot come either under the Sāropā or Sādhayavasānā, because there is no mention of both the Viṣaya aud Viṣayin as in 'Mukhaṁ Candraḥ' etc., or of the Viṣayin alone as in "Vāpi kāpi-sphurati gagane" etc., (Kuvalayananda. P. 38), and the mention of Viṣaya does not come under either category. Therefore it may have to be taken as Bhrāntimadalaṅkāradhvani.

It is interesting to note, Nagesa meets this objection in an altogher different way. In the Vaiyākaraṇalaghumañjūṣa, in the context of explaining Lakṣaṇā as 'Śakyatāvacchedaka', he states that there is nothing wrong in the "Kacatah trasyati" etc., because Kacatva is ascribed to Rāhutva ete. Though Nagesa does not say like this directly, (he says that Rāhutvādi-viśiṣṭa is'expressed with Kacatvādi) it should be the purport of his statement, in view of the context of his definition of Lakṣaṇā.

"अत्र सर्वत्र तत्तद्धर्मविशिष्टे शक्यतावच्छेदकधर्मारोपः । अत एव "कचत स्त्रस्यति वदनं" इत्यादिना कचत्वादौ राहुत्वादिविशिष्टस्य बोधात् न त्रासाद्यन्वया-नुपपत्तिः ।" (PLM. P. 122).

Nagesa's statement appears to be self contradicting, because

when there is Āropa of the Śakyatāvacchedaka on the Lakṣyatāvacchedaka the possibility of Anvayānupapatti is more, for, the Rāhvādi would be cognised in Kacādi-rūpa only. Even the commentary, Ratnaprabhā, on the above passage does not try give proper explanation. It simply says :- "राहुत्वविशिष्टे कचत्वारोपात् राहुत्वविशिष्टत्वत् त्रासोपपत्तिवः. कचत्ववैशिष्ट्येन चमत्कारसिद्धिरिति न दोषः।" (P. 125).

Next, following the famous Kārikā of Bhartṛmitra; as quoted by Mukula "अभिधेयेन सम्बन्धात् सादृश्यात् समवायतः। वैपरीत्यात् क्रियायोगात् लक्षणा पञ्चधा मता।" (Abhidhāvṛttimatṛkā P. 17), PR. explains the different Sambandhas which are the Lakṣaṇā-Śarīra. But as can be seen from the examples given by him, "गङ्गायां घोषः इत्यत्र सामीप्यम्, 'मुखं चन्द्र' इत्यादौ सादृश्यम्, व्यतिरेकलक्षणायां विरोधः; 'आयुर्घृतं' इत्यादौ कारणत्वादयश्च सम्बन्धाः यथायोगं लक्षणाशरीराणि।" (RG. P. 152.) he does not want to confine the number of Sambandhas to five only. He omits 'Samavāya' and 'Kriyāyoga' for which "Chatriṇo gacchanti" and 'Śatrughnaḥ' are given as examples by Mukula (Abhidhāvṛttimatṛka P. 18). Perhaps he feels that Samavāya which is explained by Mukula as 'group' can be avoided because in "Chatriṇaḥ gacchanti" etc., sānīpya itself will serve the purpose because the Acchatrins are near the Chatrins. Kriyāyoga also can be dispensed with by including it under Sādṛśya. 'Śatrughna' is used to mean a king because he destroyed his enemies as Śatrughna did.

Here under the phrase (Pratīka) 'Lakṣaṇā-śarīrāṇi', Nagesa who is perhaps not reconciled to the views of PR. regarding the Śakyatāvacchedaka-lakṣyārtha-bodha writes :- "लक्षणाज्ञानकार्यतावच्छेदकञ्च तादृशशक्यसम्बन्धप्रकारकलक्ष्यविशेष्यकशाब्दबुद्धित्वमिति प्राचीनालङ्कारिकमतम्। तदनन्तरञ्च तादृशशक्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारकबोधः इति च।" (Gurumarmaprakāśa. P. 186).

In other words, the Lakṣhyārathabodha would consist of

Śakyasambandha only but not Śakyatāvacchedaka. But the Vyañjanā which comes into action after Lakṣaṇā would produc the Śābdabodha consisting of Śakyatāvacchedaka also. This statement of Nagesa has been quoted with approval by Candrika (R. G. part II P. 152), adding that it refers to the theory of PR. with disapproval.

But it is not known, the views of which Ālaṅkarikas Nāgesa is quoting., as 'Prācīnālaṅkārika-mataṁ', because Mammaṭa appears to be in favour of accepting in Lakṣaṇā-sthala, Gaṅgātvādi-prakārakatīrādi-bodha for the purpose of Vyaṅgyārtha, because such Lakṣyārtha alone can suggest Pāvanatvādi which is the Prayojana. "तटादीनां गङ्गादिशब्दैः प्रतिपादने तत्त्वप्रतिपत्तौ हि प्रतिपिपादयिषितप्रयोजनसम्प्रत्ययः ।" (KP. P. 44).

Here "Tattva-pratipattau" means 'Gaṅgātva-pratipattau" which ultimately means Gaṅgātva-prakāraka-bodha and this Bodha is required for the fulfilment of the Prati–pipādayiṣita–prayojana-sampratyaya which is Vyañjya and so how can this kind of Bodha be said to be Vyañjanā-vṛtti-sādhya ? Pradīpakāra while writing "तत्र गङ्गात्वादिप्रतीतिरेव बीजम् । न तु तीरत्वादिप्रतीतिरेव ।" etc (KP. P. 44), supports the above explanation of Mammaṭa's words. Thus Nāgeśa does not seem enjoying the support of Mammaṭa, in his attempt to introduce an amendment in the views of PR.

Before coming to PR.'s classification of Lakṣaṇā into different groups, let us examine the views of his predecessors on this topic. Lakṣaṇā is of six varieties according to Mukula. (Abhidhāvṛttimātṛkā (P. 8.) He, first, classifices Lakṣaṇā into two varieties :- (1) Śuddha-lakṣaṇā and (2) Upacāra-lakṣaṇā. Śuddha is of two varieties:- (9)Upādāna-lakṣaṇā and (2)Lakṣaṇa lakṣaṇā Upacāralakṣaṇā is classified into two varieties:-(1) Śuddhopacāralakṣaṇā and (2) Gauṇopacāralakṣaṇā, with the additional sub–

division of Āropa and Adhyavasāna. Thus Mukula mentions six varieties of Lakṣaṇā :-

1. Upādāna-lakṣaṇā,
2. Lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā,
3. Sāropā śuddhopacāra-lakṣaṇā,
4. Sāddhyavasānā śuddhopacāra-lakṣaṇā,
5. Sāropā Gauṇopacāra-lakṣaṇā,
6. Sāddhyavasānā gauṇopacāra-lakṣaṇā.

Mammaṭa also classifies Lakṣaṇa into six varieties; but there is divergence of opinion among his commentators as to the nature of these varieties Mammaṭ's Karikas run as follows :-

स्वसिद्धये पराक्षेपः परार्थं स्वसमर्पणम् ।
उपादानं लक्षणञ्चेत्युक्ता शुद्धैव सा द्विधा ॥
सारोपाऽन्या तु यत्रोक्तौ विषयी विषयस्तथा ।
विषय्यन्तःकृतेऽन्यस्मिन् सा स्यात्साध्यवसानिका ॥
भेदाविमौ च सादृश्यात् सम्बन्धान्तरतस्तथा ।
गौणौ शुद्धौ च विज्ञेयौ लक्षणा तेन षड्विधा ॥ (KP. II-10-12)

This classification of Lakṣaṇā as understood by pradīpakāra is as follows :- "लक्षणा तावद्द्विविधा । शुद्धा गौणी च । तत्राद्या द्विविधा । उपादानलक्षणा लक्षणलक्षणा च । ते अपि प्रत्येकं सारोपा साध्यवसाना चेति द्विविधे इति शुद्धाभेदाश्चत्वारः । गौणी तु द्वेधा सारोपा साध्यवसाना चेति षड्विधत्वं लक्षणायाः कारिकात्रयेण प्रतिपादयति ।" (Pradipa (K.P.) P. 40.)

Thus according to pradīpa the names of the six varieties of Lakṣanā are as follows :-

1. Sāropā upādāna-lakṣaṇā,
2. Sādhyavasānā upādāna-lakṣaṇā,
3. Sāropā lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā,

4. Sādhyavasānā lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā,
5. Sāropā gauṇī lakṣaṇā,
6. Sādhyavasānā gauṇī lakṣaṇā.

But according to the 'Saṅketa' one of the earliest commentaries on Kāvyaprakāśa, the classifiction of Lakṣaṇā is as follows. First, Lakṣaṇā is of two varieties :- Śuddhā and Upacāramiśrā. Śuddhā is of two kinds ;- Upādāna-lakṣaṇā and Lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā. Upacāramiśra is of two kinds ;- Sāropā and Sādhyavasānā, each of which is again of two varieties Gauṇī and Śuddhā. Thus the Upacāramiśrā is of four varieties :- Upacāramiśrā sāropā gauṇī, Upācaramiśrā Sādhyavasānā śuddhā.

The full names of the six varieties are as follows :-

1. Śuddhā upādāna-lakṣaṇā,
2. Śuddhā lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā,
3. Gauṇī sāropā upacāramiśrā,
4. Śuddhā sāropā upacaramiśrā,
5. Gauṇī sāddhyavasānā upacāramiśrā,
6. Śuddha sadhyavasana upacaramiśra.

As can be seen from the above the classification done by Saṅketa is based on the one found in Mukulabhaṭṭa's Abhidhāvṛtti-mtārkā with slight difference only in nomenclature. While Mukula classifies the Upacāramiśrā first as Śuddhopacāra-lakṣaṇa and Gauṇopacāra-lakṣaṇā and then into Sāropā and Sāddhyavasānā ect., Saṅketakāra classifies the Upacāramiśrā first into Sāropā and Sāddhyavasānā and then Śuddhā and Gauṇī etc., and the result of these two classifications is ultimately the same.

It can be seen on close examination of what is written by Mammaṭa in his Vṛtti that he is in favour of the classification as explained by Saṅketa. Mammaṭa first, dispenses with the two varieties of Śuddhā-lakṣaṇa by giving "कुन्ताः प्रविशन्ति" and गङ्गायां घोषः (KP. P. 20), as examples of Upādānalakṣanā and Lakṣaṇalakṣanā respectively. Next he explains the Sāropā and Sāddhya-

vasānā with their sub-divisions Gauṇī and Śuddhā. When the Sāropā and Sādhyavasānā are found consisting of Sādṛśya they are called Gauṇī-bhedas and if of some other Sambandhas, as Śuddhā-bhedas. Taking all these four varieties as one group he gives suitable expamples. "गौः वाहीकः" and 'गौः अयम्' for the Gauṇī-bhedas and 'आयुर्घृतम्' and 'आयुरेवेदम्' etc., for Śuddhā-bhedas. Had Mammaṭa been in favour of accepting Sāropā and Sādhyavasānā varieties in the Upādāna-lakṣanṇā and Lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā also he would have certainly given separate examples for them. Perhaps such examples are hardly found and that is why even Pradīpakāra does not try to give any, though he has accepted such classification. Moreover, that Mammaṭa accepts only two varieties of Śuddhā (the first variety) is evident from what he writes after the Kārikā-bhāga "Lakṣaṇā tena ṣaḍvidhā". There he adds a small sentence 'आद्यभेदाभ्यां सह' which clearly indicates that the Śuddhā-lakṣaṇā is of only two varieties-Upādāna and Lakṣaṇa.

Dr. Gupta complains (RGSA. P. 278), that all this confusion has resulted from the loose use of the words 'Upacāra' and 'Śuddha' by Mammaṭa. This allegation may be true in certain lines of Mammaṭa but in the present case the confusion is more the creation of the commentators than of Mammaṭa himself. Because he never classified Lakṣaṇā first into two kinds-Śuddhā and upacāramiśra or Śuddhā and Gauṇī etc. The first classification is made by Saṅketa on the authority of Mukula and the second one is introduced by Pradīpa. First Mammaṭa explains the Śuddhā-bhedas and then Sāropā and Sādhyavsāṇā with their sub-divisions Gauṇī and Śuddhā. Ofcours after giving the examples of Śuddhā-bhedas he uses the word Upacāra while explaining why it is called Śuddhā. He says "उभयरूपा चेयं शुद्धा–उपचारेणामिश्रितत्वात् ।" (KP. P. 19). it is called Śuddhā becuse it is not mixed with Upacāra.

Here again Pradīpa is misleading, while commenting on the

above sentence it says :- उपचारमिश्रा हि गौणीत्युच्यते । उपचारश्च सम्बन्धेन प्रवृत्तिः । सादृश्यातिशयमहिम्ना भिन्नयोर्भेदप्रतीतिस्थगनं वा । (P. 43) Once the word Upacāra is thus understood as Sādṛśya mūlkopacāra, Mamaṭa's use of this word in another context क्वचित् तादर्थ्यादुपचार: etc., would be naturally confusing. Therefore the word (Upacāra) in उपचारेणामिश्रितत्वात् should be understood as Upacāra by whatever relation but not by Sādṛśya alone. That is way Saṅketa does not add any thing like 'Sādṛśya' etc., and simply comments यथा गौर्वाहीक इत्यत्र वस्त्वन्तरे वस्त्वरं उपचर्यते न तथा अत्रेति भाव: (Saṅketa. p. 19). The use of the word Śuddhā for the second time while explaining the remaining four varieties is clearly understood as Gauṇī-bhinnā by the context ; and so there is no confusion at least in the present context, on the part of Mammaṭa.

Dr. Chaudhury also appears to have been lead away by what is written by Pradīpakāra, for he also classifies Laksaṇā on the same lines. (Kāvyatattva Samīkṣā. p. 16).

Caṇḍīdāsa as quoted by Pradīpa, (p. 52), takes the six varieties of Lakṣaṇā as based on Rūḍhi, pryojana, Upādāna, Lakṣaṇa, Ārop and Adhyavasana.

The number of the varieties of Lakṣaṇā has been increased by Viśvanātha in his Sāhityadarpaṇa. He first classifies Lakṣaṇā into two varieties :- Rūḍhi-lakṣaṇā and Prayojana-lakṣaṇā. Each of them is of two varieties Upādānalakṣaṇā and Lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā and thus their unmber is four-Upādāna-rūḍhi-lakṣaṇā, Upādāna - lakṣaṇa - lakṣaṇā, Pryojana - rūḍhi - lakṣaṇā and pryojana-lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā. These four varieties are further classified as Sāropās and Sādhyavasānās bringing the total number to eight. All of them are further classified into two more varieties Śuddhās and Gauṇīs on the basis of the difference of Sambandha; if the Sambandha is Sādṛśya it is called Gauṇī and the Sambandha is other than Sādṛśya makes the Lakṣaṇā as

Śuddhā. Now the number is sixteen-eight varieties of Rūḍha-lakṣaṇā and eight varieites of prayojana-lakṣaṇā. The number of the latter is further increased to sixteen by classifying their Phala i. e. Vyaṅgya into two kinds, Gūḍha and Agūḍha. Again when the Phala is said to be Dharmi-gata and Dharma-gata their number is doubled. Thus the total number of the varieties of Lakṣaṇā is forty, thirty two varieties of Prayojana-lakṣaṇā and eight varieties of Rūḍhi Lakṣaṇā. Finally their number is eighty by further classifying Lakṣaṇā as Pada-gata and Vākya-gata. (Sahityadarpana II-9 to 18.) Needless it is to say this endless increase of the number of Lakṣaṇās, as that of Dhvanis, would only result in confusing the readers with no practical utility and PR.'s discerning mind avoids carefully all this numerical burden and sticks to the number similar to the one as given by the older writers. In fact Viśvanātha's classification of the varieties of the Gauṇī by adding the Upādāna and Lakṣaṇa is rightly critisised by Dr.Chaudhury. (Kāvytattvasamīkṣā P. 79 and 80)

PR. classifies Lakṣaṇā into eight (mainly six) varieties in the following words :- इयं तावद्द्विविधा । निरूढा प्रयोजनवती च । तत्रापि द्वितीया द्विविधा, गौणी शुद्धा च, तत्राद्या सारोपा साध्यवसाना चेति द्विविधा ।अन्त्या चतुर्विधा । जहत्स्वार्था अजहत्स्वार्था, सारोपा साध्यवसाना चेति प्रयोजनवती षड्विधा सम्पद्यते" R.G.P. 152)

His classification is like this .- (1) Prayojanavatai gouṇī Sāropā, (2) Prayojanavatī Gauṇī Sādhyavasānā (3) Prayojanavatī śuddhā Jahatsvārthā (4) Prayojanavatī śuddhā Ajahatsvārthā (5) Prayojanavatī śuddhā Sāropā (6) Prayojanavatī Śuddhā Sādhyavasānā (7) Nirūḍhā sāropā and (8) Nirūḍhā Sādhyavasānā.

After the classification PR. explains some of the varieties with examples. Words like 'Anukūla', 'Pratikūla', 'Anuloma', 'Pratiloma' and 'Lāvaṇya' etc., are taken as the examples for the

Nirūḍha-lakṣaṇ'ā. In places like 'धर्मस्यायमनुकूल: the word 'Anukūla' cannot express its original sense 'following the bank' because it does not fit in the context. Moreover this word is being used as though by Rūḍhi to mean 'Anuguṇa' because there is similarity of Eka-vastu-pravaṇatva in both the meanings, the original meaning and the one which has come into vogue. The same with 'Pratiloma; 'Anuloma', 'Pratikūla' etc. Thus the sense like Anuguṇa etc., is expressed by the adove words is said to be Lakṣaṇā-bodhya.

Again there are words like 'Nilah' and 'Raktah', which originally mean the blue colour and red colour, but are used to mean the Ghaṭādi also in "Nīlah ghaṭaḥ" etc. Here the word 'Nīla' expresses by Lakṣaṇā a thing which is having blue colour, the Sambandha between the Śakyārtha and the Lakṣyārtha being Saṁyoga.

P.R. gives here two types of examples for the Nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā-one consisting of Sādṛśya-saṁbandha and the other having any Saṁbandha other than Sādṛśya. This has been taken by some wrtiters, as PR. explains, as the basis for classifying the Nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā also into two classes Gauṇī-lakṣaṇā and Śuddha-nirūḍha-laksṣaṇā. By quoting it as the opinion of others PR, indicates that he is not in favour of accepting the classification of Nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā, because as the very name goes to prove the Lakṣaṇā in these words has almost become Rūḍha, Therefore PR. is perhaps of the opinion that there is no point in tracing the original meaning which is forgotten in many cases and finding the ralation between the same and the Lakṣyārtha. Moreover, many of the Ālaṅkārikās, barring a few like Visvanātha, discuss the śabda-vṛttis, Abhidhā and Lakṣaṇā, with the main intention of explaining the Vyañjanā based on them, The Nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā is no way helpful for this main prupose.

After giving examples for Nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā, PR. gives

"Mukham Candraḥ" as the example for Gauṇī sāropā and पुरेस्मिन् सौधशिखरे चन्द्रराजी विराजते for Gauṇī Sādhyavasānā. He does not give any examples for the four varieties of Śuddhalakṣaṇā. Probably he thinks that the same examples given by Mammaṭa and other writers hold good, and that they may be borrowed from them according to the famous dictum 'अनुक्तमन्यतो ग्राह्यम्'. Thus we can take "Kuntāḥ praviśanti" "Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ" "Āyuḥ ghṛtaṁ" "Āyuḥ idaṁ" as the examples for Ajahallakṣaṇā, Jahhallakṣaṇā, Śuddhā sāropā and Śuddhā-sādhyavasānā respectively.

At the first sight it may appear that PR.'s classification of Lakṣaṇā is somewhat different from what is found in Kāvyaprakāśa (as explained by Saṅketa). But on close examination we find that PR.'s classification is completely based on Mamaṭa's with the exception of difference in the expression. Mammaṭa first classified Śuddhā into two groups Upādāna and Lakṣaṇa which are named as Ajahtsvārthā and Jahtsvārthā by PR. in the language of other Śāstrakāras: Then he (Mammaṭa) states two more varieties, Sāropā and Sādhyavasānā which are of two kinds each, Gauṇī and Śuddhā. Thus the varieties of Lakṣaṇā acceptable to Mammaṭa are Śuddhā-upādāna-lakṣaṇā (Ajahtsvārthā) Śuddhā-lakṣaṇa-lakṣāṇā (Jahatsvārthā), Śuddhā-sāropa-lakṣaṇā, Śuddhā-sādhayavsāna-lakṣaṇā. Gauṇī-sāropā and Gauṇī Sāhdyavasānā. We find the same names in PR.'s classification also as shown above.

He like Mammaṭa accepts the existence of the Sambandha other than Sādṛśya, as the critarian for Śuddhātva and it is evident from his following sentence written in a different context:-
तत्राद्यवर्गे सादृश्यसम्बन्धेन द्वितीयवर्गे च तदितरसम्बन्धेन लक्षणायाः प्रवृत्ते : निरूढायामपि गौणीत्वशुद्धात्वाभ्यां ...(RG.P, 154).

Next PR. introduces a very long and important discussion as to the nature of the Ṣābda-bodha in the Sāropa-lakṣaṇā. "Mu-

khaṁ candrah" is given as an example for Gauṇī Sāropā, because there is a kind of identity (Abheda) between the Viṣaya (Mukha) and Viṣayin (Candra) mentioned separately. Here the Upamāna-vācaka (Chandraḥ) expresses by Lakṣaṇā the sense Chancra sadṛśaḥ, and the word 'Mukha' express the sense 'face' by Abhidhā only. Ultimately there will be an A bhedānvaya between the Lakṣaṇopsthitārtha (Candrasadṛssa) and the sense expressed by Abhidhā (Mukha) according to the well-known rule नामार्थयोरभेदेनान्वयः । Thus the final Śābda-bodha of the sentence "Mukham candraḥ" will be 'चन्द्रसदृशाभिन्नं मुखम्' । Now the question arises, what is then the difference between Rūpaka which gives the Śābda-bodha 'चन्द्रसदृशाभिन्नं मुखम्' and the Upamā in "Candra-sadṛśam mukhaṁ" etc., ? It may be argued that there is a slight variation in the ultimate Śābda-bodha of the Rūpaka and Upamālaṅkāra which makes all the difference. While the Śābda-bodha of Rūpaka is चन्द्रसदृशाभिन्नं मुखम् as explained above the Śābda-bodha in the Upamāsthala like "Candrasadṛśam-mukham" is चन्द्राभिन्नं यत् सदृशं तदभिन्नं मुखम् । The reason for the difference is this: According to the rule that only the Saṁsarga (Relation) of the two Padārthas expressed by two different words would appear in the Śābda-bodha by the Saṁsarga–maryādā. 'Candra' in "Candra sadṛśam mukham" expresses the sense 'Moon', and 'Sadṛśa' by Lakṣaṇā expresses Candra-sadṛśa. Now Candra and the Candrasadṛśa being expressed by different words there will be an Abhedānvaya between them (by Samsarga-maryādā). Thus the ultimate Śābda-bodha will be चन्द्राभिन्नचन्द्रसदृशाभिन्नं मुखम् । But in the "Mukhaṁ candrah" (Rūpaka-sathala) 'Candhrah' itself conveys the meaning of Cadra-Sadṛśa by Lakśaṇā and there is no possibility of Abheda-samsarga between 'Candra and' 'Śadṛśa, because both of them are expressed by one word only and therefore the ultimate Śābda-bodha is 'चन्द्रसदृशाभिन्नं मुखम्' । Thus there is a difference in the Śābda-bodhas of Upamā and Rūpaka which may be the differenciating factor between those two Alaṅkāras. But the Pūrvapakṣin maintains that such a slight difference in

the ultimate Śābda-bodha cannot be taken as a differenciating factor. If this were to be the case, there must be two different Alaṅkras in 'मुखं चन्द्र इव' and 'मुखं चन्द्रसदृशम्' (both Upamā-sthalas) because even in the former, the ultimate Śābda-bodha will be 'चन्द्रसदृशाभिन्नं मुखम्' and 'चन्द्राभिन्नचन्द्रसदृशाभिन्नं मुखम्' in the latter. Therefore the first question about the absence of difference between the Rūpaka and Upamā stands unanswered.

This question is answered in three different ways by different Ālaṅkārikas, and the answer of one section of them is as follows. Though there is no difference in the Śābda-bodha of these two Alaṅkāras, there is difference in their ultimate result (Phala). As the Viṣayitāvacchedaka (Candratva etc.,) is ascribed to Viṣaya (Mukha etc.,) there is a Tādātmya-Jñāna in the Rūpaka-sthala which is not to be found in Upamā-sthala. As shown above, the word 'Candra' in "Mukham candraḥ" conveys the sense of Candra-sadṛśah by Lakṣaṇā and thus as in Śleṣa-sthala, there will be an Abheda-Sampratyaya between the Candra and Sadṛśa expessed by the same word. This Tādātmya-samprtyaya cannot be obstructed by the Bādha-jñāna, because its antidote Vyañjanā also is present in the Lakṣaṇā-sthala which is absent in the Upamāsthala. Once the 'चन्द्राभिन्नचन्द्रसदृशाभिन्नत्व' is accepted in the Mukha, Candrābhinnatva also follows automatically., according to the famous saying तदभिन्नाभिन्नं तदभिन्नम्। That is how such statements वक्त्रे चन्द्रमसि स्थिते किमपरः शीतांशुरुज्जृम्भते etc., expressive of Tādātmya between the Viṣaya and Viṣayin are to be justified. Thus the first set of Ālaṅkārikas maintain the difference between the Rūpaka and Upamā because of the difference in their Phala. By mentioning it only as a Kecinmata PR. evidently feels that there is no need of bringing in the difference of Phala when there can be shown the difference in the Śābda-bodha itself. Following is the another answer given by a different group of Ālṅkārikas. Inspite of the general rule that the cognition of ths meanings of the words (Padārthopasthiti and the resultant Śābda-dodha should be of similar form (पदार्थोपस्थितिशाब्दबोधयोः

समानाकारत्वम्) it is laid down, on the strength of the experience that Lakṣyānvaya-bodha in the Lakṣanā-sthala will be having Śakyatāvacchedaka (Gaṅgātva etc.,) as its Prakāra; in other words, the cognition of the Lakṣyārtha will be more in the guise of Mukhyārtha itself. Thus in places like "Gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣah" though the Taṭa (Lakṣyārtha) is first cognised with only Taṭatva, the final Anvayabodha will be Gaṅgātva to make it possible to suggest the Śaitya, Pāvanatva etc. By applying this principle in "Mukhamcandrah" the Abhedabodha between the face that is conveyed by 'Candra' by Lakṣaṇā (as Candra-sadṛśa) and the face that is expressed by the word Mukha (by Abhidhā) will be delimited by the Mukhyārthatāvacchedaka i.e.Candratva and this kind of Abheda bodha will be helpful in bringing about the realisation of the Guṇas of the Moon in the face, Thus the second theory explains that the diflierenciating factor between Rūpaka and Upamā is not only the ultimate result (Phala) but also the intermidiary Śābda-bodha.

A third view of Prācīnas meets the question in the following way: It is true that there is the principle of Sādṛśya in both the Alaṅkāras, Upamā and Rūpaka; but there is much difference in the Śādṛśay as associated with them. Upamā is mainly based on Sādṛśya which is mixed with Bheda where as Rūpaka is based on Sādṛśya with no mixture of Bheda. Thus, it is contended that there is no need to depend upon the ultimate result (Phala).

After explaining the difference between Rūpaka and Upamā in three different ways, P. R. introduces the views of the later writers like AD; who contend that there is no need of accepting Lakṣaṇā at all, in places like "Mukham candrah" and "Vāhīko gauh" etc. In these cases the Abhedasaṁsarga between the Candra, and Mukha, Go and Vāhīka etc., can be effected by the general rule नामार्थयोरभेदेनान्वयः without resorting to Lakṣaṇā. It may be argued that such Abheda-samaraga cannot be effected because there is the Bādha-niscaya, a firm sense of

incongruity that the Moon and the face cannot be identical with each other, according to the rule "तद्वत्ताबुद्धि प्रति तदभाववत्तात्मकबाधनिश्चयः प्रतिबन्धकः"।

But the Navinas contend, this general rule can be exempted in the case of the Śābda-jnāña as was done in the case of Ahārya jñāna, an intentional cognition. It is accepted that the Bādha-niścaya cannot obstruct the Tadvattā-jñāna when a man wants intentionally to have such Jñāna and this Jñāna is called Āhārya-jñāna. Similarly it will be accepted, the Navinas contend, that the Śābda-jñāna also cannot be obstructed by the Bādha-niścaya. Thus the modified form of the above rule will be अनाहार्यशाब्दान्यबुद्धित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति बाधनिश्चयः प्रतिबन्धकः। The Navinas also claim that their theory has got the support of the well-known saying अत्यन्तासत्यपि ह्यर्थे ज्ञानं शब्दः करोति हि, according to which even such statements शशशृङ्गं पश्य etc., can produce a Śābda jñāna like the गोशृङ्गं पश्य etc.,

Now it may be argued that even वह्निना सिञ्चति will have to produce Śābda-bodha in this way. This is answered by Navinas saying that they cannot produce Śābda-bodha because there is no Yogyatā-jñāna. But in the case of Mukhaṁ-candraḥ, Gauh vāhīkaḥ etc, there is no lack of such Yogyatājñāna, at least the Āhārya one, on account of the strong desire to have such Śābda jñāna for the ultimate Camatkāra resulting from the Bodha. Such Āhārya - Yogyatā-'jnāna cannot be accepted in the case of Vahninā siñcati etc., because there is no such Icchā. This contention of the Navinas has got the support of the Prācinas also who laid down a general rule that Yogyatā-jñāna is the cause for the Śābda jñāna "शाब्दबुद्धित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति योग्यताज्ञानं कारणम्"।

This rule whould have been useless because the Śābda-bodha in "Vahninā siñcati" etc., can be averted by the Bādha-jñāna itself if the 'Śābdānyatva' were not to be included in the Bādha-niścaya-pratibadhyatāvacchedaka-koṭi. Now that the, Śābdān-

yatva' is added, it justifies the above rule related to Yogyatā-jñāna. Because the Bādha-jñāna is unable to obstruct the Śābda-bodha in "Vahninā siñcati" etc., which is not disired and now this rule comes into action and obstructs such Bodha. Even if the 'Śābdānyatva' is not added in the Pratibaddhyatāvaccheda-ka-koti, the Navīnas Contend, the Abhedānvya in "Mukham candrah" etc., will be taken as Āhārya-jñāna, and so cannt be obstructed by the Bādha-niścaya. Thus there is no need of accepting the Āhārya-jñāna to facilitate the Śābda-bodha in "Mukhaṁ candrah" etc. In fact, the rule 'शाब्दबुद्धित्वावच्छिन्ने योग्यताज्ञानं कारणम्' is itself not secessary because the Śābda-bodha in Vahninā-siñcati etc., can be prevented by the Bādha-niścaya itself. It is baseless to say that Āhārya-jñāna can be accepted only in Pratyakṣa-jñāna because we come across the Āhārya-Śābda-jñāna also in many places like Atiśayokti.

The following argument is advanced by the Navīnas in support of their contention that the Abhedānvya in "Mukham candrah" etc., is only between two Vācyārthas but not between one Vācyārtha and one Lakṣyārtha. The words 'Rāja-nārāy-aṇa' and 'Pādāṁbuja' in "राजनारायणं लक्ष्मीस्त्वामालिङ्गति निर्भरम्" and पादाम्बुजं भवतु मे विजयाय मञ्जुमञ्जीरशिञ्जितमनोहरमम्बिकायाः can be understood as both Upamālaṅkāra and Rūpakālaṅkarā. But the old Ālaṅkārikas like Mammaṭa fix up the Alaṅkāras in the above, on the following ground. If the 'Rājanārayaṇa' is understood to be Upamālaṅkāra meaning 'Nārāyaṅa-like king' the Prādhānya is given to the king and so the Lakṣmi-samāliṅg-ana will be made improbable, because Lakṣmi may embrace Nārāyaṇa but not the king. Therefore "Rājanārāyaṇa" is accepted as an instance of Rūpaka meaning 'Rajā-bhinna-nārāyaṇa' giving importance to Nārāyaṇa. Likewise if 'Pādāṁbujaṁ is taken as Rūpaka meaning 'Pādābhinnaṁ aṁbujaṁ' the Aṁbuja is given importance. But the 'Mañjira-Śiñjita-manoharatva would be improbable in Paṅkaja. Therefore Upamā is accepted

here and Pāda is given importance. All this above justification of the Prācinas would be possible, the Navīnas contend, only when the Vācyārthābheda is accepted in the so called Sāropa-lakṣaṇodāharaṇa. Because if Lakṣaṇā were to be accepted, the ultimate Śābda-bodha either in the Rūpaka or in Upamā will be 'Nārāyaṇa-sadṛśah rājā' and 'Aṁbuja-sadṛśaḥ Pādāḥ' etc., and so the Lakṣmyāliṅgana cannot be justified even if Rūpaka is accepted in 'Rājanārāyaṇa' and there is nothing wrong even if Rūpaka is accepted in 'Pādaṁbujaṁ' for, the ultimate importance would go to the Pāda only. Therefore only the Vācyārthā-bhedānvaya should be accepted in the so called Sāropa-lakṣaṇodā-harṇa.

This is the method in the case of not only the Samasta-padas like 'Rājanārāyaṇa' but also the Vyasta padas like 'Kṛpayā sudhayā' in "कृपया सुधया सिञ्च हरे मां तापमूर्छितम्" because unless Vācyābheda is accepted here, importance cannot be given to Sudhā in order to suit the Sekakriyā. If Lakṣaṇā is accepted importance would go to Kṛpā, in the resultant Śābda-bodha. It may be argued that in order to suit the Prādhānya that is given to Kṛpā by adopting Lakṣaṇā, the root 'Siñc' also can be understood by Lakṣaṇā to mean 'Viṣayīkṛti' and so the whole sentence would mean "सुधासदृशाभिन्नया कृपया मां विषयीकुरु" ।

But when the Āharyā-bheda-Jñana itself is found good in almost all the Alaṅkāras like Atiśayokti and Apahnava etc., with the one exception of Utprekṣā, where is the scope for Lakṣaṇā which is also against the common experience ? [1]

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1. "न च सिञ्चतेरपि विषयीकरणे लक्षणया नानुपपत्तिः । उत्प्रेक्षाद्यतिरिक्तातिशयोक्त्यपह्नवादिष्वाहार्यज्ञानेनैवोपपत्तौ लक्षणायां बीजाभावादनुभव विरोधाच्च" । R. G., P. 193. As Candrikā righly points out.

The Navīnas advance another argument in support of their theory. According to the Lakṣaṇā-vādin, 'Candrah' in "Mukhaṁcandrah" conveys 'Candrasadṛśa' by Lakṣaṇā and the Lakṣyātāvacchedaka here will be Sādṛśya which is synonymous with Samānadharma. Now this question arises whether the Samānadharma as associated with the Lakṣyārtha is cognised in its particularity or in its general nature. The first alternative is untenable. Because in such case, there will be Paunaruktya-doṣa in "Sundaraṁ mukhaṁ candrah" for the Saundarya (Sādhāraṇadharma in its particular nature) is expressed by the word 'Candra' itself by Lakṣaṇā and is being again mentioned by the word 'Sundaram'. It may be said to avoid this Doṣa, that in such cases where the Sādhāraṇadharma is men i ned, some other Dharma, other than what is mentioned, should be taken as the Lakṣyatāvacchedakadharma. But this argument, though avoiding Paunaruktya, is contary to the common experience because we do not generally understand in "Sundaraṁ mukhaṁ candrah" any dharma other than Saundarya. Moreover, there are certain instances where there is no possibility of any Dharma other than what is explicitly mentioned. For example, in the verse ;-

"अङ्कितान्यक्षसङ्घातैः सरोगाणि सदैव हि ।
शरीरिणां शरीराणि कमलानि न संशयः" ।।

We do not find any other Sādhāraṇadharma excepting the ones based on Śleṣa i e. 'Akṣa-saṅghātāṅkitatva' and 'Sarogatva'. Thus the first alternative is proved untenable. If the second

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'Saralā' makes some "confusion by understanding Viṣayīkaraṇe, in the sense of Upamāna etc., which is not suited to the coutext. (Candrikā P. 171) But even Candrikā, insteād of understanding "Viṣayikaraṇe Lakṣaṇayā" as explained above, takes it as 'Lakṣaṇāyā viṣayīkaraṇe' and understands it to mean 'by accepting Lakṣaṇā' (Candrikā P. 170).

alternative were to be accepted, it would be an instance, not of Rūpaka but Upamā because the Sādṛśya is montioned by Śabda. It is not correct to eontend that Upamā would arise only when the Sādṛśya is Vācya, because this contention would result in not accepting Upamā in 'Nalina pratipakṣaṁ ānanaṁ' etc., where the Sāṛśya is not Vācya but Lakṣya,

Another objection to the acceptance of Lakṣaṇā in the Rūpaka sthala is that there will be Anyonyāśrayadoṣa in the verse 'Vidvan-mānasa-haṁsa'[1] etc. Here the Rūpaka which is, accord- to the old writers, is based on Sadṛśa-lakṣaṇā, cannot have existence unless there is the cognition of Sādṛśya; which in its turn depends upon the Śleṣa-niṣpatti, because only after the cognition of Śleṣa in 'Mānasa' there can be Śleṣa-mūlakā-bhedādhyavasāna between the Manas and Mānasasarovara which is the basis of Sādṛśya (which is Mānasa -vāsitva-rūpa) between the king and the Hamsa. Again the Śleṣa depends upon Rūpaka for its existence ; because so long as there is no cognition of Rūpaka, we do not find any Pramāṇa indicatig that the Mānasapada is intended to mean the Mānasasarovara also. Only after knowing that there is Rūpaka between the king aud the Haṁsa the 'Mānasa' is understood in the sense of Mānasasarovara also to give raise to the Sādharmya required in the Rūpaka. Thus the Rūpaka and Śleṣa wo'ld be interdependent. This can be avoided by accepting Āhāryābheda - jñāna between the king and the Haṁsa for which we need not depend upon Śleṣa. This Abheda jñāna would ultimately be justified by accepting Śleṣa. Thus Śleṣa depends upon Rūpaka but Rūpaka does not depend upon Śleṣa and there will be no Anyonyāśrayadoṣa. Therefore, it is

1. विद्वन्मानसहंस वैरिकमलासङ्कोचदीप्तद्युते
दुर्गामार्गणनीललोहित समित्स्वीकारवैश्वानर ।
सत्यप्रीतिविधानदक्ष विजयप्राग्भावभीम प्रभो
साम्राज्यं वरवीर वत्सरशतं वैरिञ्चमुच्चैः क्रियाः" । (K P.P 470)

better to apply the general principle of Abhedānvaya in the Rūpaka sthala also. Lastly the Navīnrs find fault with the contention of the old writers that Tādrūpya-jñāna will be the result (Phala) of accepting Sādṛśya Lakṣaṇā, saying, in that case, the Sādṛśya-pratyaya will have to arise even when the Sādṛśya is expressed by word in 'Candra-sadṛśaṁ mukhaṁ' etc. Thus according to Navīnas there is no need of Sadṛśa-Lakṣaṇā in Rūpaka-sthala

P.R refutes the arguments of the Navīnas with strong counter arguments supported by the common sense and the general experience. in the following words. It is the general experience that there can be no existence of either Upamālaṅkāra or Rūpakālṅkāra or the Camatkāra till the happy Sādhāraṇa-dharma is cognised. This can be known from the fact that we do not experience the existence of Rūpaka when it is simply said "Bhārataṁ nākamaṇḍalaṁ" and "Nagarṁ vidhu-maṇḍalam" etc., till the Sādṛśyavācaka-padas, 'Suparvālaṅkṛta' and 'Sakala-kala' are added respectively. The same case with the well-known examples of Rūpaka like 'Mukhaṁ candraḥ' with only the difference that the Sādhārṇa-dharma will have to be mentioned by word in the Aprasiddhasthalas and it can be understood in the well-known cases. If only the Abheda-jñāna were to be accepted as the Rūpaka-mūla with no need of Sādṛśya-jñāna, we would have had the cognition of the Rūpaka in 'Bhārataṁ nākamaṇḍalaṁ' etc., even before the "Suparvālaṅkṛtaṁ" etc., is added, because there is the Āhāryābheda-jñāna.

Here Nāgeśa (Marmaprakasa. P. 196) tries to Vndicate the views of the Navīnas and says that Abhedānvaya can be accepted without resorting to Lakṣaṇā because the Bādhaka-jñāna will be nullified by the Sādṛśyarūpa-doṣa which acts as Uttejaka. This Abheda jñāna is said to be Āhārya by the Navīnas not because it is so in the usual sense of the word, but because it is uccurring at the Bādha samaya.

This contention of Nagesa has been refuted by Candrika (Part II. P. 177; saying that it is no where said that Sādṛśya jñāna is a Doṣa and that it can be Uttjejaka even, if the Sādṛśya is Bhedagarbha it cannot be Abhedottejaka because Abheda is the negation of Bheda. If it is Abhedagarbha, where is the need for instigating another Abheda-jñana? Moreever there is no Lāghava in accepting Uttejakatva in the Sādṛśya-jñāna by avoiding Sādṛśya-lakṣaṇā.

In fact, the main contention of PR. as explained above, is that there can be no existence of Rūpaka or the Camatkāra caused by it, by simple Abheda-jñāna without the Sādṛśyapratipatti as in the case of 'Bhāratam nākamaṇḍalam' and such Sādṛśya pratīti can be brought in by Sadṛśa-lakṣaṇā only. such Sādṛsya-smṛti may be justified in the Prasiddha-sambandha-Sthala, but how can it be possible in Aprasiddha-sthala like "Bhāratam nākamaṇḍalam"? Therefore it is evident that Nagesa's evplanation does not cover the complete field, and P. R's argument stands unanswered.

Further P, R. states that it is not correct to argue to avoid the trouble in "Bhāratm nākamandalam" etc., that the cognition of a particular Sādhāraṇa-dharma is responsible for the Āhārya-padārthābhedānvaya and the Camatkāra because there are instances where there is Abhedānvaya even in the absence of the cognition of Sādhārṇa-dharma For example. in the verse:-

"यद्यनुष्णो भवेद् वह्निः यद्यशीतं भवेज्जलम् ।
मन्ये दृढव्रतो रामः तदा स्यादप्यसत्यवाक्" ॥ (R.G.P.197)

there is no Sādhāraṇa-dharma mentioned, but there is Abheda-pratyaya between the 'Vahnyanusṇatva' etc., and the 'Asatyavāktva' etc. It may be said that this rule is applicable only in a place where there is Upamānopameya-bhāva. But what is the basis

for this rule and its exception. Moreover even in the Upamānopameya-bhāva-sthala, 'मुख यदि चन्द्रः स्यात् तदा भूम्यवस्थितं न स्यात्'। etc., where there is no mention of Sādhāraṇa dhrma, such Abheda-pratīti is found.

It may be argued that if it is accepted that there is only Sadṛśa-lakṣaṇā in Rūpaka there will be no identity (Tādātmya) between the Viṣaya and Viṣayin, because the Abheda that is expressed in Rūpaka is only between the Upameya and Upamāna sardśa i.e. Mukha aud the Candra sadṛśa. In the absence of such identity, statements like "सिंहेन सदृशो नायं किन्तु सिंहो नराधिपः" which are mainly intended to convey abheda between the upameya and the Upamāna would be meaningless. But this argument is basesles because such Tādātmya is acceptable even to the Lakṣaṇāvādins as explained while stating the second and the third views of the Prācīnas.

Again it may be contended that according to the Lakṣaṇāvādin, Sādṛśya also is included in Rūpaka, and as such, will it not be wrong to deny the sādṛśya (by "Simhena sadṛhśaḥ nāyaṃ") while having Rūpaka in 'Siṃho narādhipaḥ' ? This argnement is met by saying that the negation meant here is only of the Upamā consisting of Bheda-ghaṭita-sādṛśya while favouring Rūpaka consisting of Abheda-ghaṭita-sādṛśya.

PR. meets the objections raised in the case of 'Rājanārāyaṇaṃ' and "Pādāmbujaṃ" etc., in the following manner. As explained above, the Lakṣyānvaya-bodha will be only Sakyatāvacchedaka-prakāraka and thus by accepting Rūpaka in "Rājanārāyaṇa" the Rājan would be understood only in the form of Nārāyaṇatva and so there will be nothing wrong in his having Āliṅgana of Lakṣmī. Similarly if Rūpakālaṅkāra is to be accepted in "Pādāmbujaṁ" the Pāda-jñāna will be Ambujatva-prakāraka and thus Mañjīra-śiñjita-manoharatā in it will be incongruous. That is why upamā is to be accepted here in order

to give importance to Pāda because the Pāda-Jñāna will, then, Pādatvāvacchinna.

It is not eorrect to contend that there would be no difference between Upamā and Rūpaka, on the ground, that in both of them the Sādṛśya is being expressed by Śabda (though by Lakṣaṇā in Rūpaka); because the Sādṛśya in Rūpaka is Abheda Ghaṭita where as in the Upamā it is Bheda-karambita, and this will be the differenciating factor. It may be argued that there can be an instance where the speaker makes a Lākṣṇika-prayoga like "Mukhaṁ candraḥ" etc., with the specific intention of conveying Bheda-ghaṭita-sādṛśya; and this will have to be accepted as an instance of Upamā because the Sādṛśya is Bheda-karambita. But PR. maintains that there can be no scope, in such places, for Lakṣaṇā at all; because the main purpose of Lakṣaṇā it to convey Tādātmya which is the negations of Bheda.

The Pūrva-pakṣin raises another objection. In words like 'Puruṣa-vyāghra' which are the instances of Upamā, in the sense of the 'tiger like man' the Uttara-pada has to be accepted as meaning "Vyāghra-sadṛśa" by Lakṣaṇā, because there is no any other word which expresses the Sādṛśya. The acceptance of Lakṣaṇā results in the acceptance of Tādātmya-pratipatti also as its Prayojana; and this Tādātmya-pratipatti makes it as an instance of Rūpaka but not of Upamā. Such being the case, how is it that it is taken by the Prācīnas as an instance of 'Dviluptopamā'? This question is answered by PR. in two ways. According to the Vaiyākaraṇas who accept Śakti in the whole of a Samāsa the word Puruṣa-vyāghra itself conveys the meaning "Vyāghra-

sādṛśya-Visiṣṭa-puruṣa" where the Sādṛśya is Bhedaghaṭita, or the Upamāna-śabda (i. e. Vyāghra) expresses by Nirūḍha-Lokṣaṇā, Bheda ghaṭita-sādṛśya-Viśiṣṭa and this Bheda-ghaṭitatva will well explain how it has been taken as an instance of Upamā, by Prācīnas.

The Anyonyāśraya-doṣa which is raised in "Vidvanmānasahaṁsa" etc.., PR. contends, is of little consequance beause every thing in a poem, rather any art, being mainly based on kalpanā of the Pratibhā, it is not a serious defect if one thing is dependent upon the other. In this connection he gives a convincing example of a beautiful construction by a mason, where the bricks are supported by each other.

In reply to the last objection that the Tādrūpya-pratyaya cannot be the Phala of the Sādṛśya-Lakṣṇā in Rūpaka, lest it should be accepted in places like "Candra-sadṛśaṁ-mukhaṁ" etc. also, PR. says that there is no fear of such Tādrūpya-pratyaya in the case of the latter because there is no Lakṣaṇā in it; and Tādrūpya-pratyaya is only the Phala, of Lakṣaṇā. PR. concludes his argument by stating that the contention of the old writers has thus to be accepted on the authority of Mahābhāṣya and such other important works. For, in Mahābhāṣya, while commenting on "पुंयोगादाख्यायाम्" (4.1.48) Patañjali poses a question how can Abheda exist between two distinctly different things. In reply to this question he says that the Abheda is being ascribed on four grounds; Tātsthya (being on a particular thing) Tāddharmya, (Having the qulity of a particular thing) Tatsāmīpya, (being nearer to a thing) and Tatsāhacarya

(being associated with a particular thing) and he also gives four cxamples. Here the sentence "ताद्रूप्यमारोप्यते न तु मुख्यम्" indicates that also in "Mukhaṁ-candrah", the Tādātmya is being ascribed by Lakṣaṇā. This passage goes against the views of the Navīnas. Thus P,R. vindicates the views of the Prācīnas by refuting the arguments of the Navīnas like Appayyadīkṣita.

After dealing with the Śābda-bodha of the Sāropa lakṣaṇā PR. comes to the question of the Śābda-bodha in Sādhyavasāna-lakṣaṇā. He states two views. In "Candra-rajī virājate", where the Upameya is completely omitted, the Candra-sabda expresses the 'Mukha' with its Dharma, 'Mukhatva'; but the ultimate Śābda-bodha will be Candratva-prakāraka only; in other words, the 'Mukha' will be cognised in the guise of 'Candra' but not as 'Mukha', and this difference between the Padārthopasthiti and Śābda-bodha, as expressed above, is the result of Lakṣaṇā-jñāna. There is a second group of scholars who opine that even after the Lakṣaṇā-jñāna the Śābda-bodha will be Mukhatva-prakāraka-bodha which is effected by Vyañjanā, caused by Ekapadopātta-tva. According to both of these theories, there will be the cognition of the Mukhatva, and Candratva directly where as in Sāropasthala the Candratva is cognised indirectly through 'Candra-sadṛśa', which is taken as the differenciating factor between the Sāropa and the Sādhyavasāna. Thus the Śābda-bodha in 'Candra-rājī', is 'चन्द्रत्ववान् मुखत्ववांश्च मुखपदार्थः" । But according to Ālaṅkārikas the Mukhatva is completely hidden by Candratva just like the Śuktitva at the time of Rajatatva-Jñāna and so there can be no cognition of the same in

the Śābda-bodha. According to this, difference between Sāropā and the Sādhyavasānā is that the Mukhatva is cognised in the former where as it is not cognised in the latter.

As can be seen from the above pages, the discussion that is introduced by PR. on the nature and scope of the two Vṛttis i.e. the Abhidhā and Lakṣaṇā is quite exhaustive, based on sound reasoning and clear exposition, at times terse and pointed. He finds nothing new to add to what has already been said about the Dhvani and therefore proceeds to take up the next important topic, Alaṅkāras.

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